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Chapter I
Introduction
.'.!'.!~.~: Burgeonin~ Phenomenon

.£!.

Small Group

~

.~·-

There is no denying the phenomenon of the growing use of small group
methods as the vehicle of learning and growth experiences.

Popular articles

referring directly or indirectly to "sensitivity training" and "encounter"
groups have recently made their appearance in newspapers and national
magazines (e.g. Anonymous, 1968; McLuhan, 1967; Williams, 1968), and for years
now business leaders have been interested in small group laboratories as
means of improving managerial skills, human relations acuity, and productivity
in their organizations (Benne, 1964; Blake & Mouton, 1964, 1965; Campbell &
Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967).

The small group approach to problems in

education (Fox & Lippitt, 1964) and in the wider community (Klein, 1965) is
also on the rise.
The overly enthusiastic are claiming that all things can oe done through
groups.

Individuals flock to sensitivity-training laboratories or "encounter"

groups looking for a

v~riety

psychotherapy to fellowship.

of self-actualization experiences, from hard-core
Morton Lieberman is currently studying the small,

self-actualization group phenomenon on the West coast.

In one comparatively

small city (population 50,000) he has discovered over 200 self-actualization
groups of various kinds (private communication).

It would also seem that

we are witnessing merely the beginning of this phenomenon, for the idea of
growth-through-groups has just begun to catch the public imagination.
Organizations in toe turmoil of change are looking eagerly (or

bele~~uredly)

to sensitivity training for some sort of help, if not salvation.

Practitioner.
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arise all around, ·many of them with doubtful qualifications, and still the
supply does not seem to approach the_ demand.

Indeed, the professional

community stands aghast at the number of non-professionals who have taken up
the mantle of "trainer."

House (1967) expresses his concern over what is

taking place in business and industry:
The issue is one of some concern at thi~ moment, because there are
training directors, personnel managers, business consultants, and
members of business school faculties not trained in psychological
practice, who nevertheless engage in T-Group training. Are they
perhaps getting beyond the area in which they are trained, and
might they not evoke anxieties or problems which they are not
capable of recognizing or handling? (pp. 26-27)
The problem may oe even more acute outside business settings, for in these
cases group experiences have an even greater similarity to group psychotherapy.
Yet, despite the lack of qualified trainers, few professionals are engaged in
the work of training trainers.

This problem is not unlike the problem of

"lay" therapists which. will be discussed more directly below.
A striking amount of at least informal experimentation with small groups
is going on, experimentation which is outside the pale of the group-dynamics
sub-division of social psychology and which includes both "normal" and
psychiatric populations--from the sensory awareness experiments at the Esalen
· Institute (Gunther, 1968} and the self-actualization explorations of Herbert
Otto and associates (19661 to Mowrer' s "Integrity-training" groups (1964,
1968); from the molar experimentation of such psychotherapeutic communities as
Daytop Village (Shelly & Bassin, 1965) and Synanon (Casriel, 1963; Maslow,
1967; Yablonsky, 1962, 1965) doing pioneer work with "sociopathic personalitie's" to the more molecular experimentation with groups in university
"laboratories"; from the organization-oriented laboratory approach delineated
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in such works as

~Managerial

.Q.!.!i (Blake & Mouton, 1964) to the human-

relations, personal-growth, connnunity-relations, higher-education, and
conflict-management laboratories sponsored by the National Training
Laboratories (Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964) and the more "self-actualization"
exploration of Rogers (Hall, 1967; Rogers, 1967}, Bugental (1965), and
Thomas (1964, 1967).
~research ~P?blication ~·

If one looks for it, there is a fairly

extensive literature on small group laboratory learning (e.g. Blake & Mouton,
1961, 1964; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Campbell & Dunnette, 1968; Craig

& Bittel, 1967; House, 1967; Miles, 1959, 1964; Schein & Bennis, 1965b;
Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961, to mention but a few).

At least one

journal covers the field more or less directly (The Journal E.!_ 'Applied
Behavioral Science} and some articles are beginning to appear in other
journals.

But, with few exceptions, what has been published concerning

laboratory learning in general and especially what has been written specifically about sensitivity training has not yet made its way into the mainstream of psychological thinking.

The practice of sensitivity training has

outrun both theoretical formulation and organized research, and the resulting
turmoil has made many behavioral scientists look upon the whole field of
laboratory learning with suspicion and the sub-specialty of sensitivity
training with. outright hostility (a colleague of mine in counseling an
undergraduate psychology major as to the advisability of counting a
laboratory course in sensitivity training as part of his program remarked to
the young man:

''We don't give credit for love-ins") •

Despite the fact

that Schein and Bennis (1965b) render "particular thanks to Leland Bradford
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and Kenneth_ Benne whose efforts over the years to nurse the delicate child
of laboratory training have now produced a robust viable adult" (p. viii),
it seems that in many ways that we are still dealing with the problems of an
..

~-

infant offspring of an adolescent science.

Indeed, one of the strongest

motivations underlying the writing of this book is the desire to put some
order into one particularly chaotic area of laboratory

learning~the

use of

the small group as a vehicle of personal and interpersonal growth, or, if
you wish, a kind of psychotherapy or self-actualization or growth experience
for the relatively normal.

This I call "sensitivity training."

I do not

think that the term "sensitivity training" is a particularly happy one, for
it has too many negative connotations for some, while for others it means
so many things that it means nothing.

But, since the tei:m is with us for

better or for worse, and since it will be used with some frequency in the
pages that follow, it is essential to give it some kind of exact meaning.
Toward !!.'Definition of Sensitivity Training
The distinction between

~~boratory

learning and sensitivity training.

It is not my purpose here to present an extended treatment of laboratory
training, for Bradford, Giob, and Benne (1964) and Schein and Bennis (1965b)
have already provided us with excellent overviews of this field.

However,

since I define laboratory training or learning as a genus of which sensitivity
training is a species, and since it is the purpose of this hook to delineate
one particular approach to sensitivity training, it is necessary first briefly
to point out the essentials of laboratory training and secondly to situate
sensitivity training in this context.

For it is only against such a back-

ground that it is possible to formulate a specific approach to sensitivity
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training.
,The

'g~m1~:

'l~i&otaton

't:Faining.

Someone once said that it is better to

feel compunction that to know how to define it.

This sentiment, paraphrased

and applied to laboratory learning, might read:

it is easier to experience

laboratory training than to describe it.

Buchanan (1964) provides a rather

compact statement describing the nature of laboratory training:
Training approaches meriting the name of laboratory (or T-Group)
utilize (1) a face-to-face, largely unstructured group as a
primary vehicle for learning, (2) planned activities involving
interaction between individuals and/or between groups, (3) systematic and frequent feedback and analysis of information regarding
what happened in the here-and-now and what effect it had,
(4) dilenunas or problems for which 'old ways' of behaving for
most of the participants do not provide effective courses of
action (and thus for which innovative or 'search' behavior is
required), and (5} generalization, or reformulation of concepts
and values based upon the analysis of direct experience (p.
).
Schein and Bennis (1965c) outline some of the difficulties encountered in any
attempt to write about it:
Many attempts have been made to characterize the nature of
laboratory training, but most of them have not been successful
for several reasons: (l) laboratories vary tremendouslx in
goals, training design, delegate population, length, setting,
making it difficult to describe this experience in general;
(2) laboratories attempt to provide a total and integrated
learning experience for the participants, making it difficult
to communicate in written words the interdependence of the many
separate aspects of the laboratory training design; (3) laboratories intend to provide the opportunity for the participants
to explore the interdependence of emotional and intellectual
learning. It is difficult without observing the process firsthand to describe and understand the nature of this emotional
learning and its meaning to the learner (p. 10).
With this caution, one may proceed to outline the elements which are common
to most, if not all, laboratory experiences.
(a)
laborator

Learning through actual experience
ex eriences

~n

the small sroup.

the most im ortant learnin

In most

1 ace thrN1gh
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the interactions that take place in the small face-to-face, conversation group
itself.

Learning may also take place through side-reading, lectures or

lecturettes, and various "exercises" which focus in on various aspects of
..

--

the group experience, but this learning is adjunctive and is important to
the degree that it leads to and enhances the quality of interactions in the
t-group itself ("t" for "training").

The most important "input" during group

sessions is the behavior of the participants themselves.

Therefore, all

laboratory experiences have a strong "here-and-now" flavor, and experiences
outside the laboratory are considered valuable only to the degree that
they can make some more or less direct contribution to the interactions
taking place in the t-group.

The participants are learning how to learn

from the behavior that they themselves produce during group sessions.
(b}

A ciimate'of
...--- experimentation.

Theoretically, if the

group

experience is to have an impact on behavior outside the laboratory, if it is
to make a difference in day-to-day living, then it must be different from
day-to-day experience.

Interactions must in some way dramatize the overlooked

dimensions of the kinds of behavior that are the focus of the laboratory, e.g.
managerial styles, group decision-making, interpersonal rela.ting, etc.
Therefore, participants are encouraged to "experiment" with their behavior
during the laboratory, that ·is, to attempt "new" forms of behavior, kinds
of behavior that up to the present have not characterized a person's "style."
Another way of putting this is to say that the laboratory possesses a degree
of behavioral freedom which is not always found in real life situations
outside the laboratory.

The laboratory provides the participants a kind of

"cultural permission" to engage

in (hopefully responsible) forms of
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behavior which the cons·truction of their "back-home" environment do not allow.
In fact, some of the exercises introduced during the laboratory are designed
to shake tlie participants out of routine ways of acting.

Admittedly, all of

this can arouse a certain degree of anxiety, but anxiety itself, if kept
within limits, becomes a stimulus to new forms of behavior.
(c) ·Group

~·

The group has to be small enough to allow each

participant the opportunity to contribute to the interaction of the group, but
it must be large enough to allow the participants to "space" their contributions, not just according to the demands of the group, but also according to
individual needs and capabilities.

If the group is too small, each member

is constantly "on call''; if the group is too large, then it is too easy for
any one individual to hide in the crowd.

It seems also that the group must

be of a certain size if such factors as heterogeneity of contribution,
diversity of opinion, coalition formation and other variables are to become
optimally productive (in terms of learning}.

Another way of viewing group

size is to say that the group should be large enough so that the absence of
one or two members does not debilitate the group and still small enough so
that such absences are felt.

In practice groups range in size from about

eight to about twelve or fourteen members, but optimal size is determined to
a large extent by the nature of the group and its goals.
(d)

Feedback.

Group members not only engage in certain kinds of

behavior, hut, at the same time, they, both individually and corporately,
try to reflect on the behavior in which they are engaged.

The behavior itself

(e. g·. problem..,.solving work sessions, group decision-making conferences,
lllanagerial planning sessions·, discussion of interpersonal problems, etc.) is

--------------------------------·:-"'~····-~--~
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part of the "input'" of the laboratory experience.

Given this behavioral

input, the laboratory provides opportunities for both giving and receiving
feedback with respect to "input" behavior, that is, the group "processes" its
,.~-

own behavior as a group and the behavior of the individuals in the group.
All behavior is subjected to scrutiny in terms of the group culture and the
group's goals, but "process:" variables are subjected to particular scrutiny.
'!Process" variaoles are such factors as:

who speaks to whom and in what

manner, the frequency of a person's contributions, what coalitions take place
and how, whether the group atmosphere is one of cooperation, neutrality, or
competition, who are the cooperators, the neutrals, the competitors, and
other such variables.
(e}

Leader~!t:tp.

In laboratory experiences the leader is usually called

a "trainer" (though some prefer the term "facilitator") and acts as a resource
person for the group rather than an authoritarian figure who imposes preconceived goals and types of interaction on the group.

Seashore (1968) puts

it well when he says that the "staff person's role is to facilitate the
examination and understanding of the experiences in the group.

He helps

participants to focus on the way the group is working, the style of the
individual's participation, or the issues that are facing the group" (p. 1).
As a participant..,-observer, the trainer

attempts to reveal to the group its

own dynamics as it moves through various stages of group life.

In practice

there is a wide variety of leadership styles; trainers differ quite markedly
with respect to such variables as frequency of intervention, "directive"
tend'encies, degree of self-involvement and self-revelation, depth of
confrontation, etc.

Jl'inally, one of the reasons he is called a "trainer" is
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that he is "training" group members to participate in his role of participantobserver; the participants, in one way or another, learn from him how to
observe what is happening in the group.
(f)

Communication and emotion.

In almost every laboratory, one of the

principal emphases is the network of problems centering around intragroup
communication processes.

It is learned, often painfully, that it is

impossible to deal with issues on a purely intellectual level, even though
the laboratory might concern itself with a highly "intellectual" area such as
problem-solving.

As Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note, any attempt to ignore

human relations issues is self-defeating:
Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward
group productivity as meeting problems posed by taskenvironmental obstacles; in fact, because group members have
a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interpersonal
obstacles may be the major barrier to task effectiveness in
many groups (p. 88).
This does not mean that laboratory training is directly psychotherapeutic.
Rather personal and interpersonal problems are dealt with insofar as they
inhibit free communication within the group and stand in the way of the
group's achieving its goals.

In laboratory experiences, therefore, while

emotional issues are not ordinarily the primary concern of the participants
(though they may be}, neither are they ignored but rather dealt with to the
extend called for by the goals of·the group.

In the laboratory experience

to be outlined in the following chapters, a laboratory experience in which
self-actualization and interpersonal growth are the principal goals, emotional
issues are one of the principal focuses of the group.
(g)
lowerin

Support.

A laboratory is an opportunity for the responsible

of defenses which tend to rigidify the personality and distort
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reality.

But if the laboratory, directly or indirectly, calls for dealing

with certain issues, e.g. emotional issues, it must also provide a climate of
support conducive to dealing with these issues.
many laboratories fail:

This is one area in which

they demand anxiety-arousing behavior from the

participants and yet do not provide adequate security measures.

This

problem will be dealt with below in the chapter on supportive behavior.
(h)

Ambiguity.

The average laboratory experience possesses a good

deal of built-in ambiguity.

The articulated goals of the laboratory are

usually so general that one of the major perceptions of the participants is
what Benne (1964) calls a "perception of goallessness" (p. 217), and, since
the trainer, true to his non-directive approach, does little to clarify either
goals or procedure, the participants, amid mounting anxiety, thrash around
looking for viable ways of interacting with one another.
(1965c) picture the situation in these terms:

Schein and Bennis

"The goals are unclear, the

training staff provides minimal cues •••• The general absence of expectations
creates an unstructured, i.e., ambiguous situation.

This serves to upset old

routines and behavioral grooves and to open up new possibilities for the
delegates" (p. 44).

In the opinion of Schein and Bennis, "the ambiguous and

unstructured situation creates a need to define and organize the environment"
(p. 31).

Each laboratory will possess its own degree of ambiguity, which

will be marked or minimal in keeping with the nature of the laboratory and its
goals.

There seems to be a tendency in the

literature to consider a rather

high degree of ambiguity as essential to laboratory learning.

However, in my

opinion, excessive ambiguity often works counter to the principal goals
some laboratories and should, therefore, be mitigated or eliminated.

~f

Again,
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this question will be dealt with separately below.
(i)

~

seneral goals

.£!.

laboratory training.

Since there are many

different kinds of laboratories, the specific goals of laboratory training
..

will also differ.

~-

However, certain general goals which would apply to most

laboratory experiences lll8.Y be outlined, although the literature is slow to
speak in any extended way about even .the general goals of laboratory learning
(e.g. Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964).

Schein and Bennis (1965a), however,

claim that there "seems to be general agreement about the goals of laboratory
training," and suggest the following:

"(l) self-insight, or some variation of

learning related to increased self-knowledge, (2) understanding the conditions
which inhibit or facilitate group functioning, (3) understanding interpersonal
operations in groups, and (4) developing skills for diagnosing individual,
group, and organizational behavior" (p. 35).

Most professionals engaged in

laboratory training would probably maintain that all goals, both general and
specific, must remain flexible and that it is of the essence of laboratory
learning to allow the group to create its own goals and to move in fruitful,
though perhaps unexpected, directions.
(j)

Exercises.

Different kinds of exercises are used in most

laboratories to stimulate participation, introduce "missing" elements into
the group experience, and highlight different aspects of participant behavior.
For instance, individual members might be given a problem to solve.
they have reached an answer and have indicated the degree

of .

1·

:

·:

Once
nty they

have with respect to the answer, they are placed in small groups (e.g. in
threes) in which members have different answers.

They then discuss the

problem and must eventually come up with a single answer.

Finally, once the
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nnswer has been presented, the members discuss how they worked toward
achieving consensus in.the group, what emotional problems arose, etc.
F.xercises may be either verbal or non-verbal.

In groups which focus on self-

actualization processes and emotional issues there is a tendency to rely more
heavily on non-verbal exercises.

These will be discussed in greater detail

below in Chapter VII.
(k)

Laboratory populations.

For the most part, participants are drawn

from normal rather than psychiatric populations.

However, special laboratory

techniques have been used with psychiatric populations (Morton, 1965) and
with a good deal of success (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle and Moyer,
1965).

Mowrer's (1967, 1968) and Mainord's (1967) approaches to group

psychotherapy have laboratory features and undoubtedly further explorations
in the use of laboratory methods with psychiatric populations will take
place.
(1)

Differences in laboratory experiences.

Given the unstructured

nature of laboratory experiences, it is not strange to note that even among
laboratories with the same specific goals there are great differences.

It is

quite obvious that the focus of learning for a group of executives or managerial personnel from the same organization engaged in a laboratory dealing with
managerial styles and their relationship to the interaction between intraorganizational human relations variables and productivity will be quite
different from the focus of learning in a university laboratory course in
group dynamics in which the participants are interested in learning about
the nature and dynamics of small groups by actually becoming a group.

What

is not quite so obvious is the fact that strikingly different kinds of growth
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and learning can take place in similar groups participating in similar
laboratories in the same residential center.

Exactly what is learned or what

kind of growth takes place depends on the style of leadership, the peculiar
nature of each group, and the goals that it creates for itself as it moves
through the laboratory experience.

Investigations of molar activity have

always been difficult for the behavioral sciences, but research in the area
of laboratory training is even more difficult because of the diversities
outlined here.
Sensitivity training:

!!. species of laboratory learning.

The distinction

about to be made is not current or at least not emphasized, to the best of my
knowledge, in the literature, but it governs the use of the terms "laboratory
learning" and "sensitivity training" throughout this book.

I am aware that

some will find the definition of "sensitivity-training" used here too
restrictive, but I believe that the term must be defined and "restricted" if
it is to be used in any technical way.

Sensitivity training, as understood

here, is a particular kind of laboratory learning in which intrapersonal and
interpersonal issues

~the

direct focus of the group.

Other goals, such as

learning about group processes and developing skills for diagnosing group and
organizational behavior, are not eliminated, but they are incidental and,
therefore, subordinated to the goal of dealing with personal and interpersonal
deficiencies and potentialities.

Frankly, I prefer other terms to describe

this kind of laboratory experience--e.g. a self-actualization and interpersonal-growth experience, a laboratory in basic human relations, a laboratory
in interpersonal relations.

Since these terms are less "loaded," I will fre-

quently use them instead of "sensitivity training."
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A sensitivity laboratory provides its members with a unique opportunity
for responsible learning about themselves on intrapsychic and interpersonal
levels.

Admittedly, 111ost laboratory experiences, whatever their specific goals

have "sensitivity" dimensions, that is, while the principal focus may be
learning about the dynamics of an organization, managerial styles, or group
processes, still the climate is such as to sustain and even demand a certain
amount of examination of personal and interpersonal issues, especially insofar
as such issues are interrelated with other aspects of the laboratory.

House

(1967) points to this interrelationship as one of the reasons why trainers
should be competent in the area of clinical psychology:
Many of the T~Group properties deal with complex psychological
and sociological variables. The T-Group is designed to induce
anxieties and to stimulate interpersonal feedback, introspection,
and self-evaluation. Although some may claim that the T-Group
is not therapeutic, within the latit~de of T-Group emphasis are
methods which closely approximate methods utilized in overtly
therapeutic processes. This being the case, I believe it is
imperative that T-Group leaders have psychological training equivalent to that required for professional clinical psychology (p. 26).
What Schein and Bennis (l965a) conceptualize as "meta-goals" of laboratory
training "rarely articulated by the trainer"--such goals as a spirit of inquiry
(especially into oneself and one's interpersonal living), expanded consciousness and choi.ce, authenticity in interpersonal relations, collaboration with
other group members, and conflict resolution through rational means--these I
see as more direct goals of sensitivity training and see no reason why they
should not be suggested or in some way "articulated" by the trainer.

One of

the purposes of this study is to show how the elements of laboratory learning
outlined above apply to sensitivity training in genernl and particularlv to
the contract approach to interpersonal growth formulated here.
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~sychotherapy

i£E ~Normal?

If sensitivity training in the strict sense deals directly with such
intrapersonal and interpersonal issues as personal and interpersonal
deficiencies and potentialities and only indirectly with group process and
organization variables, then how does sensitivity training, so defined, differ
from group psychotherapy?

This is certainly a valid, although complex

question, but some of its complexities must be dealt with in order to provide
a meaningful context and rationale for any kind of sensitivity training.
There is a!!!. facto demand among "normals" for sensitivity experiences, and
this demand seems to be growing.

In order to understand this phenomenon

(if it is not just a fad), it is necessary to investigate the whole question

of unused human potential.
~ "psychopathology£!.~

average."

Early in the history of modern

psychology William James remarked that few men bring to bear more than about
ten percent of their human potential on the problems and challenges of human
living.

Others since Ja111es have in one way or another said substantially the

same thing, and, amazingly enough, few if any, have challenged these statements
"Unused human potential" has even become the war cry of "humanistic"
psychologists and humanistically oriented behavioral scientists and philosophers (e.g. Allport, 1955; Buber, 1937; Jourard, 1963, 1964, 1968; Laing, 1960;
Maslow, 1968; May, 1958, 1960; Moustakes, 1956; Mowrer, 1964; Murphy, 1958;
Otto, 1966; Rogers, 1961; Van Kaam, 1960; Wheelis, 1958, 1960, to mention but
a few).

It is contended here that the problem of unused human potential

"outweighs"
.
the problem of emotional disorder, even though elsewhere it has
been rightly claimed that in terms of social welfare and national economy
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r.cntal illness is our most serious public health problem (Schofield, 1964).
The problem of unused human resources. is not as dramatic as the problem of
emotional disorder and it is not a "public health" problem, but, while it
...

-

docs not have the same visibility as mental health problems, it certainly is
one of the major problems of public welfare and moreover it is much more
pervasive than the problem of "mental illness."

The problem of unused human

potential is one that affects every man.
Maslow (1968) remarks that "what we call 'normal' in psychology is
really a psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread
that we don't even notice it ordinarily" (p. 16).

Perhaps too much energy

has been poured into the task of moving men from a state of "mental illness"
to a state of "mental health," while not nearly enough energy has been
expended on the task of moving the "mentally healthy" in the direction of
self-actualization.

Mental health, if it is understood in an analogy with

physical health, is like air-conditioning.

Air-conditioning does not cause

pleasure (except by initial contrast or as a status symbol).
relief.

It gives

It renders a person's environment neutral and thus allows him the

opportunity to make better use of his human potentiality, if he so desires.
Traditionally the task of devising ways of developing a "normal" man's
potentialities is the province of education in the broadest

sense.

Despite

the theoretical importance of education, however, there is evidence to suggest
that formal education has failed to serve the function of unfettering human
potentiality (e.g. Jacob, 1957; Miles, 1964; Rogers, 1961, Chapter 13).

For

example, creativity among students, far from being encouraged, is often seen
(or rather

felt) as the proverbial thorn (Guilford, 1962; Holland, 1'961).

In
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fact, some advance the thesis that education, at least as it exists on
primary and secondary levels in this.country, is primarily an instrument of
conformity rather than liberation (Friedenburg, 1963).
The problem of the "psychopathology of the average" must be attacked at
its roots if there is to be any widespread success in dealing with it.
Limbacher (1967a, 1967b) has suggested a training program in mental health
for grammar school students.

While this program has a preventive-mental-

health orientation rather than one of self-actualization, he at least realizes
that emotional education simply must accompany intellectual education in the
school system itself.

Limbacher's program, as it stands now, seems too

didactic and overly insight-oriented.

Laboratory-learning approaches and

sensitivity-like experiences would seem more suited to children of that age.
Steinzor (1968) looks forward to the day when "the. curriculum of our public
and private institutions, from the earliest grades on, will have made the
language of honest, warm dialogue a required part of general education" (p. 9).
Full interpersonal living depends upon a person's ability to involve himself
effectively, even creatively, with others, but this does not "just happen,"
nor is it a question of some having the "gift" of creativity in human
relationships while others are devoid of it.

People have to learn how to

become present to others in more fully human ways. ·But strangely enough, until
recently at least, people have not thought it worthwhile to teach children
(and adults) how to involve themselves with others.
strange in this regard:

Our school system is

children spend an enormous amount of time doing things

next' to, instead of with, others.

Our society teems with this kind of

"parallel" learning just as it does with "parallel" living.

Therefore, it is
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essential to find ways, from the earliest years of education of putting people
into more effective human contact with one another.

Interpersonal growth

experiences such as sensitivity-training laboratories are showing us that
people can actually learn how to live with themselves and with others more
effectively.

Human relations learning is perhaps the most important kind

of learning that can take place, but, paradoxically, it is the most neglected.
I

imagine that it has been presumed that such learning occurs more or less

"naturally" outside the.more formal classroom situation, whereas most often
it does not, or if it does, not to such an extent that we can claim that the
~ajority

of persons reaching adulthood can be considered self-actualized on

:m interpersonal level.

D-needs, M-needs, and B-needs.

Maslow (1968) sees

the origin of neurosis

in a person's ''being deprived of certain satisfactions which I called needs in
the same sense that water and amino acids and calcium are needs, namely that
their absence produces illness" (p. 21).

Some of these basic needs are needs

for "safety, for belongingness and identification, for close love relationships
and for respect and prestige" (p. 21).
iency").
growth.

These are D-needs ("D" for "defic-

Such needs, if, unfulfilled, stand in the way of further human
Counter to D-needs are the B-needs ("B" for "_Being") of the person

whose D-needs have been more or les~ adequately satisfied but who still feels
within himself a drive toward further self-actualization,

For instance, a

person can feel within himself a need for B-love rather than D-love.

D-love

is "deficiency-love, love need, selfish love" (p. 42); it is possessive and.
always characterized by a rather marked degree of anxiety-hostility.

B-love,

\

on the other hand, is "love for the Being of another person, uneeding love,
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unselfish love" (p. 42); it is non-possessive, can never be sated, and
possesses a minimum (almost non-existent) degree of anxiety-hostility.

"B-

lovers are more independent of each other, more autonomous, less jealous and
threatened, less needful, more individual, more disinterested, but also
simultaneously more eager to help the other toward self-actualization, more
proud of his triumphs, more altruistic, generous and fostering" (p. 43).
I believe, however, that another category, M-needs ("M" for "maintenance"), might be added to Maslow' s schema.

While many men might not be

grappling with marked D-problems, they still have not moved on to any
significant pursuit of B-values, at least in certain key areas of life such
as interpersonal relating.
"maintenance" functions.

Rather most of their energies are poured into
Such men work adequately, but more of ten than not

it is at uninteresting jobs; their home lives are rather "neutral," neither

hotbeds of neurotic interaction nor centers of interpersonal stimulation;
they profess certain religious values, but these values are ritualistic and
restraining, holding them back for "doing wrong" rather than impelling them
to involve themselves more creatively in their communities.

Such men exhd us t

their energies in M-functions, and there is relatively ~othing left over for
B-functions.

Perhaps Phillips (1956) would include those who spend a dispro-

portionate amount of time carrying out "M-functions in the term "normally
,unadjusted adults" in whom, as he notes, the avoidance gradient (preoccupation
With defense mechanisms) is not the primary concern, but rather the approach
gradient (the inertia that keeps them from the work of self-actualization).
Sensitivity-training populations versus psychiatric populations.

It

would be simple to state that sensitivity training is not group psychotherapy
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since the laboratory population is a "normal" rather than a "diseased" one
(although, as noted above, laboratory methods are beginning to be applied to
group psychotherapy) •

This, however, would overlook certain important issues •
...

-

First of all, it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish with
complete accuracy between "normal" and "psychiatric" populations.

Burton

(1965) points out that studies of the "non-diseased" offer
the possibly novel thesis ••• that the psychically diseased and
the non-diseased are not such polar opposites as we had formerly
believed--that the existence of th~ diseased and non-diseased is
fundamentally the same and differs only in the mode of being-inthe-world, i.e., in the expression of their humanness. Both
have similar problems of being man, feel despair the same way ••••
Possibly only the crucial intensity of existence in each differs
from time to time, and the historical and contemporaneous way
in which the human condition is met (p. 384-:385).
Schofield (1964) would certainly sympathize with such a thesis, for he believes
that the "psychiatrist has frequently expanded the· domain of mental illness to
include all degrees and kinds of psychological distress, failing to appreciate
that the human suffers some pains not because he is sick but because he is
human" (p. 146).

Hendin, Gaylin, and Carr (1965) in a study of the "non-patient" also ·
find difficulty with traditional ways of categorizing the "mentally ill"
.:J.nd the "men tally well" ;

It is apparent that the distinction between patient and nonpatient is not the same as between sick and well. The
discrepancy between how these individuals [the subjects of the
study] and any textbook description of 'healthy' or 'ideal'
adjustment is striking. The interesting question then arises
as to what integrative forces permit individuals to function,
often with purpose and adaptation, constructively and
.Productively, in spite of underlying difficulties •..• It is
somewhat disconcerting that in the present study the nurse
whom the interviewer described as one of the most disturbed
girls was also described as 'dramatic and engaging,' while
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the 'colorlessness' of one of the most normal of the group led
the interviewer to speculate on how depressing it would be if
this is what constitutes 'normality' (pp. 105-106).
Maslow (1962) and Rogers (1961, 1963) have also been studying "normal" groups
...

-

in an effort to establish a baseline for psychotherapeutic treatment.
A total re-evaluation of the fruitfulness of the "medical model" in
dealing with problems of living is taking place (e.g. Ellis, 1967; Kanfer and
Saslow, 1965; Sarbin, 1967; Scheff, 1966; Szasz, 1960, 1961; Werry, 1968).

As Schofield (1964) notes, "the total case load of those who are mentally and
emotionally diseased is composed primarily of persons who are neither in need
of, nor responsive to, specific medication, surgery, hospitalization, or other
physical regiments" (p. 1) •

Given such turmoil in the "healing guild," it

would seem unwise to characterize any kind of sensitivity training as a
"psychotherapy" for the "normal," even though there are definite similarities
between the two experiences.

Even though many people stand in aware of or

are afraid of the term "psychotherapy," there is nothing mystic about it.
Psychotherapy is a human growth experience that usually takes place in some
kind of relational context (just as a laboratory in interpersonal relations
is a human growth experience that takes place in a relational context).

The

therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy,
responsible confrontation, concreteness) and patient variables (e.g. openness,
a willingness to experiment with self-exploration and other forms of growthful
behavior) that characterize good psychotherapy do not differ dramatically from
the trainer and participant variables that characterize a good laboratory in
interpersonal relations.

However, the purpose of sensitivity training may

be explained in terms of the D-, M-, and B-needs of relatively "normal"
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populations (the application of sensitivity procedures to psychiatric
populations defined as such is another question).
Sensitivity training in terms of D-, M-, and B-needs.

It is unrealistic

to suppose that participants in sensitivity training experiences should be
limited to those in whom D-needs are no longer active factors and.whose energies are not tied up in M-functions, so that the laboratory might center
around B-needs, B-values, and B-functions exclusively.

Bugental (1965)

attempted to set up such a laboratory, terming it "Advanced Sensitivity
Training."

Members were chosen because of "functional excellence" in vocation,

marriage, and friendship relations, because they manifested an observing and.
curious ego, because they gave evidence of possessing adequate tolerance for
psychic stress arising from ambiguity, intrapsychic conflict, interpersonal
conflict and uncertainty and risk, and finally because they were highly
motivated for group interaction.

But, while everything looked fine on paper,

things did not work out as well in practice:
Our hope to selection a group freer than usual of the deterrents
of psychic disturbance was in vain. The group was a fairly
typical selection of twelve functional, reasonably socially
effective people who nevertheness were beset by a clear range
of emotional interferences with their functioning.
We, as trainers, were seveJEi.y handicapped in attempting to
give primary emphasis to positive forces in the participants'
personalities by our own unresolved neurotic components and by
our years of training and experience which have been largely
in the frame of reference of psychopathology and dealing with
deficiency motivations. Time and again we found ourselves
most active in the familiar ways of pointing to interferences
and distortions and least effective in facilitating growth,
venturing, and creativity.
The participants, as faithful products of their culture and
personal histories, seemed to be more ready to recognize and deal
with that which was negative and pathologic within themselves
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and unsure and self-conscious about the positive and creative (p. 112).
sensitivity training purports to deal with the whole man, and every man, it
would seem, even those most engaged in B-functions, must grapple to some
extent with D-needs and the proportion of his life taken up with M-functions,
and this is a lifelong task.
If a sensitivity laboratory were composed principally of participants
with unresolved D-needs, then such a group would be much more similiar to a
traditional outpatient psychotherapy group than to the groups envisioned in
this book.

Slater (1966) even claims that "members of groups with which I am

familiar benefit in inverse proportion to their therapeutic need 11 (p. 253) ,
though it would be difficult to validate such a statement given the difficulties involved in measuring both

11

benefit" and

11

therapeutic need."

Be that as

it may, sensitivity groups, as dealt with in the literature and here, are
usually made up of participants with a mixture of D-problems, various degrees
of M-function over-involvement, and B-aspirations and skills.

For very few

of the participants, however, are D-needs the over-riding interactional
concern during group sessions; still, on the other hand, few, if any, of the
participants express no D-concerns.

Therefore, in almost all sensitivity

?roups some time is spent in hunting down the sources of intrapersonal and
interpersonal "noise-in-the-system. 1 '

Or, as Bugental (1965) puts it, ''much

of the typical sensitivity-training program and most of psychotherapy have
been concerned with exposing and (hopefully) overcoming those forces within
individuals which limit their abilities to fully realize their potentialities"
(p. 107).

A more important focus in sensitivity groups is M-involvernent, or rather
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M-over-involvement.

In fact, it is principally the person who is overcommitted

to M-operations in his personal and interpersonal living who is the victim
of the "psychopathology of the average."

In a laboratory in interpersonal

relations, the participants can expect to be challenged to move beyond mere
M-concerns in their interpersonal living.
And so, the sensitivity-training laboratory concerns itself with the

o-,

M-, and B-concerns of its participants, but the proportion of time and

energy spent on each set of concerns, whether in the case of an individual
participant or the group as a whole, depends on the composition of the group
and the directions in which the group moves.

D-, M-, and B-concerns are interactive.

Also, it must be recognized that

For instance, over-involvement in

M-activity might lead to frustration and D-reactions •.

Or a participant might

discover that experimentation with some kind of B-activity, such as practicing
new ways of being responsibly present to the other members of the group, might
eliminate some D-symptom such as psychosomatic distress.
~Contract-Interpersonal-Growth-Group

It is against the somewhat confused and ill-defined background of
laboratory learning and sensitivity training that this study is written, a

!

study that purports to establish a methodology for a particular kind of
sensitivity-training group, called, somewhat ungracefully, a "contract-interpersonal-growth group."
Ways in which the "contract-group" differs from "traditional" sensitivitv
!raining.

The contract-group has a much higher degree of structure and a

much' higher degree of "visibility" (the opposite of ambiguity) than do
traditional sensitivity-training groups.

First of all, prospective partici-
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pants realize what kind of experience they are about to undergo, for the major
features of the contract-experience are outlined for them, either by lecture
or in writing (e.g. a pamphlet explaining the experience more or less fully),
..

·-

before or at the time they enter the group.

Once they have an understanding

of the principal features of the proposed laboratory, they are free to enter
the experience or not, but if they do enter, they realize that the laboratory
is going to be conducted as stated in the outline.

Another way of putting

this is that entry into the group takes place "by contract," the description
of the sensitivity experience being the "contract" to which participants
subscribe.

In practice I have found that if the participants freely choose

to participate in a sensitivity-training experience, the contract need not
be explicitly chosen but rather may be "imposed" as the defining structure of
the experience.

For good or ill, this eliminates a good deal of the ambiguity

that is usually associated with the initial stages of the laboratory and also
eliminates the anxiety that results from this ambiguity.

Anxiety, however,

is by no means entirely eliminated, rather its source and focus change.

Once

the participants realize, even in some general way, just what is expected of
them, their anxiety centers around their willingness and their ability to
fulfill the contract.
Secondly, the contract (chapter 2) provides a certain degree of structure ·
for the laboratory; it establishes definite goals (chapter 3) and definite
interactional means to achieve these goals (chapter 6-9); it defines the
kind of leadership that is to characterize the group experience (chapter 5)
and the general "laboratory" orientation of the group (chapter 4); finally,
it points out the principal ways in which participnnts take fli~ht from
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sensitivity experiences and suggests ways in which members might take a stance
against such flight (chapter 10).

The kinds of interaction that are seen as

facilitating growth are self-dis_closure (chapter 6), total human expressing,
including honest expression of feeling and emotion and the non-cliche use
of language to translate oneself to the other members of the group (chapter
7), support (chapter 8), and responsible confrontation (chapter 9).

At first

glance, it might appear that the contract provides too much structure, but in
practice the structure provided by the contract is seen as "facilitating"
rather than "regulating" and provides ample opportunity for both individual
and group initiative.

Therefore, Chapter 2 explains in detail the reasons

for sensitivity-training "by contract" and then subsequent chapters both
explain the provisions of the contract and provide the rationale for
including each provision.
It is not suggested that the contract described here is the only viable
sensitivity-training contract.

Many different kinds of contract could be

set up for laboratories in general and sensitivity training experience in
particular.

The contract
--

g?:oup, therefore, is both a detailed account of a
.•

contract approach to one kind of laboratory experience and also a paradigm
for a wide variety of group experiences.

Contractual provisions for these

experiences will differ, obviously, with differing goals.
"High visibility" and the introduction of a good deal of structure (even
to the definition of the modes of interaction demanded in the group) are
actually rather radical departures from sensitivity-training theory and
practice.
this study.

Their potential value will be one of the principal emphases of
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The parentage of the contract-group:

therapy and group dynamics.

sources of the kind of group process suggested here are many.
models of man described by

Allpor~

The

Of the three

(1962)--man-as-reactive, man-as-reactive-

in-depth, and man-as-a-being-in-the-process-of-becoming--the last has been
the most influential, though the others have not been excluded.

The immediate

stimulus to formulate a methodology for sensitivity training came from my
attempts to puzzle out for myself the difference between "good" and "bad"
group process during t-group meetings of staff members and in group psychotherapy sessions with patients at Galesburg State Research Hospital, Illinois.
I

have drawn on the theoreti.cal formulations and the research findings of

a number of fields:

individual and group psychotherapy, laboratory training,

social psychology in general and group dynamics in particular.

Theory and

research in the area of psychotherapy is very helpful in formulating programs
for laboratories in interpersonal relations for a very definite reason.

The

activities that take place in the context of psychotherapy belong there not
because they are mysteriously identified with the process of therapy but
because they are intense, growthful forms of relating.

For instance, the

client begins to trust the therapist because the latter is genuine, warm, and
accepting.

Because the patient trusts the therapist he is willing to disclose

himself to him, perhaps at some of the deepest levels of his being.

The

therapist responds with understanding and support and perhaps even shares
himself in terms of self-disclosure with the patient.

This kind of relation-

ship is therapeutic because it is fully human, but because it is fully human,
it i~ the kind of relationship that belongs first of all in ordinary human
life and only "secondarily," as it were, perhaps in an intensified form, in
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the context of therapy.

Many of us are afraid of intimacy, of deep human

relations, and we would gladly relegate them to the province of the therapist.
Laboratories in interpersonal re!ations have come into being in order to reintroduce men to deeper relationships, to challenge the fact that the deepest
human relationships may exist only between a client and his therapist.

Much

of the research, then, being done in the area of psychotherapy tells us a
great deal about how to form closer, more growthful relationships with others.
Social psychology, in.that it deals with all forms of human relating, has
much to tell the clinician.

Unfortunately, few clinicians seem to read the

social psychology literature.

Those who reject a universal medical model in

dealing with problems in human living desperately need to know how man relates
to man in all areas of living.

Clinicians frequently tend to see pathology

everywhere because they do not have a sufficient feel for the wide range of
human response found in the "normal" man or at least in the man afflicted only
with the "psychopathology of the average."

Reading in the literature of

social psychology can help counteract this tendency.

This literature is

referred to from time to time in the following pages, but it is just a
beginning.

Since this study deals with groups, it seems only natural to refer to
the group dynamics literature of social psychology.

Even though Lott and

Lott (1965) claim that "since applications of so-called group behavior
principles are often urged in such fields as group psychotherapy, education,
and connnunity relations, it is vital to distinguish beD~een validated and
unvalidated hypotheses ••• " (p. 299, emphasis added), it strikes me that the
failure to make adequate use of "group behavior principles" in the practice of
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group psychotherapy is one of the foremost problems in this field.

Many

group psychotherapists do little more -than conduct individual therapy in
front of an audience, completely failing to place the laws of group inter,.--

action at the service of the therapeutic process.

Some psychotherapists,

principally psychoanalysts, have resisted the application of_principles drawn
from the study of group dynamics to group psychotherapy on certain theoretical
grounds (e.g. Locke, 1961; Lowrey, 1944; Wolf & Schwartz, 1962), while others,
also on theoretical grounds, urge such application (Bach, 1954; Goldstein,
Heller, & Sechrest, 1966; Hunt, 1964; Lorr, 1963; Schneider, 1955).

The

literature on small group dynamics and the literature on group psychotherapy
are the "twain" that have never really met; the group psychotherapist and
the group dynamicist have not been reading each other's literature.

In

self-actualization and interpersonal-growth laboratories the two·fields
converge in a most natural way.

But the literature on sensitivity-training,

even though it has grown out of an education and social psychology oriented
background, still does not make sufficient use of group behavioral principles.
Again, an attempt is made to do just this in the following pages, but it is
only a beginning.

One hope is that interpersonal-growth experiences with

"normals" which utilize principles drawn from both individual and group
psychotherapy, social psychology, and group dynamics will produce research
data which will help clear up the spectacularly confused area of psychotherapy
with the disturbed.

! "theory of method." Rioch (1951) points out that most theories of
psychotherapeutic process are really theories of method, not formulations of
the nature of the process.

The same could be said about most theories dealing
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with the process involved in sensitivity or growth or basic encounter groups.
While the present study is admittedly a "theory of method," it would not be
untrue to say that throughout it there are glimpses of an underlying
formulation of the nature of the "growth" process.

Any attempt to provide

a rationale for including certain interactional variables such as selfdisclosure and confrontation would have to make certain assumptions about the
processes involved in interpersonal growth.
Other contract groups •. The idea of growth-through-contract is hardly a
widespread one.

In the field of psychotherapy, both Mainord (1968) and

Mowrer (1968) exact contracts from prospective patients for the group "growth
experiences" that each conducts.

Mowrer's contract contains three provisions:

the prospective group member must agree (1) to be completely open about
himself to the group with respect to both past and current behavior; (2) to
take responsibility for himself once he enters the group (not to blame)
others for his predicament); and (3) to get involved with the other members
of the group.

Mainord's contract is somewhat similar to Mowrer's.

What is

most noteworthy is the fact that these are some of the first attempts to
introduce a high degree of "visibility" into the psychotherapeutic experience
itself.

In the area of sensitivity training, Bach (1966) has formulated a

kind of contract for a "marathon" group experience.

These "Ten Marathon

Commandments" form a contract which is designed to make the "marathon"
experience, which Bach describes as an "intensification and acceleration of
transparency and genuine encounter by a deliberate instigation of group
pressure focused on behavioral change" (p. 995), even more intense.
"contract" will be discussed in the chapter on confrontation.

Bach's
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TI!! Question of Training Trainers
The question of training effective trainers for laboratory groups and
especially for sensitivity groups parallels a problem in the field of
psychotherapy discussed by Schofield (1964).

Schofield claims that many of

the people flocking to mental health professionals do not suffer from
traditional forms of mental disturbance (such as those delineated in the
American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual), but rather from what he
calls "philosophical neuroses" which are characterized not by specifically
neurotic complaints but by an "absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning,
of the need to search out personal, ultimate values, or of the need to live
comfortably and meaningfully each· day in the face of final uncertainty"
(p. 150).

The "philosophically neurotic," frequently because they can afford

to, monopolize too much of the time of mental health professionals.
Therefore, Schofield calls for a way of increasing "the number of persons who
are adequately skilled and appropriately competent to converse therapeutically"
(p. 3) •

Rioch, Elkes, Flint, Usdansky, Newman, and Silber (1963) took a step in
this direction by training housewives as "mental health counselors."

The

theory is that extensive academic training leading to formal degrees is not
necessary to produce effective counselors, especially when these counselors
work in settings where they are supervised by professionals.

A follow-up

note (Anonymous, 1967) indicates that all of Rioch's trainees (except one who
dropped out because of ~llness) are working successfully in individual therapy,
counseling, or group therapy.
psychology or social work.

Three have gone on to advanced study in

The same note indicates that other centers (e.g.

---------------------------"''
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Johns Hopkins} are presently training non-professionals for work as therapists.

The whole question of who should be doing therapy (and by implication,
conducting laboratories in

inter~~rsonal

relations) is a thorny one:

[I]n the field of psychotherapy, evidence suggests that the most
important determinant of the therapist's effectiveness lies in
his personality, his capacity to empathize with the patient and
to a much lesser extent his actual experience working directly with
patients (Truax & Carkhuff, 1964). It seems that the preclinical
experience such as medical school, Ph.D., School of Social Work,
and other intensive educational procedures are largely irrelevant
in this sphere as currently practiced (Schofield, 1964). What is
even more devastating, according to an informal study conducted
by Meehl, a significant number of practicing psychotherapists,
despite the most intensive of training, are judged by their
colleagues as incompetent or ineffectual. Thus, we must assume
that in the field of psychotherapy (perhaps excluding behavior
therapy), the relevant sphere of knowledge is largely located in
the area of common rather than scientific knowledge. This
assumption is further buttressed by the fact that various studies
suggest that people without the background of mental health
professionals can, after a short period of clinical experience,
achieve a facility in certain kinds of psychotherapy (taking
account of the difficulty of making such evaluations) equals that
of someone with as tortuous and expensive an educational background
as the psychiatrist (Rioch et al., 1963; Poser, 1966) (Werry, 1968,
p. 7).

-

-

In my experience it is the socially intelligent person, the person with a
"feel" for his fellow human beings, that makes the best trainer.
I would hope to see programs similar to training programs for lay

t

;-

therapists instituted for training trainers for sensitivity work.

In fact,

sensitivity training groups seem to be excellent fora in which the problems
of the "philosophically" neurotic can be worked through, and, i f this is the
case, this would relieve some of the pressures under which mental health
professionals are now working.

While few universities have set up programs

for training trainers fo'r laboratory work in general and sensi ti vi ty training

in particular, such university centers would fill a serious lacuna in the
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clinical sector of the behavioral science field.
be

Not only could institutes

set up to train and perhaps to certify trainers (many groups looking for

competent sensitivity trainers have no way of verifying the credentials of
prospective trainers), but desperately needed research programs could also be
established in these centers.

Entrance into such programs should be controlled

so that not just the academically competent but rather those who possess both
academic and social c.ompetence would be accepted for training.

Such programs

could become excellent ways of making "increased use of 'peripheral' resources
such as teachers, clergy, and others" (Schofield, 1964, p. 169).
The Audience to Which This Study is Addressed
At the time of this writing no book deals directly and exclusively with
sensitivity training in the sense in which it has been defined here (a
laboratory experience centering around intrapsychic and interpersonal concerns)
Although the present study outlines a specific approach to a laboratory in
human relations, it deals principally with those variables (self-disclosure,
expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a
response to responsible confrontation) which are found in any group experience
in which self-actualization and interpersonal growth are goals.

This study

has been used as a text in a laboratory course in human relations and as an
adjunctive text in courses in counseling and psychotherapy.

It should be of

interest to anyone who has already participated in or is about to participate
in a laboratory experience with any kind of direct or indirect "sensi u / ~ ty"
orientation.

Finally, anyone interested in interpersonal growth might find

food' for both reflection and action here, for much of what is discussed can
be "experimented" with outside laboratory and group settings.

,.

~
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An Eclectic Approach.
The "theory of method" outlined in this book is clearly eclectic.

While

many of the hypotheses suggesteclare derived from existing psychotherapeutic
approaches, e.g., those of Rogers, London, Schofield, Mowrer, Truax,
Berenson, Carkhuff, Laing, Beier, Ellis, and a number of others, still it is
not a theory of psychotherapy that is elaborated here, but rather an approach
to interpersonal growth designed for populations of normal subjects.

Another

rich source for hypotheses has been the literature in social psychology
which deals with normal human interaction and human behavior in groups.

While

it is not the intent of the author to criticize psychoanalytic concepts or
procedures, still the major psychoanalytic concepts were not considered
germane to this specific approach to interpersonal growth.

Therefore, such

terms as the "unconscious," "libido," "transference," "repression," and the
like are not treated here.

This book focuses on h.uman communication and

the ways in which communication affects other forms of human behavior.

While

it is assumed that learning plays an important part in the elaboration of
behavior patterns, it is not assumed that learning provides an exclusive
explanation of behavior.

Still, a further assumption is that a great deal

of behavioral modification can take place through direct learning and
conscious decision.
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Chapter II
The.Contract
g_roups

~

''Natural"

~-Groups

as "Contractual"
...

~varieties

of groups.

-

The field of group dynamics is very broad.

There are many different kinds of groups and many attempts have been made
to classify them:

...,.

Over the years, many different classificatory schemes have been
proposed. A coimllon procedure has been to select a few properties
and to define 'types' of groups on the basis of whether these
properties are present or absent. Among the properties most
often employed are: size (number of members), amount of physical
interaction among members, degree of intimacy, level of solidarity,
locus of control of group activities, extent of formalization of
rules governing relations among members, and tendency of members
to react to one another as individual persons or as occupant of
roles. Although it would be possible to construct a large number
of types of groups by combining these properties in various ways,
usually only dichotomies have resulted: formal-informal, primarysecondary, small-large, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, autonomousdependent, temporary-permanent, consensual-symbiotic. Sometimes a
rather different procedure has been advocated in which groups.are
classified according to their objectives or social settings.
Accordingly, there are said to be work groups, therapy groups,
committees, clubs, gangs, teams, coordinating groups, religious
groups, and the like (Cartwright & Zander, 1968, p. 24).
There is an extensive literature dealing with the interactions that take
place within groups and between groups, but, as Cartwright and Zander note,
"only beginnings have been made 11 (p. 25) •
~conversation

group.

In many small groups, the participants come

together in order to talk with one another, that is, conversation (social
interaction) is either the principal goal of the group or it is one of the
principal means of achieving some other goal.

Conversation groups that meet

by·design come together for a number of purposes--to negotiate a labor
\

contract, to discuss community problems, to enjoy one another's company,

to engage in group psychotherapy, to engage in a laboratory course in group
dynamics, etc.

These conversation groups may be highly structured with

respect to purpose (for instance, to work out a labor contract) or the
..

--

purpose might be vague by design (for instance, to learn about small groups
by actually being a small group).

The goals of the group are achieved

principally through face-to-face conversation:

it is through conversation

(social interaction) that decisions are reached, that people get to know
one another, that personal problems are handled, etc.

This study deals

with one kind of small, face-to-face conversation group.
Contracts in conversation groups.

In all small, face-to-face conver-

sation groups that come together by design, there is usually some kind of
at least vague, implicit, minimal contract operative.

That is, there is a

series of "rules" which make the group operative and give it direction.
i

I

The

members either explicitly or implicitly agree to follow these "rules" (more
or less) in order to achieve the purpose of the group.

First of all, the·

participants agree to come (though their freedom to come might vary quite
,·

!

t
I
I

a bit from group to group).

Secondly, they usually agree to engage in or

at lea'!: listen to the conversation that takes place in the group.

Sometimes

they agree to talk about something quite specific--for instance, the

I'
l

provisions of a labor contract--while at other times there is a more vague
contractual specificity--for instance, those who agree to participate in

I

·1

group psychotherapy sessions realize to a greater or lesser degree that they
are agreeing to talk about their "problems" or themselves with some degree

l
.

of openness.

At other times the members of a group contract (vaguely,

Perhaps) to "unstructured" conversation--for example, in academic labora-
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tories in group dynamics and in sensitivity-training laboratories. ·ordinarily
in laboratory-training situations there is no predetermined topic of
conversation.

The point is this:

if one were to examine different kinds of

conversation groups, he would discover that these groups run according to a
certain set of "rules."· These rules might well change as the group moves
forward, but at any stage of the development of the group some set of rules
governing what is done and what is not done in the group is operative.
set of rules is the contract which governs the group.

This

Implicit in any

group contract are the goals or the purposes of the group and the means the
group utilizes in order to achieve these goals.
Leader and member contracts in small groups.

If the small group has a

leader, there are at least two kinds of contract operative in the group:
the leader-contract and the member-contract.
under two different but related contracts:
"process" contract.

The leader may be working
a "commercial" contract and a

For instance, in a group psychotherapy situation the

"connnercial" contract stipulates that the leader be paid, either by the
1

patients directly or by some sponsor ing agency, to operate as leader, that
is, to use his professional skills in order to guide the participants to
better levels of adjustment.

The "commercial" contract usually assumes his

professional competence and allows him to run the group as he sees fit.

But

the therapist himself usually has a specific way in which he approaches
the therapeutic situation--he has goals in mind and some idea of the means
that he wil-1 employ in order to reach these goals.

That is to say, the

thetapist himself operates within a "therapy process" contract which he has
devised.

This contract is usually quite flexible and changes as he grovs in
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experience.

However, if the therapist is also involved in a research

project, then he might be operating under some kind of "therapy process"
contract that :ts not entirely his own.
...

-

Such a contract may have been

devised by a research team of therapists, and once designed, it is "imposed"
on all the therapists working on the same project.

Such a contract serves

to standardize the therapeutic process for the sake of research.
The provisions of a member-contract specify the ways in which the
member should act during the small-group experience.

For most small, face-

to-face conversations groups the member-contract is usually quite minimal
and vague.

For instance, when the faculty members of a high school come

together to discuss the issues facing the institution, they operate under
some kind of minimal contract, but the contract is practically never
articulated.
;

I

I
I

t
I

It is assumed (no matter how gratuitous an assumption this

might be) that they know why they are at the meeting and what they are to
do.

In most laboratory-training situations, including laboratories in self-

actualization and interpersonal relations, the member-contract remains
unarticulated.

The participants realize that they are a group of "non-

patients" (Hendin, Gaylin, & Carr, 1965) or of "non-diseased" (Burton, 1965)
individuals pursuing personal or interpersonal growth through the group
Process.

They realize they constit!ute some kind of "growth" group, but

they have only the vaguest idea of how they should act in such a group.
A similar statement could be made with respect to patients or clients
entering psychotherapy:

they realize that they are patients, but they

usually have only.a vague idea of what is expected of them during the
therapy sessions.
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The contract-group differs from other kinds of laboratory-training or
"growth" groups in that both the leader-contract (the "process" rather than
the "commercial" contract} and the member-contract are spelled out in some
detail before the group experience begins.

Because both contracts are

known by all participants from the beginning, the group is said to have "high
vi!;ibility" or comparatively low ambiguity.
"Natural" interactions versus "contractual" interactions in small
~roups.

A distinction can be made between two kinds of interaction that

tnke place in small groups (a distinction which I have not seen elsewhere,
but which is important to the understanding of the nature of contract-groups)
--the distinction between

N~interactions

and C-interactions.

N-interactions

("N" for "natural"} take place in small, face-to-face groups precisely
because they are just that--small, face-to-face groups pursuing some kind of
goal principally through group conversation, that is, N-interactions are the
kinds of interactions that are characteristic of small, face-to-face groups.
In a certain sense group dynamics studies such as that of Hare, Borgatta, and
Bales (1962) and Cartwright and Zander (1968) are attempts to get at and
sunnnarize the "laws" operative in small groups.

These studies deal with such

topics as pressures to uniformity in groups, group cohesiveness, power and
influence in groups, connnunication networks, equilibrium in small groups,
role differentiation, leadership, motivational processes, and other variables
that are operative merely because a number of people have come together for
a certain purpose.

C-interactions ("C" for "contractual"), on the other

hand, take place because of the purpose of the group, that is, they arise
from the "contract" to which the group participants have explicitly or
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or implicitly "subscribed."

A couple of examples will help clarify the

difference between N..-interactions and C-interactions.
The first example refers to group psychotherapy.

A person in group

psychotherapy might (a) reveal something about himself, for instance, a
personal problem (b} in order to please the therapist and his fellow group
members.

In this case, engaging in self-disclosure is a C-interaction,

because talking about oneself and one's problems is vaguely implied in the
member-contract to which the patients subscribe when they enter the group.
Self-disclosure is considered one of the means leading to the goal,.constructive personality change.

The implicit contract includes both the goals of

the groups and the means necessary in order to achieve these goals.

The

'

j

I

contract, then, determines what kind of interactions are appropriate in the
group and these interactions are called C-interactions.

However, the

patient in question engaged in self-disclosure in order to please the
therapist and his fellow group members.

In small groups there is a tendency

for low~status persons to engage in interactions which will please the

t'

tl

leader and others who are considered higher in status (Collins & Guetzkow,
1964, pp, 166~187).

The patient's interaction, therefore, is both a

contractual interaction and a natural (dependency) reaction, that is, he

l

t

{

did the "right" thing, but his motivation for doing so was most likely a

1

reflection of his sense of inadequacy rather than his desire to grow.

1

the status and power variables that are operative even in small groups,

l

Given

l·

t

i

dependency and counter~ependency interactions are going to constitute a
Part of the group process.
Another example might illustrate the separability of N- and C-
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interactions.

Let us say that a group of executives have met to air their

feelings about a proposed merger with another company.
to be made at the meeting.

No final decision is

The purpose of the meeting is "to clear the air,"
...

-

and the (at least) implicit contract calls for the group members to be as
honest as possible in expressing feelings about the merger.
begin to speak.

The members

Mr. X waits until Mr. D, his immediate superior, speaks.

Then Mr, X, instead of saying just what he feels, "colors" his own feelings
with what he has heard from Mr. D.
interaction.

But he has violated the member-contract.

he really thinks.

I
f.

His N-interaction is a dependencyHe has not said what

There is no C-interaction in this case; there is only the

anti-C-interaction of dependency.

If Mr. X had said what he really felt,

even though he realized that this differed from what others, including his
immediate superior, were saying, then his C-interaction would have been
open-expression-of-feeling-to-the-group.

!,

However, if he expressed his

feelings in reaction to Mr. D, then his C-interaction would also have been
nn N-interaction, namely, counter-dependency.

But if he expressed his

i
I

I

1
f

''.it

feelings because this was called for by the member-contract, and if the
contract also warranted responsible confrontation, then his interaction
would have been a C~interaction on two counts:

(1) honest expression of

feeling and (2) confrontation of the opinions of others.

But if the implied

member-contract calls for open expression of feeling but does not allow a
subordinate to confront a superior, then the contract itself is deficient
and needs more explicit definition.
Dearth of C-interaction literature.
dealing with group dynamics.

There is an extensive literature

Moreover, a good deal of this literature deals,
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Jirectly or indirectly, with the verbal and emotional interactions that take
place in the kind of small, face-to-face conversation groups which are of
interest in this study (e.g., Bales,
1950, in press; Bion, 1961; Borgatta
,..b

Crowther, 1965; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Cartwright & Zander, 1968;

!!are, Borgatta, & Bales, 1962; Homans, 1950; Mann, 1967; Mills, 1964; Stock
&

Thelen, 1958; Whitaker & Lieberman, 1964).

However, since none of this

literature deals explicitly with the contracts underlying group membership
and group behavior, it consequently has little or nothing to say about Cinteractions.

As noted above, this literature studies groups principally as

"natural" rather than as "contractual."

Slater (1966), for instance, with

extensive experience in academic laboratories in group dynamics, speaks of
such things as the "theme of group murder," the "theme of autonomy," the
"theme of cannabalism," and the "theme of the sacred king."

He talks about

the revolts against the leader that take place "naturally" in groups, but
his discussion stops there.

He does not, for instance, discuss ways of

controlling or avoiding such "revolts" so that the group might be freer to
pursue more conscious and explicit goals more effectively.

Bion (1961) talks

of the "flight-flight group," the "pairing group," and the "dependent group,"
but he does not discuss ways of relating such group cultures to the overall
purposes of the group.

The point is this:

sometimes N-interactions facilitate

the work and progress of the group, while at other times they stand in the
way of such progress.
(a)

If any particular group has a solid understanding

of the goals of the group and of the means proportioned to the fulfillment

of these goals and (b) of the N-interactions which facilitate and impede the
attaining of these goals, then such a group becomes master of its destiny in
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a way unknown to groups which fail to differentiate between C-interactions and
~;-interactions.
~hypothesis

concerning C- and N-interactions.

The hypothesis is

t~is:

the more explicit both the member-contract and the leader-process contract
.ire in any face-to-face group and the deeper the commitment of the participants

to these contracts, the less crucial N-interactions become.
~ontract

If the member-

is vague and implicit, then variables such as pairing, flight-flight,

and dependency characteristically multiply and occupy a disproportionate
a::iount of the group's time and energy.

However, if the member-contract and the

leader-contract are clear, and, furthermore, if they are accepted by the
~embers

It

of the group as a condition of entry, then N-variables become less

important.

Rather, those N-interactions which are identified with or

facilitate C-interactions will multiply, while non-facilitative N-interactions

It

will decrease.

i

bring them out into the open where they can be dealt with more effectively.

i~.

Explicit and universally accepted contracts do not eliminate

non-facilitative N-interactions (e.g. preoccupation with status within the
group), but they do make non-facilitative N-interactions more apparent, they

Obviously there has to be a prior decision as to whether the elimination
or minimalization of N-interactions in the group is a value or not.

r

I·

r

If the

purpose of the group is precisely to study N-variables through the group
process (as it is in academic laboratories in group dynamics), then their
Prior elimination or minimalization would be self-defeating.

However, if

increased C-interactions is the goal of the group, and if a condition for
their increase is a strong member-contract and a strong leader-processcontract, then the subsequent minimalization of non-facilitntivi'! N-phenomena
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is a positive value.

In many laboratory-training situations .one of the precise

goals of the group (though it may not· be articulated to the participants
~eforehand)

is to discover experientially
and become enmeshed in both non... -

facilitative and facilitative N-interactions in order to get a real feeling
for what makes groups move ·forward and what makes them grind to a halt.
:!owever, since the focus of this study is a contract-approach to sensitivity-

training or interpersonal-growth groups, ways of minimizing N-phenomena that
i~?ede

C-interactions constitute an object of primary concern.

'xerationalizing the Group
The

goal~

defining group process.

The goals of a group give some kind

of specificity to the kinds of interaction that take place in the group.
Certain kinds of interaction move the group toward its goals while other kinds
of interaction stand in the way of goal-fulfil?ment.

ti

The overriding goal of

sensitivity-training (or at least of the kind of contract-group which is the

' i

focus of this study) is interpersonal growth ("interper13onal growth," an

Hl

admittedly vague concept, will be defined operationally in the chapter on

f

~

l!
i

'

goals).

Therefore, the problem is to provide a group experience which will

facilitate interpersonal growth.

Other goals, such as "learning how groups

work," are not excluded from the total goal-structure of the contract-group,

.,

but they are secondary.

It is hypothesized here that clear and explicit

l

leader-contracts and member-contracts can help create a group climate which is
conducive to interpersonal growth.

The provisions of such contracts should be

as detailed as is necessary to help achieve the goal of interpersonal growth.
O_perationality.

"operational"

March and Simon (1958) make a distinction between
.

and "non-operational" goals in group process.

A non-operational

[
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1,:iJl

is one that Cl} is

quit~

general in itself (e.g. to raise the cultural

!evcl of the connnunity) and (2) is not realized by a particular sequence of
hroup activities.
~c~ber-contract

Therefore, in the contract-group the function of the

and the leader-process-contract is to break the general group

boal--interpersonal growth--down into more specific goals and to provide spectfic group activities designed to realize these goals.
Cartwright and Zander (1960) classify hypothesized determinants of group
effectiveness under one or more of the following headings:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

the extent to which a clear goal is present
the degree to which the group mobilizes energies of group members
behind group activities
the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning
which one of several possible goals should control the activities
of the group
the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning
means that the group should employ in reaching its goals
the degree to which the activities of different members are
coordinated in a manner required by the group's tasks
the availability to the group of needed resources, whether they
be economic, material, legal, intellectual, or other (p. 345).

Contracts can do much to provide these determinants of group effectiveness.
(1) The member-contract specifices both the superordinate goal (interpersonal
growth) and certain subordinate goals (self-disclosure, expression of feeling,
confrontation, self-exploration, support) which, when taken together, constitute an operational definition of interpersonal growth.

(2) Participants

choose to enter sensitivity-training experiences because they want to grow
interpersonally.

The contract focuses or "mobilizes" the energies of tite

group by delineating the kinds of interaction which lead to interpersonal
growth.

(3) The contract does not eliminate conflict lrom the group (conflict,

too, can be growthful), but it does tend to eliminate m;~1ess "contract talk." .

l _. . . _----------~-....J
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participants find it much easier to argue about what the group should do

than to engage in specific kinds of group interaction.
.in

The contract sets up

"experiment" in interpersonal growth and invites the participants to

engage in the experiment rather than argue about its merits.

(4) The contract

also specifies the means to be used in the experiment in order to achieve
the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth.

For instance, the contract

suggests that such activities as responsible, self-involving confrontation
lead to interpersonal growth.

The participants are asked to engage in or

"experiment" with such activities (without prejudging the experience) in
order to discover whether such activities do deepen their ability to involve
themselves with others.

(5) The leader is present in the contract-group as

hoth a coordinator and as a resource person.

He both explains and models

contractual behavior and encourages the other participants to engage in the
experiment.

The member-contract stipulates that there will be a leader and it

spells out his functions in the group.

(6) Most of the resources that are

needed for interpersonal growth lie within the members of groups themselves.
The leader brings with him such resources as a professional knowledge of
group dynamics and experience as a member of groups.
at the service of the group.

He places these resources

Ideally, his skills will become diffused among

the members of the group.
Raven and Rietsema (1957) found that group members with a clear picture
of

the group goal and the paths to that goal had a closer involvement with

the group goal, more sympathy with group emotions, and a greater readiness to
accept influence from the group than those who were unclear about goals and

-the Paths to

the goals.

It is assumed, then, that the contract will help
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increase the aembers' involveiaent,. sympa.thy, and opemiu• to change.
The member-contract is established, then, in order to introduce a high
degree of "operationality" in the group from the very beginning.

.--

It is an

effort to make the group what Bion (1961) calls a "sophisticated" or "work"
group from the start. ·
Eliminating wasteful design.
behavioral sciences.

''Wasteful design" is not a stranger in the

The reduplication of staff effort in arriving at a use-

less diagnosis and a treataept program that is frequently ignored anyway is
all too common in many mental health settings.

It is my impression that a good

deal of wasteful design is too often associated with sensitivity-training
laboratories.

r

'

For instance, a great deal of time in such laboratories is spent

hanunering out a viable contract to govern the interactions of the members.
Sometimes almost the whole time is spent ln formulating and re-working this
contract.

Undoubtedly the participants leatu much about themselves and one

another during such an experience and a good deal of interpersonal growth
takes place.

But often the members of such groups leave with a great deal
I

of frustration, because there is no time to implement the contract which has
been hammered out,

Both the member-contract and the leader-process-contract

elilltl.nate a 800d deal of Wa&t•ful desip .froa the COQtract-interpersonalgrowth experience.

The prospective member realizes just what kind of

experience it is and what is expected of him if he chooses to enter.

The

time usually spent in the elaboration of the contract is spent rather in the
pursuit of the goals specified by the contract.
~Ychological Versus Mere Formal Membership!!!.!!!!.. Group

Being involved

~

the group experience.

The antecedent acceptance of

I
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the member-contract by those choosing to participate in the group experience
goes far in solving the critical problem of differentiating between what

-

Golembiewski (1962) calls "formal.... membership" and "psychological membership"
(p. 67).

It is a common experience in sensitivity groups to herald the

"coming out" of a member.

"John has finally joined the group" is a recogni-

tion that he has passed from just formal to psychological membership.

Or

perhaps it is rather that John has finally given some concrete sign that he
is (and has been) a psychological member.

Obviously the group operates more

effectively if all of its members are "psychological" members from the start.
Otherwise, instead of real group process, there is what Golembiewski (1962)
calls "the behavior of individuals in an interpersonal situation" (p. 67).
Tite contract, especially if it is freely chosen by the participants from the
beginning, does much to elicit psychological participation from the outset
of the group--at least this is the hypothesis.

In thia atudy it is assumed

that the members engage in the sensitivity-training experience because they
want to and that they could stay away without recrimination.

The behavior of

those who are forced to take part in some kind of laboratory experi"'11ce
(Howie [1967) discusses the ethics of such an ar-rangaent) is in a category
by itself and is not the focua of thia atudy.

tn th• contract-group the

'

I

i

I

L

ordinary criterion used to determine "p.sychological" membership is simply
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the contract.

Given the nature of the

contract as described in this paper, it is assumed that it would be quite
difficult, if not impossible, for a participant to "fake" psychological member·
I

ship·.

It is not assumed that everyone would be able to fulfill the contract.

Those who feel that they could or should not should not enter the experience
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in the first place. ' ·
Participation in the ncoDDDOn sood." Any group which is more than a
"group of individuals in a

socia_~-

situation" is so because in some way the

group gives birth to a "common good" in which all of the members participate.
Each member, as member, achieves his own individual good by participation in
the common good.

This "common-good" aspect of groups is one of the factors

that make a group more than a collection of individuals.

Slater (1966),

however, claims that a group. (in context he seems to be referring directly
to academic groups engaged in a laboratory in group dynamics) is also less
than a group of individuals ,since only a "portion" of each individual is
present.

In the contract-group, however, the member-contract not only gives

greater definition to the "common good" of the group, but entry-by-contract,
it is assumed, increased the. size of the "portion" of each individual present.
Ambiguity Versus Claritr,!n. Growth Experiences
Ambiguity.

Over the years any number of writers have sympathized with

the plight of the person who feels that he must seek help in the form of
psychotherapy.
confusion:

Curran (1944), for instance, describe• such a person's

"A confused person ia likely to approach the first interview

feeling a minimum of raaponaibility for himself and a maximum of fear,
insecurity and defensiveness" (p. 189).

It is not just that the person feels

confused as he approaches the psychotherapeutic situation; his confusion of ten
Persists because the therapist fails to provide any meaningful structuring:
"The patient may at first feel that his task is unorganized and formless and

I

l

that' there are no rules.
and dissatisfaction.

Then he experiences a strange feeling of helplessness

It is as though the therapist did not care what he
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talked about or how he spoke of it" (Ingham & Love, 1954, p. 81).

The

problem of the failure of the therapist to provide constructive structuring

-

still persists, however, or at least it is still being discussed and investiga....

ted.

Hoehn-Saric and his associates (1965), for example, believe that the

problem needs further attention:
Because of the diversity and ambiguities of public conceptions
of mental illness and psychotherapy, psychiatric patients reach
the psychiatrist's office with a wide variety of attitudes and
expectations. Only the most sophisticated are perfectly clear
about why they are there and what to expect. Less sophisticated
patients may have unrealistic expectations for improvement: they
may not understand their role in the therapeutic process and may
be bewildered by a procedure that differs not only from usual
medical treatment but from customery social interactions" (p. 267).
To add to the confusion, even the "sophisticated" might find it difficult to
say why the are sitting in.the waiting room of a psychiatrist rather than
that of some non-medical therapist.
There is some evidence that indicates that patients and therapists have
quite different views of the same therapeutic experience.

Truax and Carkhuff

(1967) sununarize some of this evidence:
Among the plethora of studies concluding, in effect, that
therapists prefer 'better' patients, that is, those less sick
and more sensitive, intelligent, and willing to talk about
themselves and their problems, were a few studies showing the
discrepant expectations of therapist and patient, particularly
with regard to the length of treatment (Garfield & Wolpin, 1963):
the therapist thinks in longer terms and the patient in shorter
terms of treatment. Feifel and Eells (1963), using an openended questionniare to get at differential assessments of therapy,
found that therapists tended to stress changes in symptomatic relief
and improvement in social relationships, whereas patients stressed
self-understanding and self-confidence. In addition, the patient
focused on the opportunity to talk over problems and emphasized
the 'human' characteristics of the therapist, while the therapist
·focused on therapeutic technique (p. 377).
It is no wonder, then, that failure to structure the therapeutic relationship
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leads to deleterious consequences including premature termination.

Sherman

(1945) found that leaving the client too much on his own resources early in
the process of therapy resulted in strong resistance.

Levitt (1966) found

that patients enter therapy expecting some kind of therapist participation.
The failure of the therapist to meet with this preconception reduces the
probability that the experience will affect him.

Failure to let the client

know the rationale underlying therapy and to give him some idea of expected
therapist and client

behavio~

tends to make the therapeutic experience more

manipulative than it should be.

Ambiguity can also be a difficult factor for

normals to handle in a task-oriented situation.
study of indefiniteness in a classroom situation.

Mann and Mann (1959) made a
Classroom groups, meeting

four times a week for one hour over a three-week period, were organized as
task~oriented study groups to discuss assigned reading lists ~ as free

discussion groups.

Rati~S•

of the members' desirability as friends increased

in the former groups and decreased in the latter where, according to
observers, the subjects were frustrated and angered by the indefiniteness of
their situation.

Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) express a certain

degree of amazement at the fact that many or most therapists fail to tell
there clients much about the therapeutic process:
For whatever reasons, few therapists would seem to be anywhere
near as explicit as the behavior therapists, either about the
theories they hold or about the techniques they employ. But it
is unclear whether patients are kept uninformed because (1) it
is not believed that informing them would be of any value,
(2) desirable results are obtained only when the learning is by
self-discovery, or (3) it is believed that the value of the
technique and treatment would be impaired by the knowledge of
'the patient. We would call into question the second assumption
and refer the reader to the cogent arguments given by Ausubel
(1963) in refutation of the idea that really meaningful learning
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must come through self-discovery (p. 246).
It would be less than honest to imply -that no one sees ambiguity as a value

in the therapeutic process.

Rogers' {1951, 1961) approach to therapy involves
... -

a good deal of ambiguity which he must see as facilitative and Frank {1961)
suggests that ambiguity or unclarity tends to arouse unpleasant emotions such
as anxiety and resentment which heighten the patient's desire for relief,
thereby increasing his own influencibility.

Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest

(1965), however, comment on Rogers' position:
'[R]eflection of feeling' as a technique in therapy is assuredly
manipulative and intended to have some purpose. Even Rogers has
admitted that all psychotherapists are in the business of influencing and controlling behavior {Rogers & Skinner, 1956) ••••
[I]f the therapist told them {the patients) truthfully that by
reflecting the feelings, rather than the content, of the patients'
statements he hoped to have them come to a better understanding
. of their feelings and themselves, it seems much less likely that
any resistance at all would be aroused. Whether such a straightforward statement would decrease the effectiveness of reflection
as a technique {assuming that it has some) is an empirical matter.
(p. 247).

Frank's statement souds too baldly manipulative.

However, it is doubtful

that the Rogers and Frank of 1961 are the Rogers and Frank of 1969.

In fact,

Frank is one of the co-authors of the Hoehn-Saric (1965) article mentioned
above which urges "systematic preparation of pati~nts for psychotherapy."
There is, then, growing dissatisfaction with the kind of ambiguity or
secretiveness that characterizes approaches to the growth-experience called
psychotherapy.

Sensitivity-training experiences or laboratories in inter-

Personal relationships are also growth experiences.

It would be unfair to

like~ the participants in such experiences to patients or clients entering

psychotherapeutic experiences.

But, while the ambiguity that characterizes
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the goals and processes of most sensitivyt-training laboratories might well
stimulate or at least be the occasion for certain kinds of growthful activities
on the part of the participants (e.g. setting goals, formulating a contract,
•

•rr-

etc.), still the evidence dealing with the deleterious effects of ambiguity
in the psychotherapeutic process suggests, at the minimum, that ambiguity

need not characterize all growth-experiences and that structuring a laboratory
in interpersonal relations by means of a contract could well prove quite

beneficial.
arguments:

There is no need, however, to become embroiled in meaningless
laboratory experiences high in ambiguity and laboratory experiences

high in clarity or "visibility" are different experiences.

Each may well have

its own positive and negative characteristics, but these remain to be
demonstrated.
Clarity.

Since the contract-group is characterized by such ''high

Visibility t II SOJnething Should be Said about itS potential adVaDt&geS •
Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) have reviewed a number of areas of
psychological research, for instance, the psychology of learning and a number
of areas of social psychology, with a view to applying the fruits of this
research in the area of psychotherapy.· One of the hypotheses established by
them is the following:
Hypothesis 5.4a: Giving patients prior information about the
nature of psychotherapy, the theories underlying it, and the
techniques to be used will facilitate progress in psychotherapy.
We find it remarkable that psychotherapists have apparently
been unwilling to impart to their patients more than a little
of the process of psychotherapy. Some writers have made general
.suggestions about 'structuring' of psychotherapy (e.g. Fromm~
Reichmann, 1950; Holland, 1965; Rotter, 1954; Wolberg, 1954), but
such suggestions have been rudimentary and sometimes even
·evasive. Many, perhaps even most, other writers have ignored the
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whole question of just what patients should be told about
psychotherapy. We believe that in many cases a fuller
explication would be quite desirable (p. 245).
In truth, a number.of authors have discussed the value of structuring the
~

psychotherapeutic encounter; the problem seems to be (though hard data is
lacking} that few therapists have seen fit to introduce formal structuring
techniques into their psychotherapeutic approach, especially to the extent
that Goldstein, Heller; and Sechrest might deem advisable.

As early as 1949

Bixler reviewed the literature on structuring, but did so in terms of "the
setting of limits."

Ingham and Love (1954), on the other hand, took a more

positive attitude toward structuring.

They suggest six basic process values

(all of them really patient variables) which should be co11DDunicated to the
client both in structuring remarks and through basic attitudes:

(1) that it

is good for men to investigate themselves; (2) that it is better to
investigate than to blame; (3) that emotion is to be regarded as a real and
important thing; (4) that there must be relatively complete freedom of
expression in the therapeutic situation; (5) that investigating the past may
be useful in understanding the present; and (6) values centering around the
client's present view of his world are important for the therapeutic process.
More recently, Hoehn-Saric and hi.a associates (1965) have used the Role
Induction Interview (RII) ~'to arouse or strengthen in the patient certain
appropriate anticipations of the psychotherapeutic process, particularly with
respect to patient and therapist roles" (p. 270).

The RII, based on the

Anticipatory Socialization Interview of Orne (referred to as "in preparation
for 'publication" by Hoehn-Saric and his associates), consists of four comP0 nents:

"(1) a general exposition of psychotherapy; (2) a description and
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explanation of the expected behavior of a patient and of a therapist; (3) a
preparation for certain typical phenomena in the course of therapy (e.g.
resistance); and (4) the induction of realistic expectation for improvement
within four months of treatment" (p. 270).

The research conclusion was that

"RII had a favorable effect on certain aspects of patients' therapy behavior
and improvement and, properly used, could be a valuable tool in psychotherapy"
(p. 280).
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) refer to a rather interesting way in which
initial structuring in therapy might take place:
[V]icarious therapy pre-training (VTP) ••• may be employed in
either group or individual psychotherapy. It simply involves
presentation to prospective patients of a 30-minute tape
recording of excerpts of 'good' patient therapy behavior. The
tape itself illustrates in a very concrete manner how clients
often explore themselves and their feelings: it thus provides
cognitive and experiential structuring of 'how to be a good
patient.' In short, it allows for a vicarious experiencing of
deep psychotherapy prior to the initiation of the psychotherapeutic or counseling relationship. Recent research (Truax &
Carkhuff, 1964) completed using VTP in group psychotherapy with
both mental hospital and juvenile delinquent patients provides
both clinical and research confirmation of its facilitative
effect. It was found that early psychotherapy sessions from
groups receiving VT~ showed significantly higher levels of selfexploTation than non-VTP groups having the same number of
sessions. Further, VTP resulted in significantly more successful
outcomes in time-limited therapy as judged by a variety of
objective outcome criteria (p. 373).
The authors mention only patient behavior, but it seems only reasonable to
hope that VTP would give the patient some idea of what to expect from a
good therapist, too.
~

contract !!! structuring the sensitivity-training experience.

psychotherapy deals with human growth, it is

m~

Since

convinction that we should

search through the literature on psychotherapy and borrow whatever seems to
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be beneficial for

a

sensitivity-training experience.

In the contract-group

the contract
to which the participants. subscribe serves to structure the
,
laboratory experience.

Since, at least in this study, each of the provisions

of the contract is throughly explained, the participant knows not only what
he should do but also why.

The idea of

VTP

is a most intriguing one.

Even

in laboratory groups that subscribe to a contract,/ there is much initial
fumbling around trying to get started.

Some groups, even late in the

laboratory, take flight by claiming that they still do not understand what
they are supposed to be doing.

I would like to incorporate a videotape

version of VTP as part of the structuring process at the beginning of a
laboratory in interpersonal relations.

The participants would first pre-read

the contract and get some idea of what is expected of them (and of the leader)
in the actual group situation.

Then they would watch one or two videotapes ·

of "good" group sessions, that is sessions in which all of the major elements
of contract behavior were illustrated.

This would help make the contract

much more concrete and eliminate some of the useless "contract talk" of early
sessions.

Someone might object, saying that viewing a "good" session might

frighten some of the participants;
of such intensive interaction.

the~

might think that they are not capable

On the other hand, however, it might show

the participants that intensive interaction can be quite engaging and growthful, and not destructive as some of the participants' fears would imagine it
to be.
These remarks deal with the problem of how much one should know about a

"grawth-experience"--whether

it be psychotherapy or a laboratory in inter-

Personal relltionships--before entering that experience.

A claim for ''high
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visibility" in all kinds of growth experiences is made.

Or at least it is

suggested that ''high visibility" approaches are just as valid as "ambiguous"
approaches.

These remarks, however do not touch on the question of the
...

-

therapeutic or non therapeutic nature of self-knowledge.

Is it better for a

"sick" or a "normal" man to know himself completely or is such knowledge, at
least in certain cases, potentially destructive?

This question will be dealt

with in the chapter on self-disclosure.
Minimizing Manipulation
A number of authors have discussed the humanistic and ethical problems
of deception and manipulation in psychological experimentation (e.g. Aronson

& Carlsmith, 1968; Jourard, 1967; Kelman, 1967).

Jourard, for instance, sees

psychologists as too manipulating in their experimentation.

He makes a plea

for greater openness on the part of psychologists even in the area of
experimentation, where deception and manipulation have been traditionally seen
as both acceptable and necessary.

"E" and "S," he says, should get to know

each other on a more human level.

Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), however,

while encouraging a more humane treatment of experimental subjects, point out
that it is not always possible to avoid subject distress:
[M]any questions in social psychology can be answered only by
designing experiments which cause subjects some psychological
discomfort, such as anxiety, embarrassment, annoyance, insecurity,
etc. One simply cannot investigate the effects of anxiety except
in situations where people are being caused anxiety (p. 29).
Manipula'tion and deception are even more suspect as values in therapeutic and
other "growth" situations (e.g. sensitivity-training laboratories) in which
.....

the enhancing of responsible self-determination is a traditional goal.

In the

usual approach to sensitivity training, in which ambiguity is a value, the
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trainer, whether justly or not, is sometimes seen as manipulative.

After all,

he has been through many such experiences and at least he knows what is
happening and, in a sense, what is going to happen.
..

Even his silence is seen,

~-

at times, as manipulative, for he watches as the participants "dance."

Even

the word "trainer" sounds ominous to some, for in their experience animals
have trainers.

This is not to say that ambiguity should not be a factor in

sensitivity-training experiences.

It does mean, however, that trainers should

be aware of the impact that ambiguity can have on some participants and that
ambiguity should never be used to manipulate.

If there· is ambiguity in the

contract-group, it does not stem from hidden dimensions of the experience
itself.

Individual participants may not be clear as to how to put the

contract to work in their own interactions, but this is akin to the "beneficial
uncertainty" which Beier (1966) sees as growthful in: therapeutic situations.
It is hypothesized that both the member-contract and the leader-contract will
serve as safeguards against deception and manipulation.
Grou2. farticipants

~

"Therapists" ,.t2. One Another

Patterson (1966) has discovered that one characteristic that unites
therapists of widely differing approaches is commitment to a particular theory
or method.

The failure or inability of the therapist to commit himself to a

definite approach apparently limits his effectiveness.

This does not mean

that a person has to identify himself definitively with a peculiar "school"
of therapy, that is, he does not have to be a Freudian, a Jungian, or a
follower of Rogers, but he should have a philosophy of therapy which can be
translated into therapeutic interaction.

Steinzer (1967)., when asked to what

school he belongs, inevitably replies "Steinzorian." He explains himself:

59
I hasten to add that I.'m not about to establish still another
organization, but that it is my whole being, in all my li.ved
and dreamed-of lives--my 'voices of experience'--llzhi.ch infuses
my interpretations, advice, actions, hopes and confrontations.
If pressed far enough, I could add that my allegiance is
American; my values are to-some an amalgam of my working-class
background and my present economic level; my idea of progress
is affected by the Judaeo-Christian spirit of Western culture;
my choice as the most significant person in modern psychotherapy
is Freud; the teacher who has inspired me most is Carl Rogers;
my latest enthusiasm and applause for authors in my field are
directed to Jerome Frank and Thomas Szasz--and so on (pp. 1-2).
Yet, though he eschews specific systems, he does have a very vital philosophy
of therapy which he translates into therapeutic interaction.

He maintains

that therapy takes place when people meet and respond, that healing grows out
of trust and affection.

However, these are the conditions, not just of

therapy, but of human growth itself.

It is the purpose of the contract to

help put people into growthful contact with one another.

Each member becomes,

as it were, a "therapist" to the others, that is, one concerned with the
being and the growth of the other.

The member-contract and the leader-process

contract provide the therapist-members a definite theory of method to be
used in the helping relationship.

Acceptance of the contract is the commit-

ment that makes for such "therapist" efficacy.
~Objections £2._ Growth-~-Contract

A discussion of objections must deal with two questions:

(1) Is the

factor objected to really desirable (if it is absent) or undesirable (if it
is present)?

(2) Does the contract-group de

the factor in question?
aprioristically.

~

either eliminate or foster

Obviously the second question cannot be answered

Actual experience with contract-groups is necessary in

order to determine the presence or absence of factors.

l
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Objection:

the contract makes what is usually_!. "cool" medium ''hot."

ncLuhan (1964) makes an intriguing distinction between "hot" and "cool"
communication media.

"Hot" media are characterized by "high definition,"
....

-

a state of being well filled with data.

The radio, he claims, is a "high-

definition" medium, while communication by telephone is low in definition.
Low-definition media are "cool," for the participants have to "fill in the
gaps" more and thus become more involved in the communication process.
Listening to a tape playback of a group session is "hot," for there is high
definition and experience would seem to indicate that involvement is dif f icult.

On the other hand, watching (and listening to) a videotape playback

of a group session is quite "cool."
communication-dimension.

The viewers are flooded with a new

They must interpret more (e.g., all the non-verbal

communication taking place within the group); there are more "gaps" to be
filled in.

Involvement runs high.

Small groups are usually quite "cool," that is, they are low in
definition and thus deeplf involve the participants.

Sensitivity-training

and other forms of small group process have even been called "seductive."
It is objected that a contract would make a group higher in definition and
thus render a "cool" experience tepid• if not "hot.

First of all, however,

if a group is very low in definition, that is, if it is almost completely
Without structure, it tends to die.

The failure of a group to elaborate for

itself some kind of viable contract leads to the "death" of the group.
members can no longer tolerate ambiguity and aimlessness.
involvement disappears.

The

Ennui sets in;

There is nothing more agonizing than sitting through

sessions of a group that has already died.

The question is not whether the

!

!
j
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contract introduces structure or not, it is rather whether the degree of

I

I

definition introduced by the contract is too high or not.

Obviously this is

a function of the particular kind of contract introduced.

The contract must

I

I'

be facilitating rather than restrictive.

The hypothesis in this study is

that the kind of contract to be described in the following chapters is
facilitating, that it introduces an optimal degree of definition, that it
allows plenty of room for "member-movement," that it increases rather than
decreases member participation, that it focuses the group on issues that in
themselves exact participant involvement.

It is the group that is filled

with irrelevant interaction that is high in definition and, therefore, clogged
with useless data.

Whether these hypotheses are verified or not will depend

upon research that is still to be done.

.

Objection:

the contract eliminates spontaneity, induces rigidity.

In

the contract-group, group life is not as unprogranmed as in other forms of
training- or growth-groups.

Tlie plaintive "what-are-we-supposed-to-be-

doing?" is not heard or at least not with the same intensity and frequency.
Slater (1966) claims that it is this being-unprogrammed that makes the
members of the group face "questions dealing with the central dilenma of
life itself."

However, even the detailed contract to be presented below

leaves the group unprogrammed to a great extent.

The leader, while he does

try to see to it that the contract is fulfilled, does not tell the members
~ they are to fulfill it.

(see below) they must engage.

He does not tell them in what "modalities"
If the members of the group confront one

another when they engage in "flight" activity, this could be looked upon as
"i nduced rigidity," but then the term "rigidity" begins to take on a rather
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equivocal cast.

The contract still leaves very many choices to be made

by the participants, but the point is ·that these choices, because of the
contract, are focused on much

mo;~

central issues.

It is contended that

the contract-group is much more likely to deal with the key issues of life
than is the group which must first hammer out its own contract.

The

contract provides structure or clarity or definition, but with plasticity.
Definition with-plasticity seems to be an ideal condition for a group.
Objection:

the contract antecedently limits the freedom of group members

Perhaps "guilty" is the best answer to this charge, but then it is necessary
to ask whether such "limitation" is a value or not.

Maritain (1951), in

discussing world states, objects to the concept of "sovereignty."

The body

politic, he says, has a right to autonomy, both internal and external.
sovereignty adds another note to autonomy:
character od independence and power.

But

the transcendentally supreme

If nations are to work together for the

common good of the world, he claims, they must, while retaining their autonomy
surrender their sovereignty.

The member-contract in the growth-group may be

looked upon, analogously, as a surrender-of-sovereignty.

Effective inter-

personal involvement demands a surrender of sovereignty, at leat in the
negative sense outlined by Maritain.

Freedom is curtailed, if such a word

should be used, in the name of an experience which is designed to make the
group participants more "free" in their interpersonal living.
Objection:

entry !!Y-contract introduces .!.

.!.!!.~group experience.

limit~ng

Some kind of "selectivity-factor" is always at work

in both therapeutic laboratory•training situations.

-

"selectivity-factor"

'lberapists often limit

themselves to those who are considered "good candidates"( 'truax & Carkhuff,
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1967, p. 377).

Candidates for therapy select themselves according to a

number of criteria:

e.g., the ability -to afford time off work, the de3ire

to change, financial considerations, degree of psychic pain, the desire to
please others, etc.

Analogous self-selection criteria are considered to be

operative to all groups.

The objection here is that the contract introduces

an added selectivity-factor, so that, for example, a person who might be
interested in sensitivity-training would not attempt a contract-experience.
The contract might attract an elite.

On the other hand, it might attract

those who are desperately trying to improve the quality of their interpersonal
living.
In order to discuss this question reasonably, it would be necessary to
have the kind of "hard data" that simply are not available.

It will certainly

be interesting to see what kind of clientele the contract-group draws.
Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate the contract group populations do not
differ significantly from populations engaged in more "traditional"
sensitivity-training experiences.

However, a desire for interpersonal growth

seems to characterize both the interpersonal "haves" and the interpersonal
"have-nots."

It is hypothesized that those interested in "sensitivity-

training" would also be interested in a contract-group experience.

In my

own experience over the past two-and-a half years, no one has refused to
enter a sensitivity-training laboratory because of the contract.

It is

also hypothesized that those who actually engage in some kind of sensitivitytraining experience and ~ind it valuable would like to move on to a contractgroup-growth-experience.
Bugental and Tannenbaum (1965) describe the experience of a group of
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people who, having found an initial sensitivity-training experience so
fruitful, wanted to engage in a more high-powered "festival of growth."
The participants chosen for the ..experience were an "elite," that is, a number

of people who were considered to have moved beyond stagnated involvement
with D-needs and M needs.
disappointing.

However, they found the experience somewhat

They either could not recapture the spirit of their previous

experience or the second experience was too much like the first.

One view

of their plight (though it is not suggested by the authors) mtght be this:
they were eager, they were open, but they were without a feasible contract.
~ew

contractual provisions had not been built into the second experience, and

therefore it resembled tb.e first too closely.

Those who sponsored the second

experience could have designed a laboratory with different or more intensive
features and then these features could have become the provisions of a
structuring contract.

It is difficult to say whether such an approach would

have worked, but it seems that a high powered contract-experience would have
been ideal for such a group.
Objection:

~

contract makes the risk of failure greater.

This might

well be true, but greater risk of failure is not seen as a negative factor.
11

Failure 11 is an analogous, if not an equi\tocal, term when used to describe

both physical and psychic healing.

If a physical agent is used to try to

stem the spread of gangrene, failure means something quite specific.
battle is lost and the foot or leg must be amputated.

The

"Failure" in

psychotherapy is much more nebulous, because the criteria for success and
failure are not clear.
it

is "terminated."

In one sense 1 psychotherapy does not "fail,"

rather

One of the reasons that therapy cannot besaid to "fail"
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is the low "operationality" of the go~ls of therapy.

But, while low

operationality prevents clearly defined failure experiences, especially in
the mind of the patient, it also
therapy.

~~ems

to stand in the way of effective

The contract introduces a much higher degree of operationality

than is usually found in either therapy or in other kinds of growthexperiences.

In a contract group it is difficult for a person to say to

himself or to the group that lie is "getting something out of it," if he is
not.

He is not getting out of it what he should if he is not fulfilling the

contract.
not.

.And it is quite evident whether he is fulfilling the contract or

If he tries to rationalize away his failure, his attempts ("lhese

contract things don't work," "It was too contrived to get anything done,"
"We really didn't have the freedom to move, 0 etc.) should be more transparent
and hollow because of the contract.

Ordinarily, then, such a person will

have to take responsibility for the failure himself, for it was be who did
not engage in the "modalities" contracted for, it was he who fled group
process.

Because the contract was clear, he can see

group experience.

Even his failure is "diagnostic."

exactly~

he fled the

'lbe contract-group,

because it more clearly defines success and outlines the activities of a
"successful" experience. also heightens the risk of failure ("success" being
defined here as contract-fulfillment).

'J.'his is good, for it is good to know

~ one has failed and why one has failed.

Objection:

the contract reduces "productive" anJdetz.. !here are those
•
who are concerned about the anxiety factor in labotatory experiences:
3. Can the candidate tolerate the anxiety involved in the T~Group
2rocess? Most T-Group participants are adults, already settled in
their ways., who have gone through adjustment processes involved in
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adolescence and early adulthood. They have well-established
behavior pattern~, habits, responses, values, emotional reactions
and defense mechanisms--all of which have now become meaningful to
them, and which allow them to operate in their own environment.
The T-Group ts a very soul~searching process. It requires the
individual to introspect, to look at his own values and his own
emotions, to ask himself whether and why he likes them, and
whether he wishes to live the way he has. After a person is
established in his way of life, two things must be considered:
a) Does he have the general ability to tolerate the anxiety involved
in this kind of soul-searching? and b) Is he at this time going
through some other stress experience such as adjusting to the
change of life on the part of himself or other members of his
family, or meeting difficult financial obligations?
To prevent avoidable emotional disturbances, admission to TGroups should be based on a careful screening process designed
to ensure that participants are able to withstand and profit
from the anxiety induced in the T-Group process (House, 1967,
pp. 25-26).,
l

These concerns are very real, especially in the context in which House reviews

I

the literature on laboratory training.

He is tallting about the application

of T-Group.methoda in business and other organizational settings.

Sometimes

entire organizations or entire departments are subjected to laboratory
training without being asked and without being given the freedom to attend
or not attend.

But in the present

stud~

it is assumed that the individual

freely chooses to engage in the laboratory experience and in some way reflects
upon his ability to profit from it.

Indeed, in a contract-situation the

prospective participant can make a more intelligent decision whether to
attend or not attend in that the contract clearly delineates the nature of
the experience.
Participation in growth-group experiences is an approach-avoidance
situation.

Group process is both seductive and anxtety-arousing.

It offers

a fresh source of relatedness, but it demands a certain degree of self-

l
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ilDJllOlation.

There is the lure of fushion and the terror of it, the hope of.

greater individuation and the despair of it.

Usually, the anxiety aroused as

one approaches or begins a group experience is considered to be
at the service of the ego" (Kris, 1952).

11

anxiety

It is intimately associated with

the pursuit of self-identity t.ilich implies beth separateness and relatedness.
Schofield (1964) claims that our society has tended to over-dramatize
anxiety:
If this is the Age of Anxiety it is not so simply as a function of
absolute increase in the things which man is fearful. Rather it
is because ~ have taught .!!!!!_ to be anxious about his anxiety.
We have created a distorted image of anxiety. We have attriouted
to anxiety and to the efforts to escape anxiety all of man's
neurotic ills. We have sensitized ourselves to recognize the
signs of anxiety, and we have been encouraged to the fallacious
value of a total avoidance of anxiety as a goal of life; we have
been led to believe that a complete freedom from anxiety would be
the distinguishing characteristic of an adjusted life (p. 152).

I

Anxiety is a part of life.

It is up to man to control and use it.

Schachter

(1959) showed that a state of anxiety leads to the arousal of af filiative
tendencies.

Man seeks out his fellow man when he is afraid.

Need the

resultant contact be any less growthful because it was sought in order to
reduce anxiety?
The Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) states that the relationship between fear or anxiety and learning is curvilinear.

The level of

anxiety or drive which stimulates optimal performance lies somewhere in the
middle:

it must be neither too high nor too low.

There has been some

confirmation of this "law" from more recent studies (e.g., Matarazzo, Ulett,
& Sa~low,

1955; Stennett, 1957).

It is assumed that this "law" is also

operative in growth or therapeutic experiences.
initiates sensit· it -trainin

The ambiguous group
eriences

roduce"' relative!
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high levels of drive.

The laboratorr is deai.gned to produce anxiety-drive.

It is also assumed that there are "optimal" levels of anxiety for
effective group process in contract-interpersonal-growth-groups.
..

--

The

member-contract doe& not eliminate anxiety; it is rather one of the sources
of it.

However, since the contract gtyes a fairly clear picture of the

kind of group experience ;!nto which the members are entering, ambiguity and
the "unknown" in general are not the primary sources of anxiety (it is
assumed in the major writings on sensitivity-training !e.g., Bradford,
Gibb, & Benne, 1964] that ambiguity in terms of "goallessness" and "planned
ambiguity" is a primary source of anxiety in laboratory groups).

While it

is true that contract-group participants may never have been engaged in a
sensitivity-training experience before, they still have some idea of the
meaning of the contract vartables (self-disclosure and the like).

Anxiety

arises from tl!e provisions of the contract and one's abilit1 to fulfill the
contract.

1he contract calls for self-disclosure, confrontation, and a

willingnes11 to express human feeling.

These q;eem to be more autlientic

sources of anxiety than ambiguity; they are more related to real life
concerns.

Or rather the ambiguity that arises in a person when he views

the contract is related to real life concerns:
will 1 do when challenged?

how open can I be?

how can I start expressing my feelings now?

Anxiety in the contract group does not 'tjust happen."
the contract.

what

It is part of

It i& explained to prospective participants that in accepting

the contract, they are subs:cribing to a certain amount of anxiety •. It is
explained that anxi.ety can be debilitating or that it can be an "energizer."
This more rational approach does not eliminate anxiety.

But it does prepare
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the participant to expect anxiety, to recognize it for what it is, and to
use it to "energize" group activity.
If there is such a thing as an optimal level or range of anxiety for
participation in laboratory experiences, then a problem arises.

There are

relatively great individual differences in both state (situational, transient)
and trait (part of the personaltty make-up, relatively permanent) anxiety
(see Levitt

1966).

Participants come to sensitivity-training laboratories,

then, with varying degrees-of anxiety.
or leader to be aware of this.

It is very important for the trainer

For instance, while some exercises might not

stir one participant, they might tend to immobilize another.

The function

of the laborator1 is not directly to make people anxious, but to utilize
anxiety that does arise as a drive.

Sometimes, however, it is quite difficult

to determine which participants are relatively calm, which are quite anxious,
and which are even too anxtous.

The contract calls for openness on the part

of the participants, and disclosure of one's state of anxiety (especially
if the participant feels that it is excessi'Ve or debilitating) should take
place relatively early in the group.

Therefore, while the contract itself

might well be a potent source of anxiety, it also demands the kind of
openness that allows anxiety to surface and to be dealt with in the interaction of the group.

The contract, then, viewed in different ways, can both

elicit and help to control anxiety.

The contract both provides a structure

which increases the psychological safety of the experience (e.g. by building
support into the experience, by demanding growtliful rather than punitive
confrontation, etc.) and acts as a stimulus to taking growthful risks (e.g.
self disclosure, expression of feeling, etc.l in the group.
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-A Variety .2.f,Contracts
.

'!his study will delineate one general kind of contract-experience.
there can be an almost endless

va~!ety

of such experiences.

But

Once the goals

of a group are determined, then the means that are assumed to lead up to
these goals can be elaborated.
of the contract.

Finally, both goals and means can be made part

The use of a variety of contract-groups in various kinds of

experimentation seems to be one of their most promising features.

The

variables of the group experience can be spelled out in detail, and fulfillment or

non~fulfillment

of contract is relatively easy to determine.

Any contract can be purposefully rigid or flexible.

In experimental

situations it seems that a certain "rigidity" of contract is called for.

---

purpose of the experiment is to see what effects'this contract has.
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of this contract is important.

The

So the

However, in

"growth" experiences it is possible to allow for the re-working or reformulation of the contract.
than the contract itself.

In such groups the goals are more important

If the contract has to be changed in order to

provide a more profitable group experience, then it should be changed.
However, the reformulation of the contract is a relatively drastic step.
Blaming the contract for group or personal failure can be a type o.f flight
from group process.

Responsible contract reformulation can be undertaken

only after responsible efforts have been made to fulfill the provisions of
the contract.
In both contract-experiences and in laboratories characterized by
"planned ambiguity" and "goallessness" it is possible to introduce "focused"
contracts in the form of exercises.

In a sense all exercises introduced to
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the group are contractual, that is, the exercise is generally imposed on the
group and the participants are usually expected to follow the rules laid
down for the exercise.

For instance,
in a contract-group in which self
... -

disclosure is one of the contractual variables it is possible to define the
topic of disclosure by means of a "focused" contract.

It is assumed that

there would be some reason for specifying the topic of area of disclosure and
that the participants are more or less willing to have such a sub-contract
imposed on them.

! Sample Contract

.!!!_~Laboratory

in Interpersonal Relations

Lest the notion "contract" remain too abstract, a sample contract for
a laboratory in interpersonal relations is given below.

However concise

or extended a contract might be, it should provide prospective members to get
some kind of "feel" for the group experience they are about to enter.

This

means that all the major variables that will ultimately given definition to
the kinds of interaction expected in the group should be spelled out adequately.

The provisions for the contract below have been chosen because it is

believed that these are til.e major varialiles in and de f act:o do take place in
sensitivity-training laboratories in which self-actualization and

interper~

sonal growth are tlie superordinate goals.

A CONTRACT

FOR A LABORATORY
IN INTERPERSONAL GROWTH

This laboratory in interpersonal relations will be conducted according
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to a contract.

The purpose of the contract is to provide a facilitating

structure for the group experience and to let you know the nature of the
experience you are about to enter.

Please read the following contract care-

fully and then decide whether you would like to participate or not in the
kind of experience described in the contract.

If you want to participate

in the group, you must subscribe to the contract.
1.

The Goals of the Group.

interpersonal growth.

The overriding goal•;_of the group is, of course,

Interpersonal growth involves discovering "new ways

of being present to others.

Personal growth, too, is a goal of the group,

but it is assumed that all that is good in personal growth (e.g. reduction
of anxiety, enhanced feelings of self-worth, a keen sense of self-identity)
must be placed at the service of interpersonal relationships.

Man is a

relational being and the height of his growth lies in his relationships
with others.
2.
j

'

I

l

Leadership in the Group.

The group will have a leader, but since he is

not a leader in the traditional sense of that term, he is sometimes referred
to by different titles, such as "trainer" or "facilitator."
not important, but his function is.

The name is

He is skilled in group dynamics and has

had a good deal of experience participating in and working with groups.
However, he is in the group because he, too, is interested in growing
interpersonally.

Therefore, he subscribes to the same contract that you

that is, he is a leader-member.

do,

As leader, his functiQn is to put his

knowledge of groups and his e:Kperience in groups at the service of your
group.

He is a resource person, not a super-member.

He is someone like you,

interested in increasing his interpersonal effectiveness by involving himself
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with you.

If certain provisions of the contract are not clear, he will

explain them to you, but he is not in .the group as teacher, at least in the
traditional sense.

In fact, a good teacher is one who likes to get together

.--

with others in order to learn.
The ideal is that the leadership qualities he demonstrates become
diffused among the members of the group so that, in a sense, the group might
act as its own leader.

He will work for that diffusion.

the specific things he will do.

What are some of

He will tell you about some of the difficul-

ties that face most beginning laboratory groups.

For instance, aome groups

spend a good deal of time "dealing with the leader," that is, they make him
a father-figure" and try to work out authority problems with him.
in this group the leader is not meant to be an authority figure.

However,
It is not

that the participants may not work through authority problems, but there are
other ways of doing this besides focusing on the group leader.

If too much

time is spent "dealing with the leader," this can prove detrimental to the
over-riding goal of the group.

In this group "interpersonal growth" means

that the members are to spend a good deal of time involving themselves with
one another (including the leader-member) •.
. From the beginning the leader-member will "model" the kinds of behavior
called for by the contract.

Again, he does so not because he is completely

self.actualized in the area of interpersonal relating but because the sooner
the group begins to engage in contractual behavior the better.
3.

~Laboratory

Nature of the Group Experience.

The experience you are

about to enter is called a "laboratory" for a number of reasons.
contract is to accept the experience as a laboratory.

This

i~

Part of the

what a
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laboratory entails:
(a)

Learning

£I.

doing.

You will learn how to relate to others more

-

effectively by actually relating..•.. You will see yourself in action, as it
were, and you will talk about the ways in which you relate to the other
members of the group.
(b)

A climate_of experimentation.

mentation.

The term laboratory implies experi-

You will experiment with your own behavior, attempting to relate

to others in "new ways."
ways of acting.

This does not mean that the group will invent new

Rather you will try to deal with others in ways that you do

not ordinarily use in your day-to-day contacts.

For instance, if you are

usually quiet and reserved, you may experiment with "speaking up" in the
group.
(c)

For you, this is a "new way" of being present to others.
No prejudging the experiment.

The person who comes to the

laboratory convinced that the "experiment" will not wrk usually leaves it
feeling quite self-satisfied.

His prophecy has been self-fulfilling.

You

are asked not to prejudge the experience but rather to reserve your judgment.
The only way you will ever know whether the experiment "works" or not is to
give yourself as completely as possible to it.
ld)

Feedback.

Your own behavior is the major "input" in the laboratory.

But trying "new ways" of behaving is somewhat useless unless it is possible
to determine how this behavior strikes others.

Therefore, you are asked not

only to react to others but to tell others how their behavior strikes you.
You, too, will receive feedback from the other participants.

Br

means of

such feedback you should come to a better understanding of your own
interpersonal abilities and limitations.
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Try to get a feeling for your ability to involve yourself to make contact

with others.

All of us have strong points and all of us have areas of

deficit in our interpersonal li"Vi:ug.

Use the group in order to get a feeling

for both.
4,

Rules of Innnediacy.

If the laboratory experience is to be intensive, it

must be as innnediate as possible.

Certain "rules" facilitate a climate of

immediacy in the group.
(a)

The here-and-now.

there-and-then.

Deal with the here-and-now rather than the

Your interactions with one another are the most important

part of the laboratory.

When you do talk about _things that have happened or

are happening outside the group, do so ih such a way so to make them relevant
to what is happening in the group.

If you keep talking about things outside

the group, people and situations unfamiliar to tµe other participants, you
will lose their interest.

Make the outside and the past somehow "present"

to your fellow group members.

Talking about people and things outside the

group is sometimes a way of fleeing from more intensive group interaction.
(b)

Cooperation.

one another.

Your goals can be reached only if you cooperate with

This does not mean at all that there will not be disagreements,

but interpersonal growth is much more likely to take place in an atmosphere
of cooperation rather

than one of competition or conspiracy.

mean that you have to be "nice" for the sake of being nice:

This does not
a cooperative

group structure does not exclude strong feeling and confrontation.

But there

is little immediacy unless you move toward the other person in an effort to
involve yourself with bim.

The contract provides a structure for cooperation.

If you are fulfilling the provisions of the contract, you can be sure that
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you are cooperating with the other participants.
Avoid generalities.

(c)

When ·you speak, try to be concrete and specific.

for instance, when speaking abo.ut yourself, use "I."
you mean "I • II

Do

not use ''you" when

In fact, try to avoid using general words to refer to people

such as "you," "one," "people," "men," "they," ''we," and the like.
say:

Do not

"There are some people in the group with whom I get along better, but

rather:

"I seem to get along better with John and Mary than with any of the

other members of the group,"
group:

Finally, do not make speeches to the whole

even if you want to address the whole group, try to address the group

through another member.

For instance, say:

"John, you were not really

listening to me this morning; in fact, this seems to be a group problem:

I

I

I

I

don't really listen to one another."

we

If you address yourself always to the

whole group, the other members will often sit there and listen respectfully
to you, but no one will respond to you.
to be addressed to nobody.

Speeches addressed to everybody tend

In summary, use "I" when you mean "I"; be concrete,

avoiding vagueness and generalities; try to address individuals in the group,
even when you are addressing the entire group (in a way, you are always
addressing the entire group whenever you speak).
(d)

Do not "siphon off" issues of concern to the group.

Sometimes

group members get together in twos and threes outside the group and work
through issues that have arisen within the group.

lbere is nothing wrong

with this providing you summarize to the group what has taken place outside
the group.

If the issues come up within the group, then, in some sense, they

belong to the group.

If these issues, then, are settled outside the group,

some of the life of the group is "siphoned off," and the group becomes
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somewhat anemic because of it, that is, it loses a degree of immediacy.
5.

The elements of dialogue:

You will contact one another

emotion, language, and the fusion of the two.

pr~~cipally

by talking to one another.

Language,

then, and the expression of feeling are crucial factors for this experiment.
(a)

Emotion.

Try to let reality have an emotional impact on you,

especially the lli!llity of the other members of the group.

Let yourself feel

various emotions; feel what it feels like to experience these emotions.
Secondly, let yourself react as constructively as possible to what you
experience.

Do not try to hide the emotional dimensions of yourself.

be overly intellectual:

Do not

ideas are certainly important, but in laboratories

in interpersonal relations, emotions are equally as important.

Tell others,

then, not just how you think about things, but how you feel about them.
Sometimes our ideas and our emotions do not coincide.

It is good to be able

to recognize this division within yourself.
(b)

Human language.

Get a new feeling for the power of human language.

How do you translate yourself into language?

Find out whether your language

gives expression to the deep you or only to the superficial you.

If you

tend to use an exsanguinated language in your day-to-day contacts, experiment
with a more forceful us' of language in the group.

Try to avoid cliches; use

words that have more "power" than the words you ordinarily use.

Language can

be a form of contact or it can be a barrier between you and the other; try
to make your language as "contactive" as possible.

If you speak in cliches

and generalities, this might well reflect an unwillingness on your part to
make deeper contacts with others.
(c)

Poetry:

welding

feeling~

language and language

~feeling.

Try
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to let your feelings find expression in language and let your language be
colored by feeling.
translate

Some of us experience things deeply, but we cannot

our experiencing into __..language.

to make attempts to do just that.

The laboratory is an opportunity

When you succeed, your language will be,

in one of the deepest senses, "poetry," for it will be an integrated expression of the person you are.
6.

The Core Interactions
The heart of this contract and therefore of the group experience itself

are the kinds of interaction in which you will engage.

You are asked to

experiment with the kinds of interaction listed below.

They are ways of

contacting others, of involving yourself with others, and therefore offer
possibilities of growing with others.

You are asked, then, to engage in the

following kinds of activity in the group:
(a)

Self-disclosure.

You are asked to be open about yourself.

This

means that you are to talk about yourself in such a way as to get the
"real-you" (rather than a facade) across to others.

In one sense, facts

about yourself are not important in themselves; the fact that through them
you "translate" yourself to others in the group is important.
asked to reveal your past life or your darkest secrets.
not your secrets.

You are not

You are important,

What you say about yourself should encourage others to

"come in," that is, self-disclosure should constitute a kind of invitation
to others to involve themselves with you.
It is up to you to determine how you will talk about yourself and what
you will say.

This sounds very abstract right now, and it will be easier to

determine in the give-and~take of the group interaction.

There are various
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"levels" of self-disclosure:
is.

the more personal something is the deeper it

The general "level" of self-revalation is generally determined by the

group itself and depends on a

~Jllllber

of factors--for instance, the willingness

of individuals to take risks and the level of trust in the group.

The point

is that the group members and not the contract determine the level at which
they will work.

You will undoubtedly reveal yourself at a level at which

you feel comfortable, or perhaps a little beyond (that is, you will "risk"
talking about yourself).

A moderate degree of anxiety in the group is

generally a sign that you are working at least a little beyond the "level of
comfort," and such anxiety, if controlled, can be a help rather than a hindrance.

Self-disclosure, if it is authentic, if it is really a "translation"

of yourself, tends to create intimacy.

If you have difficulty talking about

yourself, if you become too anxious, it might well be that you fear rejection
but it is also possible that you are afraid of the intimacy to which selfrevelation leads.
Self-disclosure must be in keeping with the "here-and-now" rule.

If you

talk about your past, you should do so because it tells something about the
kind of person you are here and now in this group.

If you talk about how you

are outside the group, this, too, should be made relevant to the "you" that
is in the group.
others.

That is, self-disclosure should stimulate interaction with

Never just talk on about yourself to a passive audience.

In keeping

with the "here-and-now" rule, one area of self-disclosure is most important:
You should talk about what is happening to you in the group.
if you are anxious, let others know that you are anxious:

For instance,

others want to

deal with you as you are, but this is impossible if you hide

yo:·~

feelings.
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If you are bored, let others know immediately.

It is deadly to wait an hour

and then tell others that you have been bored.

In a sense, you are responsibl

for your own boredom if you do

~Qt

speak up.

Finally, although it was said above that you do not have to talk about
your deepest secrets, you may speak as deeply about yourself as you wish.
'!be point is that you will not be forced to do so.

Sometimes if someone else

speaks rather personally about himself, you will find it easier to talk about
yourself (but you should remember that this works the other way around also).
(b)

The manner of expressing feeling.

emotion be part of the group experience.

Above you were encouraged to let

Too often we either swallow our

feelings (for instance, our anger) only to let them filter out in rather
unproductive ways (we become cold or uncooperative, we make snide remarks or
remain silent, etc.).

There is another possibility however:

speak frankly

to one another about your emotion-laden contacts with one another.

For

instance, if you are angry, instead of just "blowing up" or "swallowing"
your anger, let the other know that you are angry and would like to work it
through:

"John, I'm really angry with what you said, but I'd like to tell

you why and get some response from you.
with you here. 11
/

I

If possible, I want to work this out

Perhaps such frankness coupled with a desire to work things

through would constitute for you a "new way" of being present to another.
(c)
to others.

Listening.

It is amazing to discover how poorly we tend to listen

The contract asks you to examine your ability to listen.

Listening does not mean just hearing words and sentences and understanding
their meaning, rather it means "reaching out" for what another has to say,
it means listening to persons rather than just ideas.

Learning to pick up all
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the cues that othars emit, including both verbal and nonverbal cues, is part
of listening.

Facial expressions, gestures, a shrug of the shoulders,

bodily positions--all of these. __ jlre sources of communication.

Often, too,

when we communicate with one another, we embed "surplus-messages" in our
overt connnunications by the way we say things.

You are asked to become

sensitive to the "surplus-message" aspects of communication also.
(d)

Support.

It is difficult for people to "put themselves on the

line," that is, to engage in meaningful self-disclosure and to express
feelings responsibly.

Wh.en you and the other members of the group do make

sincere attempts to fulfill the contract, then you need support.

It is

assumed that you are basically supportive, that is, that you have some kind
of bas·ic acceptance of others simply because they !.!!.; otherwise you would
not want to engage in an experience the goal of which is interpersonal
growth.

Still, you can

acc~pt

others, and sincerely ao, without always

approving of everything they do.

It may be, for instance, that you may

reveal things about yourself which you yourself do not approve.

Obviously,

then, though you would expect others to support you in your self-disclosure,
you would hardly expect them to approve of the things that you disapprove of

I

in yourself.

J

others to fulfill the contract.

Support has two phases.

The antecedent phase consists in encouraging
Fo~

instance, one of the best ways of

encouraging others to fulfill the contract is to fulfill it yourself.

!l

lbe

leader-member will try· to do just this by "modeling" the behavior called

I

I
I

I

l

for by the contract.

The second phase refers to your support of those who

do engage in contractual interaction.

Others will reveal themselves, they
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vill express their feelings.

Support then means giving some kind of recogni-

tion that the other has fulfilled the contract, that he has "done a good
thing."

Support means being res_p_onsive to the behavior of others.

Again,

engaging in contractual behavior is an excellent way of giving phase-two
support.

For instance, if one of the members engages in responsible self-

disclosure, you may give him a good deal of support by revealing something
about yourself in the same area, something that responds to his concern.
Although support is absolutely necessary for effective group operation,
it is also perhaps one of the most difficult of the contractual provisions.
When someone "invites you in" by being open about himself, you may feel
gauche and find it difficult to respond to him.

When someone speaks

feelingly about himself, it is too easy to ignore his feelings (for this may
be an uncomfortable aspect of his communication) and to try to deal with him
on an intellectual level, for instance, by asking him a lot of questions.
Because of our discomfort we try to intellectualize the whole process.

t

1

II

ever,

How-

if you are made uncomfortable by what another says, if you are unable

to respond in what you think would be a meaningful way, do not pretend that
you can.

Counterfeit support, expressed in such cliches as "I understand,"

and "I know how you feel," deadens group process.

Perhaps your best response

is to admit that you are uncomfortable, that you are at a loss for a response.
This can be supportive in itself, because it is honest.

Do not try to show

"conventional" sympathy to others merely because you think that you should
say something.
of a convention.

Support is the gift of one's person and not the fulfillment
Learning to be present to others in meaningful support is

one of the most important tasks of the group experience.
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(e)

Confronting others.

Sometimes you will find it impossible to agree

with what another person is saying or doing.
honestly as you can, and tell hi.JD why.

If this is true, tell him so as

This is confrontation.

Confrontation

is basically an invitation to another to examine or reflect upon his behavior
"in community," that is, in the context of the group.

For instance, perhaps

another person in the group is simply not fulfilling the provisions of the
contract at all (if he is silent all the time, he could not be).

If you

tell him this and ask him to examine his behavior, then you are confronting
him.

The way you confront, however, is very important:

the cardinal rule

is that you should confront another because you are concerned about him and
want to involve yourself with him.
"telling a person off."

Confrontation is not just irresponsible

Responsible confrontation is an invitation to self-

examination, not an act of punishment.

If you are merely punishing another,

you might find some relief (for instance, from your anger), but you are doing
little to set up interpersonal contact between yourself and the other.
Undeniably confrontation will almost always have some kind of punitive side
effects (none of us like to be challenged because of allegedly negative forms

j

of behavior), but punishment cannot constitute the rationale of confrontation.
Sometimes it is not easy to confront without making punishment the primary

I
I

purpose of the act.

Confrontation, then, is something you must experiment

with in the group.
{f)

Responding to confrontation.

If confrontation is responsible,

that is, if it really is an invitation to self-examination, then obviously
the best response .!!_self-examination.

However, when we are confronted, even

when it is done by someone who is concerned for us and wants to involve
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himBelf with us, our instinctive response is often twofold:
ourselves and to attack the confronter.
side effects of confrontation

i~~tead

to defend

That is, we respond to the punitive

of to the confrontation itself.

Therefore, try to listen to what the one confronting is saying and not just
to the feelings he is evoking in you.

If what he says is true and if, in

addition, he wants to involve himself with you, then it is to your advantage
to listen, to examine yourself, and to respond to him.

This is difficult,

but frequently rewarding.
Self-disclosure, expression of feeling, listening, support, confrontation
and response to confrontati.on--these, then, are the forms of interpersonal
behavior with which you are asked to experiment.

The ability to engage

freely and responsibly in such behaviors is interpersonal growth.
7.

! Stance against Flight. Engaging in the kinds of interactions described

above is not easy, and therefore we find ways of running away from group
process.

We tend to run away because we get anxious, because we

prefer

not to know the truth about ourselves, because it is painful, perhaps, to be
the object of another's concern.

You are asked, then, to take a stance

against all the different forms of flight from inimate group interaction:
e.g. calling upon humor whenever things get "too" serious, keeping one's
feelings to oneself, spending a good deal of time on intellectualized
interpretations of the behavior of others.

You must become sensitive to the

ways you flee group process and to the different ways in which the group as
a whole tends to flee (e.g. by "tacitly" deciding not to talk about certain
subjects).

Confronting modes of flight in yourself and in the group is

essential to the li,ee of the group.

One JDOde of flight is extremely
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~estructive:

cyniciSIO about the experience even before one enters into it.

nie person who comes to the group believing that he will get nothing from it
o~

.,,.111 leave having fulfilled his
11

prophecy.

nxiety by employing all sorts of defenses.

dealing with it in the group.

Try not to flee from your

Rather handle your anxiety by

It is obvious by now that the contract demands

t!iat you be active in the group.

Silence and withdrawal are types of flight.

f'erhaps in other groups the non-active member profits even though he adds
little more than his presence.
8.

Freedom.

Th.is cannot be the case in the contract-group.

This contract is not meant to put you in constraints; it is

meant to help you channel your freedom.

It says, for instance, that self-

disclosure is a value in this group, but it does not say what you must talk
about nor does it dictate the level of disclosure.

Th.is is something that

you must work out yourself in the give-and-take of group interaction.

You

must choose the kinds of interaction that are most meaningful to you.

Some

of the experiments you engage in in the group will be successes and some
failures, but this is a reflection of life itself.
much from the group nor too little.

Try

not to expect too

The only way you can really learn about

the possibilities of the group experience is by giving yourself to it.

The contract, then, is a certain attempt to use cognitive input at the
beginning of the group experience in order, hopefully, to promise interpersonal-affective learning.

If the cognitive input, to a greater or lesser

extent becomes a reality of interpersonal function, then the group experience
has been'successful."
The elements in the above contract are the elements found in any

-.

~
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sensitivity-training group the goal of which is interpersonal growth.

The

contract provides a certain degree of what Boy and Pine (1963) call
"structured permissiveness";

th~_contract

is both a stimulus and a safeguard:

it moves the participants toward intensive interaction, but it lays down
certain ground rules to insure that this interaction will be growthful.

It

facilitates the formation of a "cultural island" in which the participants
are given a good deal of "cultural permission" to investigate the possibilitie
of intimacy with one another; risk-taking is not eliminated but it is
controlled.
The term "contract group" will
follow.

be used frequently in the pages that

However, when it is said that something happens or should happen in

the contract group, this means that this "something" is part of the contractual experience and
of

~

sensitivity~training

that it does not or could not happen in other kinds
experiences.

For instance, it is stated explicitly

in the contract that constructive confrontation is an expressed value in the
contract group, it mus: be remembered that confrontation constitutes an
essential element in any kind of laboratory experience in which personal and
interpersonal growth are overriding concerns.
The Focused Contract
Contracts can be comprehensive--they may cover all the major facets of
the group experience--or they can be "focused"--they may refer specific
facets of the training experience.

The "focused" contract, for instance, can

be introduced as an exercise in the group.

It may be that the participants

have made a "tacit decisi.on" not to talk about sex, even though it is an
issue of major concern and the failure to deal with it in any way is
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the interaction.

The trainer under the circumstances might

introduce a focused contract which will enable the participants to deal with
the

issue under relatively low-risk conditions.

A sample contract might

read something like this:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The general topic of the next meeting will be sex.
The purpose of the meeting is not to have individual participants
disclose their sex lives but to examine the reasons why this
group has completely avoided the topic of sex.
What are some of the fears you personally would have in discussing
sexual issues here?
What are some of the advantages that would accrue to you
personally from a more open discussion of sexual issues?
If you do talk about yourself, feel free to "bracket" any areas
you find too uncomfortable to discuss.

Such a focused contract gives the participants a certain degree of cultural
permission to deal with sexual issues.

It stimulates but does not force.

It

l

is admittedly contrived, but so is the entire laboratory experience.

I

advantage lies in the fact that it uses structure to rescind a possibly non-

Its

growthful "tacit decision"; it gives the group the freedom to face an issue
or to decide openly to "bracket" an area in future discussions.

The variety

of such focused contracts is limited only by the imaginative resources of
the group.
~ Impsed Versus

.!h,!. Freely Chosen Contract

It has been suggested above that the contract be given to prospective
participants before the training experience begins so that they may decide
whether or not they want to participate in such a laboratory.

If this is

i

I

l

I

the case, then the contract can be pursued with a good deal of vehemence
(see Bach, 1966), but even then it should be remembered that the contract
exists for the sake of the participants and not vice versa and intensive
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pursuit of a contract should exclude mechanical rigidity and inflexibility.
However, the more usual case is that the participants enter a laboratory
experience with only general ideaa about the nature of the experience.
question is:

Can a contract be imposed on such participants?

believe, is yes.

l

I
\

The

The answer, I

The participants come expecting some kind of experiment

in interpersonal intimacy.

The contract merely gives form to the experience.

It does not exist in order to manipulate the participants in some kind of
inhuman way; it is there to channel their energies.

I have "imposed" both

general and focused contracts on groups with good effect.

On occasion there

has been too much talk about the contract and its provisions during the
j

interaction, but this relatively mild form of flight is easily handled.

It

II

would be another question were a leader to impose a sensitivity-training

f

such an experience even in a general way, to impose such a contract would be

1
l

to impose on their freedom.

I

contract on a discussion group.

Since the participants had not opted for

Finally, if imposition-of-contract rather than

entry-by-contract characterizes a laboratory-training group, the interaction
will tend to be somewhat less intense.
Cautions
~

l:!l Contractual
myths

~ ~.

Approaches

ideal contract.

The contract delineated in this

chapter, while it does not include many of the factors that are relevant to
all

interpersonal~growth-oriented

an ideal that should be imitated.

laboratory experiences, is not necessarily
As noted above, contracts should be

fitted to the needs and the goals of the participants:
itself.

it is not a goal in

Furthermore, while the contract may both stimulate and channel

the energies of the group, it has no J1111gic in itself nor is it a substitute
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work.

Dozens of different contracts, both comprehensive and focused,

could be elaborated, but they are valuable only if they serve the needs of
the group.

If they do not, they

~hould

be discarded.

However, they should

not be discarded before they are given a fair trial, for this would merely

l

condone the flight tendencies of the group.
The myth of the ideal participant.
two senses.

The contract is an ideal in at least

First of all, it is an abstraction that becomes concrete only in

the lives of tha participants.

However, if it is to be meaningful, it must

be adapted to the needs of the individual participant.

Since individual

participants differ greatly from one another, the contract is not to be
rigidly applied to all participants in a univocal way.

The contract (for

instance, the contract outlined in this chapter) calls for experimentation
with certain kinds of behavior (self-disclosure, confrontation, etc.), but
the individual hinlself in the context of the

give~d-take

of the group

interaction must determine what behaviors are most meaningful to him and
the degree to which he thinks that he should engage in them.

He may be

asked to experiment with. selt~disclosure, but he is not asked to engage in
as much

self~disclosure

as participant A nor aa little as participant B, nor

does he have to discuss the same areas that participant C does.

In order to

become more deeply himself, the participant has to make choices, but his

.

choices should be based on his own interpersonal-growth needs rather than
arbitrary "ideals," whether these ideals are set forth in a contract or
elaborated by the group itself.

While the individual participant should

become as aware as possible of his own resistance to growth and come to
realize that this resistance can manifest itself in his inventing reasons
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why he should not engage in contractual behavior, still he should retain his

autonomy throughout the group experience and not allow it merely to carry
him along.

The hypothesis is that if he both fails to take risks and fails

to make choices, the group experience will not benefit him.
The contract is an ideal in a second sense.

The contractual behaviors

outlined in the contract above and explained in the following chapters are
not easy to

engag~

in, and success is not measured by the participants

ability to engage in every one of them perfectly.

The contract is primarily

a stimulus and a guide for behavior, not some absolute measure of growth
or a device by which one participant may be compared with another.

j

I

The

contract is an ideal in the sense that it sets goals, but it does not (and
cannot) delineate idiosyncratic pursuit and poasesaion of such goals.

Growth is direction:

in some sense of the term it means "moving forward,"

but it also encompasses such notions as "regressions," "plateaus," and
"limits."

The contract-group participant is expected to ''move forward" with

the contract as a stimulus and a guide, but since different participants
have different interpersonal potentialities and since there are a variety
of starting points, "success" in contract-fulfillment must be defined
idiosyncratically.

As Bunker (1965) puts it, there is "no standard learning

outcome and no stereotyped ideal toward which conformity is induced" (p. 42).
Boyd and Elli.as (1962), too, argue that no particular pattern can be regarded
as typical training outcome.

The entire laboratory experience, including

the contract, is at the service of the individual.
Fulfilling
the contract.

~

contract.

There is, then, no "perfect" way of fulfilling

One person's approach might be global, that is, he gets some
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idea of the spirit underlying the provisions of the contract and tries to

'

experiment in some global way with contractual behaviors that seem meaningful
to him.

Another person's approach might-be more studied, that is, he might

carefully consider each contractual provision and try to see what each means
for his interpersonal behavior.

Neither of these extremes or anything in

between is the way of implementing the contract.

It is certainly assumed

that every participant will "violate" the contract in one way or another from
time to time, but he can learn as much about himself through recognized
violations as through strict observance.
The contract as contrived.

Some might say that contracts are too

rational, that life runs on as a mixture of the rational and the irrational,
and that people cannot be expected to do violence to their life style in order
to follow the provisions of a contract.

A training laboratory is a place

where people come in order to examine their life styles.

If a person's life

is governed too closely by reason, the contract gives him an opportunity to
experiment with the affective dimensions of life; if a person's emotional
life is too labile, the contract gives him an opportunity to experiment with

j
I

growthful controls.

The question is not whether the laboratory is contrived

I

or not but whether it has a growthful impact on the participant's real life

f
I

it can enrich it.

or not.

The laboratory is not real life nor is it a substitute for it, but

~ Contract and Research Possibilities

Research with training laboratories, especially laboratories in interPersonal relations, is minimal.

The purpose of this short section is not

to indicate what research should be done (Campbell and Dunnette [1968,
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do point out major areas of needed research) but to suggest what

contributions contract approaches might make to research in this area.
1eem

to be principally two:
Control.

They

con,;ro 1 and provocation.

Golembiewski (1962) divides small groups into three "designa-

tions" for the purpose of research.

"Designation I" means that the group:

1.

Consists of a small number of individuals in more or less
interdependent status and role relations who

2.

Have an indigenous set of values or norms which regulate
the behavior of members at least in matters of concern to
the group (p. 35).

He quotes Bales (1950) in defining "Designation II": "any number of persons
engaged in a single face-to-face meeting or series of meetings in which each
member receives some impression of the others as a distinct person even
though it was only to recall that the other was present" (Bales, 1950, p. 33).
"Designation III" refers to groups in a simple aggregative sense: "Thus one
study dealt with a 'relatively stable group of college students.' 'Stable'
was defined as lack of newcomers or dropouts.

The group was a formal one of

forty-two girls taking the same course of study" (Golembiewski, 1962, p. 36) •
Golembiewski complains that it is difficult to determine whether the exper!mental collectivities in any "laboratory" situation are really small groups
in the sense of "Designation I."

And yet, he says, this question becomes

crucial in the analysis pf experimental results with such groups.

The

contract-group offers a possible answer to the problem of membership
(psychological rather than just formal).
sense of "Designation I."

It is certainly a group in the

Research with contract-groups seems to be quite

feasible, for the contract not only gives greater assurance of the kind of
ns i

also eliminntes a number
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uncontrolled variables (e.g., it reduces the number of goals in the minds

J! group members) and provides a definite set of variables amenable to

•tatistical analysis.

---

Truax and Carkhuff (1967) recommend as a research model for psychotherapy
general linear equation.

the

c!iange (CPC).
be

The outcome desired is constructive personality

The variables which lead to this outcome and which are to

placed in the linear equation are therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive

~annth),

patient variables (e.g. self-exploration), situational or contextual

\'ariables (e.g. vicarious therapy pre-training), and interaction or process
variables (e.g. the therapist's approach to hostile responses on the part of
the client).

The same linear model is applicable to laboratory-training

situations also.

The contract controls the variables which go into the

training situation:

leader variables, participant variables, situational

variables, and interaction variables.

Since the researcher can also

determine whether the contract had been fulfilled or not, he can more easily
relate training variables to outcomes.
Provocation.

Weick (1968} defines the observational method in research

as "the selection, provocation, recording, and encoding of that set of
behaviors and settings concerning organisms 'in situ' which is consistent
~ith

empirical aims" (p. 360).

With respect to provocation he says:

For the moment it is sufficient to note that settings and behaviors
are robust and that interventions do not necessarily affect the
ways in whi.ch they unfold. As was pointed out, it is· 'provocation'
.which tends, more than any other term, to blur the distinction
between experimental and naturalistic methodology. We contend that
such blurring is beneficial (p. 361).
He talks of "the use of directed settings" and of "evoking a behavior":

_...,

I

.

94

-c.1 reful

choice. and/or lDOdification of a situation can enable observers to

c·:oke behaviors that are of interest" (p •. 377}.
t.J

provoke or stimulate behaviors "of interest."

The contract, then, is used
It is assumed here that

training situations are "robust," that is, that the addition of the contract
\

•

does not radically alter the nature of the training group.

~s

itself is contrived and it would seem that the contrived nature of the contrac

i

The laboratory

!

is not antithetical to the nature or purposes of the laboratory.

J

in face-to-face groups can be scored (see Holsti, 1968 and Weick, 1968).

Scoring systems.

There are many different ways in which interactions

They go from the relatively simple to that of Katz (1964) which has 56
categories.

In the contract-group the contract itself provides the scoring

categories.

For instance, I have used a rather simple scoring system in some

i

informal research.

t

a series of phrases or sentences, uttered wi.thout interruption, about p.
single topic.

The scoring unit used was the "remark" (Snoek, 1962):

"Remarks" were scored (+) if they were contractual, (-) if they

i

were non-contractual, and 0t) if they were questions or remarks which

f

merely sustained the interaction without adding to it in a contractual way.

l

lbe (+}'sand the (:-l's were also rated on a three-point scale to give some
indication of how "good" or how "poor" the "remark" was.
~egan to emerge.

Participant profiles

For instance, one young man's profile consisted almost

entirely of ()c)'s, that is, he had become a kind of leader in his own right,
but not a leader-member, for he contributed little in the way of contractual
behavior.

"Remarks" can also be broken down into other categories.

For

instance, (+)'scan be scored according to the kind of contractual behavior
engaged in (self~disclosure, responsible confrontation, self-exploration as a
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response to confrontation, etc.).

In the same way, (-)'scan be scored in

such a way as to indicate the kind of flight involved (defensiveness,
counterattack, actuarial self-disclosure,
punitive confrontation, etc.).
..;-

Such

scoring leads to more elaborate and more useful profiles.
Concluding Remarks
How detailed a contract?

How detailed a contract should be given to

participants in a contract training laboratory?
a question.

Only research can answer such

One hypothesis would be that the relationship between the

definition (detailed nature) of the contract and group productivity is
curvilinear:

contracts both too high and too low in definition will result

in low productivity, while a contract of moderate definition indicating clear
goals and flexible means will result in high productivity.

In high-definition

conditions the participants become too embroiled in the technicalities.of the
contract itself; in

low~definition

conditions ambiguity is high and many

energies remain unchanneled.
Maintenance versus effective synergy.

Cattell (1951) calls the sum

total of the energy which any group can command and expend "synergy."
"Maintenance synergy" is the energy used up in the machinery which keeps the
group in existence and "effective synergy" is the residual energy available
to carry out the purposes for which the group explicitly exists.

One of

the primary functions of the contract is to cut down on maintenance synergy
and maximize effective synergy.
the contract can do just that.

If the group has pre-established goals, then
For groups whose primary goal is to create

their goals it is another question •

.!h!:_ chapters which follow.

The rest of the book is a study in some
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of the provi.si.ons of the contract outlined in this. chapter.

~ontract

Since the

variables suggested here are· those associated with any sensitivity-

training experience designed to

~-~imulate

interpersonal growth, the following

chapters probe the anatomy of such experiences.
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Chapter III
Group Goals

.--

! :it roduc tion

.

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) in a review article summarize some of the
~oals

I

I

I
I1
I

'
i
!

of laboratory training:

1. Increased self-insight or self-awareness concerning one's own
behavior and its meaning in a social context ••••
2. Increased sensitivity to the behavior of others •••• It refers
first, to the development of an increased awareness of the full
range of communicative stimuli emitted by other persons ••• and second,
to the development of the ability to infer accurately the emotional
or noncognitive bases for interpersonal communications ••••
3. Increased awareness and understanding of the types of processes
that facilitate or inhibit group functioning and the interactions
between different groups--specifically, why do some members
participate actively while others retire to the background? Why
do sub-groups form and wage war against each other? •••
4. Heightened diagnostic skill in social, interpersonal, and
intergroup situations •••
5. Increased action skill •••• [I]t ••• refers to a person's ability
to intervene successfully so as to increase member satisfactions,
effectiveness, or output. The goal of increased action skill is~
toward intervention at the interpersonal rather than simply the
technological level.
6. Learning how to learn. This does not refer to an individual's
cognitive approach to the world, but rather his ability to analyze
continually his own interpersonal behavior for the purpose of
helping himself and others achieve more effective and satisfying
interpersonal relationships.
Differential emphasis among the above objectives constitutes one of
the most important dimensions for distiriguishing among variations
in T groups (p. 75).
The overall emphasis depends principally on the unit of society which is the
focus of the laboratory.

Laboratories may focus on individuals, groups, or

organizations or on any combination of the three.

A key question in any

laborato~y is whether the participants at the beginning of the laboratory
have a clear idea of the purpose of the laboratory or not.
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pevelopmental sequence·!!!_ training groups.

Another way of getting a

feeling for the general goals of training groups is to see what actually takes
place over time in such groups. __Tuckman (1965), in reviewing developmental
sequence in small groups in general, distinguishes between the interpersonal
stages of group development and task behaviors manifested in the group.

He

calls the pattern of interpersonal relationships the "group structure,"
while the content of interaction as related to the task at hand is called the
"task activity."

This distinction is somewhat difficult to maintain in therap

and training groups, however, since the task is a personal and interpersonal
one:

"the group exists to help the individuals deal with themselves and

others" (p. 385).
is

The proposed developmental sequence in training groups

as follows:
Stage .!_.

Group structure:

testing and dependence.

In this initial

stage there is a good deal of testing and dependency behavior, the latter
~e!=.g

predominant.

Participants express, in one way or another, strong

:ependency needs toward the trainer.

There is a tendency toward quick

acceptance of structure and arbitrary norms •
.stage

.!.·

Task activity:

orientation.

There is a good deal of talk

a!x>ut what is to be accomplished (goals) and how (means).
Stage .?_.

Group structure:

place in the group.

intragroup conflict.

Polarization takes

For instance, those who favor a more active, less

defensive approach vie with those who remain defensive and try to find safety
in structure.

Anxiety, threat, and resistance characterize this stage.

There are also struggles for leadership.
Stage .?_:

Task activity:

emotional response to task demands.

Members

I
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I

I
f

l

,·xpress themselves freely and engage :in experimental aggressiveness and
:iostility.

The task is to remove blocks to learning about themselves, to

reduce anxiety, and to express

re.~l

reactions to one another.

I

relevant T-group development studies see the stage of conflict and polariza-

j

tion as being followed by a stage characterized by the reduction of conflict

I

resolution of the polarized issues, and establishment of group harmony in

J
•l

Stage

Group structure:

the place of disruption.

development of group cohesion.

"All the

It is a 'patching-up' phase in which group norms

and values emerge" (Tuckman, p. 392) •
Stage

'

1.·

l·

Task activity:

discussing oneself and others.

''While the

j

social function of the third stage is to cause a unique and cohesive group

t

structure to emerge, the task function is to attempt to use this new

f

structure as a vehicle for discovering personal relations and emotions by

i

t

conununicating heretofore private feelings" (p. 392).
Stage !±_.

Group structure:

functional role-relatedness.

The members

coalesce into a work organization which has strong but flexible norms;
members provide one another support and mutual acceptance.
Stage!±_. ·Task activity:

insight.

The participants discover things

about themsleves and provide one another with growthful feedback.

If, then, the development sequence of a training group gives any
indication of the sequence of desirable goals, the following goal-pattern
emerges:

(l} The expression of dependency needs and the need for structure;

(2) discussion of goals and means; (3) experimentation with aggressiveness
and hostility; (4) declaring where one stands with respect to proposed goals;
(5) attempts to reduce defensiveness and anxiety; (6) reduction of conflict.
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increased cohesion; (7) open discussion of self and others; (8) working to
i

l
i

I

~intain

an organization of support and mutual acceptance; (9) deepening of

communication, intimacy, responsible
feedback •
..
~-

~mbiguity

Versus Clarity of Goals in Laboratory Training

Confusion in face-to-face groups.
whatever tneir nature:

In most small, face-to-face groups--

laboratories in group dynamics, T-Groups, psycho-

therapy groups--the members undergo a good deal of at least initial confusion,
anxiety, and discomfort because they have no clear knowledge of group goals.
Obviously their knowledge of the means to achieve nebulous goals is even
less distinct.

For instance, the patient in a group psychotherapy setting

realizes that he is in the group "to get better," and he either has a vague
idea himself or he is told that "getting better" is contingent upon his
talking about his problems in the group.
he is being "cured" in a group.

But the patient often wonders why

Many patients see the group--and often this

is a true perception of what is actually happening--as a place

wh~e

a number

of individual therapy sessions are conducted at the same time.
The novice T-Group member is traditionally "at sea" during the early
sessions of the group.

He may be told of the general "contract" that exists

between trainer and group, but both the contract and the goals are implied
in it, if remembered at all, remain vague.

Benne (1964), for example, tells

his groups that he is a resource person who is there to help them learn
about groups and membership in groups.

He indi.cates that there are two

sources of data for learning about groups:

(1) the knowledge that members

already have about groups because of membership in other groups, and (2) the
observation and clarification of behavioral events and the relationships
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that emerge. in the T-Group itself, as the members interact with one another.
Hennis (1964} spells out the goals of

I

I

I
I
Ii
I

l

a

human relations laboratory:

There are two major goals of .. .the T-Group which can be
indivisible in operation: (1) that group members become more
aware of the enabling and disabling factors in decision-making
in groups and of their own behavior and feelings in groups;
(2) that group members utilize the group as a crucible for
increasing their own repertoire of skills in managing group
processes and their own behavior in groups (p. 272).
But, despite these adumbrations of some kind of operational goals, earlysession confusion is almost universal:
If we were to interview members of a T-Group during its
early sessions concerning the then current goal of the group,
we would find two modal perceptions. One is the perception
of goallessness-- •••• The other is that the group goal is what
"I" (that is, the group leader) and a few other members have
stated it should be and that most of the other members are
aimlessly (or willfully) wandering from this goal (Benne, 1964,
p. 217).

l
I

which the participants are to leam "group fomative processes" (Benne, 1964)

ft

by immersing themselves in group process.

Such ambiguity, goallessness, and division are beneficial in laboratories in

Bennis (1964) sees this initial

groping for goals, not primarily as a search for a viable goal-structure,
but rather as dependency plea:

"The group's pretense of a fruitless search

for goals is a plea for hiJU (the leader) to tell the group what to do"
(p. 254).

The leader is presumed to know what the goals are or ought to be.

But, according to Bennis, initial dependency gives way to something more
solid:

"Without any particular structure or clear-cut goals to begin with,

the group must develop its own muscles and structure; and this demands
sophistication about the group formative processes, as well as sensitivity
to the self as a result of this maturation process" (pp. 274-275).

The group
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l

l

start goalless because one of the principal goals or functions of the
-must
group is to create its own goals. The interactions involved in this creative

I

process contribute also to the __ _l!ersonal and interpersonal growth of the

I

participants.

I

Gibb (1964) distinguishes between "natural" groups and

!-Groups precisely in terms of goals; T-Groups are forced by the very nature
of the "social contract" to both create and scrutinize goals.
In groups in which the participants must create their own goals there
is bound to be a good deal of frustration and division.

French (1941)

showed that the attractiveness of a group is lessened when the members
disagree over the way to solve a group problem (e.g., the establishment of
goals).

He notes that withdrawal is most likely to occur when the members

are disagreeing over the method they should use in solving the problem.
Indeed, in a residential laboratory there is usually a good deal of talk
about "getting out of here" because of the disorder, confusion, and hostility
that characterize the goal-setting phase of the laboratory.

However, since

it is a laboratory and since goal-setting is part of the experiment, few if
any participants actually do leave (many more would probably leave if this
were a "real life" situation).
such a process.

Undoubtedly there is must to be learned from

The group both feels and later reflects on the frustrations

and divisions that go into a group decision'""11laking process.

The individual,

because of the behavior he emits and the feedback he gets, learns a great
deal about himself on an interpersonal level.

There are undoubtedly other

advantages to engaging in such goal-creating activity.

For instance, Lorge

and his associates (19581 note increased productivity on the part of groups
which have had a hand in setting goals for themselves.
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In the typical T-Group, the members come with such a variety of personal
goals that the trainer must be oriented toward a "meta-goal," namely,
"establishing the group

conditi~t\..P

which are necessary for maximally meeting

the needs of the various members who enter with discrepant individual goals"
(Horwitz, 1964, pp. 365-366).

Therefore, in the early sessions at least,

even though group leaders or trainers have a more panoramic view of the group
process and where it is going, the members remain confused.
is

But, again, this

understandable if one of the principal reasons for their being there is

the "creation" of their own goals.

One problem is that group members sense

that the leader has some idea of what goals will be formulated and of the
developmental sequence that will take place.

A plausible hypothesis would

be that such differential knowledge the so-called authority- or leaderproblem on the part of the members.
In academic laboratories in which students get together with a leader-

"

teacher to study the formation and processes of small groups, the goals
again are purposefully vague.

The members are "supposed" to experience

periods of ennui and drifting, to have "hang-ups" with the leader and to rise
up against him in revolt, to experience group inertia with respect to the
formulation and execution of goals--for this is one of the most effective
ways to study the "nature" of small groups (Slater, 1966).
Not all of the confusion concerning goals, however, stems from the
practical necessity of creating goals for the group.

Much of the "goal-

disturbance" (intolerance of "goal-ambiguity") is both a manifestation of and
a defense against anxiety.

The implication of goal-confusion is:

"If I knew

the goals of this group, if the leader would not insist on hiding them, then
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I would pursue t h em.

II

Actually such statements as "I don't know what the

goals are" can often be translated:

"I am afraid," "I don't want to move too

fast," "I want in, but I am not sure_ that I can pay the price," or "I have
decided not to invest myself yet; it is too early for me."
Goallessness as a value.

The danger is to assume that the "purposeful

goallessness" that characterizes so many different kinds of groups--whether
by

design or by accident--is a value in itself, a value that must characterize

all kinds of laboratory-training groups, a value so central that other group
values must be subordinated to it.

It is undeniable that group participants

learn much about group dynamics as they participate in the of ten agonizing
process of "working out" a· viable contract for the group.

Too often, however,

grinding out the contract becomes a goal in itself, an absolute value,
because it engenders a kind and degree of learning about group process
impossible to duplicate in a didactic classroom situation.

The formulation

of the contract becomes the absolute value, or rather learning about group
process is the absolute value and this is achieved by working out a contract.
This absolute value is surrounded by satellite values such as the members'
"working through" their feelings about one another and becoming more aware
of their own interpersonal strengths and limitations.

If it is undeniable,

however, that there are groups in which the creation of goals and/or the
formulation of an operational contract are the prime values, it is also true
that such groups often end with just that, a formulated contract which cannot
be implemented because time has run out.

In such groups frustration often

runs high, no matter how much has been learned about "group formative
processes."
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the contract group.

Although "goallessness" and "planned

.i::higuity" characterize most of the sensitivity-training paradigms to be
found in the literature and in the one followed by Tuckman (1965) in
elaborating his developmental-sequence model for training groups, this need
not be the case.

In fact, there has been an almost unwarranted acceptance

of goallessness as a value, for there is no empirical evidence demonstrating
the superiority of goallessness in all training groups.

While the value of

goallessness and planned ambiguity in many training situations is not
denied, it is suggested here that clear-cut goals and "high visibility"
:.ay also be values in certain training situations.

Ambiguity and goallessness

are of special value in situations in which learning about group formative
processes is a primary goal.

This is not the case in the contract group.

TI1e primary goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth.

The contract,

then, provides structures which enable the participants to make intimate
contact with one another as quickly as possible.

The contract delineates

specific goals in order to make the group more operational from the beginning.
Goallessness, ambiguity concerning goals, differential knowledge concerning
goals in leader (panoramic vision of developmental sequence) and in group
members (goal confusion}, creation of principal goals, contract-talk,
formulation of contract, goal-disturbance, and similar factors are not values
in the contract group.

While the benefits of "working through" goal conflicts

may be lost, other benefits take their place--for instance, there is more
time for intimate interpersonal contact.
Place of contract formulation.

Contact fulfillment takes the

This does not mean that such factors as goal

conflict and ambiguity do not occur in contract groups, for the group remains

r

'
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! "natural" even while it is contractual.

::!nimized.

These variables, however, are

When a member, despite the contract, is uncertain about group

,;Jals, this is "diagnostic" and must be worked through in the group.

This

~-;-

ls

a far cry, however, from "developmental" goallessness and ambiguity.

finally, even though interpersonal growth is the overriding goal of the
'

I
I

I

contract groups described in these pages, this is not to say that little is

j

learned about group process in such groups.

lI

group process, even though such leaming is secondary.

J

y_arieties of Goals in Group Process

Indeed, much is learned about

Research has shown that goals become "operational" to the degree that
they are clear and to the degree that the steps or means leading to goalachievement are made clear (March & Simon, 1958; Raven & Rietsema, 1957).
In one kind of laboratory experience, then, one of the first objectives• is

to establish and clarify goals and goal-facilitating structures.

The members

of a contract group, however, should have a clear understanding of goals
from the start so that energy can be channeled into pursuing instead of
clarifying goals.

An example.
statement:

Let us say that a group member makes the following

''You know, at home my wife and I don't really talk to each other

very much any more, thatis, there is little or no serious talk.

And lately

I have been finding excuses to stay late at work so that when I come home

the kids are already in bed.

I am withdrawing from them.

It seems that I

have a need not to be with people, at least in any very close way.
know that it has been affecting my participation here.

And I

I speak only when

it's safe •. I haven't really put myself on the line with you.

I feel alone
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right here in the group, as if I were not a part of the whole operation."
This example illustrates different kinds of goals found in the contract
group:
(1)
i

t

Contract goals.

This is a generic term and refers to all of the

provisions of the contract.

In the kind of contract group under discussion

J

I

interpersonal growth is the superordinate or overriding goal.

t

key contract goal and hypothetically all other contract goals are subordinate

'f
I

to and subserve this goal.

This is the

For instance, in the example cited above, the

participant is engaging in self-disclosure.

Self-disclosure is a contract

goal, for it is seen as one of the ways of establishing the kind of intimacy
that is at the heart of interpersonal growth.

By engaging in responsible

self-disclosure (a ''means"), the participant is by that very fact pursuing
the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth.

He reveals the kind of

person he is both within and outside the group and through this revelation
makes contact with his fellow participants.

All the provisions of the

contract are contract goals.
(2)

Interaction goals.

The contract specifies certain kinds of

interaction, specifically, self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support,
responsible confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to responsible
confrontation.
interaction.

In the example above, self-disclosure is the predominant
The contract also "forbids" certain kinds of interaction, for

instance, long-winded, intellectualized interpretations of the behavior of
others and defensive, self-excusing behavior.

In the example above, the

Participant reveals an area of deficit factually without trying to rationalize
or excuse it.

Thi.s refusal to involve himself in defensive behavior is, in
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negative sense, also an interaction goal.

Interaction goals are the heart

.if the contract experience.

(3) Process goals.

Since it is a

qu~stion

of group process, one set of

goals indicates the kinds of activities that are necessary in order to
establish effective group process.

These goals are essential to any group

i

desiring to handle its business as a group rather than as a collection of

l

lndividuals in a social setting.

I

J

y

i
\
I

.I,

t
l

One of the process goals illustrated in the

example above is dealing with the "here-and-now."

Whatever a group member

talks about must be made relevant to these people (his fellow group members)
in

this situation (the give-and-take of group interaction).

quoted above does just that:

The participant

while he talks about an interpersonal problem

that he has at home, he realizes that this problem in some way defines an
aspect of his personality make-up and influences the quality of his participation in the group experience.
a there-and-then problem.
the group.

He deals with the here-and-now relevance of

In doing so, he makes contact with or "engages"

Process goals are species of contract goals.

Their purpose is

to make the group run more efficiently and with greater inunediacy.
(4)

Content goals.

Content refers to the specific subjects or topics

discussed by group members.

A contract may or may not specify the topics to

be discussed by group members (although the contract described in these
pages does not).

If the contract does specify areas of discussion, then con-

tent goals become contract goals.

This may be the case with "focused"

contracts that take place within the laboratory experience.

For instance,

the leader may suggest an exercise which involves discussing a specific
topic (for

example, one's relationship to authority).

In the example above,
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.: participant talks about his tendency to withdraw from people.
~.

not the contract, specifies the area of self-revelation.

However,

While authentic

,elf-disclosure is specified by the contract, _talking about alienation is not.
;lie participant himself chooses the subject matter of his act of self-

disclosure.
(5)

Need goals.

Each participant enters the group with a variety of

pi:rsonal needs and. a tendency to use the group in order to achieve these
needs.

Horwitz (1964) indicates possible conflicts between personal needs

and group goals:

Although certainly there are unstructured features of a T Group,
the T Group does generate a group goal which, however, will
ordinarily differ from the individual goals with which trainees
enter the group. Frustration arises from the goal's being difficult
to define and exceedingly difficult to attain.
The trainee may be oriented toward reaching a more or less specific
goal--X', e.g., to deal more effectively with persons in authority.
A second trainee may be oriented toward reaching a specific goal-X' ',e.g., to work better with subordinates. By contract, the
trainer is oriented toward what might be called the meta-goal--X,
namely, establishing the group conditions which are necessary for
maximally meeting the needs of the various members who enter the
group with discrepant individual goals. This goal is enforced upon
members by the particular characteristics of T-Group interaction.
The underlying task of the T Group is to develop a social system
which enables maximal satisfaction for each of its members (pp. 365366).

In the contract group, too, need goals must be integrated with contract goals.
Certain needs may be antithetical to the goals of the group, e.g., the need
to Withdraw, the need to dominate others, the need to monopolize conversation,
While other needs, e.g. the need for affiliation, may be more readily integrated with contract goals.

In a sense, it is not whether individual need

goals are satisfied or not, but rather how they are satisfied.

In the example
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above, the participant is acting counter to his need to withdraw; if he finds
affiliation safe, growthful, and rewarding, this may reduce or eliminate his

I

need to flee.

At any rate, his first attempt to deal with this need is to

I

reveal it, to get it "into community" where it can be dealt with more

!

effectively.

f
!

If the group is to run smoothly, there must be some kind of goal-harmony.
Since goal-harmony and goal-clarity are considered so important in the

!

i

contract group, each kind of goal will now be taken up separately.

'

Contract Goals

\

Contract goals include not only the overriding goal of the group, interpersonal growth, but also those interaction, process, and sometimes content

j

goals

that are seen as means of achieving interpersonal growth.

Interaction,

i

process, and content goals will be dealt with separately.

I

the emphasis is on the superordinate goal of the contract group--interpersonal

In this section

growth.

!

Interpersonal growth.!!_ the overrriding

~superordinate

goal.

"Inter-

personal growth" as a superordinate goal is too general and must be defined
operationally.

Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of

both process and interaction goals.

More concretely, one who engages in

authentic self-disclosure, responsible expression of feeling, concerned
confrontation, non-defensive self-exploration, and realistic support (all of
these are described in the chapters that follow) and does so by effectively
contributing to and utilizing group resources (process goals)
sis, growing interpersonally.
interpersonal growth.

~,

by hypothe-

Operationally, these activities constitute

111

Growth in interpersonal effectiveness is considered to take place
through practice in establishing a responsible and viable dialogue of word
and feeling among the members of the group.

The participant is expected to

learn and put into practice new ways of being-present-to-the-other and new
ways of allowing the other to be present to himself.

If a participant is

"shy," and this keeps him from interacting with others, he is considered to
be irresponsibly out-of-conununity.

He must try new ways of getting into

community; he must risk embarrassment, discomfort, and anxiety in involving
himself with the 0th.er participants.

If, on the other hand, a participant

is a "manipulator," then he is considered to be irresponsibly in-connnunity.
He, too, has to learn new ways of being present to the other members of the
group.

The "interactional" provisions of the contract--that is, interactions

such as self-disclosure, confronting others responsibly, accepting confrontation, giving effective support, etc., all of which are called for by the
contract--present general guidelines for formulating "new ways" of being
present to others.

!f a participant usually never talks about himself, if

he never lets others know what he is like "inside" in any way, the kind of
person he is--then self-disclosure will be a "new way" of being present to
others.
Interpersonal rather than personal growth.
to introduce here a meaningless

dic~otomy

While it would be fruitless

between personal and interpersonal

growth, still the goal of the group is stated as interpersonal rather than
personal growth.

Ego-centered and other-centered goals are conceived of as a

dynamically interrelated system.

A healthy egocentricity (loving oneself)

even has a kind of existential priority over involvement with others (loving
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others).

Fronnn-Reichmann (1950) believed that any display of lack of self-

respect was inevitably accompanied by a reduction of one's rspect for others.
Sullivan (1940), too, found that:.-one respects others only to the extent that
one respects himself.

Erikson (1959) sees true engagement with others as

both the result and the test of firm self-delineation.

According to Erikson,

when a person who has not achieved a sense of self-identity attempts to engage in interpersonal realtions, he experiences a "tense inner reservation,
a caution in connnitment" (1959, p. 125).
stereotyped interpersonal relations.

Such a person engages in only

He does not really encounter the other,

but deals in desperate attempts at clarifying what Erikson calls the "fuzzy
outlines" of his own identity.
narcissistic mirror.

The other is not the "other, 11 but a kind of

His relationships with others, then, involve "fusion"

rather than growthful involvement and result in a loss of identity.
Lynd (1958) emphasizes the relatedness of personal and interpersonal
growth:
Openness to relatedness with other persons and the search for
self-identity are not two problems but one dialectical process;
as one finds more relatedness to other persons one discovers
more of oneself; as the sense of one's own identity becomes
clearer and more firmly rooted one can more completely go out to
others. It is not a loss of oneself, an 'impoverishment,' but
a way of finding more of oneself when one means most to others
whom one has chosen. Nor must complete finding of oneself, as Fromm
and others sometimes seem to imply, precede finding oneself in and
through other persons. Identity is never wholly realized. Love
is never perfect. Strength to apprehend love that is beyond
anxiety, beyond the need to use other persons for one's own
security, beyond desire for power over others is never complete, but
may grow throughout life. Like identity and mutuality with others
it is a lifetime process of discovery (p. 241, emphasis added).
While this is true and some kind of understanding of it is cardinal to psych--logical growth, it is nevertheless also true that interpersonal effectiveness
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is a pre-eminent goal of human living,, and, as such, superordinate to
individualistic or ego-centered goals, e.g., personal psychic comfort.

While

l

self-identity has its "antecedent" priority in human living, responsible

f

interpersonal involvement has a "subsequent" or ultimate priority.

l

ultimate self-actualization can take place only through effective in-

t

community involvement, and self-actualization-in-connnunity becomes the

ll

i
f

..

composite goal of human living.

--

That is,

These, at any rate, are the assumptions

underlying the present dilineation of group goals.
The contract group is to serve as a means of getting its members more
effectively into community.

This means both dyadic connnunity, the community

of the small group, and the wider comm.unity.

If Buber (1937) is right and

a person does not effectively become an authentic "I" until he has worked
at transforming another from object to "Thou," then it is also true that a
person is not fully a social or societal or community "I" until the community
or the communities to which he belongs becomes "Thous" in

his life.

Studies

(Jacob, 1957; Allport, 1961) describe the average American college student
as quite conformist and quite disinterested in wider comm.unity concerns.
Jacob's study showed the average student to be "gloriously contented" and

j

"unabashedly Self-centered. II

Though they discharge the Obligations demanded

of them by the government, they will not voluntarily contribute to public
welfare.

Nor do they particularly desire an influential voice in public

Policy.

They vote, but otherwise they abdicate the citizen's role in the

Political process.

Though they predict another war, international problems

are the least of their concerns.

Although pouring one's energies into

various forms of concern for the wider connnunity may be a way of avoiding
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intimacy on a more personal level, still disinterest in the larger connn.unity

can also reflect a general disinterest in others.
The reason for making something
of the distinction between personal and
.. ·interpersonal growth is this.

It is amazing how many people come to group

experiences--and this seems to be especially (if obviously) true of psychotherapy groups--"to get something out of it for myself."

The contention here

is that many people enter groups intending to grow in some way, but without
any special realization that the condition of growing is the coming-together.

Too few fail to realize that the experience is taking place in a group, not
just because others have something to contribute to one's own personal
growth, but because the culmination of personal growth lies in the ability
to involve oneself responsibly with others.

In the contract group, the

members come together in order to grow together.
Berne (1966) doubts that authentic intimacy, as described here, can take
place in groups.

At least in psychotherapy groups, all that can be expected

is a kind of "pseudo-intimacy."

"Affective expression is encouraged without

careful assessment of its authenticity •••• The affective expression is
largely socially (externally) programmed, and it is usually part of a game
in which the patient compliantly participates" (pp. 231-232).

I disagree.

The "game" structure that is evident in Berne's psychotherapeutic method,
seems, at least partially, to be imposed upon the psychotherapeutic situation
rather than to grow out of it.

As Coles (1967) points out, "the cynicism,

the cult of self, the lack of any philosophical, historical or religious
perspective found in Berne are "thoroughly contemporary, thoroughly American,
and awful" (p. 17).

The contract group is anti-game," even while admitting

115
that many do engage in games in order to avoid intimacy.
Interaction Goals
Little more will be said

he~

about interaction goals because these are

studied in some depth in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX.
however, the heart of the contract.

They constitute,

The participant agrees to experiment

with:
(1) the elements of dialogue:
(a}

freer experiencing and responsible expression of feelings and

emotions;
(b)

the value of language as a means of translating oneself to

others;
(c)

the recognition and use of non-verbal channels of commtmication;

(2) self-disclosure:

revealing to the other members, in some way, the

person inside";
(3) support:

listening effectively to others; encouraging others to

fulfill the provisions of the contract; giving others recognition
and help when they do engage in contractual behavior; reacting responsibly when others present themselves emotionally in the group;
(4) confrontation:

inviting others to fulfill the contract, if they are

not doing so; inviting others to examine aspects of their behavior which,
it seems, they have not sufficiently examined;
(5) accepting confrontation:

responding to responsible confrontation,

not by defensiveness and attack, but by engaging in self-exploration;
(6)

taking~

stance against flight:

refusing to engage in interactions

antithetical to the interactions listed above; refusing to withdraw
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from the interaction; trying to minimize flight in oneself and in others.
Process Goals
Process goals refer to the way in which any goal in the group is pursued.
Their purpose is to regulate and give definition to the interactional process
itself.

They provide cautions and structures which make the group a more

cf ficient and effective organization.

In the contract group these pragmatic

rules are also contract goals.
The distinction between self-oriented and altruistic goals.

The entire

discussion of goals might become a bit clearer if some attention is first
paid to a distinction that Cartwright and Zander (1960) draw between
"selfish" and "altruistic" goals in group process.

I.n the following

schematization, process goals, that is, the ways in which the group is
utilized in the pursuit of other goals, have a kind of primacy over other
goals:
Process goals:
The ways in which any other goal
is pursued in the group
selfishly

-

Other
Goals:
contract,
content,
need

altruistically

selfish

A

B

altruistic

c

D

Examples of interactions illustrating each quadrant of the diagram will
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help make the distinction between goals, especially the distinction· between
process goals and other goals, clearer:
Quardrant A:
"selfishly. 11

"Selfish" goals (contract, content, need) purused

This means that a group member pursues a contract, content, or

need goal that redounds to his own benef-it ("selfish" or "self-oriented")
in a way that is inimical to the interests of the group.

That is, the way

in which he pursues his goal tends to destroy the efficiency and the
cohesiveness of the group.
high in the group.

Mr. A finds that his anxiety is running very

He has learned from experience that he can reduce his

anxiety by monopolizing the conversation (this might not be a completely
conscious realization).
stimuli at bay.

This keeps him occupied and it also keeps disturbing

He proceeds to do this, and his anxiety is lowered.

He

has pursued a "selfish" goal (the need-goal of reducing personal anxiety) ,
but he has done so in a "selfish" way (by monopolizing the conversation in
the group, by keeping the group from being an interacting group).
Quadrant!=

"Selfish" goals pursued "altruistically."

This means that

a group participant pursues a goal (need, contract, content) that redounds
to his own personal benefit, but he does so in a way that is designed to
promote inter-member "engagement" and group cohesiveness.

For instance, Mr. B,

too, is quite anxious, and he feels the same need that Mr. A felt, namely,
to reduce his anxiety.

But, instead of dodging the issue, he confesses to

the group that he is anxious and that this is affecting the quality of his
participation.

He wonders if other participants are anxious, too.

He tells

the group that he would like to know what it is about the group and about
himself-in-the-group that causes such anxiety.

He has pursued an ego-
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centered goal (the reduction of personal anxiety) in an "altruistic" way
(by bringing his conern before the groui), by eliciting the feelings of other
i:iembers, by "engaging" the other members of the group).

He has also fulfilled

a contract goal--self-disclosure.
Quadrant

f.:

"Altruistic" goals pursued "selfishly."

This means that a

participant pursues a goal that is intended to benefit some other member of
the group itself, but he does so in such a way as to hinder desirable groupprocess variables.
about sex.

For instance, Mr. C decides that the

group should talk

He realizes that this will make him quite uncomfortable, but he

thinks that it is an issue that this particular group should handle for its
own good.

He brings the subject up a few times and even gets the group to

discuss the fact that it has been avoiding this area of discussion.

However,

the group as a whole is not ready to pursue the subject; sex is not yet a

I

viable topic for the group.

Still, Mr, C, at every opportunity, brings up

the subject and tries to get the group to engage in a serious, perhaps selfrevealing, discussion of it.

He is pursuing an "altruistic" content-goal

(though it is hardly denied that other, more basic, need goals are operative),
that is, he sincerely believes that a comparatively open discussion of sex
will benefit everyone, but he pursues the goal in a way designed to disrupt
group process.
way.

He wants what well might be good, but he wants to get it his

He cannot trust the group to handle the problem.
guadrant Q:

"Altruistic" goals pursued "altruistically."

This means

that a participant pursues a goal (contract, content, need) that is of benefit
either to another member or to the group as a whole, and he does so through
the group process, by "engaging" the other members of the group.

For
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instance, Miss D says:

"I don't want to hurt or embarrass you, Mr. Y, .but

you have been rather quiet in the group.

It just seems to me that you have

been reneging on our contract,.... -and I don't think that that is fair to the
group or to you.

I think we have been remiss in not trying to involve

ourselves with you sooner."

She pursues an altruistic goal (it is a contract

goal, for she confronts another to "join" the group for his own sake and for
the sake of the group, and she confronts the group--including herself--for
being remiss), and she does so in a way designed not to alienate either Mr. Y
or the other members.

Her confrontation is not an act of punishment, it is

not primarily an expression of her own frustration, rather it is an attempt
to get the group members--including herself--to involve

thems~lves

more

completely with one another.
Given these distinctions, it is clear that a certain degree of group
"altruism" is essential if the group itself is to become the vehicle of
problem-solving and growth.
Some key group-process-goals.

Group-process goals are also contract-

goals, that is, the participants agree to use these goals as standards with
respect to their manner of participation.

interactional tone of the group.

These goals or standards set the

The following group-process goals are

considered essential to the effective running of the group:
(1)
this is:

All concerns

~be

made group concerns.

Another way of stating

whatever is done is to be done through group process.

The examples

above make it clear that it is not important to multiply contract-goals
nor is it important that the content and need goals being pursued be
"altruistic."

What is important is that all goals--contract, content, need--
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be pursued through the group process.

The members of the contract group nQt

only agree to pursue interpersonal growth as the superordinate contract-goal,
but they contract to pursue both personalistic and altruistic sub-goals in
,.~-

such a way as to involve themselves more deeply with the other members of
the group.

This is the cardinal group-process goal:

to the group.

to submit everything

The group should never become just a group of on-lookers, while

two of the members interact.

It is not against the better interests of the

group for two members to discuss their relationship, whether it be one of
concern or of antagonism, but they should do so in such a way as not to
exclude the other group members (although, in one sense, it is impossible to
"exclude" other group members since they are "there").

If Mr. A and Mrs. Q

show a great deal of antagonism toward each other and finally discuss it in
the group, the other group members are not only free to comment on the
relationship and how it affects them and the entire group, but they should be
encouraged to do so.
want to "butt in."

This is often difficult.

Other group members do not

It is "none of their business."

Often it is a question

of the other members being afraid of the emotions that are involved in the
interchange.

They are afraid to engage themselves.

One of the violations of the everything-through-the-group standard, at
least in residential sensitivity training laboratories, is "siphoning."

Two

or more members get together outside the group in order to work out their
relationships.

They return to the group changed, and this interrupts the

rhythm of the group.

Or worse, one member will pair with another member

outside the group in order to discuss and work out feelings toward a third
member.

This dilutes

~roup

process and manifests negative feelings toward
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and mistrust of the group.

It is only natural that a certain amount of

pairing take place outside the group; but whatever significant interactions
this involves should be made pub,1ic to the group.

Pairing may even be

encouraged or planned if it helps make the group sessions more meaningful.
For instance, one of the group members might find it quite difficult to
engage in self-disclosure.

So, outside the group, he tells what he thinks

is important to another group member.
enables him to be open

~n

the group.

This "breaks the ice" for him and
Mowrer (1963) l<H.11 interview a patient

before he enters the "integrity" group.

The patient unburdens himself here

first and then usually it is easier for him to "tell his story" to the
entire group.
Participants in various kinds of face-to-face groups of ten fail to
participate, it is true, because they are selfishly preoccupied with their
own concerns.

They neither engage other members, nor do they want to be

engaged by others.

When they speak, they do so in a rather solipsistic

manner, or they look to the leader for a "solution" to their "problem."

But

there are also participants in these groups who realize that a group has been
assembled precisely because some problems are handled more effectively
through group interaction.

Cattell (1953) even defines the entity "group"

of the inter-reliance of the members:
The definition which seems most essential is that a group is a
collection of organisms in which the existence of all (in their
given relationships) is necessary to the satisfaction of certain
individual needs in each. That is to say, the group is an
instrument toward the satisfaction of needs in the individual.
Individuals belong to the group only because they achieve certain
satisfactions made possible by its organization which would not be
so readily possible (or which did not happen to occur) for them
through any other device (p. 20).
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one or two individuals should be allowed to act as if the other members

of the group did not exist.

Many participants are too "polite" or too timid

to "interrupt" non-involving groyp action (or dyadic action, as the case
might be), to "intrude" themselves.

Everyone should feel free to speak to

every issue and actually take advantage of this freedom.
Fouriezos, Hutt, and Guetzkow (1950) showed that groups primarily concerned with "self-oriented" needs are relatively ineffective.

After

observation of 72 decision-making conferences, they concluded that groups
with the highest scores on self-oriented needs rated themselves lowest· on
satisfaction measures.

They were less satisfied with the meeting in general,

with the decisions reached, with the manner in which the group reached its
decisi6ns, and with the chairing of the meeting.

Groups with high scores

on "selfish" or self-oriented behavior completed fewer items on the agenda,
but they held longer meetings.

The contract for the interpersonal-growth

contract-group calls for "altruistic" process goals, not just because they
seem to be more fully human, but also because they are m:>re "economic."

Such

goals assure that further contract goals will be pursued more quickly and
more efficiently.
(2)

Acceptance of the "laboratory" nature of the group experience.

The

laboratory nature of the group experience is explained in some detail in
Chapters I and IV.
"laboratory" set.

The contract-group participant is asked to assume a
The experience he is entering is, in a

it is different from day-to-day experience.
molecular aspects of human interaction.

sense, contrived;

It focuses on many of the

It demands that the particpants

experiment with "new forms" of behavior, that is, potentially growthful ways
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of involving themselves with one another, but ways which are not presently

part of their interpersonal life style.
~ent,

Since the laboratory is an experi-

the participant is asked to reserve judgment; he is asked not to

prejudge the experience, to determine beforehand that it is going to be
completely successful or unsuccessful.
(3)

Cooperation.

Isreal (1956) found that groups which establish a

"cooperative goal structure" are more effective than groups which establish
a "competitive goal structure."

In the contract group the assumption is that

cooperation is essential to the work of the group and therefore the participants are asked to adopt a cooperative "set."

Since cooperation is considered

so important, it will be considered here at some length.

I

I

(a)

Cooperation and personality.

In disturbed relationships ''working

against" tends to take the place of "working with."

Homey (1945) describes

the interpersonally disturbed as "moving toward" people, that is, in a
compliant way which is both an expression of helplessness and a call for
support, (2) "moving against" people, that is, in an aggressive way, competing with others in order to surpass and defeat them, with the ultimate
purpose of becoming strong enough

to

disregard the possible counter hostility

of others, and (3) "moving away" from people, avoiding all the threats and
risks involved in any kind of close interpersonal relating.

These needs

tend to give rise to N-interactions that can hamper the efficient running
of the group.

They certainly stand in the way of es·tablishing a cooperative

goal structure and working pattern in the group.
On the other hand Dreikurs (1967) insists that effective human relationships are characterized by cooperation.

Cooperation, according to Dreikurs,
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demands four attitudes together with a stance against their antitheses:
(1)

social interest versus hostility; (2) confidence in others versus distrust

and suspicion; (3)

self-confide~~e

courage versus fear.

versus inferiority feelings, and (4)

Interest, trust, a feeling of self worth and courage

are all essential to optimal performance in the training group.
(b)

Cooperation in therapeutic situations.

Individual therapy is

being seen more and more as a cooperative venture in which both therapist
and client become involved with each other (Schofield, 1964; Steinzor, 1967);
it is a route taken by both therapist and client (Stern,

1966).

In a study

by Fiedler (1950), the good therapeutic relationship was described by a
variety of therapists as one in which the therapist saw the patient as coworker on a

common problem.

In my own experience, group therapy progresses

ioost steadily when the members come to the realization that they are not just
recipients of help but'that their involvement with one another is the
condition for growth.

When patients cease being patients in therapy and

become agents instead, then there is cause for hope.

In the contract group

neither leader nor members are "finished products" in the area of interpersonal maturity.

All the members have much to offer one another if they

are willing to drop some of their defensiveness and become involved with
one another.
(c)

Cooperation

~

a process goal in training groups.

In the "natural"

developmental sequence suggested by Tuckman (1965) for training groups, a
Period of initial dependency and confusion is followed by a period of
antagonism and turmoil in which personal differences and differences in goal
orientation are worked through.

This is followed by a period of cohesion and
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cooperation.

Such a sequence seems "natural" to a group situation character-

!zed by initial goallessness and plann·ed ambiguity.

However, whatever value

may accrue to group participants _t:.rom working through the problems
associated with the first two stages, still a group experience in which the
first two stages, if not eliminated, are at least shortened and in other
respects attenuated has its own peculiar value.

Even though group members

may learn a good deal about the value of cooperation by both engaging in
and becoming the victims of non-cooperation, there is also a value in
forestalling and minimizing non-cooperation.

Cooperation, after all, must

be some kind of ultimate goal in all training groups, for productivity, no
matter how productivity is defined, is impossible without cooperation.
Cooperation, then, is one of the process goals to which the members of
the contract group subscribe.

The empirical evidence supports the value of

cooperation with respect to smoother performance and increased productivity
in a variety of group situations (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Deutsch,
1949; Grossack, 1954).

There is also a good deal of evidence that cohesive-

ness in groups is enhanced if members work together for common rather than
mutually exclusive and individual ends (see Lott & Lott, 1965 for a review
of the evidence).

Cooperation in the kind of enterprise called for by the

contract is not an easy thing.

As Goffman (1967) notes, "Joint involvement

appears to be a fragile thing, with standard points of weakness and decay,
a precarious unsteady state that is likely at any time to lead the individual
into some form of alienation" (p. 117).

The hypothesis in the contract group

is that if the participants enter the group with a set toward cooperation,
"d ecay II is a good deal less likely.

Deutsch (1958) found that prior
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cooperative orientation and Oak.amp and Perlman (1965) found that public
commitment to cooperation increased cooperation on a task which ordinarily
evoked relatively low levels of

~ooperation.

Making cooperation one of the

process goals of the contract group is similar to Deutsch's "cooperative
orientation," and the participant who agrees to the contract makes a form of
"public commitment" to cooperation.
(d)

The nature of cooperation in the contract group.

In the contract

group cooperation means getting "into community" as quickly as possible.

It

means that members have come together, not to compete with one another, but
to grow with one another.

A cooperative style of group interaction will

produce a distinctive type of "interpersonal movement" in the group.

Three

types of interpersonal movement may be indicated as follows:
Type A.

self

~-------------------

other

Type B.

self

-------------------')

other

c.

self

------->

other

Type

(-------

In Type A, one member remains entrenched in himself and makes the other
"capitulate" or move out toward him.

In Type B, which is the counter of

Type A, one "leaves" himself in a movement that entails "giving in" to the
other.

In Type C, which is characteristic of cooperative group movement,

both participants venture out of themselves and both encourage the other to
venture forth.
movement.

In the contract group the participants subscribe to Type C

This does not mean that types A and B will not occur.

For instance

if a group member remains silent long enough, other group members will finally
remark on his silence and make efforts to get him to move out into the
The silent person is engaging in Type A movement (or lack of movement),

grot1i;.
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vhile those who finally pursue him are engaged in Type B movement.
!>Uent member should be confronted.

The

However, were he engaged in pursuing

the provisions of the contract with others who were doing the same, then all
~ould

be engaged in Type C

movement~

Type C is the ideal, though this hardly

lessens the value of necessity of Type B.
At first it would seem that confrontation, one of the interaction goals
of the contract, would automatically and necessarily involve a combination of
:oovements A and B.

However, if the group is characterized by cooperative

l!ffort, this will not be the case at all.

At least in an ideal confrontationa

situation, Mr. X, the object of confrontation, first gives the group some
cues that he is open to confrontation.

By his verbal exchanges he moves

"into the group" in various ways.

When he is confronted, then, he is already

"out in the group" in some sense.

There are a variety of ways in which a

participant can move into the group, and once he does so, he becomes "available" for a variety of interactions.
(e)

Cooperation and complementarity of contractual roles.

The members

of the group enter the group by accepting the stipulations of the group
contract, that is, they say that they want the kind of experience described
by the contract.

One way of interpreting this is that the particpants

willingly assume, or try to assume, certain roles in the group.

The contract

is so set up as to induce within the group a certain "complementarity of
roles."

This means that, because of the contract and the role complementarity

that it induces, fewer decisions are required about certain aspects of group
activity, energy is conserved for more important activities, and the group
process proceeds more smoothly.

For instance, the contract calls for
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~csponsible

confrontation, but it also calls for self-examination rather

:'.;en defensiveness ·or attack or other forms of counter-behavior, as the
~csponse

to such confrontation ...-The role of the confronter and the role of

:he self-examining confrontee are complementary.

If the contractual roles

4re learned and accepted, group process moves along vigorously, meaningfully,

.i!ld comparatively smoothly.
Spiegel (1957) points out various causes for failures in role comple=entarity.

Such failures are deleterious to group cooperation and disruptive

of effective group process.

Some of the causes for complementarity failures

Jre relevant to the discussion on cooperation.
~iscrepancy

First of all, cognitive

takes place when one or more parties are not familiar with the

roles they are expected to assume and therefore miss their "cues."

However,

if the participants in the contract group understand the provisions of the
contract and are willing to take a "cooperative stance," the possibility of
cognitive discrepancy is lessened.

In the group "missing cues" usually has

some other meaning than failure to understand the contract.
discrepancy refers to non-acceptance of roles.

Allocative

If the participants really

subscribe to the provisbns of the contract, ailocative discrepancy should
also be minimized.

The problem arises when a group member, after agreeing to

the contract, reneges on his agreement.

In situations in which the contract

is "imposed," allocative discrepancy arises from the fact that some members
do not really accept the contract or some of its provisions.

Complementarity

also suffers when one or more members simply do not possess the roles calied
for by the contract.

For instance, a particular member might always see

even the most responsible confrontation as attack.

He cannot assume the
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role of one-who-explores-himself-upon-confrontation, because his self-identity
is

too weak to sustain confrontation..

He might be almost completely lacking

!n the capacity to lay aside his _defenses and engage in the self-examination
called for by confrontation.
(f)

Cooperation, dependency, and conformity.

One might object that

this demand for a cooperative goal structure is an unrealistic attempt to
banish difference of opinion and disagreement, which are part of the warp
and woof of interpersonal relating, from the group interaction.
the kind is meant.
~cant

Nothing of

The kind of cooperative effort suggested here is not

to eliminate difference of opinion and disagreement, but to have them

take place as growthfully as possible.

The contract states that the members

are present, not to compete, but to become involved with one another.
Becoming involved with one another will obviously entail conflict and
difference of opinion.

For instance, when A confronts Bon B's mode of acting

ideally B will respond, if A's confrontation has been responsible, by
exploring his behavior.

After R, in the give-and-take of the group interactio

has examined himself and his behavior, he may well reply to A that he
disagrees with him.

A comes to realize that there are modes of living that

differ from his own, but by involving himself, within the structure of the
group, with others who live and think and feel differently from the way he
does, he can broaden the base of his experience.

A certain degree of

heterogeneity in the make-up of the group would seem to be in order precisely
for this reason.
Nor can the cooperation called for by the contract be identified with
conformity or dependency.

Tuckman (1965) says that initially there is a
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period of dependency in the training group.
for goals and direction.

The members look to the trainer

Cooperation, however, means that the members assume

corporate responsibility for the group from the start rather than assigning
this function to the leader.

The early sessions of groups are always filled

with anxiety, and anxious people tend to surrender blindly to the security of
authority (Fromm, 1955; Getzels, 1957; Maslow, 1959; Riesman, 1950).

But

this tendency to polarize into leader and members must be counteracted by
leader and members a_like, for it militates against cooperative effort and
involves working through problems which are not the focus of the group.
Darley (1966) found that fear causes increased conformity and that this
increase is greatest if the conformity pressures come from people toward
~horn

the subject feels affiliative.

Anxiety in the contract group should

be handled as openly as possible so that dependency and conformity can be
minimized.

The only "conformity" looked for in the contract group is

fulfillment of contract, and the purpose of the contract is to facilitate the
development of responsible autonomy and relatedness.
(g)

Cooperation and the deviant member.

Since failures in cooperation

and role complementarity involve the notion of deviancy, a word might be

said about the deviant member.

The problem of deviancy is minimal in groups

in which entry-by-contract is the norm, but it is a more serious problem for
impositbn-of-contract groups.

If the deviant person only reneges·on certain

provisions of the contract while fulfilling Qthers and if his deviancy does
not become one of the prime concerns of the group, then the group can still
function adequately.

The problems with the deviate are many:

for a period

of time his deviancy becomes the focus of group interaction and then he is
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:1nally usually rejected, and strongly so if the group is a highly cohesive
(Schachter, 1951).

Once he is rejected, he hangs albatross-like around

t!1e neck of the group.

If the deviate (one who simply refuses to engage in

"'ne

contractual behavior) does not leave the group, then the group members should
deal briefly with how such a member should be handled.

If the deviate actu-

ally disrupts group interaction, then it would seem better to expel him.
Groups are very reluctant to do this because the members are usually concerned
about the deviate and expulsion is tantamount to admitting failure on their
part.
(4}

The here-and-now.

This is one of the most important process goals

in both contract groups and other kinds of training experiences.
what might be called the "space-time" dimension of the group.
only a group when the members are actually together.

It involves

The group is

Therefore, the

principal focus of the group is the present, the here-and-now.

The content

of the interactions that take place in the group must in some way lose their
space-time "distance."

A participant 1 s search for identity may be complicated

by the fact that his father made him an appendage, denied him the freedom to

grow as an individual.

members present

What is important to the group, however, is the

being-in~the-world-ae-appendage,

his present feelings of

identity diffusion, and how this mode of being influences his action in this
group.
Present.

The member may well talk about the past, but the past has to be made
He may well talk about what has happened or is happening outside

the group, but the "there" must also be made "here."

For instance, a

Participant's mode of being present to his co-workers at his place of
employment can be "transported" by comparing it to his mode of being present
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to the other members of the group.
the same.

I'm still a mouse."

~·hostility,
~~ybe

Here it's still

Or--"At work and at home I can hardly contain

but I don't feel hostile here at all, even when I'm confronted.

you have accepted me.

others,

"At work I'm a mouse.

Or maybe I have accepted you more than the

Anyway, there's a big difference."

If a past or future concern can

be made relevant to the activity within the group, then it loses its spacetime distance.
The problem with the then-and-there is that it (coupled with other
factors associated with it that will be discussed below, e.g. the quality of
a person's self-disclosure) engenders ennui.
~embers

This is just a fact.

If group

spend a good deal of time discussing problems outside the group, the

group members "lose contact" with one another.
such a thing as healthy egocentricity.

There is, as noted above,

A person must be a person first,

before he can involve this "person" in various activities.
such a thing as healthy group-egocentricity.

There is also

It cannot survive, much less

operate effectively, unless certain of its needs are fulfilled.

Prolonged

dealing with con:erns that are too "distant" is like cutting off the oxygen
supply of the group.

A kind of suffocation takes place.

Therefore, group

members have to search out ways of rendering their then-and-their concerns
present to the group.

These concerns, if they are real concerns and not

just dodges which insulate the participant from interacting meaningfully with
the other members of the group, in some way "define" him.
and his activity, including his activity in the group.

The group leader can

be very helpful here, by "modeling" ways of transporting
concerns so that they become relevant to this group.

-

They color him

then-and-there

It seems to me that
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::e of the principal defects of psychotherapy groups is this inability to
;cal with the here-and-now.

Members keep talking about the problems that

:;:ey have at home and outside the
:~:ese

in general.

They fail to see that

various problems are defining their manner of participation in the

,;roup.

The group is not seen as a laboratory for the examination of these

;iroblems.
·~sing

gr:~up

The inept group psychotherapist falls back on the expedient of

the group as a locus for multiple individual therapy.
If a member finds it difficult to overcome the space-time dimensions

0f his concerns, then this very fact should become a concern for him and
for the group.
:'.lOde

His inability to overcome "distance" partially defines his

of presence in the group.

the word.

This is "diagnostic" in the best sense of

His discussion of the then-and-there might be a flight from

group process.

Or the concerns that he verbalizes might not be his real

concerns but diversions, ways of keeping him from thinking about issues
that are really pertinent to his style of interpersonal living.
This concern for the here-and-now is also rooted in a theory concerning
the usefulness (or uselessness?) of investigating past behavior in order to
change the present.
This is not to deny the significance of the past in indirectly
affecting behavior. However, even though the past can create a
certain condition which carries over into the present, it is,
nevertheless, the present condition that is influential in the
present. Strictly considered, linking behavior with a past
event is an extremely difficult undertaking; it presupposes
that one knows sufficiently how the past event affected the
psychological field at that time, and whether or not in the meantime other events have again modified the field (Deutsch, 1954,
p. 186).
Rogers (1951) applies such thinking to the therapeutic situation:
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It should also be mentioned that in this concept of motivation
all the effective elements exist in the present. Behavior is not
'caused' by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions
and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors
to reduce or satisfy. While -it is true that past experience has
certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in
present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a
present need (p. 492).
:Jo

often in training-group situations participants become preoccupied with

t!:ere-and-then concerns, not because they are more meaningful, but because
t:1cy are safer.

If they are really meaningful, they should be translated

into here-and-now concerns and become vehicles of involvement rather than
:-.odes

of flight.
(5)

The rules of innnediacy.

It is difficult to listen to conversations

filled with vagueness and generalities.
boring.

It is difficult because it is

Truax and Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that "concreteness"

in therapeutic conversation might well be a variable worth exploring.

They

define concreteness as follows:
A low level of concreteness of specificity is when there is a
discussion of anonymous generalities; when the discussion is on
an abstract intellectual level. This includes discussions of
'real' feelings that are expressed on an abstract level. A high
level of concreteness of specificity is when specific feelings and
experiences are expressed--'I hated my mother!' or ••• then he would
blow up and start throwing things'; when expressions deal with
specific situations, events, or feelings, regardless of emotional
content (p. 266).
Such concreteness is definitely a value to the contract group and forms part
of the "rules of immediacy"--ways of making the interaction more immediate
and personal.

(a)
must

The "rules" are:

The~

of".!.·"

When the participant is speaking of himself he

use "I" and not some substitute such as "we," "one," "you," "people,"
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or some inpersonal expression such as "it happens," etc.

Any substitute for

"I" entails a loss of immediacy, puts some kind of distance between the

speaker and the state or action he is discussing.
,-·-

(b)

Concreteness.

and generalities.

The speaker should avoid vagueness, abstractions,

If he does talk about something abstract such as a

principle, he should illustrate what he means by a concrete example,
preferably from his own experience.
01Jt1

experience.

In general, he should talk about his

If he talks about the experience of others, he should talk

about the impact that the other's experience has on him.
(c)

Speak to someone.

The participant should in general address speci-

fie people in the group rather than the entire group.

The participant who

is always speaking to everyone is very often speaking to no one.

It is more

innnediate to address the whole group through a specific member of the
group.

For instance, someone might say:

flight behavior in the group.
then all the time.

"I think that there is a lot of

John, you tend to talk about the there-and-

Bill, when confronted, you are always very defensive.

You seldom open up and examine the issue at all.
said nothing at all."

In the morning session I

The person who tends to address the whole group teitds

to talk about generalities and to give speeches.

Both are deadly as far as

the group interacting goes.
(d)

Questions.

The participants should not ask too many questions,

especially the question "why?"

:Pointed questions that demand concrete

answers help keep the interaction concrete.

The question ''why?" usually

demands an interpretation on the part of the respondent and interpretations
tend

to become vague, highly intellectualized, and hypothetical and as such
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Jre antithetical to the innnediacy desired in the interaction.
::1m?" gets at the facts of the respondent's behavior.

"Did you hit

''Why did you hit him?"

can lead anywhere and thus nowhere.
Content Goals

~~-----

In most kinds of group interaction in which personal and interpersonal
growth are the overriding goals, the content of the interaction is ordinarily
not predetermined.

It is believed that this would unnecessarily limit the

scope of group interaction (Grinker, MacGregor, Selan, Klein, & Kohrman,
1961).

Goals, they say (and I would add, specifically content goals), depend

on and develop from the transactional experience of the group.
concern is grist for the mill.

Any human

If the growth experience is taken seriously,

the content of the interaction will be pitched at a more or less deep
personal level, that is, group members will tend to treat of subjects that
"touch" their persons.
Although content freedom is also the goal in the contract group, still,
as was indicated above, it i.s possible to include certain "focused" contracts
in which the content of the discussion is specified.

This is especially true

if the participants are trying to avoid certain areas of human concern.
"Focused" content-contracts may also be used to stimulate interaction.

An example of

~

focused content-contract.

A group might contract to

discuss "non-growthful conformism" in day to day living.

If the members are

to discuss such a subject concretely and intelligently, they should be
prepared to do so in some way.

Some topics need little preparation, but

the participants could be given the following remarks on conformism by way
of preparation or stimulation.
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By "conformism" is meant the tendency to follow fixed patterns, to
:onform to certain standards, in situations in which conformity is not a
value at all and to do so from motives which are non-growthful such as fear,
..

laziness, or lack of motivation.

~-

Munroe (1955) contends that the "triviality

and the magnificance of hwnan devotion to social goals represent the folly
and the grandeur of our species" (p. 116).

Doubtless all of us are wedded to

certain social conventions that are meaningless and perhaps even detrimental
to interpersonal living, but they usually go unchallenged in our lives.
Henry (1963), for instance, denounces our conformity in the area of
advertising in America.
tendencies.

Advertising, he says, preys upon unhealthy conformist

He sees it as a means used by an irrational economy to imbue

the subjects of such an economy with "pecuniary logic."

If Americans could

wrest themselves from their conformist tendencies and pursue a more realistic
logic, such an economy, he claims, could not survive.

This is the paradox:

if Americans are to exist economically as they are, they must work at
remaining stupid.

Although Erikson (1964) sees no reason to insist that a

technological world as such need weaken man's inner resources of adaptation
and produce a "nation of sheep," still subscribing without reflection to the
~~

values of a

technocratic society, one's creative potential untapped because

it entails socially unacceptable "divergent" thinking, submitting without
criticism to the host of unexamined conventions imposed by the societies
and organizations to which one belongs., accepting the common rituals that
govern interpersonal living because they provide an escape from intimacy
(Berne, 1957, 1964, 1966), submitting to personal suppression built into the
American system of education (Friedenberg, 1963; Keniston, 1965)--all of these
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forms of conformism are prevalent and some of them affect us.

Such conform-

ism undoubtedly, either directly or indirectly, gives a certain definition
to our persons and affects the quality of our human relationships.
~elcome

We may

conformism because it saves us from the agonies of decision and

intimacy.

Convention and ritual undoubtedly have their value in human living,
•
but when do they obstruct and deaden human relating instead of channeling it.
Residential sensitivity training laboratories seem to stimulate the
non-conformist tendencies of its participants.

Whitman (1964) seems to

be a bit wary of the kind of "regression" or adolescent culture that springs
up in these situations, although he calls it a "healthy and understandable
thing" (p. 314).

He claims that some regression is necessary for learning,

but sees problems with those who regress either too little or too much in
laboratory settings.

However, it seems possible to interpret the "adolescent-

culture" phenomenon in terms other than regression.

During adolescence a

certain number of quite engaging qualities are in evidence:

the adolescent

is often quite spontaneous, clever, humorous, adventuresome; there is a
pleasing unpredictability about him, for he is striving to get a feel for
himself as an independent being, a person in his own right rather than an
appendage of home, school, church, or society.

I
His speech is often quite

refreshing, because there are few "filters" between what he thinks and
what he says.
creative

He is open, honest, candid, frank.

person~-fluency

The qualities

~f

the

or the ability to put out a large number of responses

to a situation rather than focusing in on just one correct one, flexibility
or the ability to change one's thinking and to change the meaning, interpretation or use of something, and originality or a flair for the

unus~al,

the
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novel, the far-fetched, the remote, the clever (Guilford, 1962)--these
qualities are often much more in evidence in the "innnature" adolescent than
in the "mature" adult.

"Maturing''....J.s often a process of controlling such

"adolescent" behavior in the face of the conventions of society and its
organizations.

In the residential sensitivity laboratory, the need to

confom is minimized, conventional "conformism" disappears, and many of the
more admirable qualities of adolescence reappear.

Th.is is hardly regression.

It is progress.
The purpose of the above discussion of conformism is not to induce an
intellectual discussion of this phenomenon but to serve as a basis for selfexploration on the part of the members of the group.
be

a concrete, personal one:

The discussion should

the conformism of these people and the way it

affects their relationships to one another here and now.

If the participants

adhere to the process and interaction goals of the contract, the conversation
will not become intellectualized, abstract, and a-personal.
~Goals

The group is not only a contractual group, but it is a "natural" group.
Each member has his own psychological make-up and his own constellation of
needs.

One of the reasons a member joins the group is that he feels some

kind of need for a more effective interpersonal life.
to fulfill this need.

The group itself helps

In one sense all needs are ego-centered, yet it is not

logical nonsense to divide needs into ego-centered needs (e.g. a need to
reduce personal anxiety) and altruistic needs (e.g. a need to improve one's
neighborhood).

Most needs, however, are not pure; they are multi-determined.

A person's altruistic need to serve his community also

s~tisfies

ego-centered
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needs for recognition and belongingness.
Within the context of the contract group, conflicts will arise between
need-goals and contract goals.

A geed to dominate will obviously conflict

with the kind of cooperation called for by the contract.

Therefore, the

contract group experience should prove quite diagnostic with respect to the
strength of certain needs.

Often it is only within the context of a group

experience that a person begins to
withdraw.

reali~e

how strong is his "need" to

The group experience also gives its participants an opportunity

to test their ability to control their needs, that is, those needs that
conflict with the contract.

Again, conflict will not be eliminated and

contract violations will occur, but because of the contract conflicts should
be highlighted in such a way as to render them more manageable.
The Overriding Goal--Interpersobal Growth--:R.evisited
Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of the interaction goals (pursued according to process goals), that is, the person who
experiments with and engages in responsible forms of self-disclosure,
expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a
response to confrontation is, at least by assumption, growing interpersonally.
Th:fs admittedly introduces a certain kind of circularity in the training
process.

As Campbell and- Dunnette (1968) note:

"It appears that some of the

interpersonal skills most important for accomplishing the T-group's objectives
are also the very skills constituting the major learning goals of the method"
(p. 77).

The assumption, however, is that the participants have the basic

ability to engage in these behaviors, but because of personal, group, and
cultural circumstances, they have had inadequate practice in them.

The group
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as a "cultural island" allows the members to actualize these behaviors rather
1uickly.

The participants "learn" principally in the sense of reducing to

act what already exists in potency.

. ..

-

The sensitivity-training experience does not provide a major personality
"overhaul."

The person who leaves the group with the intention of going

"back home" to demonstrate how different he is to family co-workers, and
friends is a horror to behold.

The average participant, upon leaving the

laboratory, finds that growthful behaviors that became relatively easy to
engage in in the laboratory situation are difficult to manage in his reallife situation.

He realizes that he experienced something quite valuable in

the laboratory, but now he is faced with the very difficult task of integratin
the laboratory experience with life.

A certain modesty with respect to the

ultimate goal of the laboratory is in order.

I would say this:

if the

interactions which take place in the laboratory induce in the participant
a healthy form of diagnosis which leads to attitude change which, ultimately,
leads to growthful behavioral change, then the training experience is a
success.

A word about "healthy" diagnosis and attitude change is in order.

Dynamic diagnosis:

the cybernetic function of the group.

Experimen-

tation with the kinds of behavior described in the contract should serve a
diagnostic function.

It is an opportunity to challenge what Frank (1961)

calls one's "assumptive world" (see pp. 18-34), especially in the area of
interpersonal relations.

Some people say that it would be a waste of time

for them to participate in a sensitivity-training experience:

they are

adjusted both personally and interpersonally, they experience deep relationships with others, they are productive.

They see the group experience as a
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refuge for those who cannot ''make it" interpersonally, a kind of substitute
for real interpersonal living.

However, the assumption is not that a person

enters such a group because there is something radically wrong with the
quality of his interpersonal life.

It is rather that all human relationships

can be improved; the group offers opportunities to experiment with "new ways"
of being present to others.
life or a substitute for it.

The group is not meant to be a flight from real
Those who come to it thinking that it is usually

suffer quite a bit.
For some diagnosis has become a dirty word in psychology.

It is assumed

that as a process separate from treatment, it is relatively useless or at
least "uneconomic," that is, the fruits of a separated diagnosis are not
sufficient to warrant pretreatment expenditure of time and energy, which in
many mental health systems is reduplicated time and energy.

Erikson even

sees the diagnostic process as potentially dangerous (1964):
Hospitalized patients, having been committed, are often ready
to commit themselves. They expect 'to go to work,' both on
themselves and on whatever task they may be asked to do. But too
of ten they are met with a laborious process of diagnosis and
initiation which emphasizes the absolute distance of patienthood
from active life. Thus literally 'insult is added to injury' in
that the uprooted one, already considered expendable or abnormal
by his previous group of affiliation, finds himself categorized
and judged by those who were expected to show him the way through
a meaningful moratorium. Many a man acquires the irreversible
identity of being a lifelong patient and client not on the basis of
what he 'is,' but on the basis of what is first done about him
(p. 97).

However, diagnosis, freed from its pejorative connotations (and perhaps from
a too strict association with the medical model of emotional disorder), is
a human value.
worth living.

Plato in the Apology claims that the unexamined life

is not

The fact is that we tend to drift to "maintenance" levels of
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interpersonal relating.

In the contract group, the member gets a sense of

or feeling for his own "areas of competence," his own "areas of promise,"
and his own "areas of deficit" in

~gterpersonal

relating.

In the matrix of

the group experience, disturbances in human communication (Ruesch, 1957) come
to the surface.

The participant develops a feel for his present interpersonal

limits (and this is usually quite painful) and perhaps even for his absolute
interpersonal limits (and this is even more painful).

He comes to a

realization of failed-potentialities in interpersonal living, but this implies
that he gets a deeper insight into these potentialities themselves.

This

makes the diagnostic aspect of the group experience a starting point--dynamic,
hormic, motivational.
Diagnosis here is contextual and cybernetic.
it develops out of the context of actual
in this sense.
the group.
members.

It is contextual in that

interrelating~

It is cybernetic

The participant "emits" certain interpersonal behavior in

He receives "feedback" concerning that behavior from the other
Finally he uses this feedback as a corrective device or as a stim-

ulus to try different modes of behavior in the group.

For instance, Miss G

constantly introduces new topics of discussion in the group, often in the
middle of on-going discussions.

The other members confront her with the

fact, first by a not too warm reception for the new topics and then by more
direct forms of confrontation.

Miss G begins to realize that she never

really listens to what others have to say.

Or she realizes that there are

areas or topics discussed that arouse too much anxiety in her.

Or she begins

to realize that she is not happy in the group unless she is the center of
attention.

Because of the feedback she receives, she can try new forms of

144
Jf behavior in the group.
~ccause

"I always change the subject when you discuss sex,

it makes me afraid."

The group is not miraculous.
exists.

It-does not create capacity when none

But if Maslow (1964) and a host of others are right, none of us

tomes close to using a very significant amount of his human potentialities,
interpersonal capacities included.

Diagnosed patterns of unsatisfactory

:nterpersonal behavior may be amenable to modification, to learning and relearning.

Finally, diagnosis, in the sense explained here is not easy,

especially for those with high levels of anxiety.

Studies show that the

highly anxious do not show a great deal of interest in exploring new areas
and having new experiences (McReynolds, Acker, & Pietila, 1961; Penney &
~!cCann,

1965).

Attitude change.

It is suggested that effective diagnosis in the

training group will lead to attitude change (that is, if such change is
warranted).

Although attitude change seems to be a "natural" goal of labor-

atory learning, it is not mentioned with any frequency in either the theory
or research literature:

"Turning to another type of internal criterion, the

authors were surprised to find relatively few studies relating T-group
experiences to attitude changes •.•. [T]he scarcity of research relating
laboratory education to attitude change is disappointing and rather hard to
understand" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, pp. 92, 95).
modest and realistic goal.

Attitude change is a

For instance, a participant who has difficulty

responding to even responsible confrontation by self-examination finally
realizes that he is very defensive, that he usually sees even helpful and well
ment confrontation as attack.

Gradually his attitude toward confrontation

I
I
f

j
:

i~
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changes.

Although even responsible confrontation has punitive side-effects,

still it is possible to ignore or endure these for the sake of the benefit
to be obtained.

After the laborat9ry is over, the participant may still

react adversely to honest criticism (he has not changed overnight), but his
attitude has changed and this is the seed of behavioral change.

If this is

true, then research should show attitude changes by the end of the laboratory
experience and behavioral changes in follow-up studies.
Behavioral change.
change.

The ultimate goal of the laboratory is behavioral

Experimentation with behavior in the laboratory is the first step in

this process.

The laboratory offers no magic and works no miracles.

Be-

havioral change demands work, both during the laboratory and especially after
it.

The person who sees little value in working at bettering his interpersona

relationships is ill-advised to enter a sensitivity-training

experience.
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Chapter IV
The Laboratory Method
Introduction
The "laboratory" character of the interpersonal-growth experience is
part of the contract.

Although a sunnnary of the fundamental aspects of the

laboratory method is given in the first chapter, an indication of how these
factors apply to interpersonal-growth experiences in general and to the
contract group in particular is in order.
Diversities in laboratory experiences.

It would be unrealistic to try to

catalog here all the differences that exist among the various kinds of
laboratory experiences.

It is much more feasible to discuss some of the

sources of the differences that do exist.

Two factors that account for a

great deal of the differences are the size of the social unit in focus in the
laboratory and the purpose of the laboratory.

For instance a laboratory

might be oriented primarily toward (1) the community,. (2) the organization,
(3) the group, or (4) the individual.

In each instance, a variety of goals

might be contemplated.
(1) The community.

Klein (1965} describes the use of laboratory

experiences in community development programs.

The purposes of such programs

are quite broad:
For the purposes of the program which this chapter describes,
community development has been considered to encompass work
with community groups and entire communities for the purpose
of assisting in the development of leadership skills, of
fostering effective citizen participation in meeting economic,
social, and civic needs, and of enabling optimal utilization of
state and national resources from both government an<l
voluntary bodies while strengthening local community initiative
and autonomy (Kelin, 1965, p. 185).
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Laboratories are run in which goals such as the following are set for the
participants:
1.

Increasing their sense of community, by which [is] meant the
readiness to view communi~y events in terms of interacting
forces and processes within a coherent whole.

2.

Enlarging their definition of citizenship ••• an increased
ability to identify and respond to opportunities for effective
participation in community events.

3.

Enhancing their sensitivities and skills as citizen participants
within groups and organizations.

4.

Developing more sophistication and objectivity in their attempts
to diagnose the forces and processes contributing to cormnunity
problems.

5.

Helping them to function more effectively as agents of change
in situations where collaborative planning and effort is
needed (Klein, 1965, pp. 185-186).

In some cases community teams composed of a number of workers from the same
community agency or representatives from a variety of community agencies
came as units to the laboratory.

Teams of trainers or community consultants

also go into the community itself and work toward a variety of goals with
community leaders in situ.
(2)
focuses

The organization.

An example of a laboratory experience which

on a single organization is found in The Managerial Grid (Blake &

Mouton, 1964; see also Blake & Mouton, 1965).

The "grid" deals with

managerial styles and emphasizes the two major dimensions of managerial skill:
human relations and productivity.

The grid itself is depicted in Figure 1.

kn entire laboratory program with a large organization may require from three
to five years to complete.

A six-phase approach to organization improvement

is suggested (Blake & Mouton, 1965):

I

High

9

8

I

I

I

Coimtry Clµb 1.'anagement-(1, 9)
.__ ProduC:ion i~ inci1ental to
lack of cor1 f!ict and £ood
fEflowsh ip.

Team Man;;i;em(nt-(9, 9)
Production is from
ir.!'!gration ol task aod
hLrman requirements intc 1
unified S)'Stem of interplay
toward organizatiofiaf .&oafs.

.

7

-

-

Middle of the Road;-(5, 5)

Push for prodvction but

Concern

don't go i)ll out. GiVl!
some. but not at:. Be
· fair but firm.

for

..
..

People
4

....._
3

..__
2

..__

Low

1
Low

fmpovenshe:l Manage"Tient-(1. 1)
Effective produc~icn is
unobta;nable beo"..ause p.:ople are
lazy, apathetic, ar.d ir.different.
Sound and mature relationships
ere drff1cult to ach1e11e be-::ause.
human nature 1>e:r.g •1hat it is,
conflict is inevit~ble.

l

Task Management-(9, 1)
Men are a commodit/ ;ust
like mac~ines. A manager's
responsibility is to pla~.
direct. and. control the ..,·ork
of those subordinate to ttim.

.

3

-----

-

,

I
2

-

5

Concern for

7
Prod~ction

8

9
High

..,
14'

Phase 1:

learning to apply behavioral science theory of solvin 0

problems of work in a human laboratory.

and to understand behavioral

sc~ence

"The aim is for managers to study

theory and research findings sufficiently

well, and in such a concrete and personal way, that intuitive assumptions
underlying habitual behavior can be replaced by sound managerial approaches
for getting work done in a manner that arouses mutual confidence and respect"
(p. 172).

The laboratory is so structured that line personnel rather than

academic behavioral scientists serve as the faculty for each of the
laboratory sessions.

This makes them better teachers (and one assumption is

that a good manager is an effective teacher) and makes them also feel more
responsible for the implementation of what is taught.

The participants

engage in various exercises designed to reveal to themselves their own
managerial styles and to improve managerial skills with respect to both
human relations and productivity.

The ideal, of course, according to the

grid is a 9,9 style of management (see Figure 1).

The other phases of the

program involve team training, interteam cooperation, setting organization
improvement goals, implementing planned change, and stabilizing and replanning
Even though the managerial-grid laboratory is a highly structured, organization-oriented experience, the participant learns much about himself
personally and interpersonally in the give-and-take of group interaction.
(3)

The group.

"Group" here means the small, face-to-face group.

Obviously small, face-to-face groups are used in both community and organization laboratories, but there are also training experiences in which the
principal focus is on the small group itself.

For instance, some courses in

group dynamics are taught in a laboratory fashion.

The participants (the
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,tudents} learn about the small group by actually being one (or becor....... 6
for the duration of the course.

vuc 1

The leader (usually the teacher) establishes

!lis position as leader (usually_..by merely being the teacher), but otherwise

offers little direction, much to the frustration of the participants.
~embers

The

of such a group, in an even more basic way that the members of a

"goalless" sensitivity-training group, must determine the goals of the group
and work out viable ways of dealing with one another.

This is often a

tortuous process during which they tend to take out their frustrations on the
leader by symbolically expelling, "killing," or usurping the position of the
leader (Slater, 1966).

From time to time the members use the sessions to

explore themselves and one another, so that the meetings sound like group
psychotherapy sessions.

Therefore, though the direct goal is to learn about

small groups by becoming one, the participants engage in a good deal of
behavior similar to that found in "growth" experiences of various kinds.
Laboratories are also designed to study the potentialities of small
groups, e.g., group versus individual ability in problem-solving and decisionmaking situations.

For instance, small groups are given different types of

problems to work out or are asked to make managerial decisions.

With the

help of a trainer such groups reflect upon themselves and the processes they
engage in order to solve problems and come to decisions.

The participants

become more aware, not only of group problem-solving and decision-making
processes, but also of the human relations problems involved in group
processes.

According to Collins and Guetzkow (1964), inability to handle the

interpersonal dimensions of task situations is one of the greatest sources of
task failure.
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Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward
group productivity as meeting problems posed by taskenvironmen tal obstacles; in fact, because group members
have a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interpersonal obstacles may be the majo~ barrier to task effectiveness
in many groups (p. 88).
The principal focus of a laboratory, then, may be the small group its elf-e.g., how they are formed, how a group of unrelated individuals becomes a
cohesive unit, problem-solving processes in groups, group decision-making,
certain group characteristics such as group norms, group climate, group
structure, and power factors in groups.
(4)

The individual.

The contract group is a laboratory in which

intrapsychic and especially interpersonal issues are the direct focus of the
group experience.
such issues:

A small group provides a unique opportunity for handling

the participant can experiment with a wide variety of inter-

personal behaviors and can benefit from the comparatively wide spectrum of
feedback he receives from his fellow participants.

Stoller (1968) refers to

such experimentation as "stretching accustomed modes of behavior,"

The group

forms a kind of culture-in-miniature within which new constructs may be
tried not just in an intellectual but in a behavioral way.

Hampden-Turner

(1966), in formulating an "existential" learning theory applicable to

training situations, suggests that part of the growth cycle involves a
person's periodically "letting go" and risking a portion of his "experienced
competence" in order to "bridge the distance" between himself and the other.
The participant ventures out into the group, experiemnts with "new" behavior,
receives feedback, and ends with a new synthesis, including broadened
knowledge and a clearer sense of his identity.
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In all laboratories, and this includes the contract laboratory, theory
is subordinated and emphasis is placed on impact-through-involvement.

whole purpose of a laboratory is.--- to translate theory into action.

The

Very often

the participants are not ready for this kind of learning; the emphases are
unaccustomed ones:

"The learning of concepts, the setting of goals, the

clarification of values, and even the achievement of insight into self, are
sometimes far ahead of the development of the performance skills necessary
to expression inactual social transactions" (Berne, Bradford, & Lippitt, 1964,
p. 17).

One of the principal modes of flight employed by groups is to

regress to an abstract discussion of concepts and values.

But the group

demands interpersonal performance rather than discussion:

"Laboratory method

starts with a different over-all view of learning as a transaction between
learner and environment in which neither learner nor environment is regarded
as fixed and in which both undergo modification" (Benne, Bradford, & Lippitt,
1964, p. 24).

Even i f the laboratory is an academic course, books are absent

or secondary.

If there are lectures they are very short.

The participants

are not asked to repeat what they have learned and the general authoritarian
structure associated with learning is laid aside.

In fact, almost all the

cues that traditionally enable a learner to identify a learning situation are
absent.

This disturbs some people.

Some think that no learning or an

inferior kind of learning is taking place.

After the experience is over,

the participant finds it difficult to categorize what he has "learned" in
traditional terms.

This at times embarrasses him and confuses those with

whom he discusses his experience.
George Kelly (1955a, 1955b) is interested in man-in-evolution.

He
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claims that man is best understood in the perspective of history and that by
reflecting on himself he can discover ways of restucturing his life.

The

pattern man uses to view or const_rue the world he is in are called
"constructs."

Whether these constructs are "right" or ''wrong," they still

exist:

"What he perceives may not exist, but his perception does" (1955a,

p. 8).

Even though a person tries to improve his constructs by increasing

his repertory of experience, his general construct system is resistant to
change.

Thus, two factors hinder him from bettering his construct system:

(a) fear and the resultant need to hang on to the old and (b) the lack of a
"laboratory" in which he could experiment with new constructs in a relatively
controlled and safe way.

The training laboratory is precisely the place

i.·here the search for new "constructs" is secure.
of the old, for it is both
Possibly new

permi~ted

It is much easier to let go

and encouraged by the group culture.

constructs are there spread out among the heterogeneous group

comprising the laboratory.

Perhaps one of the reasons for the almost

phenomenal growth of sensitivity-training laboratories and encounter groups
is the need to have a relatively safe place in which to re-do one's construct
system.
Cultural permission.

Residential laboratories are sometimes referred

to as "cultural islands" both because they are cut off or insulated from the
highly routinized culture in the "back-home" situation and because they
develop their own culture in miniature.

But whether the laboratory be

residential or not, it affords the participants "cultural permission" to
engage in certain activities that is not found in the back-there situation.
"Cultural permission" is one of the keys to the success of laboratory
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training; it allows the laboratory situation to be different from day-to-day
living so that it might make a difference in such living.
then, means the establishment of a climate of freedom.

"Laboratory,"

If it is to succeed,

there must exist in it a kind of freedom that is lacking outside the group.
The contract is not just a structure; it is a stimulus to a certain behavioral
freedom.

It serves as a guideline to the kinds of experimentation that are

encouraged and even demanded.

Even contract laboratories, then, are freer

than ordinary life, for they declare a moratorium on certain inhibitory
conventions •
What are some of the cultural permissions afforded by the laboratory?
It "allows" comparative strangers to talk with one another at comparatively
deep levels:

the cultural prerequisites for friendship and intimacy are

laid aside and the participants deal with one another at some depth, not
because they are long time acquaintances, but merely because they are fellow
human beings.

Confrontation is another important area of cultural permission.

We seldome tell one another what impact we have on one another.

In our

culture it seems much more permissible to tell a third party impressions about
another that I would not dare tell the other.

Such conversations abound, and

while they may satisfy some need to ventilate one's frustrations in interpersonal living, there is little in them that could be called growthful.
The contract, in a sense, is a list of the cultural permissions given the
participants in their interactions with one another:

they may disclose

themselves, express their feelings, tell others what they like about them,
challenge the behavior or attitudes, lay aside those forms of politeness
Which are really no more than interpersonal constrictions, and anything else
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that appears to be both interpersonally responsible and growthful.

Tilere

is some complaint that some laboratories go too far, that they "permit" or
even encourage too much, so that the cultural and even ethical sensibilities
of the participants are offended.

In view of the sensitivity-training

explosion taking place on the American scene, this may well be true.
However, the contract group encourages responsible cultural permissiveness
without subscribing to cultural (or ethical) license.

The person who

participates in a contract group learns not only the operational provisions
of the contract but he also learns why the contractual variables have been
chosen.

In the contract wide cultural permissions are extended, but it is

the participant who must determine what he is going to allow himself.
The Assumptions of Training Technology
Campbell and Dunnette (1968) outline the implicit and explicit
assumptions of T-group methodology.

These assumptions will be listed here

together with some indication as to how they apply to the contract group.
Feedback.

"A substantial number of group members, when confronted with

others' behaviors and feelings in an.atmosphere of psychological safety, can
;;roduce articulate and constructive feedback" (p. 77).
is designed to facilitate just this kind of feedback.

The entire contract
Neither the inactive

nor the irresponsibly confronting participant is fulfilling the contract and
become themselves the object of group confrontation.

Perhaps few of us feel

comfortable revealing to another the impact his behavior has on us, but the
contract provides a stimulus to do just that.
Agreement

~

feedback.

"A significant number of the group members can

agree on the major aspects of a particular individual's behavior exhibited
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in the group si.tuation.

Certainly a complete consensus is not to be exacted,

but neither must the feedback go off in· all directions" (p. 77).
participant is a person who goes

o~f

If the

"in all directions," then the feedback

should reflect precisely this, that is, the contradictions in his behavior
should become apparent.

Secondly, a person l!lust reveal enough about himself

if he expects any kind of consistency of feedback from the group.

If he

gives little of himself, then the feedback will be scattered, for it will
be a question of each other member interpreting the participants behavior in
his own way.

There is no guarantee that there will be consistency of

interpretation.

In a word, if the participant wants to get some consistent

picture of himself from the other members in the group, he must assume an
active role in the gre>up, he must generate sufficient "data" as the raw
material for feedback.
be consistent:

If the participant is active, then the feedback will

this certainly is the assumption in the contract group,

though it still awaits empirical verification.
Completeness of feedback.

"Feedback is relatively complete and deals

with significant aspects of the individual's behavior" (p. 77}.

If the

members are actively pursuing the contract, then feedback will be as complete
as the participant receiving the feedback will allow.

A participant will

not receive feedback on those dimensions of his person which he chooses not
to reveal.

But even if the participant is q_uite defensive in certain areas,

feedback will be complete in the sense that others will teli him how
defensive he appears.

Again, this assumption depends upon whether the members

of the group assume an active role in the group, especially with respect to
the "significant aspects" of one another's behavior.

The contract, in that
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it encourages both_ self....0.:tsclosure and responsible confrontation, is a
stimulus to deal with the significant.
Representative behavior.

"The·behavior emitted in the group is

sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group so that learning
occurring within the group will carry over or transfer" (p. 77) •
really two assumptions here:

There are

(1) that the behavior in the group is a sample

of behavior outside the group and (2) that changes in the sample behavior
will transfer

to behavior outside the group.

really dealt with separately below.

The second assumption is

If a group not only permits but demands

that its participants be themselves, then behavior in the group will be
representative of behavior outside the group.

A case comes to mind.

A

young lady in a week-end laboratory experience was all sweetness, light, and
cliches.

She was inunediately supportive of everyone and thus ingratiated

herself with everyone.

However, I did not believe that her behavior in the

group was "sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group," she
seemed less than real.

I confronted her with my misgivings several times.

She finally got quite angry and manifested a completely different side of
her personality.
realistic.

After that incident her feedback to others became more

A group has a way of dealing with facades; facades prevent

person to person contact, and this inhibits the growth of the group.

It is

not that thre is any particular sense of accomplishment in stripping away
the facade of another, it is rather that in the give-and-take of the group
it is too frustrating to try to communicate with a facade.
demands a variety of "significant" behaviors.

The contract

If a person does not engage

in a particular kind of contractual behavior, this in itself is revealing.
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For instance, if a person simply never confronts anyone else in the group,
this can mean several things.

It may mean that he is afraid of others or

overly sensitive.

t~at

It may mean

if he were to confront people would see

a side of him that he does not want to reveal.

In any case, he should be

faced with his refusal to confront; he should be faced with the fact that
his behavior in the group does not seem to be "representative."
Psychological safety.

"Psychological safety can be achieved relatively

quickly in the group (in the matter of a few hours) among either complete
strangers or among associates who have had varying types and degrees of
interpersonal interaction" (p. 77).
safety in a number of ways:

The contract increases psychological

it adds "high visibility" to the training

experience and is thus anti-manipulative; it helps create a common group
culture, so that the "risks" taken by the participant take place against
the background of a shared culture; it demands growthful forms of behavior,
e.g., concerned rather than punitive confrontation; the leader "models"
contractual behavior and serves as a kind of "guardian" of the contract.
Some would probably object that the contract makes the training situation too
safe.

I would rather hope that the participants would see in the contract

a pledge of response and support no matter what they risked.
Interpersonal incompetence.

"Almost everyone initially lack inter-

personal competence; that is, individuals tend to have distorted self-images,
faulty perceptions, and poor communication skills" (p. 77).
is overstated.

This assumption

Most men have areas of competence, areas of promise, and areas

of deficit in the interpersonal dimensions of their lives.
however, should never be considered just as remedial.

The

The laboratory,
1 :. 1

,oratory gives

159
its participants an opportunity to eKamine their interpersonal styles,
including their areas of promise.
adequate in relating to others,

A person, even though he feels that he is

~ight

discover that he is even more comfort-

able or stimulated when he approaches others in ways different from those
he is used to.

The participant, then, is asked to share his areas of

competence, explore and experiment with his areas of promise, and discover and
experiment with changes in his areas of deficit.
Anxiety and learning.

"Anxiety facilitates new learning" (p. 77).

The

place of anxiety in the training situation was dealt with above.
Transfer learning.

"Finally, transfer of training occurs between the

cultural island and the 'back home' situation" (p. 77).

While there is much

anecdotal evidence that such transfer does take place, there has been
relatively little empirical corrobo-ration.

Burker and Knowles (1967), using

questionnaires sent to those who knew the laboratory participants in the
back-home situation, found evidence indicating that transfer of training does
take place.

As suggested above, perhaps the immediate fruit of training

experiences lies in the area of attitude change, which may subsequently
underlie behavioral change.
Most experimental findings are useless unless they have some degree of
generalizability.

Interpersonal growth laboratories are failures if the

participants do not ttansfer their learning to other social groups.

Another

way of conceptualizing the process is for each participant to consider his
Wider social environment as part of the laboratory.

I have been in groups

in which college students, once having experimented with openness with
their peers, widened the scope of their experimentation to include parents
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and siblings.

A number of them reported rather dramatic improvement of

relationships, while a few said that people outside the group thought that
they were "putting them on."

However successful or unsuccessful these

experiments outside the group might be, they enhance the group experience
itself, especially to the degree that what takes place outside the group is
transformed into the here-and-now.

"I talked to my dad, and I tried to be

open, but I don't think that he had the slightest idea what. I was talking
about.

I'm not sure whether it's him or me.

Do I talk and say nothing here?

I just wonder whether I am as vague as he makes me think I am."

It is not

just a question of trying out laboratory "gimmicks" on one's friends.

Such

childish manipulation would merely reflect the immaturity of the participant.
But i f the laboratory experience generalizes to include some of the
"significant others" in the lives of at least some of the participants, then
it is having the impact that it is meant to have, and

Ll, lt:1

dialogue-with-

others-outside-the-group can add a new dimension to the total group ·
experience itself.
"E;xperimental Controls"
The laboratory as such is not an experiment in the strict sense (unless,
of course, it is also the object of research, but then such research "stands
apart" from the actual laboratory, at least in some sense of the term).
Still, the notions of laboratory and experimentation, even in their widest
sense, imply some concept of experimental controls.
degree of "control" to the laboratory,

The contract adds a

Goals are clearly defined and an

attempt is made to eliminate other than contractual variables.

Even when

non-contractual behavior arises, e.g •• the intrusion of need-goal behavior
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that is antithetical to contract goals, such behavior is rather readily
identified and "controlled" in this sense.

The contract also offers a

structural schema which facilitates the elaboration of different training
,-·-

"designs."
§uspension of Judgment
On the one hand, the laboratory offers the participant a climate of
interpersonal freedom that is available in few other social contexts; on the
other, it demands of him a kind of suspension of judgment with respect to
the design of the laboratory.

In the contract group this design is quite

visible and might seem, at least at first glance, to involve a number of
artificialities (these are discussed below).

There is the natural tendency

to pre-judge the entire experience or at least various aspects of it.

The

participants, however, contract to suspend judgment as much as possible, to
experience the laboratory and its exercises before evaluating them.

Both

more traditional sensitivity training laboratories and contract experiences
involve a certain amount of psychological risk.

In the former the

participants are not sure what lies ahead; in the latter, the members know
what lies ahead and are apprehensive about it.

In both experiences the

participant might find out that he is not as interpersonally effective as he
thinks he is.

Risk engenders anxiety, and anxiety engenders defensiveness.

This defensiveness can well take the form of attacking as meaningless an
experience that well might highlight interpersonal inadequacies both to
oneself and others.

If the participants are forewarned with respect to the

elements of risk and anxiety and to the tendency to attack what might prove
to be painful, it is

hypothesi~ed

here that they will approach the laboratory

162
experience with a greater sense of openness.
something like this:
the contract.
I

An ideal attitude would be

"In general I want the kind of experience described in

I realize that it_ involves a certain amount of risk and anxiety

also realize that I am not entirely convinced as to the meaningfulness of

all provisions of the contract, and I will probably have some reservations
concerning the communication exercises that will be proposed.

Still, I

prefer not to pre-judge any particular aspects of the laboratory, in so far
as this is possible.
open mind."

I am going to try to enter into everything with an

If antecedent suspension of judgment is a value, so is consequent

evaluation of laboratory and exercise.

Again, if the laboratory itself or

some particular aspect'of it reveals certain areas of deficit in interpersonal capability, there will be a natural tendency to attack the source
of this knowledge.

Still, laboratory designs will grow in effectiveness

only if the laboratory experience is realistically ul ti, !.wd hy the
participants.
~ 2_

Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations ..!!_Not.

The laboratory is not an assemblage of guinea pigs who are being
manipulated either by the leader from within or by researchers from without.
Jourard (1967) strongly questions the kind of research in which the human
person becomes an object to be manipulated:
A humanistic psychologist, like his less humanistic colleague,
is concerned to identify the factors that affect man's
experience and action, but his aim is not to render man predictable to, and controlled by, someone else. Rather, his aim
is to understand how determining variables function, in order that
man might be liberated from their impact as he pursues his own
free projects (p. 109).
Jourard goes on to suggest that the experimenter-subject relntionship be one
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of dialogue rather than manipulation.

Rome and Rome (1967), who have been

developing a unique method of studying the organization and government of
large social organizations,

repor~

successful research in which subjects are

seen as collaborators in the enterprise rather than as objects of manipulation
~!ilgram

(1963) conducted a study in which "obedience" to the experimenter

meant that the subject (insofar as he knew the situation) had to administer
painful shocks to another subject.

Tuenty-six out of forty subjects "admin-

istered" the highest shocks on the "generator" (the other subject was a
stooge and was not receiving any shocks at all).
what a subject will do for a man of science.

It is chilling to think

Milgram's subjects were given

a kind of "scientifi.c permission" to do what they would ordinarily consider
inhuman.

It would be ironical if the leader were to engage in any kind of

large scale manipulation, for one of the purposes of the laboratory is to
have the participants learn to involve themselves with one another in nonmanipulative ways.
Artificiality-Reality Dimensions of Laboratory Life.
The sources of artificiality.

At first glance it would seem that a

laboratory in interpersonal relations labor under a relatively high degree
of artificiality.

In a sense this is true; laboratories are contrived, and

their artificiality would make little sense unless it somehow had an impact
on day-to-day living.

The sources of artificiality in the contract group,

for instance, are at least three.
(a)

Laboratory artificiality.

The laboratory itself is artificial.

The people who comprise the various groups in the laboratory situation do not
come together "naturally," that is, they do not choose to be with other
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members of the group because they are attracted to them for one reason or
another.

In most instances the participants find themselves in "stranger"

groups, that is, most of the participants are, at least relatively, unknown
to one another.

Or, if they do know one another, it is not along the

dimensions emphasized by the laboratory.

And yet they are expected quickly

to achieve a certain degree of intimacy with one another in the give-and-take
of group interaction.

The artificiality of being with the members of this

group is often emphasized i f the laboratory is composed of a number of
groups.

After a while certain members begin to feel the "distant-fields"

urge, and they begin saying to themselves "I wish I were in that group."
(b)

Contract artificiality.

contract itself.

The second source of artificiality is the

The participants are not only expected to achieve a certain

degree of intimacy with one another, but the contract (at least the one
described here) specifies to a great extent the nature of this intimacy.

For

instance, the participant is expected to reveal to others the kind of person
he

is~

at least in some degree.

confronted by them.

He is expected to confront others, and be

Not only are strangers thrown together in a kind of

intimacy, but even the dimensions of this intimacy are imposed.
(c)

Exercise artificiality.

The laboratory usually entails certain

stimuli to connnunication in the form of laboratory exercises.

These will

be considered in greater detail elsewhere, but at least one example must be
treated here, because exercises do constitute a third source of artificiality.
For instance, there is the "snake" exercise, a somewhat ominous term, arising
innocently enough, however, from the physical arrangement of the participants.
The members of the laboratory divide into two groups, arranging themselves
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in two lines a couple of feet apart so that each member is directly opposite
Jnother member.

Then each member merely looks silently into the eyes of the

person standing opposite him for

~!fteen

or twenty seconds.

Each row circles

around (the "snake" undulates) until every member has gazed into the eyes
of every other member.

This part of the exercise is entirely non-verb.al.

Then the members of the group sit down and discuss how they felt, what
emotions or reactions arose, during the exercise.

There are other both verbal

and non-verbal exercises, most of which are designed to stimulate different
modes of communication among members or to dissolve communication "blocks"
that arise in the group.

Whatever their purpose, however, they are still

artificial; they are ways of interpersonal acting which are not current in
even the relatively intimate associations of ordinary life.
The reality of laboratory life.

One of the assumptions underlying the

laboratory experience is that it must be different from day-to-day living if
it is to make a difference, if it is to have an impact on such living.

But

the laboratory experience is not designed just to be different, it is not
a question of courting a "games" artificially.

"Artificial" experiences are

countenanced only to the degree that they are considered useful in changing
interpersonal attitudes and behaviors in the direction of fuller interpersonal
living.

Perhaps a better way of putting it is this:

the artificialities of

the human relations laboratory are valuable to the degree that they highlight
"overlooked realities" in day-to-day interpersonal living.

Much of what

takes place in a laboratory is artificial only in the sense that it is not
what is usually done in interpersonal relationships, not in the sense that
it is false or inauthentic.

Training groups, then are something more and
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something less than real life.

They are certainly more than most of the

ritualistic and cliche interrelating that goes on in everyday life, but
they are less than the natural, -~pontaneous growthful contacts that take
place between those who choose one another as friends at the deepest levels.
(a)

Laboratory reality.

to grow interpersonally.

The members come together because they want

The participant is expected to involve himself

with this group of "strangers" precisely because they are human beings.

They

involve themselves with one another; the work out their likes and dislikes,
and they do so in the context of this group.

The laboratory sets up a

demand that each member face this set of interpersonal relationships.
One of the realities of ordinary human living is that people are "locked"
into relationships with certain other individuals or sets of individuals.

In

the laboratory, interpersonal problems cannot be solved by ignoring them,
by moving to a different set of persons, or by utilizing other modes of
interpersonal flight.

The pressure for involvement with this particular set

of people, while artificial in one sense, highlights the unreality of unproductive modes of involvement or non-involvement with the "real" people in
the participant's normal life

si~uation.

Moreover,

deal~g

with the

stranger in the laboratory group can bring home to the participant, in a
dramatic way, his failure to deal with the "stranger element" in those with
whom he is intimate in real life.

The laboratory does not allow the

opportunities of flight from intimacy that day-to-day living often does.
Therefore, part of its artificiality is that it is more rather than less
real than ordinary interpersonal living.
(b)

Contractual reality.

The laboratory itself makes it impossible for
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the participant to take flight from these people, this set of interpersonal
relationships.

The contract, insofar as it defines the general ways that

each is to involve himself with the others, prevents group members from
avoiding certain important modalities of interpersonal relating.

The member

is forced to engage in interpersonal activities that may not be part of his
interpersonal life style.

He is not only engaged with these particular

people, but he cannot avoid the qualitative realities of this engagement
that are called for by the contract.

A member, in his ordinary life, might

manage to avoid letting others know something about the "person within," he
nay court "any-price" peace and thus avoid confrontation and the selfexamination it involves, but in the group the pressures of the contract
tend to force him to face, at least to some degree, these realities of
interpersonal living.

Therefore, the contract, too, for all its artificiality

exacts an engagement with interpersonal realities which are too often avoided
in real life.
(c)

Exercise reality.

Exercises usually focus in on smaller elements

of the connnunication experience.

The "snake" exercise, for instance:

When

two people communicate, they usually look at each other from time to time,
and they are aware that they are present to each other.
isolates this aspect of communication.

The "snake" exercise

It is artificial in its isolation of

certain elements of connnunication, in its protractedness, and in its
completely non-verbal character.

But eye-contact and mutual non-vet t;al

presence are human realities, realities that usually go generally unnoted in
human interrelating.

Exercises focus on molecular aspects of relating in

order to make them more real in molar living.

Some artists exaggerate
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vJ.rious fonns in their painting in order to make the observer look at a

:orm that has never really "lived" in the observer's eye or to revive a feeling for something that may have oo..ce lived but is now dead.

the "zoom lens" of the laboratory experience.

Exercises are

If they are used judiciously,

they can make certain aspects of interpersonal relating come alive in
dramatically new ways.
Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), in discussing experimentation in social
psychology, refer to both "experimental" and "mundane" realism.
In one sense, an experiment is realistic if the situation is
realistic to the subject, if it involves him, if he is forced
to take it seriously, if it has impact on him. This kind of
realism we call experimental realism. The term 'realism' can
also be used to refer to the extent to which events occurring
in the laboratory setting are likely to occur in the treal
world.' We call this type of realism mundane realism (p. 22).

If this terminology is adpated to

l~boratories

in interpersonal relations, it

may be said that such laboratories are high in both experiment and mundane
realism.

The participant can become as "engaged" as he desires in the inter-

action of the group, and, if the intimacy that develops within the group
does not reflect the intimacy of the participant's "real world," in some way

it should and therefore becomes diagnostic, if not motivational.
Conclusion
Laboratories

~

centers for study of the normal.

The interpersonal-

growth laboratory provides an opportunity to study some of the deepest
reactions of man in an atmosphere of relative security.
its realism and yet it is controlled.

The environment has

There is no reason why growthful

training experiences and research cannot take place at the same time.
Laboratories as centers for the "therapy" of the !'_:nrmal.

Schofield

'
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(1964) expresses concern about the number of people with "philosophical··

:ieuroses" who take up the time of clinical professionals who have more
important or pressing work to do .•_- According to him, the "philosophically"
diseased':
suffer a freedom of complaint. The absence of conflicts,
frustrations, and symptoms brings a painful awareness of
absence--the absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning, of
the need to search out personal ultimate values, or the need
to live comfortably and meaningfully in the face of final
uncertainty. For increasing number of rational, educated, and
thoughtful men the central struggle becomes one of finding and
keeping an emotional and psychological balance between the
pain of doubt and the luxury of faith. A distaste for this
struggle, or an insistence on its resolution as a necessary
condition for continued existence is at the heart of the
philosophical Neurosis (p. 150).
Encounter groups, led by those with drastically less formal training than
professional therapists, seem almost ideal in

handlin~

such problems.

The

participants are suffering and therefore the group is serious business to .
them.

Bot one of their chief complaints is that, in one way or another, they

are out-of-meaningful-community.

The small group is a meaningful community,

but it is also a center where the participants learn to involve themselves
more effectively with others, with the wider community, and with the problems
which face the country in general.
Schofield is also concerned with the need of trained people to work with
the emotionally disturbed.

He favors steps that have been taken to recruit

and utilize non-professionals as mental health counselors (see Rioch, Blkes,
Flint, Usdansky, Newman, & Silber, 1963).

Contract group, under the direc-

tion of professionals, could be used quite effectively to train such mental
health counselors.
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The present culture.
It is hardly surprising.

Growth-through-groups has caught on in America.
There have been diatribes against sensitivity-

training, encounter groups, resid=ntial laboratories, and other facets of
human relations training, but any wholesale affirmation or condemnation of
these phenomena is meaningless.
phenomenon.

Sensitivity-training is simply not a unitary

There are good laboratory experiences, poor ones, and even

dangerous ones.

We should now see to it that a wholesome laboratory culture

takes roots in our social system.
laboratory-orientation to life.

It seems that there is even a humanistic
If I am laboratory-oriented, this means that

I am always somewhat aware of my areas of deficit and promise and that I can
experiment ways of reducing dissonance in my life and actualizing interpersonal possibilities.
to grow.

It means that I am willing to take risks in order

In means that I realize that others have resources even for my

own growth which I do not possess myself but which I can tap in a very human
and growthful way.
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Chapter V
Leadership
Introduction
The question of leadership in general is a complex one.

Gibb (1950)

studied two sets of ten-man leaderless groups (one group of college students
and one of army officer candidates).

He had outside observers rate the

group members on leadership qualities and the members of the groups themselves rated one another on three sociometric questions.

The group members

·•ere to choose (1) those with whom they would like to spend leisure time,
(2)

those with whom they would like to work, and (3) the person whose removal

from the group would bring about the largest group change.

The results

showed that sociometric choice on the third criterion (removal and group
change) had, by far, the highest correlation with observer ratings of
leadership.

It is difficult, then, to point out in any general way what

makes a good leader, for leadership criteria can change from situation to
situation.

As Lindzey and Byrne (1968) point out, "it appears that the

nature of the relationship between sociometric status and leadership is
dependent on the demands of the situation and the characteristics of the
individuals composing the group" (p. 485).
Mann (1959) sunnnarizes some of the problems associated with evaluating
leadership.
Viewed historically, the study of leadership has stimulated more
than its share of controversy. The trait approach to leadership,
the view that leadership is an attribute of the individual, has
received the harshest treatment throughout the years. To have
spoken of an individual as possessing a measurable quantity of
leadership was perhaps an unfortunate choice of wor<ls. The clear
implication of such a statement is that since leadership is specific
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to the indivi.dual, it will remain constant for the individual
regardless of the situation in which he finds himself.
Investigations of the actual consistency with which an individual maintains leadership status in different groups and
under varying conditions h~ve yielded results sufficiently
equivocal to permit a new bifurcation of the field. On the one
hand, the trait approach has been modified to imply that an
individual's achieved leadership status is a function of his
personality. On the other hand, sufficient evidence has been
accumulated to give impetus to the situational approach to
leadership, which lllB.intains that leadership is an emergent
phenomenon, created through the interaction of individuals
(leaders and followers), and that selection and stability of
any leadership pattern is a function of the task, composition,
and culture of the group. From all this work has emerged some
such sunnnary formulation as that an individual's leadership status
in groups is a joint function of his personality and the
particular group setting (pp. 246-247).

I.
·,

Given these cautions, Mann goes on to indicate those personality qualities
~hich

the empirical literature shows as associated with effective leadership

in small groups.
The pos:t:ive relationships of intelligence, adjustment, and
extroversion to leadership are highly significant. In addition~
dominance, masculinity, and interpersonal sensitivity are found
to be positively related, while conservatism is found to be
negatively related to leadership (p. 252).
It is difficult to specify leadership qualities in as restricted an area as
laboratory training, for little or no research has been done on leadership
in such groups and de facto leadership styles vary greatly from leader to
leader and from situation to situation.

According to Whitman (1964), the

trainer in a T-group should have experience in two areas:
life, and (2) group dynamics.

(1) his own inner

Both of these qualities seem essential for a

trainer in a contract group.
~ Trainer as Leader-Member

Leader-member.

In the contract group the leader is also a member, that
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is, he subscribes to the same member contract that the other participants do.
In most sensitivity-training groups part of the "planned ambiguity" revolves

1round the role of the trainer in the group.

For a while he seems to be

~either

leader nor member, for he gives the group little direction and in

~;eneral

interacts little with the individual members.

But again, it is

Jifficult to talk about what trainers do or do not do in groups in general
~ecause

~roup

of the great variability in trainer styles.

the function of the leader is explicit.

is spelled out in the member contract.
spelled out in this chapter.

However, in the contract

What he should do as member

What he should do as leader is

What follows, then, constitutes a kind of

leader contract.
The leader-member and interpersonal effectiveness.
indicated that an effective leader is an adjusted one.

Mann (1959)
Rogers (1967) has

found that the "congruent" therapist is more effective and describes such
a person as one who "responds as the real person he actually is," who
"employs no artificial front and does not have to hide or fear his real
reactions" (p. 10).

The trainer in the contract group should also be a.\

justed and "congruent," but this does not place him in a separate category
in the group.

"most

It is not essential that he be the "most adjusted" or the

congruent."

The leader-member is in the group because he is interested

in interpersonal growth, his own included.

He is not there because he had

"made it" in the area of interpersonal relations, but because he thinks that
interpersonal growth is important.

Because of his experience he may be mo re!

aware of his own interpersonal strengths and his areas of deficit, and it is
this being in touch with his own experiencing which enables him to make

II J:'ltact with others.
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Ideally, the leader-member is a person of high social

1.:1tclligence, that is, he has

a feeling for people and knows how to get in

, ,.,tact with them without manipulating them.

llis social intelligence is

L"en partially in his ability to become a member of the group sincerely, even
~hough

he is the leader or trainer.

If the leader-member is not congruent and

::1 other respects socially intelligent, then his presence in the group will
.c disturbing rather than growthful and the participants will have to spend
1

good deal of energy in learning how to deal with him.

::1e Functions of the Leader-Member
Initial structuring.

It goes without saying that the leader should be

familiar, both theoretically and experientially, with the contract under
·•hich the group will be working.
~embers

If the contract is given to prospective

before entering the group, then the leader need say little about

the contract once the group begins.

However, if the contract is "imposed,"

there may be more "contract-disturbance" during the first few meetings and
some minimal discussion of the contract as contract will be in order.

Under

no condition, however, should the leader allow the contract to become the
continual object of discussion; one of the reasons for the contract is
precisely to avoid such "contract talk."

The leader should avoid answering a

multiplicity of abstract questions about the contract, even when the contract
is brief and therefore open to some misinterpretation.

The best time to

answer a question concerning the contract is when the particular contract
Problem arises during the group interaction itself.

Many areas within the

contract can be cleared up effectively only within the context of group
action.
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Whitman (1964} sees the initial remarks made by the trainer in a T-group
as extremely important in defining the subsequent character of the group
(see Redl, 1942).

The situation in the contract group, however, is quite

different in that the contract itself bears a good deal of the weight of the
initial structuring.

What is important in the contract group is the immediate

affective impact that the leader has on the group.

There is no reason why

he should not be warm and accepting from the very beginning rather than aloof
and ambiguous.

If the emotional attitudes he expresses arouses the resistance

of the participants, then the group will have to spend time dealing with this
rather than proceeding to the immediate concerns of the contract.

Working

through such resistance may well be a fruitful experience in itself, but it
is not part of the explicit design of the contract group experience.

In the

contract group a poor beginning due to a clumsy leader is simply "uneconomic,"
for it is a time-consuming undertaking to try to right "wrongs" in group
process once they have been made.
Putting his knowledge and experience at the service of the group.
According

to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), one of the sources of the group

the rapist's "power" comes from the unique posi tlon from which he sees the
group "focal conflict," which consists of two elements:

a disturbing motive,

that is, a wish on the part of one or more participants and a reactive motive,
that is, the fear or fears aroused by the disturbing motive.

The therapist,

because of his experience and training and because he in some way "stands
apart" from the group, has a vision of the group which none of the
participants has.
powerful figure.

This is at least one of the factors which makes him a
In training laboratories any leader who has a high degree
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Jf social intelligence, who has a solid knowledge of group dynamics, and who
as had experience in groups in a powerful figure indeed.

;1

in

which the trainer in the

contr.~ct

However, the way

group uses his power differs from the

·.:ay in which a therapist traditionally uses his in group psychotherapy and
from

the way in which another trainer would use his in a more traditional

sensitivity-training group.

This is to be expected since the goals (or at

least the means!) differ .in these three different situations.

The primary

function of the leader in the contract group is to place all of his resources
at the service of the group

~

directly and

~unambiguously ~possible.

He

is there both to fulfill the contract and to help the other members to
fulfill it too.

He is a kind of "social engineer," who in interested in the

development of the conditions of the interpersonal setting.

The statement of

the conditions of the interpersonal setting is taken care of by the contract,
but it is up to the trainer to see to it that these conditions develop in
such a way as to lead to the fulfillment of the goals of the contract.

His

leadership does not place him "outside" the group nor does his leadership in
the group give him any special position in the group with respect to the
member contract.

He is not even different from the other members in that

he is to serve the group, since it is the function of all the participants to
serve the group.

However, because of his knowledge, experiencl!, and skills,

he is in a special position to serve the group.
Because of his knowledge of group dynamics (groups as "natural") and
because of his experience (including his experience with groups as
"contractual"), he knows, even before the group begins, the kinds of problems
that will most likely arise "naturally" and impede

tLL: pr

.;gress of the group.
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::c therefore uses this knowledge of groups-as-"natural" to forestall the
dnds of group process that do not contribute to the goals of the group, no
::Jtter how profitable such activUy would be in another context.

For instance

e prevents the participants from entering into a long, intellectualized

:1

discussion of the merits of the contract or of sensitivity training in
.;cneral.

Such discussions, no matter how intellectually profitable they may

be, do not contribute to the goals of the contract and therefore are

considered by definition (or rather "by contract") forms of flight behavior.
If the group wants to pursue goals other than those outlined in the contract,
they should come to a consensus, abandon the contract, and subscribe to a
different process.
Dealing with the major characteristic problems of groups.

N-interactions

(see chapter 2} can be disruptive, neutral, or facilitative with respect to
the goals set by the contract.

The contract trainer ignores the neutral,

confronts the disruptive, and encourages the facilitative.

For instance,

Lott and Lott (1965), in a review of the literature on group cohesiveness,
found that increased contact or interaction on the part of group members
heightens the cohesiveness of the group.

The trainer, then, encourages the

members of the group to interact with one another as much as possible and he
discourages or confronts behavior that limits interaction (e.g. speeches,
monologues, psychological withdrawal, excessive silence, etc.).

There are

certain usually avoidable "natural" problems in groups that are so important
that, at least in the contract group, they should be explained in some way
from the very beginning.

If these problems which are productive of disruptive

N-interactions are explained in the contract itself, then the leader need
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do so but merely comment on them (and confront when necessary) when they

do arise.

However they are explained and handled, it should be before they

interfere with an "economic" purs_l,lal of group goals.

In other kinds of

;;roup experiences these same problems arise, but they are handled often
Jnly after they disrupt the group, and purposely so.

For instance, a group

=ight become entangled in long, intellectualized discussions of psycho<lynamics.

During the course of these discussions, many members become bored

and withdraw psychologically from the group.

Finally, after the participants

have experienced the deadening effect of the particular kind of non-growthful
!\-interaction, the trainer may ask the group to reflect on what is happening.
The participants learn painfully, but profitably, that they have really been

avoiding more intimate contact with one another.

However, learning the

anatomy of disruptive or non-growthful N-interaction:, b9 actually living with
them is not one of the primary goals of the contract group.
Perhaps the central characteristic problems that will face the group
should be included in the contract and/or discussed by the leader from the
very beginning.

Later, as less crucial problems arise, the leader can

interpret them in the context of the group interaction.

Some N-interactions

are more disruptive than others and it is also possible that different kinds
of N-interactions will prove disruptive (or facilitative) to groups with

different kinds of contracts.

The problems discussed below are considered

important enough for the contract group to warrant attention before the group
begins:
(1)

The handling-the-leader problem.

Almost everyone who discusses

the question of leadership in small groups deals with the problems that
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Jrise because of the polarization that takes place between leader and members
(e.g. Bennis, 1956, 1964; Bion, 1961; Tuckman, 1965; Whitman, 1964).

Tuckman

(1965) suggests that the initia~_stage of training groups is marked by a

degree of member-leader disturbance.

Bennis (1964) divides participants into

three categories during this initial stage:

the "dependents," those who

look to the trainer for cues, the "counterdependents," those who solve their
dependency needs by opposing the leader, and the "independents," those who
are "not threatened by the prospect of intimacy" (p. 264).

Nor is it certain

that such polarization is confined to the initial stage of the group, for
although Bennis (1956) hypothesized that the group would deal first with the
problem of authority (evidenced by power struggles and by preoccupation with
relationships with the trainer) and then go on to deal with the problem of
intimacy (evidenced by concerns about how much self-revelation there could
be, etc.), the results showed a continuous dealing with both these issues.
Perhaps Slater (1966) deals most intensively with such group-characteristic
phenomena as dependency, counterdependency, revolt, exclusion-of-the-leader,
etc.

Mann (1967) has developed a rather extensive member-leader analysis

system in which all feelings of member toward leader are scored.

The system

includes such categories as "moving against," "resisting," "withdrawing,"
"guilt inducing" (e.g. , blaming, accusing, feeling misunderstood, etc.) ,
"identifying," "moving toward," "showing dependency," "showing self-es teem"

(e.g., showing leader ability of being open and honest), etc.
As intriguing as such variables are and as focal as they are in a variety
of group experiences, in the contract group an attempt is made to render them
relatively inconsequential.

The overriding goal of the contract group
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~emands

that the parti.cipants become as deeply involved as possible with one

.:nother.

However, if the group spends an initial stage dealing primarily

·.;ith member-leader phenomena (Tuck.man, 1965) or deals continuously with such

.. -

?roblems (Bennis, 1956), time and energy are diverted from what are considered
to be more important goals.

Therefore, the leader "blows his cover," as it

1.·ere, he tells the group about these phenomena, he indicates the kinds of
::-interactions (e.g. dependency, counterdependency behavior) that arise in
face-to-face groups because of member-leader polarization.
"fatherhood" and his "divinity" from the beginning.

He abdicates his

If members are to have

difficulty with him, he wants it to be because he is another group member and
not because he is leader.

However, this does not mean that dependency and

counterdependency phenomena will not arise in the group, but it is
hypothesized that they will not arise with the same frequency and with the
same intensity as they would in groups not made aware of such phenomena from
the beginning.
~o

The fact that a particular member refuses to allow the leader

abdicate his fatherhood or his omnipotence is quite significant.

~uthority

problems do exist and they will be stronger in some participants

than in others.
~voided,

But

Member-leader polarization "stages" or "cultures" are to be

not individual N-interactions that arise from very deep needs in

individual cases.

No contract can legislate authority or dependency problems

out of existence.

In fact individual problems in these areas will be high-

lighted in the contract group because they will not appear merely as a part
of a "stage" or a "culture."
I

According to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), part of the therapist's

,,

Power" in group therapy comes "from the frequency with which the patients

181
i::ipute to the therapist the power of gratification, threat, and magical
. . olutions.

On this basis, the therapist becomes an object of impulses

:nvolved in the group focal confllct and a source of solutions" (pp. 197-198).

:t

is precisely this power which the leader, insofar as this is possible,

.1bdicates.

The contract-group leader differs from both therapist (at least

.!s traditionally conceived) and trainer in that he makes himself quite
''visible."

He tries to avoid rather than utilize ambiguity.

Unlike the

trainer as Whitman (1964) conceives him, he is not concerned with a middleroad between "absence of visibility" and "complete visibility" (p. 312).
::is cards are on the table.

He does not feel constrained to withhold infor-

::::it ion from the group because they cannot "tolerate" it.

Jnd leader contract are group property.

Both member contract

It is hypothesized that such

0penness will facilitate communication within the group and make the leader
less of a "problem."
Finally, the trainer in the contract group does not conceive of the
::iembers' relationships to him and his to theirs in terms of "transference" and
''countertransference."

While there is no special need to look upon transfer-

t;nce as "a devil conjured up only to be sent back to his usual habitat with
:::uch expenditure of time and energy" (Eysenck, 1959, p. 74), still it is
considered a non-crucial issue in the contract group.

Those who conceive of

resistance to growth in such tenns as tr.ansference (e.g. Bernstein, 1965)
I ~ight argue that an attempt to eliminate the problems centering around member-

1 leader polarization by increasing the visibility of the phenomenon merely

:::o.kes the problem of transference more acute by making it less visible.

On

t-1
Le.le
ot l1er hand, many therapists work without the concept of trans ferencc or
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.i: leat conceive of it in other than psychoanalytic terms.

For instance, May

:158) suggests that "the neurotic is one who in certain areas never developed
~<:;:ond

the limited and restricted forms of experience characteristic of the
,.

I ::1fJnt.

Hence in later years he perceives wife or therapist through the

,,1:::e restricted, distorted 'spectacles' as he perceived father or mother"
p. 79).

It is not a question of "transfering" feelings but of persistently

;dceiving relationships in maladaptive ways.
Whitman (1964) refers to the

Preventing "tacit understandings."
~ifferent

"levels" on which a group operates simultaneously.

"for practical purposes, two levels is a useful division.

He says that

Overt and covert,

Jr manifest and latent, are ways of describing these levels" (p. 318).
3oth Bennis and his associates (1957) and Lieberman (1958) found that norms
.ibout member behavior were established early in the group and tended to
persist throughout the life of the group.

Groups "naturally" make decisions,

' :!1at is, they make N-interaction decisions, and not just C-interaction
decisions, about all sorts of things:
limits to be set, etc.

procedure, topics to be discussed,

Some of these decisions are overt, some are covert.

For instance, sex might come up in the course of the group discussion, but
somehow or other it is sidetracked.
is sidetracked.

It comes up again later, but again it

finally, even though it is not openly discussed, group

members realize that "we do not talk about sex in this group."
Slater (1966) calls a "tacit understanding."
reached in the group.

This is what

A covert decision has been

The group of tacit understandings which is currently

operative, gives direction to the group, and sets limits for group interactions, may be called the "group mentality" or the group "culture."

Bion
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(1959), Slater (1966), and Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) all deal with
this phenomenon.
"Facit understandings" can subvert the expressed purposes of the group.
The trouble with covert decisions is that once they are made, they are very
difficult to change.
The group forms its own history and constructs its own standards
and modes of behavior and, once fixed, they are extremely difficult to alter •.•. They have almost the binding effect of laws; for
the social punishment when they are broken (such as disapproval,
ostracism, and hostility) is as severe as its equivalent prison
sentence in Western society (Whitman, 1964, p. 315).
Groups can die from stumbling over their "tacit culture."
Since covert decisions are considered to impede rather than facilitate
group process in the contract-group, the leader discusses the notions or
"tacit understandings" and "group culture" with the participants.

He not

only "blows his own cover," but he ·also "blows the cover" of the group.
ideal is that decisions in the group be made overtly

The

and and not covertly.

Explaining the concept of "tacit understanding" at the beginning of group
process certainly does not eliminate the "natural" tendency of the group to
operate this way.

The leader must confront the group in the process of

coming to a "tacit understanding,"

For instance, if the leader witnesses

the sidetracking of the sex issue mentioned above, he would confront the
group:

"The sex issue has been brought up a number of times and each time

it has been sidetracked.

It seems that we are on the verge of entering into

I

a tacit understanding' not to talk about sex,

If we really want to avoid

the sex issue, let's first talk about it and then make a decision above
board."

Crucial (and thus anxiety-provoking) issues are often sidetracked

~throueh this covert decision-making ~rocess.
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Any kind of ''hidden agenda" in the group muddies communication and

,.,ould be avoided insofar as
. m develop a hidden agenda.

possible~

Both individuals and groups as such

Fo:r,_example, A might be attracted to B and

·•:)Uld like to see the relationship a mutual one.

Therefore, A in any number
for

;.hink and feel alike.
;'unitive trainer •

Or a group may conspire, indirectly, to "get" a

The participants become apathetic and bored or sabotage

.:::·:crcises suggested by the trainer and in general see to it that the trainer
'.ails in his task.

Since pursuit of a hidden agenda ultimately works

counter to the declared· goals of the contract group, it should be dealt with
in the same way as tacit understandings.
(3)

Lowest-common-denominatorism.

When even one person in a group

displays indifference toward the goals of the group, the efficacy of the
group is lowered.

Whitman (1964) claims that the T-group can move along only

as rapidly as the slowest member.

The problem of the lagging or delinquent

or deviate member is one that arises "naturally" in groups.

Although an

effective contract can help control deviancy by eliminating the unmotivated
(especially if the contract is freely chosen and not just "imposed") and by
eliminating the kind of vagueness and ambiguity in group process that often
engender the indifference or apathy of the deviant member, there is no
ultimate way of ensuring the interest and cooperation of all members.

The

problem of lack of motivation is one of the most difficult to handle in all
kinds of growth experiences.

Rogers (1966) believes that it is more

difficult to deal with than psychosis:
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From our own experience in working with unmotivated schizophrenic
individuals and a small matched group of unmotivated normal
individuals I have come to a conclusion which you may regard as
startling. It is my present conviction that working with a lack
of conscious motivation in the individual is more difficult than
working with the problem of-psychosis. This is of course a
subjective opinion, based in part on our general lack of success
in trying to form a facilitative relationship with unmotivated
'normals' of low socioeducational status. Insofar as the two
elements are separable, I believe the absence of conscious desire
for help presents a greater challenge to the therapist than the
presence of psychosis (p. 8).
Tiie leader, then, should discuss the possibility of the group's ultimately
having to deal with an unmotivated or deviant member.

If this is done, it is

hypothesized that the delinquent member will not have as much of a retarding
effect on the group.

Whether such a member should be expelled or encouraged

to remove himself from the group is a moot question.

The natural tendency

of groups which lose a member for one reason or another is to spend a good
deal of time dealing with their own feelings of guilt and loss.

Whatever is

done, the contract group should not allow a deviant member to absorb its
energies.
~Leader

as Guardian of lli_ Contract

Stock (1964) suggests that a trainer may be sensitive to "missing
functions" in the group and may either deliberately try or unconsciously tend
to supply the missing element.

In the contract group the "elements" of the

group experience are more clearly delineated and it is therefore much easier
for the leader (and the other members) to see what is "missing."

The traint~r,

then, should consciously try to stimulate the group to add what is missing.
In a sense, therefore, the leader-member is, at least initially, the guardian
of the contract.

He is in the service of the group members principally to
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. ~:1efit to the degree that they share in the "common good" of the group, and
~t

is the function of the leader to see to it that this common good, as

~efined

by the superordinate,

:s pursued.
·~chavior
~:1gage

int~raction,

and process goals of the group,

He fulfills this function. by encouraging and modeling contract

and by confronting those who do not engage in such behavior or who

in anti-contractual behavior.

He has every right to encourage and

-:onfront quite directly, for his being a "stimulus" is part of the contract
~o

which the members agree.

:on tract.

However, the way in which he fulfills his function as "guardian"

:s quite important.
~Jnfronts
~ctween

He does not have to apologize for upholding the

If he is a watch dog, an authoritarian figure, who

in alienating ways, then he will induce a non-growthful polarization

himself and the other participants.

An important way of encouraging

'ontractual behavior is to have the participants reflect on their own
behavior.

He has them stand back and evaluate or "process" the ways in which

they are pursuing (or avoiding) the goals of the contract.

Such self-criticism

is less ego-deflating and of ten more direct and incisive than that of an
observer.

There is perhaps a curvilinear relationship between the degree of

''guardian" behavior and productivity in the group.

Productivity will be low

if the leader-member is either too cautious or too eager to confront a
delinquent group.

Optimal productivity will be correlated with forceful but

tempered confrontation.

This is a difficult task, so, again, there is no

substitute for social competency in the leader.
~ Leader as Model

There are various ways in which the leader can promote the contract:
c~in

encourage, stimulate, confront, "process," and in general act from the

he
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"outside."

But since in the contract group he is a leader-member, he

?romotes the contract perhaps principally by modeling the behavior called for
~y

the contract:

~e

invites

he accepts,

h~_encourages,

he engages in self-disclosure,

others to self-examination, he responds to confrontation by

examining his own activity, he expresses his feelings, cooperates with others,
sticks to the here-and-now, tries to involve himself with others and
encourages others to involve themselves with him, and generally searches for
new ways of being present to others.

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest

that such modeling characterizes trainer behavior in all kinds of sensitivitytraining experiences:
The role of the trainer also constitutes a dominant technological
element bearing on the group's effectiveness for giving feedback
and promoting psychological support. The trainer serves as a
model for the participants to imitate; that is, he absorbs feelings
of hostility and frustration without becoming defensive, provides feedback for others, expresses his own feelings openly and honestly,
and is strongly supportive of the expression of feelings of others.
In short, he exhibits for consideration the very process deemed
necessary for maximum learning to occur (pp. 76-77).
~!odeling,

however, demands a good deal of tact.

For instance, if the trainer

engages in self-disclosure, he does not rush in with a degree of selfrevelation which would shock and inhibit rather than challenge and encourage.
Dramatic self-disclosure would then be the leader's way of deciding for the
group at what level of disclosure they should operate.

To set this level

is a function of the group as a whole and should not be usurped by any
single individual.

Similar caut~ons apply to the other interaction goals

such as confrontation.
~Diffusion of Leadership

Whatever might be the most current thinking on leadr- r hip in training
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nd/or therapy groups, the function of the leader in the contract group is to

1

~ccome
~~e

less and less a leader and more and more a member.

That is, all of

functions which have been listed as leader-functions above should become
.---

dispersed among the members of the group.

Leadership, according to Collins

.ind Guetzkow (1964), "is a scattered activity--one member being influential
;it

one time because of a particular combination of environmental demands and

personal characteristics, and another being influential at another time
because of a different congruence of demand and trait" (pp. 214-215).
Cattell (1951) suggests, leadership is measured by impact-on-group.

As
If an

appointed leader has no real impact on the work of the group, then his
leadership is merely nominal.

Leadership, then, is really a shared function,

:t is something fluid in the group.

Having a leader-member in the contract

group is a contrived state of affairs in the same sense that the entire
laboratory is contrived.

He is the leader in the beginning because of his

experience, knowledge, and skills.

But the whole function of the group is

to have the participants grow in precisely the same skills.

As the members

begin to engage in contractual behavior, there is less and less need for the
leader-member to stimulate such behavior.

Whenever any participant engage in

contractual behavi.or, at that moment he becomes a "leader" in the sense that
he promotes the "work" of the group.

"Status" in the contract group, if such

a term is applicable, is identified with contract-fulfillment.
If leadership is to be diffused in the group, then the leader must be
Willing to relinquish his "favored" position.

If he is over-invested in

being a "parent," it will be difficult for him to recognize and reinforce
through support the increasing skills of the participants.

If he hangs on
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:~o

'

tightly, not only his level or depth of intervention, but even his

~.i:iner

of intervention is likely to become the standard of the group (Blake,

I

/ ;164).

Such behavior, however,
!
' :::c group.

r~ns

completely counter to the purposes of

There are analogues to the above conception of leadership in certain
:j ~:ierap
·
y groups •

Bach (1966) describes a Marathon group in which "every

I:ember is a co-therapist responsible for

l

.1:1Y given Marathon meeting" (p. 997).

I ;roup,
1

I

the relative success or failure of

The professional co-therapists in the

"if and when they feel like it," participate as "patients" rather

:han consultants.

~~rathon

Structure is provided by the "Ten Commandments" of the

which provide a kind of contractual foundation for the group

experience.

The staff in Mowrer's (1968) integrity groups are there as

?articipants rather than "therapists" or observers.

They are leaders in the

sense that they "go ahead" and fulfill the contract.
If the trainer in the contract group models effectively and monitors the

contract judiciously, trying to see to it that C-interactions increase while
disruptive N-interactions decrease, if he teachers the group to confront
itself according to the provisions of the contract, then his skills will be
disseminated throughout the group and the group will be "leaderless" by
paradoxically being full of "leaders."
~aderless

Groups

Research is currently being carried on with unled training and psychotherapy groups.

Leader+ess groups are not new, for Gibb (1964) and others

have been experimenting with them for a number of years:
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Our many years of experience with 'leaderless' groups in various
settings lead us to feel that maximum participative behavior is
attained more readily in training groups without trainers than
with trainers. The groups are perhaps more aptly described as
'leaderful,' in that what occurs is not an abolition of leadership but a distribution of-leadership roles in the group. It is
perhaps even more accurate to describe the participative groups
as 'trainerless.' Members learn to observe and experiment upon
their own behavior in increasingly creative ways. They learn
that it is less adaptive to take a 'trainer stance,' that is,
advise, 'help,' teach, change, or persuade others (pp. 298-299).
!!arrow and his associates (1967) found that unled groups tended to be warmer
and more supportive.

Salzbert (1966), in studying the verbal behavior of

therapy groups, found that unled groups produced fewer problem-relevant
responses, but were more spontaneous.

Berzon and Solomon (1966) not only

found leaderless group therapy to be feasible, but one kind of interaction,
confrontation, increased in unled groups.

The authors do not say, but I

presume that the confrontation was considered therapeutic.

In experimenting

with unled sessions in_group marital counseling (I observed the interaction
through a one-way mirror), I found that not only were the groups more
spontaneous (that is, there was much IllOre self-initiated interaction), but
there was also a high degree of problem-relevant interaction.

The latter

(although contrary to Salzberg's findings) was most likely due to the fact

that the group was working under a contract.

Once they had learned the

contractual process ("how therapy goes"), they could have profitable sessions
Without me.

At least this was my cl:tnical observation.

evidence in this area is cornple tely positive.

Not all the

Truax and Carkhuff (1964)

found that although some of the deepest levels of therapeutic process took
Place with juvenile delinquent groups during unled sessions (sessions were
alternately led and unled), the alternately unled groups showed no greater
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Il ;rogress

I

::1

on a variety of outcome criteria than did continually led groups.

unled groups, then, there is the possibility of greater patient process

j -.-ithout greater outcome.

However, the saving of manpower powers seems

si£nificant in itself, nor is there any reason to suppose that the cautions
suggested by Truax and Carkhuff need apply in any way to laboratory training
~roups

with non-psychiatric populations.

"Instrumented laboratories."

The National Training Laboratories have

been experimenting for some years now with "instrumented" training laborator-

1 !es (Blake

I

& Mouton, 1962; also see Benne, 1964).

There is no trainer in the

"instrumented" group; whatever staff there is usually works outside the group.
In the place of the trainer, a series of self-administered evaluation forms
or "instruments" are introduced.

These "instruments" are used throughout

the laboratory to provide its participants with feedback.

Group action is

interrupted from time t? time, and, through feedback, the participants learn
to see themselves better.

In a trainer-directed group, feedback takes

place through his "interventions."

In the instrumented group, wall charts

and graphs indicate the characteristics of both group and personal action
during each meeting.
variety of activitiea:

In "instrumented" laboratories, the staff engages in a
they provide the instruments of action research,

train members to use the data gathered, give general sessions in modeling
and in setting standards for giving and receiving feedback, arrange for
intergroup competition and collaboration among development groups, etc.
Although their activity may provide a good deal of structure for the
laboratory, still they do not sit in and control the groups.

The information

that is fed back into the groups from the data collected is used as the
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:.c::ibers see fit.
The "instrumented" laboratory has been used in industrial, university,
,rn<l hospital settings, with both "normals" and with psychiatric patients.

Johnson and his associates (1965), in a follow-up study of an "instrumented"
L1boratory with psychiatric patients, found that the improvement-cure record
Jf the "instrumented" groups equalled or surpassed that of the regular

therapy groups.
The contract group begins with a leader in order that it may become
effectively leaderless in as short a time as possible.
'.'Jnn

If the leader is

and skillful in engaging in con tr actual behavior, then "behavioral

contagion" (Lippitt, Polansky, Redl, & Rosen, 1952) will take place and the
group will be quickly on its way to a creative interpersonal experience.
Semi-led training groups.

Although, as indicated above, it is not

uncommon for psychotherapists to experiment with alternate led and unled
group therapy sessions and although completely unled training groups are
common (Gibb, 1964), there is no mention of training groups with alternate
led and unled sessions.

I have experimented with such a procedure in a

laboratory course in interpersonal relations.

When I was in the group, I was

there as leader-member, but obviously it was much more difficult to become
a full member.

One member even connnented:

"Since you were on the outside of

the group, we did not have to work through the whole problem of your leadership,"

Even though such parttime leadership-membership is hardly ideal, it

is workable especially if it is made clear from the beginning that thb

Part of the contract.
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II conclusion

1

1_

/

The style of the contract-group trainer differs, at least theoretically,
from

that of the trainer in more "traditional" T-groups.

Campbell and

nunnette (1968) says that in a traditional training experience, "a trainer is
usually present, but he does not accept, in fact he overtly rejects any
leadership role" (p. 75).

He may overtly reject leadership in some sense of

the term, but he is still present in the group as leader in some sense.

If,

as Campbell and Dunnette suggest, his modeling of growthful behavior does
give direction to the group, then he is a leader.

In the contract group, the

leader overtly accepts his role as leader, but he makes it clear that one of
his primary goals is the diffusion of leadership among the participants.
There is evidence (Fleishman & Harris, 1962; Halpin, 1957; Oaklander &
Fleishman, 1964; Rush, 1957) that suggests that high-consideration, highstructure behavior is frequently associated with effective and successful
leadership for widely different populations.

If this is true, then a warm

and accepting trainer working within the structure of a viable contract
should be successful, even though success is ultimately defined as the
diffusion of his leadership qualities.

It is not structure per se which is

offensive, but constricting, controlling, non-facilitative structure.
~

leader ~ "anti-entropic."

Entropy has been described by

Rosenblith (1967) as the "tendency of a closed system to deteriorate and run
dowuhill by going from a highly differentiated, and less probable state to
the more probable, undifferentiated, and chaotic state." (p. 274)
group can be considered analogous to such a system.
the group tends "naturally" to run downhill.

The

Left to its own devices,

The leader is an anti-entropic
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force in the system.

He keeps the co11l!llunication system "open. 11

The group

system "closes" when the individual members seal themselves off from one
another.

When the members are fulfilling the contract, they are engaging in

"non-probable" interpersonal behavior that is assumed to lead to growth.
The system, then, is open.

The leader helps keep the connnunication system

open by his knowledge of groups "as nature" and by fulfilling his function
as "monitor" of the contract.

When members close in upon themselves, they

become undifferentiated, that is, the group resembles, analogously, the
"rundown" state of the system in entropy (see Wiener, 1954).

The ideal is

that each member become an anti-entropic agent in the group.
Leadership and individual style.

Leadership demands in the contract

group still allow the leader to be himself, to possess his own style.

Any

particular leader may be m::>re effective in or stress one set of contract
variables rather than another.

The leader should be himself just as he

allows (or encourages) others to be themselves.

The contract-group leader

will also become a member of the group in his own individual way.

Perhaps

he will always remain differentiated from the group in some way (Slater [1966]
claims that the image of the leader as differentiated from the group serves
as a point of orientation in turmoil), but he should "stand off" from the
group as little as possible.

The contract itself is a "point of orientation."

At times he may be the victim of what Goffman (1967) calls "interactionconsciousness, 11 that is he becomes preoccupied with his special responsibility
to see to it that the interaction "goes well."

The leader who becomes too

Preoccupied both fails to "give himself to his own party" and forgets that
responsibility for effective interaction is a corporate one.

Finally,
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Jlthough the leader should be a fairly well integrated person, there is no
reason why he must be the "best" group member.

Different participants will

excel in different interpersonal skillS..t with each learning in some way from

Jll the others.

I
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Chapter VI
Total Human Expression·:

the elements of human

dialogue;_ pathos, logos, poiesis
Introduction
Needless to say, the members of a face-to-face sensitivity-training
group are there in order to co1!llllunicate with one another.

Since, in the

contract group, the members agree to experiment with their interpersonal
behavior, this means experimenting with the process of communication.
Communication, however, is both an ambiguous word and a complex task.

The

purpose of this chapter, then, is to consider the elements of communication
insofar as they relate to a laboratory in interpersonal relations.
Total human expressions refers to a man's ability to communicate himself
fully, that is, both on an intellective and an emotional level.

This

ability will be examined in terms of three dimensions of dialogue:
logos, and poiesis.

Pathos refers to all the elements, passive and active,

that constitute the experience of feeling and emotion.
concept:

pathos,

Logos is a large

it refers to man's ability to cotlllllunicate himself to others both

in words and through non-verbal behavior.

Logos also refers to the ability

to utilize all channels of interpersonal communication in the "translation"
of oneself, intellectually and emotionally, to the other.

These "channels,"

according to Wiener (1968), include (a) language in its most straightforward
sense, that is, "verbal content, e.g., word meaning and syntax,"
~in

(b) the

which the verbal message is delivered, that is, the "extra-linguistic

phenomena of communication (Mahl & Schultz, 1964), e.g., variations in tonal
<1 11 alities,

patterns of stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by
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the required linguistic form, and (c) all the forms of non-verbal behavior
that enter into the connnunication process, that is, "motoric or bodily
phenomena ••• , e.g., facial expres13ions, gestures, postures, and proxemics"
(p. 51).

Poiesis refers to the ability of man to be "poetic" in his commun-

ication, that is, the ability to integrate verbal, non-verbal, and emotional
expression in dialogue.

Negatively, it is the refusal to strip words of

their human feeling together with a refusal to allow emotions to become
irrational.
The logic of the following discussion of these three elements is not
the logic of human living, that is, elements discussed separately (and
therefore somewhat abstractively) are actually woven into idiosyncratic
patterns in the transactions of any particular individual.

However, if this

dissection leads to the kind of awareness that underlies behavioral change,
then it is justified.

It is obvious that these elements of dialogue are

important in everyday life.

It is just as obvious, then, that they are

important in any kind of sensitivity-training experience.

The contract

group, however, is explicit in its requiring its participants to focus their
attention on their emotions, especially those that arise from the interaction
within the group, on their ability (or inability) to translate themselves
into language, on their non-verbal communications, and on the difficulties
involved in allowing emotion to give color and character to one's verbalizations.
Men, either by their inability or their unwillingness to communicate
deeply with one another, seem to foist upon themselves a state analogous to
social deprivation.

It would seem that such self-inflicted deprivation might
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well have effects analogous to those observed in studies on social deprivation
Studies by Mullin (1960), Nardini (1962), and Rohrer (1961) indicate that
variables such as monotony o:f

en~ironment

and absence of sources of emotional

gratification can cause intellectual inertia, impaired memory and concentration, insomnia, headaches, lov-grade depression, and greatly increased
appetite (with resultant weight gain).

An interesting hypothesis is that

similar symptoms found among relatively normal populations of our society
reflect self-imposed estrangement from others, although such a macrohypothesis would be difficult to verify.

The contract group is a laboratory

in which the participants come together to determine whether or not they
themselves are victims of any form of self-inflicted social deprivation, and,
if this is the case, to find ways of remedying such a situation by incommunity activity.
PATHOS:

MAN AS THE SUBJECT OF FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

~Flight

From Emotion

There is growing concern--and perhaps it may also be said that there is
growing evidence, though it is the fruit of observation rather than
experimentation--over the inability of some to engage in a free and construetive expression of emotion.

The hypothesis might be stated:

many men in our

society, especially those in the middle and upper classes, are constricted in
their ability to experience and to give expression to their emotions; for
one reason or another, they have not faced up to their "possibilities" in
these areas.

Even in sensitivity laboratories where it is expected that

a certain selectivity factor would engage a population somewhat more free
than the average in the area of emotional experiencing and expression, parti-

199
~ipants

have to be reminded again and again to give expression, not just to

..:iat they think, but to what they feel.
Formal education is overloaded in the area of intellect, impoverishment
!:1

the area of emotion.

As Neill (1968) notes:

Today our schools educate the head and leave the emotions
to the crowd-compellers--the press, the radio, the TV, the
churches, the conunercial exploiters with their lying advertisements. Our pop heroes and film stars have become our
leading schoolmasters dealing with real emotions •••• The
d~nger today is underdeveloped emotion, perverted emotion,
infantile emotion (p. 37).
:'aperback novels, movies, and the ubiquitous television set all constitute a
t•.io-edged sword in the emotional life of man.

If used with imagination and

discretion, they can complement a person's emotional life, enhance and enrich
it by broadening his emotional experience and provide the beginnings of some
kind of insight or vision into a wide variety of human experiences.

But too

many misuse these media with the result that they are not complements to
emotional living but rather substitutes for it, and for many this vicarious
emotional living is sufficient.
Fromm (1941) decries the general tendency of society to discourage
emotion and the resulting "cheap and insincere sentimentality with which
movies and popular songs feed millions of emotion-starved customers" (p. 271).
He sees the child developing a "pseudo character," not because he has to
learn to control his feelings, but because he must deny that he even experiences them.

Lynd (1958) notes the same trends:

is frequently used as a derogatory term.

"In our society 'emotional'

Developing emotional maturity is

more often conceived in terns of training a child in what he should not feel
1

and in controlling the expression of his feelings than in extending th\_ r.,<e
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and depth of his emotions and their expression" (p. 236).

Fronun goes so far

as to suggest that bad dreams result from the fact that people force their
true feelings out of consciousness ..because these feelings do not fit in with
the social self.
In a recent book, Schutz (1967) describes the joy that he experienced
watching his new-born son being totally absorbed in the experience, both
happy and unhappy, of growing.
but also begins to wonder:
to us all?

He describes what he sees as unbounded joy,

"But will something happen to Ethan as it does

Where will his joy go1

distorted, contorted.

In 1110st of us it becomes depleted,

Guilt and fear begin to defile it.

of Ethan goes, never to fully return" (p. 10).

Somehow the joy

The rest of the book is an

engaging essay on some ways and means of winning back the joy that too many
men forfeit as the price of security, socialization, and productivity.
Keniston's Hypothesis.

One way of looking at the emotional parasitism

of society---men become parasites to television, movies, and the rest mentioned
above--is that it is an essential or at least unavoidable phenomenon in a
technocratic society such as ours.

Xeniston (1965} suggests that two

phenomena of our society converge to create an emotional dilemma for the
working man.

First of all, many men find little emotional satisfaction in

the work they do in order to earn a living.

Work instead of satisfying

certain emotional needs, intensifies them.

Breadwinners come home, then,

hungering for emotional satisfaction and expecting to find it with their
families.

But today's family~-and this is the second phenomenon--is a

smaller unit than yesterday's.

Family today no longer means a complex of

grandparents, aunts, uncles, and children living in the same at least
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relatively circumscribed geographical area.

Family today means wife and two

or three children too geograhical1y or psychologically separated from close
relatives to constitute an
~eaning

or impact.

inte~actional

unit with any direct emotional

Keniston claims that, given the emotional constriction

or frustration of the breadwinner at work, the family, especially so small a
family, cannot satisfy his intensified or exaggerated emotional needs at home.
Obviously the wife, too, faces analogous emotional frustrations, and then
both husband's and wife's intensified emotional needs become interactive.
There are no ready made solutions for these emotional binds.

Ideally,

husband and wife, without abandoning their obligations to work and children,
will move out into the community, e.g., in church and civic activities, thus
broadening the bases of emotional fulfillment.

However, other less,

responsible "solutions" tend to destroy the equilibrium of the family:
tension and fighting in the home, extramarital adventures, emotional
constriction and insulation, and the vicarious emotional living mentioned
above, made easy, for instance, by the proliferation of "engaging,"
undemanding, sports events on television.
Man's struggle for freedom has been the theme of much of his literature
from the very beginning of recorded history.

While this freedom if conceived

of in more or less political terms, this does not mean that there has not
been a concomitant or parallel struggle for more interior forms of freedon
such as emotional freedom.

I

I

Today if men have been freed from the emotion-

constricting slavery of Jansenism, Puritanism, and Victorianism (and certainly

. not all have), many have managed to shackle themselves with new bonds.

I

~hile

the prior slavery was enjoined in the name of morality and religion, the new
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slavery is imposed in the name of technocracy, progress, and production.
~·'.any

have been duped into thinking that they are emotionally free, when all

that has happened has been a change in the facade of their bondage.

It is

as if men were afraid to allow men to experience either themselves or their
environment in an unfettered way and to institute communication with one
another based on this experiencing.

Rather this is the unknown, the unknown

is dangerous, the dangerous is to be feared, and the feared is to be
resisted.
Some men are relieved when they are told that "feelings get in the way,"
for it justifies an already determined mode of interpersonal acting.

Men

who are guarded in their feelings toward others do not particularly want to
become aware of their feelings toward others.
others not feel strongly about them.

They would also prefer that

It is thought uncivil, rude, uncon-

ventional, unwarranted, and even obscene to express feelings toward others.
Emotional insulation parades under such euphemisms as "respect for others"

and the "dignity of privacy."

Sometimes the mentally ill are feared, not

because they express too little but because they express too much.

Men who

are afraid of feelings and emotions to begin with are utterly terrified when
these are expressed without restraint.

Perhaps the best symbol man-as-

emotional today is the polyethylene bad.

Nothing gets in.

Nothing gets out.

He remains enshrined in interpersonal asepsis.
"Normal Alienation from Experience."

Laing (196 7) conceptualizes what

is assumed here to be a fairly widespread flight from fuller emotional living
as man's "normal alienation from experience":
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As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its
contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of
the existence of the inner world: .•. as for our bodies, we retain
just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our
movements and to ensure thaminimal requirements of biosocial
survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation,
sleep; beyond that, little or nothing .•.• our capacity even to
see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded in veils of
mystification that before one can begin to experience the world
afresh, with innocence, truth and love (pp. 10-11).
For Laing, psychotherapy is the process of getting back into contract with
one's experiencing through affective contact with another:
The psychotherapeutic relationship is therefore a re-search. A
search, constantly reasserted and reconstituted, for what we have
all lost and whose loss some can perhaps endure a little more
easily than others, as some people can stand lack of oxygen better
than others, and this re-search is validated by the shared experience of experience regained in and through the therapeutic
relationship in the here and now (p. 34).
The contract group or any growth-experience for "normals" is also an emotional
"re-search" project.

Emotional alienation might be more easily "endured" by

the normal, but if it is true that the "psychopathology of the average" or
man's "normal alienation from experience" is as serious a problem for society
as it is assumed to be here, then, while the individual might be able to
"endure" his emotional constriction, society cannot.
The evidence is in.

It would be a simple, but rather useless, task to

go on cataloging the evidence of man's sins against the emotional dimensions
of his humanity.

However "clinical" and anecdotal such evidence is, it is

still compelling, and one need not prove what is self-evident.

The growing

popularity of organizations such as the Esalen Institute, the National
Training Laboratories, the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, and of
sensitivity laboratories in general dramatizes the plight of a people seeking
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~cliverance

!I :csponsible

I

from emotional bondage.

Whether this deliverance take place in

ways depends, at least partly, on the willingness of behavioral

,cientists to channel some of

~xperimentation

in this area.

the~r

talents into creative thinking and

The growing laboratory-learning culture in

Jur society offers any number of possibilities for such work.
i

~c~

Perhaps a

era is dawning in the field of mental health, an era in which concern

1.'ith prevention is absorbed into larger concerns such as self-actualization
,md community potentialities for human growth.

Emotional life and the function of the contract-group.

Sensitivity

groups possess the potentiality of developing an intense intragroup emotional
life.

Since one of the process-goals of the group as a whole and of members

i::idividually is "diagnosis," the group provides ample opportunity for the
pdrticipants not only to deal with one another on an emotional level but to
examine the quality of their emotional living.

The members should experiment

with all phases of the pathos experiences outlined below; they should try to
feel and give expression to emotions and nuances of emotion that do not constitute their ordinary patterns of emotional living.

This does not mean that

the participants should "manufacture" emotions, for most of them already
probably spend too much time expressing emotions that they do not really feel.
P~ther

they should try to interact as intimately as possible with one another

and allow themselves to feel the
such interaction.

~hole

range of emotions that arises from

Only then will they be able to evaluate, both within

themselves and in dialogue with one another, their emotional successes and
failures.

The members of the contract-group are told explicitly that the

group is to serve as a laboratory in which the quality ·of one's emotional
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living can be evaluated and, hopefully, enriched.

The participants contract

(1) to examine their ability to face up to the emotional realities of
?crsonal and interpersonal living, and (2) to experiment with different
aspects of emotional living.
~ill-help

The analysis of the pathos experience below

operationalize these provisions of the contract and serve as a

guide as to what to look for in both individual emotional experiences and in
the corporate emotional life of the group.
The Phases of Emotional Experiencing
The pathos experience, dealt with at a level of abstraction that is
~eaningful

for sensitivity experiences, is constituted by four phases:

(1) awareness, (b) impact, (c) reaction, and (d) expression.

It is possible

to short-circuit pathos at any one of these phases, the result being a
truncated emotional experience.
(a)

Awareness.

As Arnold (1960) notes, emotion is preceded by a

cognitive element in which the individual first evaluates the situation in
which he finds himself.

If he evaluates the situation confronting himself

as innnediately dangerous, fear arises.

This means that the quality of a

person's emotional life is dependent on the quality of his awareness.

If,

either by nature or nurture, a person's ability to be aware of what is
happening around him is constricted, then his emotional life will be constricted.

On the other hand, if a person wants to grow emotionally, he

must improve the quality of his awareness of himself and of his environment,
especially his interpersonal environment.
This refusal or inability to be aware of self and ot>e.rs is characteristic of the emotionally distuTbed.

In fact, it m::i.y be hypothesized
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that the more disturbed a person is the greater his tendency to cut off the
p~~

process or experience of an earlier stage.

The most severely

disturbed, then, would sabotage emotional experience at the level of
awareness.

I have been in group therapy experiences in which the most

severely disturbed have been challenged merely to repeat the gist of what
another had revealed in an emotionally-charged disclosure.

An "I-didn't-

hear-what-he-said" typlified the poverty of awareness that characterized
these patients.

This inner numbness or preoccupation with self effectively

fended off any kind of affective contract with others.
In a parallel way, this lack of awareness of self and others
characterizes the more severe forms of the psychopathology of the average.
In the contract group it is assumed that the unfettered ability to experience oneself and one's environment is a relatively rare phenomenon.
ness can be cut off in a variety of ways:

Aware-

men can be "too busy" to notice

emotion-generating stimuli in themselves or coming from without; emotional
involvement "gets in the way" and cuts down on productivity, and this is
treason in a technocratic society.

Recently, however, industry itself has

realized that closing one's eyes to the emotional realities of life is
literally unprofitable.

Programs have been set up for alcoholics because

merely dismissing them meant a loss of valuable personnel and decreased
morale.

Men in managerial positions have been sent to human relations

laboratories in order to become more aware of the emotional realities of
interpersonal relating on the job.

Ignored emotion leads to ineffective

communication; ineffective communication leads to decreased productivity.
~!anagerial involvement in human relations laborntories is growing because
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is profitable in terms of dollars and cents.

It would be a sad commen-

:;iry on the hmnan condition if industry's new-found interest in the emotional
:limate of the work situation bec.ause it is financially profitable were not
(Jralleled by a renewed interest in emotional variables on the part of
?rivate individuals merely because it is profitable in terms of human growth.
Denial is not the only mechanism used to fend off emotion-provoking
stimuli.

Festinger (1957) suggests that men distort their perception, that

is, the quality of their awareness, so that reality may seem to be concor-

dant with pre-formed attitudes or pre-chosen forms of behavior.
A

For instance,

might be angry with B and express his anger in a variety of ways, and yet

B, because he does not want to deal with the emotional realities of the
situation distorts the cues emitted by A.

He sees A's anger as A's "not

feeling well," because "not-feeling-well" is not a factor that would force B
to become involved with A on an emotional level.

Or a person might not want

to be in contact even with himself because it would force him to come to
grips with his emotions.

For instance, a person might somatize his anxiety:

his colon is in an uproar, but he tries. to ignore the painful stimuli or if
he does advert to them, he interprets them as signaling "poor eating habits"
rather than anxiety.

He cannot experience himself reflexively as anxious,

for this would have behavioral consequences that he prefers not to face.
The contract calls for a willingness to become aware of one's self and
one's environment.

The first step, then, in the pathos process is, broadly

speaking, a cognitive one.

Awareness is not merely passive, however; a

person has to make himself aware, he has to reach out into his environment,
instead of defending oneself from input, especially input that will start the
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l·motional process.

One has to court such input.

of what he calls the "creative process."

Schutz (1967) makes much

The first aspect of this process is

called "freeing, or acquisition":_ "Before one is able to use his experience
in unusual, productive, and satisfying .•. ways, he must acquire a repertoire
of experience.

He must be open to experience, able to perceive and sense

his environment, and be aware of his own internal feelings" (p. 55).

In

c!eveloping one's emotional potentiality the element of perception or awareness seems to have at least a logical priority.
Ambiguity of emotional stimuli.

Another reason why awareness must be

a dynamic, active process is that fact that emotionally tinged or charged
emotional stimuli in interpersonal transactions are often ambiguous:
Fiedler (1960) sees distortions in interpersonal perception as so common as
to provide a means of measurement of attitudes:
It has become a psychological truism that a person's behavior
is influenced not by some objectively definable reality but
rather by the individual's perception of reality. Ambiguous
stimuli increase the likelihood that perceptual distortions
will occur, and we assume that these distortions reflect in
part the inner needs, emotional states and attitudes of the
perceiver. Among the most ambiguous of our everyday stimuli,
as Festinger (1957) and others have pointed out, are the
feelings and attitudes of others. Moreover, it is frequently
difficult, and often socially taboo, to discuss one's feelings
towards others openly with them. As a result, distortions in
interpersonal perception are frequent, and they provide an
important avenue for the measurement of attitudes, and hence
also, of the individual's interpersonal relations with these
others (p. 587).
Sensitivity laboratories do not operate under the social taboos to which
Fiedler refers.

In the contract group, the participants are not only

encouraged to scrutinize the <tuality of their own awareness, ferreting out
tendencies to misinterpret and dis tort stimuli received from others, but
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:o be active in having others clarify the ambiguous stimuli which they emit.

I
I

(b)

Impact.

Even if a person does not short-circuit the pathos

experience at its very roots, th~~ is, at the level of awareness, he can do

I so at the level of

"impact."

It is true that at times feelings and emotions

I t.:ike us by storm; willy-nilly, we are flooded with fear, anger, sexual desire,

I

0r some other emotion.

But even though a person remains more or less open

to emotional stimuli at the level of awareness, he can still learn how to
cut off the affective impact of that of which he is aware.

While he realizes

in a rather detached, intellectual way that he is encountering an emotionally
''vocative stimulus and can even correctly identify the emotion or emotions
that the stimulus is geared to evoke, he has learned how to neutralize the
affect-evoking dimension of the stimulus.

He has learned not to allow

himself to react at all or to react in such an attenuated way that there is
no proportion between the stimulus and the strength (or weakness) of the
reaction.
Laing (19601 describes. a number of syndromes in witlch the 'logical"
defense is to strip one's envi.ronmen t, especially one's. interpersonal
environment, of its emotional impact.

First of all, there are those with

such a poor sense of self-possession or identity that they see interpersonal
encounter as potentially "engulfing."

The best defense in the face of the

engulfing presence of another is isolation.

Since it is impossible always

to manage absolute physical isolation, the next best thing is to preserve
emotional isolation.
not emotionally.

The other is allowed to be present physically, but

Secondly, there are those who feel som empty that they

fear the "implosion" of reality.

If reality, especially affective reality,
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·.-ere to rush in upon them, this would mean their destruction, for they are
their emptiness.

In order to get away from the "impingement" of reality,

the sufferer learns how to cut off the affective dimensions of his "contacts."

In a third syndrome, the sufferer, rightly or wrongly, perceives himself as
being treated as an it by others rather than as a person with feelings; he
feels that he is being "petrified."

In order to counteract this process of

,:c;iersonalization, he "petrifies" others first, he refuses to run the risk of
experiencing the others as free agents.

Interpersonal transactions, therefore

;:hen theydo take place, become stereotyped "business contacts" with no
emotional overtones.
Laing depicts extremes, but perhaps most of us at one time or another
are victims of milder forms of the syndromes described.

He observes with

respect to "implosion" that all of us are literally just a few degrees
Fahrenheit away from such an experience, for when we are suffering from even
a slight fever, the world can become quite threatening and "impinging."
Whatever the reasons underlying the tendency to eliminate or minimalize
the emotional impact of reality and whatever different idiosyncratic patterns
or syndromes this process might take, the partic:lpants in the contract group
contract to determine the extent to which they are victims of such a process.
To put things more positive, the group is a laboratory in which the participants try to allow affective reality to have as full and as constructive an
impact as possible.
Rogers (19671, in dealing with a psychiatric population, discovered
that with respect to the client 1 s in-therapy behavior, the major varlable
Was "the degree of immediacy of the client's expcriencing--the degree to
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,';ich he is 'in' his experiences ox :remote from it" (p. 74).
~o

the degree to which the client is open to his feelings, able to "own"

~::cm,

.

I
I

J:1

This refers

and to explore them in search of their personal meaning.

Rogers goes

to suggest that the neu:rotic may be one who "looks away" from the felt

l

;rocess of experiencing as it goes on within him.

The degree to which a

, ;)crson can be present to his own experiencing indicates the degree to which

I'"
I

I

I

is disturbed or self-actualfaed:
At one end the individual's psychological functioning is rigid,
static, undifferentiated, impersonal. Constructs are fixed. He
exhibits feelings but does not own them. He is remote from the
experiencing going on within him. He is unable to relate. He
is unable to communicate himself. He sees himself either as
having no problems, or being in no way responsible for the problems which do exist. At the other end of the continuum the
individual is functioning in a fluid, changing way, responsive
to the ever-changing experiencing which is going on within
himself, and responsive to the events going on outside himself.
Feelings are experienced with immediacy, are owned, may be
expressed when appropriate. The individual is c2' e to his
experiencing and refers to it in guiding his behavior. Experience
is construed tentatively, and new meanings are drawn from new
experience (Rogers, 1966, p. 5).

Hobbs (1962) sees the neurotic as one who cannot be intimatt' even with

himself; he is unable to let him.self feel how he actually feels about 'hL ·, l f
and others.

Others Q1cReynolds, Acker, and Pietila, 1961; Penny, 1%'.J;

Zucherman, Kolin, Price, and Zoob, 1964) have found that the anxious tend to
avoid sensation-seeking.

They restrict interest in the sensual, in excite-

ment, in the new, in the strange, in the unpredictable.

If this is the

case, then the neurotic has problems with both the awareness and the impact
levels of the pathos experience.
Contract-group members are asked to check tendencies to "look away"
from their experience or to flee the "in timncy-with-self" that develops from
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I

:.,11 emotional openness.
!i ....

Yet, if McReynolds and the rest are right, the

I

:,boratory should not be so anxiety-provoldng as to cause or encourage the

I ·;cry

process of constriction that it is supposed to combat.

I

Increasing the range of emotional impact:

the "subtle" emotions.

Most

Jf us are readily aware of the impact of the "heavy" emotions such as anger,
:~ar,

sexual desire, depression, and others, especially when they are strong

.1:1d "make" us aware of their existence, but we are not as aware and as open
:o their more attenuated or subtle forms or to more subtly nuanced emotions
such as wonder, surprise, curiosity, ennui, and caution, to name just a few.
:·;1e English language is filled with words referring directly or indirectly to

these more subtle forms of feeling and emotion, but, though this might give
some witness to the reality of such emotions, still it is a reality that does
:10t seem to play the role it should in our interpersonal lives.

For instance,

when one person meets another for the first few times, he might "like" the
other, but "like" merely summarizes a whole group of emotionally-laden
variables.

Part of this "liking" is a rather wholesome and pleasing curiosity

He is attracted to the other and finds a certain delight in "exploring" the
other or in engaging in mutual "exploration."

Again, the contract group is

a laboratory for learning how to become aware of, experience, and enjoy the
whole range 0£ these more subtle emotions.

If this is the case, then the

laboratory must provide an atmosphere in which such subtle emotions are viable
Too often sensitivity laboratories are rather heavy-footed, providing opportunities only for the more dramatic emotions.
The

~

of exercises to stimulate emotional awareness.

:M.::my laboratories

use various exercises to stimulate awareness of some of the emotional
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of life.

Participants are asked to relax, to be quiet and become

...:Jre of themselves as body (to become conscious of their own breathing, to
:isten to the beating of their hear-ts), to experiment with the "forgotten"
•,cnses of taste, touch, and smell.

Gunther (1968) considers the process of

·;ocialization as one, at least in part, of "desensitization" in a pejorative
sense:
Children by nature are sensitive, involved in sense play and
exploration ••• Social and formal education stress the cognitive
and motor functions of the organism without regard for sensory
development. We teach them non-sense. This lack of sensitivity
creates desensitization: an imbalance in being; a loss of
feeling; senseless: inhibition-alienation-depression-anxietydeadness (p. 20).
He has devised any number of exercises or games to enable people to regain
contact with the physical realities within and around them.

One group

exercise in tasting, the "bread ceremony," seems even to reach back deeply
into the religious history of man:
Sit in a circle surrounding a loaf of unsliced bread. After
sitting quietly, looking at the bread, pass it around the circle.
Allow each person to feel its eight and smell its flavor. As the
loaf is passed from one person to another, look into each other's
eyes. One person slowly (just a fraction of an inch at a time)
breaks the bread open. The group watches. The two halves are passed
around the circle, each person looking at the inner exposed half
and breaking off a piece no bigger than he can chew comfortably.
After each person has taken his piece of bread, he closes his eyes.
He puts the bread in his mouth and slowly chews, not swallowing
until the bread is completely liquefied. Afterward open your
eyes and see all of the group (p. 179).
Such exercises may or may not form part of the contract-group culture.
However, if exercises and games are to be used emotional awareness and
contact, then the participants should know this from the beginning.
(c)

Non-verbal reaction:

the "passive" element.

There are those \,•ho,
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although they are quite aware of the emotion-provoking stimuli in their
environment and even allow these stimuli to have their impact, still shortcircuit the pathos experience at the level of expression, even non-verbal
expression, if possible.

They have learned to control the emission of non-

verbal cues which would give others some insight into their interior lives.
rney seem "unemotional," but this does not really mean that they are devoid
of emotion--frequently it is just the opposite--but rather that they have
learned to control its expression.

Actually they are over-controlled.

All

of us, at one time or another and for one re as on or another, engage in such
"control," but over-control becomes problematic only when it is resorted to
with some frequency or becomes part of person's life style.

Again, the

contract-laboratory provides an opportunity for its participants to examine
the positive and negative aspects of the "emotional control" they exercise
from day to day.
Emotional congruence.

Rogers (e.g. 1961, 1967) has long insisted on

what he calls "congruence" in the therapeutic relationship:
•••• each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust because
we sense that they are being what they are, that we are dealing
with the person himself, not with a polite or professional
front. It is this quality of congruence which we sense which
research has found to be associated with successful therapy.
The more genuine and congruent the therapist in the relationship,
the more probability there is that change in personality in the
client will occur (1961, pp. 61-62).
At least part of this congruence is emotional congruence.

If the therapist

hides his emotions from the client behind a professional facade, then he
lacks emotional congruence and is not as effective as he might be.

It would

seem, however, that lack of congruence is non-therapeutic for the same
reason that most kinds of behavior are termed non-thcrn eutic:

it is non-
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Jl, that is, it falls .short of being fully human behavior.

Some men choose to be emotionally incongruent; they look upon natural,
. -:l-verbal emotional reactions as too dangerous, too self-revealing, too

i

Ii ::itrusive,

or too disruptive.

And so they opt for

a rather drab, expression-

/ :~ss, "archaic-smile" emotional style for rather lack of style) in appearance

Il

,1d gesture as being both "proper" and safe.

l

i ,·.otional asepsis is less than human.

I
f

!

!

'~

.~

I
I !t

The problem is that such

When Rogers says that such incongruence

"non-therapeutic," this does not mean that it is non-therapeutic because
falls short of some kind of medical or professional standard, it is non-

1

I ~:1erapeutic

Il

(d)

because it falls short of being fully human behavior.

Non-verbal emotional expression:

the "active" element.

The term

"expression" here does not refer to using language to give expression to

·•hat one feels.

This interpenetration of feeling and language will be con-

sidered below under poiesis.
~-verbal

"Expression" here refers to the active use of

forms of emotional expression as part of one's communication style.

As Murphy (1964) notes, non-verbal communication of emotions has not been
sufficiently tapped as a source of knowledge of man:
If communication theory is conceived of only in terms of bits
of verbal information received, it can miss its most fundamental
role; for the world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and
averting the eyes leads into a rich communication world that can
be treated as communications and which we can teach our recorders,
and magnetic tapes, and our computers to understand and use. We
nee.cl to understand the whole communication process. The inner
structure of man will then be seen more fully in its relation both
to the social environment he encounters and the social environment
which he is forever creating (p. 101).
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..•. people interact not only through words but also through
spatial relations •.• through temporal relations ••• and people
interact through gesture and touch and many other media.
They not only send and receive information in these many
different ways; they use each ~f these ways for participating
in a communal dialogue, for reciprocating and mediating one
another's meanings. Collllnunication is far more comprehensive
than language (p. 3).
:!owever, some people--even though they are aware of emotional stimuli, allow
these stimuli to have their impact, and react in the sense that they allow
~:ieir

emotions to appear "in public" in their facial expressions, gestures,

~tc.--still

:,1'.rn

truncate the pathos experience to a certain degree by failing to

active use of these non-verbal forms of affective communication.

It

is

the difference between merely allowing oneself to react and being involved

in

one's reactions, even taking delight in them, to the extent that they

become part of one's active communication style.

One can become "active,"

communication-wise, even in such involuntary reactions as blushing if,
sensing one's reaction, one puts oneself "in" one's reaction in such a way
as to say, non-verbally:

"You have 'caught' me, you have hit upon a

vulnerable area, a point of shame."
All laboratory training and especially all sensitivity training
laboratories deal with the problems and potentialities of feeling and
expressing emotion.

The contract laboratory is a place where one can not

only experience all the dimensions of the pathos

exper~ence

including

authentic emotional response from others but where the feedback potential
of the group provides a unique opportunity for the objective appraisal of
. the role of emotion in h~man life.

[_~ Sensitivity Laboratory as Stimulator of Feelin:;s nnd F.motions.
--~-~J.J..!.'.l>J;.~Il.illl..a..LD.lsi.na nn(l W1iitnlsc~r.J.1..2i"'..~-1J~J..:l.1lld

tli:1t ;m imp0i;.t~---•
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•?acity of a therapy group is to "induce and release powerful feelings."

. ::i a group
[I]ndividuals may be carried ~way~ may experience feelings which
they later believe are uncharacteristic of themselves, and may
act on feelings without displaying their typical controls •••• An
individual may experience preciously-denied feelings not with
enduring terror but with growth--the corrective emotional experience
of finding that the feelings are not overwhelming or that the
feared consequences do not occur.
In group therapy, participation in group-generated affect may allow
the patient to by-pass defenses so that the feared affect may be
experienced first, thus rendering the resistance less necessary.
(T)he patient in individual therapy who intimates his innermost
feelings to a benign professional person undoubtedly risks far
less than the group therapy patient, who may undergo feelings of
extreme exhilaration or fear as he reveals himself "in public."
The managing of group affect becomes one of the essential skills of
the therapist. This skill involves tamping down contagion where
necessary, protecting individuals who need to be exempted from
participation in group affect, breaking up group resistance in
order for affect to emerge, sensing when to let the affect run on
and develop and when to introduce cognitive reflection about the
affect (p. 32).
Sensitivity groups, too, generate a good deal of emotion and perhaps
experimentation with emotional expression can be more intense than in therapy
groups because of the greater initial psychological integration of the
?articipants.

The cautions which Lieberman notes, while they should be

taken into consideration, refer more specifically to psychiatric populations.
::oreover, the safeguards built into the contract-experience, e.g., the emphasi'
I

I

J:l

supportive behavior, go far in making experimentation with emotion as

l s:ife

an experiment as possible.

I

Emotion-evoking exercises.

In sensitivity groups, emotions are not

/ only allowed to arise naturally from the verbal interaction of the particil_;i.,n
th
•
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Jre introduced to further stimulate the arousal and expression of emotions.
ese exercises may be verbal or non-verbal and they may or may not involve

;;1

'

II ~hysical contact. Exercises
Il ~~otional stimulants both in

I

:efrain from touch as

a mode

invc:ilving some form of touch are usually powerful
themselves and .because we as a people generally
of communication.

Tactile communication,

I

! Jccording

I

to Frank (1957), is one of the more important forms of non-verbal

rnrnrounication.

"Tactile experiences considered as messages and responses

are exceedingly diverse and capable of an amazing variety of transformations
in human communication, where, as in language, we must recognize both the

cultural patterning and the idiosyncratic deviations and elaborations" (p.
209).

Perhaps tactile contact is too immediately related to sexuality in our

society and therefore we are afraid to explore its communication potential.
3e that as it may, it is not suggested here that the kind of contact that
takes place during certain laboratory exercises become a way of life.

But

such contact insofar as it stimulates a variety of feelings and emotions can
be "diagnostic" in the very best sense.

Frequently it reveals--sometimes

dramatically--to a person how hesitant he is to make human contact, how far
a~ay

from others he really is, or how little or how ineffectual he makes

use of emotion in his attempts to relate to others.
"Manufacturing" emotion.

It may be objected that the participants in

sensitivity laboratories are called to "manufacture" feelings and emotions
("feelings-by-contract").

Rather they are asked not to suppress at any

i "stage" the feelings and emotions that arise naturally in the group and to
I ~ive themselves to exercises designed to stimulate emotion.

'

I

Berne (1966)

claims that expression of real feeling rarely takes place in therapy groups

~------~~~~~~----~--~--~~----------~------~~~~--_.;~~--~~------~
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that the feelings that are exprssed are actually "socialized" feelings •

..~:ether this is true or not of therapy groups (and even if it is true de
'-~'

I do not believe that it

-~eed

be true, it is my experience that there

'.s a good deal of authentic emotion in sensitivity groups enough to dramatize
:o most participants their areas of strength and areas of deficit in the area

Jf emotional living.

Emotion as a dimension of laboratory interaction.

Emotion has been

discussed here somewhat abstractively, but in the laboratory the participants

I fo

not express emotions abstractly.

! Jctions
I

I Jnd

of the meeting.

They do so in the context of the inter-

This can be done in several ways.

First of all,

this is the usual case, emotion is expressed as a dimension of the variety

of interactions in which the participant engages.

For instance, when someone

engages in self-disclosure, he does so with some (and perhaps a good deal of)
emotion.

10f

Likewise emotion can be (and in some sense should be) a dimension

other kinds of interaction, e.g. support, confrontation, self-exploration.

'econdly, a person might talk about his emotions directly.

Il
I

instance, that he is very angry.

He might say, for

However, if a person merely talks about his

e::iotions without giving expression to them in some way, he usually appears too
cold and controlled, and the otb.e::rs wonder whether he really "owns" his

I .;motions or not.

Finally, emotion can be expressed non-verbally.

A person

j

I ::!ay
ii

!
I

TI1e

cry or throw his arms around another person or stalk off from the group.
laboratory encourages the expression of emotion if emotion is really

felt, but does not demand emotion for the sake of emotion.

-LOGOS:

MAN'S TRANSLATION OF HIMSELF INTO LANGUAGE

-~ltroduc t:i.on

'~~·-------------------------------------'
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The contract group contracts to logos, effective interpersonal
~::::nunication

~specified
;; 0 ·,:

through human language.

_It has been assumed above that an

number of men suffer from emasculation in their emotional life.

it is also assumed that many men also suffer a concomitant emasculation

' :n the quality of their verbal communication, in their ability to use
'.Jnguage as a mode of interpersonal contact.
Logos, when usad as a generic term, refers to man's interaction with
~an

in tenns of human language, the way a man translates himself into

:.mguage.

While it is true (1) that both philosophers and behavioral

scientists have theorized about the phenomenon of language as a form of what
Lorenz (1955) calls "expressive behayior," that is, as a reflection of the
structure of personality (e.g. Buhler, 1934; Cassirer, 1953; Hodges, 1952;
Honingfeld, Platz, & Gillis, 1964; Moscovici, 1967; Piaget, 1952; Stout, 1902;
\'on Hartmann, 1884; Wittgenstein, 1922), and that (2) there have always been
those who have been interested in the language differences existing between
?sychiatric and normal populations (e.g. Forrest, 1965; Glauber, 1944;
Gottschalk, 1961; Johnson, 1944; Lorenz, 1955; Newman, 1938; Sanford, 1942;
Sherman, 1938; Spiegel, 1959; Wender, 1967) and that (3) more or less
~olecular psychological studies are increasing man's understanding of the

Phenomenon of language and verbal behavior (e.g. Cofer & Musgrave, 1963;
Di%on & Horton, 1968; Kansler, 1966; Meharabian, 196G; Salzinger, 1967:
:\'iener & Mehrabian, 1968), still little of this theorizing and research h.'.ls
l::een translated in such a way as to become useful in dealing with people,
either normal or abnormal, on a "clinical" or applied level.

I

More attention

must be given to such molar dimensions of language as the quality of man's
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·:erbal expression in his interpersonal contacts.

As Wiener and Mehrabian

11968) note, it is too fruitful an area of interpersonal discovery to ignore:
Anyone who listen carefully-to the way people say things quickly
learns that the particular words a speaker uses to describe an
event or experience can be a rich source of infonnation about his
feelings and attitudes. The bases for making these kinds of
inferences are not usually explicit, although members of a
communication group appear to respond regularly to these subtle
variations in word usage (p. 1).
Laboratory learning situations seem to provide excellent opportunities for
such research and for the application of research findings.

What follows is

a brief indication of the aspects of language that might be profitably
considered and experimented with in a sensitivity laboratory.

The laboratory

experience is an opportunity for the participants to examine man-as-one-whospeaks by subjecting their own verbal interactions to the scrutiny of the
group.
The Problems and Potentialities of Language
Problems.

There are various ways in which people underuse or abuse

language in interpersonal situations and many reasons why they do so.

Some

language problems stem directly from and reflect varying degrees of
?sychopathology.

Bettelheim (1967) discusses children who have surrendered

the use of language because of parental disapproval, their mutism being an
indication that they have given up any hope of influencing the world.
~~rrender

This

of speech closes a vicious circle:

Once the child has even stopped communicating with others, his
self becomes impoverished~ the more so the longer his mutism
lasts, and the more so the longer his personality remains underdeveloped at the time of the onset of withdrawal (p. 56).
If this [mutism] happens before he has fully learned to manipulate
!

~-------~~--~~~------~--~~~----------~--~--~~~-----------------------'
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symbolic forms, before the age of three or four, then the child
also £ails to develop the higher intellectual processes (p. 57).
::rikson (1954) discovered that one of the outcomes of traumatic war experience

Ij ·;as

a distrust and devaluation ·;f language.

I :::anifested in language-use disturbances:

Meerloo (1952) found neurosis

"The insecure neurotic shrinks

from free word-play; he tries to manipulate words mechanically, like
:iachinery.

He fears the adventure of cormnunication" (p. 87).

Ruesch (1957)

sees the origin of connnunication problems in parents' inability to adapt
themselves to the maturation level of their children.
three types of language are learned in succession:
verbal.

According to Ruesch,

somatic, action, and

If parents do not adapt their language to the developmental stage

of their children, while at the same time offering encouragment to improve
verbal language proficiency, then

communication disturbances may arise in

their children.
Language problems arise out of and reflect not only psychopathology
in the strict sense; they also reflect the psychopathology of the average.
~!any

"normal" men fear the communication process because of more or less

normal fears of involving themselves deeply with others.

They neither pour

themselves into their language in interpersonal situations nor do they
' expect others to do so.

Language must remain on a "safe" level.

They

habitually put "filters" between what they really think and feel and what
they say.

This results in exanguinated or muddied, but "safe," communication.

Some men engage in language that is overly precise--they ask too much of
language--while others engage in language that is too vaguc--that is, they
ask too little of language, both both extremes are usually defensive rne.:Jsures,
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of keeping interpersonal contacts at "acceptable" levels of intensity •

. :.z men are victims of poor education in language.
· dlies or in societies that

hav~

They have lived in

been afraid of open communication with the

,ult that patterns of language are not available to them to express what
.ey would like to express.

This conversation or language anemia is

.....:ognized by the novel writer:
Even in modern-novel dialogue the most real is not the most
conformable to actual current speech. One has only to read a
transcribed tape of' actual conversation to realize that it is, in
the literary context, not very real. Novel dialogue is a form
of shorthand, an impression of what people actually say; and
besides that, it has to perform other function--to keep the
narrative moving (which real conversation rarely does), to reveal
character (real conversation often hides it), and so on (Fowles,
1968, p. 89).
:~n

read novels not only for vicarious pathos but also for vicarious logos,

:::e meaningful talk that is missing from their lives.
In societies which subtly discourage or limit conversational freedom and
~eeper interpersonal contact through language, some men abandon (at least in
J

relative sense) language either because it is useless as an instrument of

Jeep human communication or because the patterns of language "allowed" are
seen as identified with the "establishment" that is being rejected.

In the

c:ise of the present "hippy" culture, this flight-from-language involves both
(1) the creation of an argot that reflects a break from the values of society
that are seen as useless or opporessive while emphasizing the values of the
sub-culture and (2) an often irresponsible immersion in the pathos dimensions
of living.

A counter language evolves and a counter pathos-society is

established parallel to or outside the confines of the society being rejected.
Potentialities.

Despite the problems involved in exsanguinated
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:inguage and conununication, language is still one of the most dramatic ways
::1 which man differs from other animals.

Stout (1902) sees language as an

i:1strument by means of which man examines the world around him.

If he is

Jfraid of this world, his language will be anemic and feeble, but if he loves
~he

world and is challenged by it, his language will be strong and searching.

70 adapt a phrase from Wittgenstein (1922), the limits of a person's language

are the limits of his world.

Cioran (1968) sees silence as unbearable and

·:ould find it easier to renounce bread than speech.

He claims that one can-

' ::ot withdraw one 1 s confidence from words "without setting one's foot in the
abyss."

Language exposes, reveals both individuals and societies:

"Words,

at least in traditional societies, often express far more than feelings or
ideas.

The way words are us ed--in tales, riddles, proverbs, and typical modes

of address and conversation--can reveal a great deal about the structure and
values of a society" (Abrahams, 1968, p. 62).
Novelists and writers frequently have, if not deeper, at least more
striking, distinctive, and challenging insights into the nature and force of
human language than do behavioral scientists.
enlarge the possibilities of language.

Writers continually try to

D.H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and

James Joyce never hesitated to experiment with. verbal symbols that would
most fully convey what they experienced.

As Burgess (1968) notes:

"Language, of its very nature, resists tau to logy; it wan ts to launch out,
risk lies, say the thing which is not."
Brian Friel's entire play Philadelphia Here.!_ Come is based on the
distinction between what the leading character really thinks and feels and
'

·ould like to say and what he actually says.

1

In the pl.'.ly there are two
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~e·:els
/ .c:1

of conversation--the vague, hesitant, compliant, failed bravado of the

who is about to leave his father in Ireland to seek a new way of life in

I

I

!:'ic United
I.::
;s

States and the vigorous speech of the son's "inner core" (played

a separate character).

The pity of it all is that, although the audience

electrified by what the "inner man" says, yet it knows that his speech

I ~cally

dies (and in a sense the son dies with it) because it is never spoken.

::1e man who chains up his language chaims up himself.
The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants can
experiment with the potentialities of language.

The purpose of what is said

I

I ::ere
I

is not to apotheosize language, for as Lynd (1958) notes, language is

I

!.m:ietimes

a sensitive instrument and sometimes a clumsy tool of communication.

:ut when a man enlarges the possibilities of his language, he enlarges his own

possibilities.

The laboratory gives him the opportunity to extend the range

of language in order to contact himself and others at deeper levels.

In the

safety of the laboratory he can run risks in his use of language that he could
::t outside.

The following discussion of language might serve as a basis for

t~is experimen ta ti on.

21._fferent kinds of language
In keeping with the consideration of language from a molar, interactional
?oint of view, perhaps the following distinction--again, despite the fact that
they are somewhat abstractive--might give direction to the discussion that

follows.
(1)

Logos.

Logos, in the strict or restricted sense, refers to man's

ability to translate his real self into language.
1

Logos is language filled

ldth the person who is speaking and therefore refers to his ability to use
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?ccch in order to express his identity.

It also refers to the use man makes

: speech in order to establish some kind of growthful interpersonal contact.

i

1 ::~gatively,

it is the refusal to use speech merely to fill interactional space

1.1:1d time or as a smokescreen or shield behind which to hide.

I

Just as there are different kinds of truly human contact and various

i

I
'

degrees or levels of such contact, so there are different kinds of logos.

i .: man

I

I

If

talks meaningfully about his political or religious beliefs, this is

.

1c1 gos,

Logos need not be self-disclosure in the sense discussed in chapter

I

: '.'II, but, in that it is meaningful speech, it will always provide some insight

!

! into

the identity of the speaker.

Meaningful speech with an intimate friend

·.·ill be on a different level from meaningful speech with one's fellow workers.
The special ability to allow one's language to express not only one's
thoughts but also the feelings and the emotions that surround these thoughts
is a special kind of logos called poiesis.

Poiesis will be treated separately

~elow.

Logos must be clearly differentiated from the ability to speak fluently
and elegantly, for both fluency and elegance are at times used to camouflage
rather than reveal one's identity.

It would also seem necessary to

distinguish logos from the ability to speak "insightfully" about oneself, a
quality which as traditionally been seen as a favorable condition, if not a
pre-requisite, for effective participation in psychotherapy, an hypothesis
that is being seriously challenged today (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967;
London, 1964).

Logos here means translating or handing

oneself over to

others through the medium of speech, whatever the es the tic v.:1.lue of the
lan~unge

used.
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Logos implies a respect for language as a form of connnunication and
Jntact.

It implies dialogue, and, as Matson and Montagu (1967) point out,

:or certain contemporary existent_ialist thinkers, authentic existence is
J:mnunication, life is
:ontract group.

dialogue.

Dialogue is certainly the life of the

That is why the group member, by contract, is expected to

.;):amine his use of speech.

If he is to develop "new ways" of being present

to the members of the group, he must discover "new ways" of speaking and
;:crhaps develop a new respect for- language.
Dialogue in the sense in which it is being used here is opposed to "game"
~o;:-_rnunication.

Dialogue is "game-free" or at least an attempt to make

co::i.munication "game-free."
~ave

Rapoport (1964) and Wiener (1950), both of whom

made significant contributions to the mathematical theory of games,

caution against the use of game-theory as a basis for human communication.
Rapoport finds dialogue with the "strategist" impossible, for the basic
question in the strategist's mind is:
advantage over my opponent~

human question is:

Rapoport thinks that the much more basically

If I can gain an advantage over another, what sort of

person will I become?
dialogical,

in a conflict how can I gain an

The "cybernetic" man is basically monological, not

and for him communication is intimately wedded to control, the

control of the other.

Berne (1966) uses "game" in a somewhat different sense.

The "games people play" are ways of avoiding intimacy in humm relationships.
The "game" prevents dialogue.

llerne goes so far as to say that the most that

one can expect in a psychotherapeutic group is the discovery and analysis of
the "games" played there.

such group situations.

Real intimacy, he says, is almost never found· in

It is the contention of this paper that the members
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.: a contract interpersonal growth group can establish dialogue, can free
:::e::iselves to great extent from a "game" approach to one another, and can
I

!' c:;tablish

not just the social imj. tat ion of intimacy that Berne speaks of, but

I ~cal human intimacy.
I (9) Commercial-speech.

"Commercial-speech" refers to the language of

::1e "market-place," the use of language in the "commercial" transactions of
=en.

Such language is lean, utilitarian, pragmatic; it deals with objects

r~ither

than persons, for it is a medium of exchange rather than of inter-

i1ersonal contact.

Much of such language today is left to computers.

It

i ~ould be of no interest to us here were it not for the fact that there are

I

j ~'eople who use commercial-speech as their principal mode of speech in inter-

! personal transactions.

They see people as objects to be manipulated rather

than persons to be contacted and this is reflected in the quality of their
speech.
If speech is principally "commercial," then, as McLuhan (1964) suggests,
it can be dispensed with:

"Electric technology does not need words any more

than the digital computer needs numbers" (p. 80).

However, the utopia he

envisions which is characterized by a "speechlessness that could confer a
?erpetuity of collective harmony and peace" arising out of a "collective
awareness that may have been the preverbal condition of man" (p. 80) is
antithetical to man himself.

Speech defines man.

It is just strange that he

:cakes such poor use of it in his effort to humanize himself.
I

(3)

,·

Cliche-talk. "Cliche-talk" refers to "anemic," language, speech in

the sense of talk-for-the-sake-of-talk, conversation-without-depth, l.:mguage
that neither makes contact with the other or reveals the identity of the
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I

j speaker (except negatively

I :iot want

in the sense that he is revealed as one who does

to make contact or does not want to be known).

.

I

Cliche-talk fosters

ritualistic rather than fully hulllan contact ("Do you think that it is really
going to rain?"--"The way they're playing, they'll be in first place
/

first of September I").
~ithout

by the

Cliche-talk fills interactional space-and-time

adding meaning, for it is superficial and comes without reflection.

?erhaps it is the person who is over-committed to maintenance-functions (see
Introduction), a person who is either unaware (because he lacks the requisite
social intelligence) or afraid of possibilities, for further interpersonal
/

growth, whose speech will be predominantly cliche-talk.
.

I

People usually listen politely to cliche-talk, especially when it is
pseudo-logos, that is, dressed up or doctored to sound important:
When a conversation fails to capture the spontaneous involvement
of an individual who is obliged to participate in it, he is likely
to contrive an appearance of being involved. This he must do to
save the feelings of the other participants and their good opinion
of him, regardless of his motives for wanting to effect this
saving (Goffman, 1967, p. 126).
If the needs of the listener are such that he is willing to put up with the
/

boredom of cliche-talk in order to enjoy the safety that is found in ritual,
then the circle is complete and the field is wide open for such cu1>vu sation.
I

One of the most connnon forms of cliche-talk in our culture(and perhaps
this is a transcultural phenomenon) is "griping," a more or less superficial
communication of dissatisfaction with persons, institutions, or things outside oneself.

It is one of the few verbal expressions of feeling allowed

in public, and it is probably allowed because it is n ritual and most rituals

j safe.

~l

The trouble with chronic griping is that it is a fixative.
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.. ~and in the way of change; "forces outside of me control me;" "I can do
:·.)thing to change."
I

Cliche-talk is just words, while logos always connotes human contact •
..

SJ~e

·-

people speak endlessly about themselves and say nothing (if they were

~~ally

disclosing themselves, others would not find it boring).

They say

::Jthing about themselves because they have no real feeling for themselves-~hey

are deficient in the pathos dimension of life--and could hardly be

expected to relate what they do not experience.
using speech as a mode of contact.
centered, centripetal.
(4)

Anti-logos.

Such people simply are not

For them speech is solipsistic, self-

It is monologue rather than dialogue.
When language is actually used to destroy growthful

interpersonal contact rather than foster it, then it is anti-logos.

There

are a number of forms of speech that are really violations rather than uses
of language.
~eapon,

For instance, in the heat of anger language can be used as a

a tool of destruction rather than an instrument of growthful

encounter.

When a married couple stand shouting at each other (often saying

things they do not really mean), language becomes completely swallowed up in
emotion; it loses its identity as language.

At such times it actually has

More in common with a sledge-hammer than speech.
of

~-logos,

contact.

Lying, too, can be a form

for deception cannot be the basis of growthful interpersonal

The speech of the psychopath, for example, is frequently, if not

continually, anti-logos, for he uses speech to create situations that do not
exist, to manipulate others rnther than to engage in growthful encounters
With them.

Finally, the language of the psychotic, while it might have its

own peculiar logic (and without discounting the possibility th.:it a psychosis
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-,iy be a desperate fonn of revolt against a "sick" family or society--see

:.Jing, 1967), is frequently anti-logos.

The psychotic, at least at times,

':'pears to use language to drive others away.
:~cply

.;f

He fears human contact so

that he reverses the function of language, making it a barrier instead

a bridge.
Another way of conceptualizing anti-logos is to see it as the kind of

expression proportioned to high deficiency-functioning (see Introduction).
The stronger the influence of deficiency-needs in a person's life, the more
likely he is to engage in some form of anti-logos.
Most men engage in all four kinds of speech at one time or another.
!hey use commercial-speech not only in strictly commercial transactions, but
allow it to slip occasionally into interpersonal encounters.
~ithout

some

I
cliche~talk.

Indeed, life

would be intolerably intense for most men.

It is a

question, however, of proportion and most men need to find ways of increasing
the amount of logos (in the

restric~ed

sense) in their lives.

The sensitivity

laboratory affords an opportunity of discovering ways how to do just that.
Language:
II

Content, Invitation, and Self-Expression

That Buhler's (1934) analysis of the functions of language strikes at a

I
I ?henomenological core is evidenced by the number of writers who use his
I analysis as a basis for a further discussion of the nature and use of

I'
I

l

language.

I ~nvitation,
I

'

l

Language, according to Buhler, (1) has content, (2) is an
and (3) involves self-disclosure or self-expression.

First of

au, language has content, that is, it signifies or represents something;
the speaker conununicates, explains, or verifies something.

Insofar as speech

merely imparts information, it is functioning at its lowest, impersonal level.
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.\nd yet many people have difficulties even at this point, that is, they have

in making language a clear conveyer of their ideas.

~ifficulties

It is

extremely important, however, for a person to know whether what he says
..

--

comes across with the requisite degree of clarity.

If the manifest content

of a person's language during group sessions is not clear, it does not help
if others are "polite" and pretend to understand a muddled message.

It

happens that some people in affective situations defend themselves by dealing
in unclear content.

If this is the case, it takes courage but it is also a

sign of interest in the other if a listener says:

"I don't know about the

others, but I really didn 1 t understand what you just said."

It is amazing

how often group members allow muddled or unintelligible communications to go
by without any kind of responsible challenge.

On the other hand, there are

those who habitually strip language of other than utilitarian content
functions.

They take pains to see to it that the content of their communica-

tions are clear, but for them speech is defined as nothing more than
commercial-speech.

But even this attempt at restricting the function of

language is itself a disclosure of the personality of the speaker.
Secondly, speech is always some kind of invitation, challenge, or
sunnnons.

It is

a~

the very least a request to be heard, even when it is

being used as a means of driving others away.

When a person speaks, he does

so in order to be heard, his speech is a call for a response.

The response

is expected to be proportioned to the nature of the invitation or challenge:
a command requires obedience, a petition hopes for a concession, a promise
expects trust, an explanation demands attention, testimony looks for faith,
and so forth.

Therefore, speech not only has explicit content, but it also

233
.J:itains implicit "messages" for the listener:

it tells him to come close or

away, to take a particular stance, to become active or remain passive,

.J

~d

so forth.

It is not just the ability to understand the explicit content
..

-

;f language that makes a person a good listener but rather a sensitivity to
~:ie

other "messages" embedded in language.

In the contract group the

;'Hticipants are asked to reflect on their use of language in terms of the
::ivitations or challenges that it implies.
je

A participant's language might

an invitation to affective contact or it might be a command to stand clear.

rt is important for participants to come to some understanding of the

' :abitual invitations, summonses, and challenges characterizing their speech.
Finally, speech always involves some degree of self-revelation, even
·.-:1en the speaker uses it as a means of hiding himself ("Even thy speech
'.ietrays thee"), for he then reveals himself as one who is afraid of the
intimacy of dialogue.

But speech for the non-defensive person or for the

?erson who is attempting a responsible relaxing of his defenses becomes self1

12xpression in a most positive way, even though he is not speaking directly
Jbout himself.

When a person becomes less defensive, two things happen with

respect to his use of language:
~e

he puts more of himself into his speech an.J.

initiates a truer communication with the other by aiming at the other

directly in himself as a person.

If the other responds in a non-defensive

i.·ay, then dialogue becomes a reciprocal opening up, a mutual revelation.

But,

if this is to happen, both the speaker and the one addressed must respect
0 ne
:

1

another in the mysteriousness of their personalities and there must be

0th mutual trust and mutual availability.

Only under these conditions does

language lose its fetters and take on the strength and color of the person-
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Jlities of those who use it.
~ontract-group;

Much will be said about self-disclosure in the

the participants are encouraged to examine their use of

language in order to discover how much of themselves they really do disclose
through their use of language.

It may well be that by the way they express

themselves they are disclosing precisely what they think that they must hide.
7ne Function of Language in Organizing Reality
Sapir (Mandelbaum, 1949) and Whorf (Carroll, 1956) suggested one more
function for language in a proposition that has been called the Sapir-Whorf
hypothesis, which states that language

functions not simply as a means of

reporting and communicating experience but also as a way of defining
experience (see Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968, pp. 5-10).

Language is an instru-

oent that actually shapes perception to some degree.

Lynd (1958) also

recognizes the ability of language to influence perception:
In his study of "Memory and Childhood Amnesia" Schachtel (1947)
gives a particularly illuminating account of the way in which
language inevitably reflects the dominant preoccupations and the
limitations of a society. By such reflection it restricts
perception and experience unless refreshed by innovation.
Certain kinds of experience may be buried or lost because the
culture provides no language through which they can be expressed
(p. 247).
Schachtel (1947) sees the ability of socialized language to ·turn experience
into a cliche{

"The capacity to see and feel what is there gives way to the

tendency to see and feel what one expects to see and feel, which, in turn,
is what one is expected to see and feel because everybody does.
increasingly assumes the form of the cliche'~ .. " (pp. 12-13).

Experience

But Lynd does

admit that language is a two-edge sword, that although acquiring a language
freque:ltly means a dulling and conventionalizing of perception, it is also

235
;:ossible "for the use of words to quicken, not to deaden, awareness" (p. 171).
Though language hardly creates reality, it is one of the organizers of
perceived reality and as such

c~n

organization of the speaker.

If this is the case, then the participant who

perhaps reveal a good deal about the inner

is aware of his use of language has found another "diagnostic" tool by which
to guage his personal and interpersonal life.
Translating "Messages" into Logos
When two or more people are talking, there are usually at least two
levels of connnunication:

(1) what is de facto conveyed by the verbal inter-

change (the "content" mentioned above) and (2) a variety of other "messages"
that are transmitted in a number of different ways, e.g., the qualities of
the verbal exchange itself such as speed, tone, inflection, intensity, and
emotional "color" and nonverbal cues such as eye contact, bodily stance,
facial expressions, and gestures.

These "messages" are similar to what

Ruesch (1963; see also Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) refers to as "metacommunicative processes," the purpose of which is to interpret or classify
the content of the verbal message or to send a parallel message more or l •_' _,:_,
unrelated to verbal content.

These meta-communications can even negate or

deny the explicit meaning of the verbal message (for instance, it is a rather

common occurrence to hear "no" on an explicit verbal level and at the same
time to experience "yes" on a metacommunicative level, the latter being
the "real" message).

As Berne (1966) notes, the metaconunun:L:ative "message"

might even substitute for some kind of tactile stimulus:
Game analysis is grounded on the principle that the human org.::tnism
can accept, up to a point, visual, auditory, nncl symbolic recognition signals as a substitute for direct tactile stimulation of
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received (that is, people would "read" one another, if asked to do so, on
a meta-communicative level even though they might seldom verbalize the fact
that they have either sent or received such messages), still people would
differ in their sensitivity to meta-communicative messages and in the number
and kinds of messages sent out over non-verbal rather than verbal routes.
One of the functions of the contract group is to become aware of the
metacornmunicative dimensions of language and then, as opportunities arise in
the give-and-take of group interaction, to attempt to translate meta-communications into logos.

This means first of all becoming aware of oneself as

transmitter of such messages and translating them into verbal language and
:econdly becoming aware of the "messages" of others and confronting them with
"translations."

Obvious, this does not mean that one should be on the watch

for and attempt to translate all meta-communications, for this would be to
err in the opposite direction and make the communication process intolerable.
The meta-communication process is a kind of communication shorthand and, if
·..:sed correctly, facilitates the communication process.
a~d

However, both vague

never-translated meta-communicative messages can clog or muddy inter-

?ersonal contact.

Excessive reliance on meta-communication might also mani-

fest an implicit distrust of language.
~unications

At any rate, all interpersonal com-

problems are fair game for the contract group.

Language and Self-Identity
One of the messages of G. B. Shaw's Pygmalion is that in some fashion
language makes the person.

Differences in the use of language not only

reflect class differences in society but language actually helps create and
maintain the differences in values that separate one class from another.

'
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I

ior instance, a person from a lower class might speak quite freely about

I :exual matters
I

and do so in public, while a member of an upper class might

/ ::ot feel free to speak about se:x;l!ality at all.

Language, then, is an instru-

1

j :~nt of reinforcement regarding the different approaches to sexuality that
exist in the two classes.

What is true with respect to social identity is

also true in the area of self-identity.

Self-identity is one of those heuris-

tic "impact-concepts" that is just beginning to be translated into operational
terms and subjected to controlled investigation (e.g. Bronson, 1959; Hess,
1

:963).

Language not only reveals a person's identity, "who he is," but in

some way it makes him the person he is.
l'homme

A

~'

The literary dictum, Le style c' est

can also be applied to a person's style of speaking:

"

c'est 1 'homme meme.

La parole
I

If a person's language is weak, insipid, cliche-ridden,

and consistently ritualistic in social situations, this says much about the
person's ability

and willingness to relate both to himself and to others.

Language not only reflects his encapsulation but becomes one of the instruments of his self-imprisonment.
Erikson (1956) sees the relationship between language and self-identity
as developing early during the maturational process:
•.• [A] child ••• learning to speak •.• is acquiring one of the
prime functions supporting a sense of individual autonomy
and one of the prime techniques for expanding the raius of
give-and-take .•. Speech •.. defines him as one responded to by
those around him with changed diction and attention .•. [A]
spoken word is a pact: there is an irrevocab 1y cornn· i • 1- -f ng
aspect to an utterance remembered by others ..•. [TJi.e tL~ld may
come to develop, in use of voice and word, a particular
combination of whining or singing, judging or arguing, as part
of a new element of the future identity, namely, the element
'one who speaks and is spoken to in such-and-such a way' •••
(p. 115).
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::rikson (1963) also discusses the case of a man who wanted to bury his past,
:o break with certain aspects of his self-identity.
·•as to pursue graduate studies in a foreign language.

One of the things he did
Erikson suggests that

this new language, both in terms of a new career, a new medium of expression,
.111d a new culture, may well have offered his client an opportunity to

establish a different self-picture.
It is hypothesized, then, that language reveals certain dimensions of a
rerson's life style and also creates and serves to maintain certain patterns
of living and interacting.

Ryle (1952), for instance, suggests that personal-

ity differences exist between those who use dispositional verbs such as

'.Jelieve, wonder, suppose, and aspire, which signify ability, tendency, and
proneness-to, and those who deal principally in modal verbs such as does,
.:md must.

~'

Tii.e person who constantly believes, wonders, and supposes is seen

to be differently oriented toward reality from the person who disposes of
reality in terms of what does,

~'

or must happen.

Identity crises (Erikson, 1956, 1963, 1964), too, are reflected in the
use of language.

The adolescent who, according to Erikson, goes through a

kind of natural period of identity diffusion and a moratorium in which society
allows him to experiment with a number of different roles, speaks the
specialized language of his sub-culture.

Language becomes one of the ways

in which he declares that he is not just an appendage of parents, church,
school, and society in general, but a person in his own right.
The contract

group, then, is

a laboratory

in which the participants

have the opportuni.ty to reflect on the implications of the propositions:
"M
•y language is me," and "In some .way I use language to make myself what
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: am."
1

It is an opportunity to examine the ways in which they use logos,
'/

·onmercial-speech, cliche-talk, and anti-logos to fashion a communication
life-style.
in the Contract Group

~ogos

The contract group obviously calls for logos rather than any form of
co~~ercial-speech,

/

cliche-talk, or anti-logos.

Moreover the contract speci-

fies the kind of logos that is acceptable during group sessions.
~ith
,1:1d

Therefore,

respect to the contract group, logos can be divided into both contractual
a-contractual Jo gos.

For instance, if a participant begins seriously

:o spell out his views on the current political situation but in no way
:elates what he is doing to contractual goals (e.g. rendering the there-andthen here-and-now), given the ordinary sensitivity contract, he would
?robably be engaging in a-contractual logos.

Engaging in a-contractual logos

is frequently a fairly sophisticated form of flight from group

pro~ess,

for

while a-contractual logos might well be meaningful in itself, it is not so in
the context of the contract group.

It is one thing if a member speaks about

values, another if he speaks meaningfully and feelingly about his values.
The latter is contractual, while the former is a-contractual logos.

Group

members often hesitate to challenge the member engaged in a-contractual logos
because they feel that they would be keeping him from doing something that is
good in its elf.
The general rul./ is that logos in the group stimulates logos.

If a

person uses language powerfully in the group, others will tend to follow
his lead.
logos.

Therefore, one of the functions of the leader-member is to model

However, he must do so intelligently, that is, he must proportion his
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:w.1 ner of speaking to the ability of others to listen.
:i

spur rather than a club.

His language must be

Goffman (1967) suggests that this might well mean,

1 ~ least in the first sessions of.. .the group, "scaling down" one's expression

::i the service of dialogue:

These two tendencies, that of the speaker to scale down his
expressions and that of the listeners to scale up their
interests, each in the light of the other's capacities and
demands, form the bridge that people build to one another,
allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a communion
of reciprocally sustained involvement (pp. 116-117).
-'·.~ever,

this line of reasoning should not be used as an excuse to keep talk

:1 a "safe" level.
In my own experience I have seen ill-timed and ill-controlled logos
(·•hich then really becomes anti-logos) inhibit and even destroy group process .
.::1ce one group member, tried of the anemic communication that characterized
the first couple of meetings, spoke with such dramatic force about himself-as?roblematic and the group-as-anemic that he frightened the other members into
shutting off communication rather than upgrading it.

Instead of challenging

the group from the start, he allowed his frustration to build up until it
burst forth in language that

could not be handled by the group.

On the

other hand, I frequently (but not frequently enough) find myself stimulated
':iy

the "strong talk" of a number of my friends.

~ithin

Their logos awakens logos

me and I find myself both thinking thoughts, feeling emotions, and

giving expression to both with a depth that surprises me.

It is as if the

third thing, dialogue, is greater than its parts, which are my thoughts and
feelings and those of my friend taken separately.
stimulation is the goal of the contract group.

This kind of mutual
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_rne

~-Linguistic

Dimensions £!_Speech

Much can be learned about a person, not only from the verbal content of
.:~s

/

communications (the content -can be strong, cliche-ridden, ambiguous, weak,

etc.), but also from the quality of the voice in delivery, or as Wiener and
~'.Jhrabian

(1968) put it, from "variations in ton:al qualities, patterns of

stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by the required linguistic
form" (p. 51).

For example, a person may claim that he is not anxious but

)etray his anxiety quite openly in the tone, pitch, and timbre of his voice:
··,\.'1

insecure person ••• may speak in complex, involved or even unfinished

sentences, with poor pitch and volume control, and with frequent nervous
:::mnerisms" (Mahl & Schulze, 1964, p. 51).

Voice quality, rhythm, continuity,

speech rate, and verbal output all communicate something to the listener, or,
:rom a more active point of view, the speaker has all of these extra-linguistic factors at his disposal, to use, as he sees fit, to increase the
effectiveness of his communication.
extra-linguistic phenomena:

In a sense, there are two kinds of

(a) those related to speech itself (e.g. pitch,

tone, etc.), and (b) those forms of behavior which, although they "communicate," are more or less separable from speech in the strict sense.

Such

non-verbal behavior, as it is called, is a subject of intense interest and
debate in sensitivity-training laboratories and, as such, deserves separate
consideration.

-

LOGOS:

NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION IN THE LABORATORY

1'E!.

scientific study of non-verbal communication.

Although it is a

truism that non-verbal behavior plays an extremely important part in the
entire conununication process, some have suggested that its scientific study
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is not worth pursuing.

La Barre (1964) takes strong exception to such a

suggestion :
It is easy to ridicule kine~iology as an abstruse, pedantic, and
unimportant study by pure scientists. But I believe that
kinesiology is, on the contrary, one of the most important
avenues for better understanding internationally. Consider, as
one small example, how Chinese hate to be touched,slapped on the
back, or even to shake hands; how easily an American could
avoid offense by merely omitting these intended gestures of
friendliness! Misunderstanding of nonverbal communication of an
unconscious kind is one of the most vexing, and unnecessary sources
of international friction. (Consider, for example, the hands-overthe-head self-handshake of Khrushchev,which Americans interpreted
as an arrogant gesture of triumph, as of a victorious prizefighter, whereas Krushchev seems to have intended it as a friendly
gesture of international brotherhood.) (p. 218).
Birdwhistell (1952, 1961, 1963a, 1963b) and Hall (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1964,
1966) have both elaborated categories which relate body movements, including
gestures and facial expressions, to the process of communication.

Davitz

(1964) has reviewed the literature on the interpretation of emotions from
facial expressions and researchers such as Ek.man (1965) and Ekman and Friesen
(1967) continue to do research in this area.

Dittman (1963) is another who

studies the relation of bodily movement to communication.

La Barre (1964)

discusses (not without humor) a wide variety of non-verbal communicative
behavior--greetings, kissing, sticking out the tongue (in China "a quick,
minimal tongue-protrusion and -retraction signifies embarrassment and selfcastigation" [p. 200]), gestures of contempt (Neapolitans click the right
thembnail off the right canine in a downward arc" [p. 201]), gestures of
.Eoliteness ("a Shan may bend over and snuff the sleeve of the benefactor's
coat" [p. 202)), conventionalized motor acts (e.g., in both Oriental and
Occidental acting), and conversational gestures (e.g., "the shaken
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I

II

:orefinger of accusation, sharp criticism, and threat" [p. 203])--on a cross-

cultural basis.
the

On the other hand, while there is a good deal of talk about

non-verbal dimensions of sensitivity-training and even though many

laboratories use non-verbal exercises in group interaction, I know of no
systematic study of this phenomenon.

Perhaps many of the studies mentioned

above could begin to lay a theoretical foundation for their use.
Non-verbal connnunication is always present in the sensitivity-training
group, but

in different ways.

The following division might help conceptual-

ize the presence of such behavior in training groups:
(1)

Inadvertent non-verbal connnunications.

First of all, since the

?articipants are physically present in the group, they are continually giving
off communication cues by their facial expressions and bodily posture both as
a complement to their verbalizations and when they are silent.

They grimace,

sit on the edge of their chairs, yawn, cough, bury their hands in their
faces, cast their eyes down, wring their hands, scratch their heads, cry, and
engage in a whole host of communicative non-verbal acts.

Very often such

acts give some evidence about how they are feeling at the moment, but at
other times these acts seem ambiguous, out of place, or even contradict the
verbal portion of the participant's message.

For instance, I once videotaped

the last session of a laboratory course in interpersonal relations.

One of

the participants engaged in a fairly lengthy remark on how much he had liked
the experience, how interesting and worthwhile it was, etc.

However, his

Voice was flat, without affect, he could hardly be heard by the other
members, he was slouched down in his chair, and he made no eye contact with
any of the other members.

In a word, his entire tone an<l posture belied

Iwhat he was saying,
J
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a fact that was not lost on him during the replay of the

tape.
(2)

Advertent non-verbal communication without physical contact.

A

participant may intentionally emit some form of non-verbal behavior in order
to make psychological contact with another participant or the group as a
whole.

He may groan, wink, smile and engage in a variety of other non-contac-

tive acts in order to transmit some message.

The person who scratches his

head might unwittingly be saying something about his perplexity and/ or
anxiety, while the participant who winks at another is actively using a
non-verbal channel in order to communicate (e.g. he may be flirting or he
may be engaging in a form of non-verbal support).
(3)

Advertent non-verbal communication with physical contact.

A third

category, and this is the kind of non-verbal behavior that is the object of
most of the controversy and/or discussion, involves actual physical contact-e.g., touching, holding, hugging, kissing, pushing, swinging, "passing,"
etc.

Sometimes such non-verbal behavior takes place "naturally" within the

group, e.g., one participant, after disclosing himself at a rather deep level,
begins to cry, and a second participant puts his arm around him to give him
support.

Other forms of physical contact can take place through exercises

designed to have the participant feel the effects of physical contact.
exercises involve dyads.

Some

For instance Gunther (1968) suggests an exercise

called "back talk":
[T]he couple stands back to back with eyes closed, and through
movement get to know each other's backs. Have a non-verbal
conversation with your backs. (One person rubs; the other
listens; take turns.) Have a back argurnen t. Make up. Be very
gentle, playful. Move up and down at various speeds.
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Eventually stand quietly back to back and slowly separate.
Experience your back--how you feel. Turn around, open your
eyes and see your partner (p. 118).
Jther exercises may involve the whole group, e.g., "under the sheets":
Each person goes under a sheet and stays quiet for 5 minutes.
They are allowed to do anything they want to, except to move around
the room. The move about the room, contact/encounter other people
or groups as long as each stays under his own sheet. Be open to
your desires and let whatever action-reaction that wants to happen
occur. No talking during the experience. When it is over,
experience how you feel; come out from under the sheet (Gunther,
1968, pp. 174-175).
Such exercises are frequently quite diagnostic:

emotional constriction.

they quickly reveal areas of

For example, during a "processing" session which

took place immediately after a few simple non-verbal exercises involving
physical contact, one of the participants, who had been obviously rigid
during the exercises, made a statement something like this:

"I really feel

somewhat disturbed, not by the exercises but by my reaction to them.

Over

the past couple of years I have become much more at home with myself and with
others.

I felt that I was more or less in possession of myself both on

the personal and interpersonal level.

These exercises this morning disturbed

me because I did experience my rigidity, I did see dramatically that not
everything has been worked out, I did see that I am still afraid of intimacy
with perhaps both myself and others."

Insofar as these exercises are

diagnostic, they aid the process of communication in the sense that they
put the participant in more effective (though sometimes painful) contact
with himself.

Such communication-with-self serves as a basis for more

effective communication with others.
The anxiety and the value inherent in physical contact.

Physical
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:ontact in our society is anxiety-arousing.

First of all, it is an express-

ion of intimacy and many of us are afraid of intimacy.

Secondly, physical

contact in our society seems to be over-identified with sexuality; it is not
seen as a universal mode of contact and communication.
~hen

Anxiety runs very high

the exercise is so structured that the dyads are of the same sex,

especially if both are male.

"I would feel a lot better if my partner were

a girl" says a number of things:

"I live in a culture in which physical

contact of male with male is more or less taboo"; "physical contact, is, of
its very nature, sexual"; "I consider intimacy as something intersexual. 11
However, the laboratory is a "cultural island, 11 that is, it attempts to
develop its own human culture apart from the cultural rigidities that exist
outside the laboratory.

In the case of exercises involving physical

contact, the laboratory culture says this:
channel of human communication.

"Physical contact is another

It can be so restricted as to communicate

only certain dimensions of interpersonal living such as hostility (in acts
such as shoving, striking, etc.) and sexuality (in any physical act showing
interest or concern).
of communication.

Here we experiment with physical contact as a channel

Our purpose is to see how many different human realities

we can express through physical contact or through a combination of physical
contact, non-verbal behavior which does not involve physical contact, and
verbal behavior.

Our purpose here is to grow interpersonally by involving

ourselves with one another.
involvement.

Physical contact is one of the modes of human

Here in the laboratory there is cultural permission to deal

with it more .freely than we could in day-to-day living.
we can take advantage of this permission."

It is hoped that
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~of

the problems associated with physical contact in the laboratory.

?hysical contact can arouse strong emotion, especially strong anxiety.
:y

In

own experience I have found that the way in which exercises are introduced

to the group is of paramount importance.

An example, in the first residential

laboratory I attended, we had generally avoided exercises, especially nonverbal exercises involving physical contact during the first half of the
laboratory.

Around the midpoint we were involved in a session in which

communication had noticeably bogged down.
£et in contact with one another.
·.·hen suddenly the trainer sa.id:

It seems that we just could not

We were sitting outside on a kind of patio,
"I'd like to do something.

The anxiety level in the group shot skyward.

Let's go inside."

My imagination ran wild:

we

were going inside because we were going to do something that should not be
seen by others.

Once inside, we sat around for a while, saying nothing.

trainer remained in a very serious, brooding mood.
mount.

Finally he said:

ran riot:

Our anxiety continued to

"I would like a volunteer."

Again my imagination

volunteers are called for (especially under the "battle" conditions

under which we were operating) only when the mission is dangerous.
remained silent and frozen in our seats.
a volunteer.

1

The

We

The trainer made another plea for

Finally, with obvious trepidation, one of the men in the group

I (certainly not me)

said that he was tentatively willing to try to cooperate.

The trainer said:

"Hold out your palms, I'd like to feel your strength and

I

I

let you feel mine."

They pushed against each other for a while, but the

I volunteer's willingness faded and he withdrew from the ,:rcise.
The exercise the trainer proposed was really
simple, fairly nonI threatening exercise, but the way in which he introduced it crented such
t
i

E·

a
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i ::n:iety that it practically immobilized the group.

lI :1oundered.

The trainer's purpose, then, was to offer an exercise or two to

Istimulate contact and communication,
?urpose.

Communication had

but he completely defeated his own

The leader can control the degree of anxiety (at least the general

J:ixiety level of the grotip) by the way he introduces the group to such

I ~xercises.
1 tory

In the contract group both the experimental nature of the labora-

experience and the reason for using non-verbal exercises are explained

~efore

the laboratory begins.

Furthermore, if non-verbal exercises are first

introduced as experimental games, they will arouse much less anxiety than if
used as "serious" dynamite to get rid of communication blocks in the 'Middle
of group sessions.

I often begin a laboratory with a "micro-lab," a kind of

festival of communication games which involves many different kinds of
exercises--verbal, non-verbal without physical contact, and non-verbal with
physical contact, and mixtures.

This tends to make the partie ! pants less

•·ary and thus more ready to experiment with communication-through-physicalcontact later on in the laboratory.
In the contract laboratory the participants should not be forced or
'Jullied into more serious exercises or exercises that take place. at more
serious times during the life of the group.

Again, the way the exercise

is proposed will often determine whether the participants will engage in it
or not.

For instance, if two people seem to be avoiding each other or if

they have not been able to make contact on a verbal level, the trainer might
reflect on this and then say:

"I wonder whether the two of you would like

to engage in a little non-verbal experiment which may or may not facilitate
communication between you.

These exercises work no magic, there's nothing

--------------------------------------------------------------~
250

::iystic about them, but they may help."

Individuals differ quite a bit in

their willingness to explore the non-verbal dimensions of communication.
if this dimension of laboratory

li_f~

But

is made relatively non-threatening (it

;.•ill almost always arouse some anxiety), most of the participants will make
use of it and it can become a fruitful area of experimentation, complementing
the verbal interaction of the group.
Choosing the right exercise.

Exercises should not be used indiscrimi-

nately in laboratories, but should rather be integrated with the task at hand.

If the overriding purpose of the laboratory is to become more aware of oneself
and of others as body and as sensing, then the laboratory might be highly
exercise-oriented and many of the exercises suggested by Gunther (1968) might
be used.

If the purpose of the laboratory is interpersonal growth, many of

the exercises suggested by Schutz (1967) could be integrated into the
experience.

But the

choi~e

and timing of an exercise are important.

If the

participants are already anxious and the exercise is seen principally as an
instrument which will arouse more anxiety, there is a strong probability
that it will not have a beneficial effect, for the participants will not
be able to give themselves to it properly.
exercise is not an end in itself.

In the contract laboratory the

Even when it constitutes a form of commun-

ication in its own right, it is still there to complement and help stimulate
verbal involvement.

Some trainers mechanically substitute exercises for

the give-and-take of verbal interaction, but this often merely reflects their
own anxiety and need to see to it that the interaction keeps moving.
are certainly plenty of exercises of all kinds available.

There

Besides those

listed by Gunther, Schutz,, and Malamud and Machover (1965), there is an
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endless supply in the fertile imagination of those who conduct
;~

laboratories~

exercise created or modified to fit a specific situation that arises in
group will fare better than a 1:>9rrowed exercise, which, although "interes-

a

ting," does not fit.
Exercises and life.

Exercises, like the laboratory itself, are contrived

They are not meant to be a way. of life.

If they make a participant pause and

reflect on some dimension of his interpersonal life, if they show him some
of his unused potentialities, if they enlarge his area of freedom with himself and others, then they have served their purpose well.

However, even

though a participant might not make a contrived exercise-culture part of his
day-to-day living, he may find that because of his laboratory experiences he
interacts in somewhat different ways.
more readily in physical ways.

For instance, he may show affection

The only caution is that he not inflict

himself in his new-found freedom on others.

POIESIS:

WORDS-MADE-FLESH

When pathos finds expression in human language, when logos is suffused
with human feeling and emotion, a new term is needed to describe the communication that takes place.

The term used here is poiesis which comes from

the Greek verb meaning "to do, to make."
from the same stem.
the result is poetry.

The English word "poetry" comes

When meaning and feeling become artfully one in language,
In human dialogue, when words are meaningfully filled

With human emotion, when feelings and emotions find creative expression in
human language, the ref';ult is poiesis.
With somewhat negative connotations.

Forrest (1965) uses the same term
For him poiesis is a "making" almost

, in the sense of "making up" or "contriving."

The schizophrenic, for instance,,

--------------------------------------------'

•--.,..~...
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but fulfilled.
•ords.

In fact, fulfillment
of wishes occurs only in the world of
.-·-

Be that as it may, in the present context poiesis has only positive

I

connotations.

It is too rich a term to be wasted on pathology.

Poiesis is

·•ord-made-flesh in human dialogue.
Men seem to feel safer when they compartmentalize their experiences.
Feelings are all right, and language is all right, but they are to be
kept apart, if possible.

Lynch (1967) recognizes in movies a similar move-

nent, that is, a movement toward immediate, private, and wordless experience.
He deplores such a movement:

"[W] ords and ideas have been given a hard time;

they have been pushed into a polarized state, devoid of contact with images
and things.

They need to be allowed to re-enter the world and re-establish

their relation to things and their own power as a human art" (p. 79).
~!eaningless

cation.

words and unverbalized feelings both sin against human communi-

Lynch suggests that even brutal language is better than either

emasculated words or silences that hide hate and bitterness:
••• [T] words in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf are, on the
surface, ordinary human words that say something. On the
second level they turn out to be words describing games
being played at, unrealities, fictions. On the third and
final take they have inflexibly human rules behind them and
are the only forms of salvation and contact, cruel though
they might be, between George and Martha (p. 83, emphasis
added).
Language, then, can be strong medicine, if it is "made" strong by becoming
the vehicle of the speaker's experience.
The members of the contract group are asked to experiment with poicsis.
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<his does not mean that their language must be continually filled with
er.~tion.

First of all, there are degrees of poiesis, and secondly, we could

not keep up the process of conununication if all words were afire.

What is

demanded in the contract group is feeling proportioned to meaning and
expressed with simplicity in human language.
Experiencing, expressing, conununicating.

Men first experience something,

then they express it, and, if their expression is successful, that is, if
they actually contact another, they communicate their experience.

Gendlin

(1962) suggests that psychotherapy deals primarily with the first variable,
experiencing:

"Psychotherapy generally ••• seems to involve not only

verbalization, but more fundamentally, the client's inward reference to and
struggle with his directly felt experiencing.

The individual's inward data,

concretely felt, seem to be actual stuff of psychotherapy, not the words •••
(p.

).

In sensitivity groups, however, it is rather a question of getting

participants to verbalize the more or less integral pathos experiences they
do have and are in contact with.

But even in therapy, the impact of the

therapist is determined, according to Patterson (1966), by the client's
perception of the therapist.

It is not sufficient for the therapist to have

positive feelings toward his client, nor is it sufficient merely to express
these feelings.

Rather he must express them in such a way that they are

actually picked up by the client, that is, he must communicate these feelings.
Therefore, although helping a patient to get into contact with his own
experience seems to be the first step in the therapeutic process, still,
since integral functioning is ultimately defined by the quality of a
person's interpersonal relationships, the ability to express and communicate

I

II;:1eself integrally are also essential goals of therapy.
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Patterson thus

i .ighlights one of the frequently forgotten dimensions of poiesis, that is,
that feelings must be expressed through language in such a way that others
.---

actually do pick them up.

This is work, hard work.

communication is called poi es is, a "doing, a making."

This is why integral
Therefore, when Salter

(1949) recommends "feeling-talk"--"we must forego premeditated utterances

and say what we feel when we feel it" (p. 99)--it must be remembered that
:::ere "feeling-talk" may not be sufficient.
be

The expression of feeling must

suffused with logos so that it becomes an invitation to dialogue.
Failed poiesis:

action divorced from language.

While perhaps the

primary failure to achieve poeisis consists in an inability or a refusal to
include emotion in verbal expression, there is also another, even more
dramatic, form of failed poiesis.

It involves what Bloch (1968) calls "an

inability to substitute and utilize language for action and acitivity" (p.

178).

When a married couple stand screaming at each other, a kind of

communication-through-action is taking place, but the use of language is
really incidental to the whole process.

This dumping of raw emotion on each

other is an "action" or an "activity" devoid of both logos and poiesis.

But

if a marriage begins primarily on the level of pathos so that, although each
"experiences" the other~ still neither is capable of translating that
experience into language, and if the marriage continues principally on the
level of pathos, with commercial-speech alone handling the necessary transactions between partners, then trouble is almost unavoidable.

The couple

turns up in some marital counseling situation and it is discovered that their
problem is "a lack of communication."

From the beginning their feelings

255

'

lI

:~·nrd

each other have been strong and turbulent, but strength and turbulennce

';~not

imply depth.

l eschew

logos:

Ii ~heir

They have never really questioned their feelings.

they never speak meaningfully about their core, their values,

goals, the interlaced meanings of all the phases of their lives.

I

I

?athos is not modified, stimulated, and matured by effective logos.

I ~as

They

never been any "need" for words.

There

When ephemeral feeling dies away,

however, and the inevitable problematic of living together arises, communication fails because it has never really been a part of the

relationshi~.

The

2athos level on which the relationship has been based is not sufficient to
handle the problematic.

When undiscussed problems mount too high, irrespon-

sible pathos runs wild, with words becoming the lackeys of feeling.

Then

the conversation that does exist is nothing but a caricature of communication.
The sooner a couple realizes the potentialities of human language and makes
~ature

verbal interactional systems part of their relationship, the better

prepared will they be to handle problems that arise, and, what is more
important, the greater will be their potentiality for interpersonal growth.
~

Expression of Emotion
In human affairs there seem to be two highly prevalent, though doubt-

fully growthful, ways of handling strong feeling, both positive and negative.
Actually both are ways of avoiding rather than handling emotion in transactional situations.
(1)

The suppression of feeling.

feeling is to suppress it.

The "safest" way of handling strong

Perhaps "conceal" is a more accurate word than

" suppress," for hidden emotion does make itself felt under a number o f

disguises.

For instance, if a person suppresses or conceals his anger, it
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frequently comes out in a number of deceitful ways, e.g., in coolness,
unavailability, snide remarks, obstructionism, and other subtle forms of
revenge.

Feeling has not really been suppressed, rather it has been trans-

lated into a number of non-growthful activities which are difficult to deal
1Jith precisely because of their "underground" character.
Riecken (1952) describes a work camp in which, because of the philosophy
and religious convictions of the members, the prevailing atmosphere was one
of friendly and gentle interactions.

Since the members disapproved of all

kinds of aggression, both physical and verbal, a problem arose with respect
to the handling of the minor antagonisms that arose daily and tended to
:~terfere

with the work to be done.

Meetings were held, but problems were

discussed in a most abstract and intellectualized way.

Because of the

failure to institute real emotional connnunication, the antagonisms persisted
nuch to the dissatisfaction of everyone.

But an intellectual approach to

a non-intellective situation was bound to fail.
(2)

Acting-out.

it on the other.

The second way of handling strong feeling is to foist

Pent up anger is allowed to "explode" or pent up affection

is allowed to overwhelm the other.

Such "solutions" are rationalized as

forms of honesty, but, strangely enough, such "honesty" seldom results in
growthful encounter.

Acting-out does satisfy immediate instinctual needs,

but seldom serves the process of communication.

Some people pride themselves

on "blowing up" and getting it "out of their systems," claiming that this
is more honest than concealment and the subtle "leakage" of negative fe.eling
that ensues.

This may well be true, but such pride should be tempered by

the fact that there is still a more human way.
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(3)

Poiesis in responsible encounter.

I

:.1s

l

Jngry with you.

!

Let us suppose that once George

been angered by John, he says something like this:

"John, I am really

I could try to_swallow my anger or I could blow up, but I

Jon't think that either of these would solve anything, because I think that
[n

a way my anger is really our problem, yours and mine, and I'd like to

talk it out with you.

How about it?"

Such a tack (especially if the stylized

·.:ay in which it is presented here is overlooked for the moment) is rarely
c~ployed,

for it demands too much honesty and runs the risk either of refusal

or of disquieting discoveries about oneself.

It also demands dealing with

icelings instead of relinquishing them in one way or another.

George remains

Jngry, but now his anger becomes a point of possible contact instead of just
an abrasive force.

Sometimes a person has to choose between the pain of

talking out another's hostility toward him and the discomfort of being the
victim of a dozen covert expressions of hostility so rationalized that it
is impossible to get at them.
~

Prevalence of Hos.tility
One of the first emotions that members of sensitivity groups tend to

experiment with is hostility.

For a number of people hostility is a rela-

tively "inexpensive" emotion (though there are those who find it almost
unbearable either to express or to be the object of hostility), more or less
readily available for use.

Because it is readily available, some use it

recklessly, and this serves to perpetuate the caricature of the sensitivity
laboratory as a place where people "tell one another off."
The responsible expression of hostility as

~form

of poiesis.

Contract-

group members are in no way discouraged from expressing anger or hostility,
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they are asked to do so in as constructive a way as possible.

Mann

.1959), in reviewing the literature, discovered that the expression of

:·ositive feelings in group situations is positively correlated with intelli-

feelings is not the issue; it is rather how they are expressed.

Negative

feelings, too, are part of the human condition and are experienced by the
intelligent and well-adjusted.

The hypothesis here is that the intelligent

and well-adjusted, when they do express negative feelings, would tend to do
so in a positive way, that is, through some form of poiesis.
ex?ression of negative feelings can be growthful.

The positive

Therefore, the airing of

negative feelings can be quite beneficial to contract-group interaction if it
is done responsibly, but it should hardly be the major emotional preoccupation
of the group.
Hostility that is expressed by some form of anti-logos rather than
£Oiesis merely elicits more hostility.
~1iller

A study by Bandura, Lipsher, and

(1960) showed that hostile therapists encourage patient hostility.

The study also indicated that therapists tend to avoid patients who direct
hostility toward them.

Finally, patients suppress or redirect hostility

following avoidance reactions on the part of therapists.

Thus, when

hostility is a more or less "buried" variable in a transactional setting,
it tends to evoke a manipulative, "game" culture that is hardly growthful.
In the contract group, if anyone tries to engage in this "attack-immunity"
game of Bandura's therapists, h~ should be challenged immediately.

I
I
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The meanings of hostility.

Hostility frequently expresses more than raw

I

I "againstness."

Especially in group interaction it can mean many things.

(1)

I

it may be a way of expressing
;;roup.

on~'s

individuality or showing strength in the

This use of hostility, however, is relatively immature and usually

characterizes only the earlier sessions of the life of the group.
strength and individuality can be displayed in contractual ways.

Real
(2) For

the person who feels threatened by the interaction of the group hostility may
be a defenisve maneuver rather than a form of attack.

(3) "Planned"

hostility may be used as a "dynamite tachnique" to stimulate action during a
~ioring

session.

~caning:

(4) Hostility can also have a. more subtle and constructive

it may be an attempt to achieve some kind of interpersonal contact

or intimacy.

A number of authors (e.g. Burton & Whiting, 1961; Mills, 1964;

Ogilvie, 1961; Slater, 1966) have suggested (and some have conducted research
that supports the hypothesis) that identification tends to follow aggression.
For instance, Slater states:
to identification:

"It is for this reason that aggression leads

in fantasy the attack is a freeing of the desirable

attributes from the hateful shell that prevents their acquisition" (p. 146).
It would take rather ingenious empirical investigation to determine whether
this is the case or not, but it does seem to be a fact that sometimes after
two people storm at each other, they tend to draw closer together.

Perhaps

the direct route to intimacy is too difficult and the turmoil of the indirect
route is all that is available.
Perhaps one of the best ways available to a participant in a sensit

i.v it y

group to discover the meaning of hostility in his interperson3l relations is
to express the hostility that wells up within during group sess:0ns.
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The Problems and Potentialities of Poiesis

--

One of the problems of poiesis is that it is an anti-manipulative and

-

anti-"game" form of connnunication.. in a manipulative and game-prone culture.
_

Even therapy does not escape verbal manipulation, for, as Krasner (1963) has
observed, the connnunication of therapeutic influence is a function of the
therapist's verbal behavior.

His studies indicate that the patient learns

the role that the therapist expects of him through verbal conditioning.

And

yet the hypothesis under which this book is being written is that the less
manipulation in human interaction the more growthful will it be.
A second problem is that it is doubtful that our present culture is
ready for a sharp rise in the amount of poiesis in interpersonal relating.
The character Jerry in Albee's The Zoo Story is somewhat disconcerting to
the average reader, for people are not accustomed to dealing verbally with
reality on the level that he deals with it.

Jerry is resented both because

he feels too much and because he translates what he feels into language.
Therefore, even those who are responsibly and intelligently "poetic" in their
encouters must expect to experience a certain amount of rejection from those
vho cannot tolerate intimacy.
And yet, as Lynd (1958) would have it, men have a moral obligation to
become artists in communication.

This is difficult, for schisms within man,

according to Maslow (1967)--for instance, splits within the personality due
to the inward battle between impulse and control--cause splits in his
communication:

"To the extent that we are split, our expression and communi-

cations are split, parital, onesided," but, on the other hand, to the extent
that we are integrated and whole, our communications are "complete, unique,
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idiosyncratic, alive, and creative" (p. 197).

The split between feeling and

verbal language reflects the schizoid nature of the "average" man.

His task

is to overcome this split, because, if Lynd (1958) is right, too much is to
be lost if he does not:
It may be asked why, since the language of intimacy will always
be to a large extent a language of gesture, facial expression,
and touch, it should be important to enlarge the possibilities
of verbal language for such connnunication. For at least three
reasons: 1. Lack of a verbal means of connnunication of certain
experiences may sometimes lead to atrophy or lack of awareness
of the experiences themselves. 2. Ranges of mutual exploration
may be cut off and unnecessary misunderstandings may arise if
there is a feeling that words should not be used or an unwillingness to search for words to use as one medium of connnunication.
3. The creation of symbols in language is a characteristically
human ability that can bring unconscious creative forces into
relation with conscious effort, subject into relation with
object, can give form to hitherto unknown things and hence make
possible the apprehension of new truth (pp. 249-250).
Such integration of words and feeling is perhaps both a cause and a reflection•
of the general integration of the individual.

If the participants of ·a

contract laboratory come away with a deeper respect for· honest emotion,
honest language, and honest attempts to integrate the two, then the laboratory
has been successful.
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Chapter VII
Self-Disclosure
Introduction
One of the principal interaction goals in the contract group (and all
·ensitivity-training groups) is self-disclosure.

Since self-disclosure of

·ome degree constitutes an integral part of almost any kind of laboratory
'xperience and does so in a special way in laboratories in interpersonal rela.ions, i t needs special attention, especially in view of the fact that most of
s fear self-revelation to a greater or lesser extent and therefore find it

l

'.ifficult to estimate its value in interpersonal living.

Since this chapter is comparatively long, a preview is in order:

(.0llowing topics are dealt with: (1)

the

Dangers associated with concealment.

· :iere is a growing literature pointing toward the potential pathogenic nature
f concealment.

The works of such people as Mowrer and Jourard are considered

rom this point of view.

(2)

Our culture and self-disclosure.

The relation-

'.iip between our culture and self-disclosure is placed in focus, for there seem
IJbe a number of cultural bans against self-disclosure.

~~ems

to extol privacy as an absolute value.

This same society

Therefore the value of privacy

i

t~d its relationship to interpersonal involvement are considered.
'-~

·~

h
.....Q.nes t_y_.

t

Truth

At least in practice, truth and honesty are not the precious com-

~ities that they are made out to be.
~reater

(3)

Some of the factors militating against

spirit of truth and openness in society and how this affects self-

"'elation among men are discussed.
(4)

Intra-individual resistance to disclosure.

Resistance to self-disclo-
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·Jre is not just a function of certain factors in society.
~:1tra-individual

There are also

factors which prevent a greater spirit of openness among men--

.. g., flight from self-knowledge, fear of intimacy, and a refusal to bear re-

-?onsibility. (5)

Guilt and disclosure.

Guilt is an everyday human commodity

•

. ~ich often is instrumental in keeping a person out-of-community in some way.
'.t has many faces, and some of these are probed.
:uman

life.

Shame, too, is a common experience.

(6)

The value of shame in

Depending upon how it is

i;iproached, it can either enhance or prove detrimental to both personal and
interpersonal living.

How it differs from guilt and how it relates to communi-

:ation with self and others are considered.
·~·nee.

(7)

Honesty in the group experi-

Possible areas of. self-disclosure during the group experience itself are

Jiscussed.

Of especial importance is the here-and-now honesty of what is hap-

?ening to oneself and how one stands in relationship to the other participants
foring the group interaction.
(8)

Self-disclosure: "story" and "history." It is argued that humanistic

self-disclosure is not a mere recital of actuarial data, no matter how intimate
they might be.

(9)

The degree of disclosure in the group.

achieve different levels of self-disclosure.
the depth of disclosure are reviewed.
control.

(10)

Different groups

Some of the factors determining
Labeling ~ ~ form of behavioral

It is hypothesized that self-disclosure can be used as an effective

behavioral control device.

It is then called "labeling," a term borrowed from

Dollard and Miller (1950) to describe a process somewhat different
(11)

The dangers of self-disclosure.

fru1:1

theirs.

Finally, some of the dangers of self-

revelation, especially self-revelation in a group situation, are reviewed.
However, it is suggested that these dangers can be minimized or even eliminated,
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that the potential advantages of self-disclosure will outweight its paten-

tial disadvantages.

This is not to deny, however, that self-disclosure always

entails a certain degree of risk...Interaction Goals
In contrast to the T-group in which there is an "absence of any prearrange
or externally assigned task" (Benne, 1964a, p. 217), the contract group imposes
certain tasks on its members.

The impact-value of the traditional T-group lies

in its members search for viable goals and effective modes of interrelating.
The impact of the contract group, on the other hand, lies in the specific kinds
of interactions to which its members subscribe.

The provisions of the contract

dealt with so far--the concept of the contract itself, group goals, the laboratory nature of the group experience, leadership, and the elements of dialogue-have, to a large extent, specified attitudes that group members are expected to
adopt and the structures of group process.

Interaction goals, however, deal

more specifically with the kinds of interaction that are expected to take place
in the group.

These interactions flow from the attitudes and the structures

which have already been dealt with.

The participants, then, are expected to

engage in self-disclosure, for this is one of the provisions of the contract.
But the self-disclosure engaged in must be made relevant to the here-and-now,
and it must be done in cooperation with (rather than opposition to) other members.

That is, all the interactions to be discussed in this and the following

chapters must reflect the attitudinal and structural aspects of the contract

'
I

which have already been discussed.

Self-disclosure, then, is one of the inter- ,

. actional means of "operationalizing" (March

&

Simon, 1958) the

ovcrridin~

goa1
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of the group.

If self-disclosure, as outlined in this chapter, is effectively

engaged in, then this ..!.§_, in part, interpersonal growth.

SELF-DISCLOSURE:

A BASIC STEP TOWARD GROWTH

All the participants in the contract group must agree to engage in some
degree of self-disclosure; they must make some efforts to reveal the "person
·•ithin" to the other members of the group.

Self-disclosure is cardinal in

growth groups, pivotal in the sense that many of the "good things" that happen
in such groups happen because of self-disclosure.
~hich

In non-contract groups in

interpersonal or personal psychological growth is at least an implicit

goal, a good deal of the group's activity, especially in earlier sessions,
deals with formulating policy with respect to self-disclosure. "I'm not so sure
how far I can go,"
group here,"

"I am beginning to wonder whether we are starting a therapy

"Boy that (some disclosure made by one of the participants) was a

bomb; how are we going to handle that?" -- these and similar statements are
"contract talk" referring principally to self-disclosure.

The prospect of re-

vealing oneself .is unsettling and must be approached gradually in such groups.
The group must first decide whether self-disclosure is a value or not, at least
for !hi§_ group in these circumstances.

Or, while many of the members of such

groups might realize that it has a value in human living and even in this groupi
they need time to get used to this idea, or time to decide how to approach such
a dangerous undertaking, or time, perhaps, to screw up the courage needed to
talk about oneself.

In tpe contract group the person must make most of these

decisions before he enters the group or at least at the time that the contract
is imposed.

Self-disclosure in the contract group ..!!!_a value.

The rest of thi~
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·?ter is an attempt to explain why it is a value and how it may be approached

:· :!le group.
:~~elf"

Lynd (1958) says that "a person who cannot love cannot reveal

(p. 241) •

The contrary also seems to be true: the person who cannot

:·.cal himself cannot love.
~~

:

If this is true, then the question of self-disclo-

is intimately associated with interpersonal growth.

The assumption in this

:· i:ement is that responsible self-disclosure is a kind of royal road of commun: .... This sharing of the human condition - in its sublimity, banality, and de~ ~ity

U

- pulls people together.

Deception and Concealment

..2.§..

Pathogenic .Q.!. Growth-Stifling

Mowrer's position. In a series of publications (e.g. 1950a, 1950b, 1952a,
' '2b, 1953a, 1953b, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1968a, 1968b)
~ '··rer

has elaborated a theory concerning the etiology of emotional disturbance.

?

'•rer is constantly re-thinking his position, so that what started out to be a

t

·2ory of psychopathology is being modified, complemented, and expanded to such

'~

extent that a coherent interpersonal theory of man is beginning to emerge.

~:ch of what Mow.rer says deals directly or d.ndirectly with the problem of selfH:losure.
Mowrer (1968a) places himself in the camp of "third-force" psychology.

'.

' ::1

is both free and responsible.

To a large extent he can fashion his own

· .stiny, and need not be just a simple product of his heredity (force I) and
.s environment (force II).

Or, from a different viewpoint, neither Freudian

:;choanalytic theory (force I) nor Watsonian and Pavlovian behaviorism (force
::) • separately or in combination, provide an adequate working model of man.
sees Adler (Adler, 1964; Ansbacher, 1967; Dreikurs, 1950) as. having "antici-
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?ated both aspects of contemporary Third-Force psychology:

the emphasis on vol

!tion, individual choice and responsibility, and the emphasis upon man's irrev.'cable need for community, that is.,_ deep communion and identification with one's
~ellow

men" (Mowrer, 1968a, p. 9).
Mowrer turns to Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966) for a conceptual or struc-

:ural model of man-in-community, man's interactions with himself and his fellows.

For Pratt and Tooley, all social relations represent "contractual trans-

Jctions."

All of life is a patterning of contractual arrangements which men

:ake with themselves and with others, so that contracts become the "instrumen:alities" for both the creation and the exchange of values among men.

"These

tontracts may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, unilateral or
[ultilateral, voluntary or coercive.
cnal and social life.

Men~

They constitute the warp and woof of per-

their contracts" (Pratt & Tooley, 1966, p. 882).

· '.uch of psychopathology, then, can be conceptualized in contractual terms:
'Psychological and psychosocial disorders are conceptualized as personal-social,
:ontract-system disorders, contract crises, contract conflicts. distorted or
Jn ti-social contracts, contract deficity, contract stress-and-strain, inade:;uate or immature contract system development" (p. 882).
1 lso

depicted as a contract function:

Self-actualization is

"The ideal is authentic competence in th

::ajor contract spheres of liv;f.ng" (1966, p. 882).
The first step on the road to emotional disturbance, then, is some kind
'f mismanagement of contractual life.

A man may

overcommit himself, he may

.:ndercommit himself, and he may "cheat" on the commitments that he has made
~fowrer, 1968a).

The selfish person is someone who is overcommitted· to himself

~d undercommitted to others.

He is either irresponsibly out-of-community
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1

e.g., the miserly recluse) or he is irresponsibly in-community (e.g., the per-

1 _in who must always have "his way" when he is with others).

A person may mis-

::..inage his contractual life in a seemingly endless variety of ways, and no man'
:ife is enti!ely free of contractual failure.
~efined

in terms of contractual failure itself.

Emotional disturbance may be
Thus the sociopath, either in

·?ecific area of life or more generally, disregards the contractual structure o
interpersonal living.

He makes his own rules.

Contract mismanagement, then, is man's first mistake.
in a sense worse than the first.

The second mistake i

If a man fails to fulfill a contract, but ad-

-cits that he has failed, and tries to make restitution, he can usually avoid
~motional
~en

trouble.

This, however, is not the course which all men follow.

Som

fail to live up to their contractual obligations and then try to conceal

their failures both from themselves and from others.
a way of life.
genie.

Deception, then, becomes

Mowrer sees this refusal to face up to the ''what-is" as patho-

It is a break with reality, and breaking with reality is the warp and

woof of emotional disorder.
In his writings Mowrer contends that this refusal to "confess" one's misbehavior, at least to the "significant others" in one's life, often leads to emotional disorder.

Re tentatively divides the usual symptoms associated with

emotional disturbance into two types (Mowrer, 1967)

Type I symptoms are the

agonies usually associated with emotional disturbances of one kind or another:
•e.g., tension, anxiety, depress.ion, loss of appetite, fatigue, loneliness, phobias, scrupulosity, sense of unreality, hypochondriasis,etc.

He sees these

.->'\'

symptoms as discomforts ··arising from deviant behavior, contractual failures.
These symptoms are usually involuntltry, mediated by the autonomic nervous sys-
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tem.

Yet they are potentially sueful in that they aim at motivating the suffer

er to change his life-style, to get at and do something about the contract disorders underlying them.

Type IJ_ symptoms are the means, usually ineffectual,

that the sufferer uses to try to handle Type I symptoms.

They are attempts to

escape the pain rather than attempts to get at its roots: withdrawal, suicide,
rationalization, blaming others, self-pity, busy-ness, overeating, abuse of sex
day-dreaming, intoxicants, tranquilizers., etc.

Type II symptoms are disabling,

because they prevent the sufferer from moving in the right direction.

They are

"home remedies" of various types either chosen by oneself or suggested by · · ,
others.

Though they may bring temporary relief, they do not get at the root of

the problem.
worse.

Since they are delaying tactics, they ultimately make things

Both Type I and Type II symptoms are "muted confessions," they are sign

of a person's inability or refusal to involve himself responsibly. in his contractual obligations.

Mowrer is not the first to recognize the potentially

pathogenic nature of secrecy.

In his writings (e.g., 1964, 1968b) he uses ex-

amples drawn from literature of the therapeutic value of "confession." Harper
(1959) notes that "the personal privacy, the hidden subjectivity, of various

i

aspects of neurosis can be removed by talk alone (even if the talk is devoid
of insight into causation and does nothing other than expose the problem to
objective discussion), and sometimes the emotional disturbance loses its power
With its privacy."

Mowrer probes further into the "why" of the pathogenic

nature of such privacy.
In his earlier writings, Mowrer refers to the process he instituted to help
those with emotional problems as "integrity therapy."

Recently he has tended

to drop the term "therapy" and substitute "training" for various reasons.
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,:<

of all, the term "therapy" implies illness, but, generally, Mowrer does no

the emotionally disturbed as "sick" in the usual sense of the word.

He does

: : : reject biochemical approaches to psychopathology, but he is wary of their .
. ·irextension:
We are not here holding that organic or biochemical anomalies do not
reflect themselves in the sphere of human functioning; and in this
sense and to this extent, the so-called medical model is highly adqquate and relevant. The danger lies in possible over-extension of
the model •••• To the extent that mental and emotional suffering have a
viochemical basis, their elimination or amelioration is a merciful
boon to all humanity. But where suffering i~ the consequence of
behavioral malfunctioning, it has motivational, educational work to
do, and its chemical counteraction is clearly not indicated. We have
yet to determine the dividing line between the organic and the functional, and the argument advanced in this paper is offered primarily
as a means of conceptualizing emotional problems with a beh&vioral
and interpersonal, rather than a strictly organic, biochemical basis
(1968a, pp. 37-38) •
:condly, Mowrer's groups are actual "training-grounds" for more effective inlcrpersonal living.

1'th
ty,

I had experience with these groups in Galesburg, Illinois--

at Galesburg State Research Hospital with Mowrer himself and in the communThese groups were run according to a simple contract which was the basis

or entry.

The prospective participant was to agree (1) to "tell his story,"

~at is, to reveal the "unconfessed" deviant behavior that could possibly be at

~e root of his distrubance and to remain "confessionally current" as the group
f'JVed along·

(2) to assume responsibility for himself, that is, to stop blamin

tthers for :is problems and to ass1>11e the direction of his own life; and (3) to
tecome interested in and involved with the other members of the group.

The

r;roup formed a small community which became the vehicle of the redintegration
rts members into the other communities from which they had come, e.g., family,
reighborhood, church, job, etc.

Self-disclosure, however, was not the only or

0
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ven the most important group variable.

Once a person revealed himself, he was

.ext expected to discuss with the group what kind of "restitution" he was to

:.ake and how to go about it.

He ·-Was asked to review his contractual relation-

·hips with himself and with others, -especially with the "significant others" in
.is life and to start on a process of contractual re-adjustment, first within
he group and then in the· other groups to which he belonged.

I

The group produced some dramatic successes (as far as "success" could be
~asured

by clinical observation), but there were also the failures.

One of the

ources of the failures, I believe, was a "violation" of the "laws of the groups
.pelled on in this paper.

Too often the groups became places where individual

'therapy" or "training" took place in the presence of others.
.ot sufficiently encouraged to interact with one another.
hey dealt with their feelings towards one another.
·dealt with their feelings towards one another.

The members were

It was seldom that

It was seldom that they

Too much of what was revealed

ealt with the then-and-there, no attempts being made to make it relevant to
hese people in this group.

All in all,' the theory of the source of emotional

isturbance became so central that other conditons for effective interpersonal
nvolvement were overlooked.

While Mowrer's natural "feel" for what kind of in-

eraction should take place within a group made him an excellent group leader,
believe that he has underestimated the necessity a>f "teaching" effective group
rocess in the tvaining sessions.

I also have

some difficulty with a certain

arrowness in Mowrer's initial formulations concerning the etiology of emotional
isturbance, but this problem will be dealt with below.
Other approaches !.Q_ the relationship between openness

I·is not

~

growth.

Mowrer

alone in advocating complete openness in the therapeutic situation.
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~sychological

honesty or openness is a goal of almost every therapeutic ap-

?roach, but there is something distinctive about the "confessional" honesty

~emanded from the beginning by Mm.i;er., .· Mainord (1968) describes what he calls
"Therapy 1152--The Truth."

The prospective client must agree to a group con-

tract which is much like Mowrer's: (1) the patient must agree to be completely
open with the group.

1

(2) He must agree to accept total responsibility for all

l

; of his behavior all the time, twenty-four hours a day.

Responsibility here

: ::eans acting according to one's own ethical code.

Each patient must

I

.

(3)

j Jccept responsibility for every other patient in the program.

'

Mainord says

i

I

: that the first two conditions are usually accepted, but with a lack of under-

!

!
J

I

.

taking of the behavioral demands that these conditions will entail.

The

third condition, he says, is usually bewildering to the patient. In Mainord's
groups are much more "behaviorally" oriented than Mowrer's:
The group meetings are to be sources of new information,
and an avenue for feedback, for manipulation of consequences,
and even a place to learn skills in new modes of interaction, but
the truly important social environment will. never be .. some group
sharing a similar plight with reinforcements manipulated for the
patient's benefit. The appropriate social skills can never be
completely demonstrated in the therapeutic group, and only a
rigid adherence to the use of an external criterion makes it
possible to expect much generalization.
The group meeting should result in extracting new behaviors, but the crucial reinforcements can come only from the
environment (p. 33).

'.owrer, too, was beginning to

talk about a totally controlled hospital environ-

ent in which group work would be only a part of a total program.

l

Jourard .Q!!. concealment. Jourard (1964, 1968) has been investigating the

r:iplications of concealment and self-disclosure in a context which is much wider
·nd perhaps more positive than Mowrer' s.

He, like Mowrer, believes that con-

__________________________

,,....
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;~ 3 lment can "sicken."

The person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in one

, 1y or another, both to himself and to others must conceal his own identity.

l"e person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in . one way or another, both to
i ::.self and to others must conceal his own identity.

The energy that he pours

!:to concealment adds to his stress and dulls his awareness of his own inner
t1.?erience.

Whatever contact he makes with others is through a facade; a kind

1! rigidity or stereotype permeates his relationships with others.

I rd
I

Loneliness

depression are inevitable as part of the price for concealment, for the

r-~ncealer

is separate, apart, out-of-community.

The concealer thus increases

!

(::~e stress factors in his life and thus becomes susceptible to all sorts of -<. ~

I

/ickness, both physical and psychological.

I

r~s

But when Jourard talks like this, h

not describing just the neurotic or .the emotionally disturbed in general.

~~es this as the affliction of most men, at ·1east in our own society.

This lac

)f transparency is a major element in the "psychopathology of the average" that

fflicts the so-called "normal" personality of our time.

1

The more desperate

~he need to conceal, the greater the stress, and the more likely the occurrence

lf physical and psychological decompensation.
~pathogenic

''pathogenic secret."

secret. Ellenberger (1966) discusses the concept of the
Like Mowrer, he believes that the content of this secret

:ay be deviant behavior, but it is not limited to deviancy.

For instance, the

secret may deal with thwarted love, jealousy, or some physical infirmity.
~

"oes not always

~eal

It

with guilt and shame, but •it always hds hopelessness con-

:iected with it, a "no-exit" aspect.

Ellenberger claims that Moritz Benedikt

I

(1835-1920), a Viennese physician, was the first to deal systematically with

the pathogenic secret.

Benedikt cites instances of hysterical women who were

------------

,..,..--------------------------------------------------------......._...,,,,,.~.

.......
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:ured of their neurosis by confessing their pathogenic secrets and working out
related problems.
None of these men "prove" that··-Concealment in itself causes

emotional dis-

turbance and that self-revelation, even accompanied with restitution-behavior
in the case of deviancy, effects a cure.
~any

But it is undoubtedly true that in

well-documented cases deception and concealment have at least aggravated,

if not caused, emotional anguish and that "confession" of self-revelation,

often coupled with restitution-behavior, has led to dramatic improvement.

Self

disclosure of guilt and failure is certainly one of the principal patient variables in the psychotherapeutic process, just as concealment, as Jourard notes,
is an undeniable facet of "normal" living.
the factors within society and within
greater openness;

It is essentail, then, to review

the individual which mitigate against

Evidence concerning the deleterious effects of concealment

has always been with us;

it is only recently that men have begun to point a

scientific finger at this evidence.

But why is self-disclosure in such

disrepute?

Self-disclosure

.!!.!.£

Cultural Taboo.

There seem to be at least two forces in society that militate against
greater self-disclosure among its members: (1) a kind of cultural ban againtit
intimate self-disclosure, and (2) a society-wide cultivation of the "lie" as
a way of life.
Self-disclosure

~weakness.

The person who exhibits strength by "suffer-

ing in silence" has become a cultural stereotype in our socuy.

"Little bc,ys

don't cry" is an early version of the masculine ideal, ·and the woman who, in

275
1·e

• t)

fiction of radio, TV, or the novel, confesses that

11

I simply have to talk

someone" is really confessing, not a deep human need, but her own weakness,
...

-

r•·en though such weakness migP,t be understandable and even excused in a woman.
~!self-disclosure

is not weakness, then it is "exhibitionism, 11 and, as such, a

1:~gn of illness rather than a desire for htnnan communication.
.~!olescent,

Very often, the

in his discovery of himself and "the other, 11 engages in a good deal

r! self-disclosure. But this drive to exchange intimacies, even though it might

hve overtones, at times, of exhibitionism and other kinds of problematic beha1

I

r·ior, is usually not looked upon as the beginning of something that could be
l;uite sood--being at home in discussing oneself with significant others at an
:ntimate level (see White, 1964).

f

I

It is rather just that, adolescent behavior,

:aive and immature.

Such behavior will pass, just as the "natural neurosis" of

dolescence passes.

When the adult finds it necessary to communicate himself

~o

a friend, he often feels that he needs an excuse for such action.

"The

erson with a painful and perplexing personal problem is loath to ask a friend
to share the knowledge of it, and his friend is loath to encourage him to talk
it out" (Schofield, 1964, p. 160).

It is difficult for both of them, for there

is little cultural support for what they are doing.

Lynd (1958) goes further

nd maintains that the ban refers not only to "revelations of the inmost self"
ut to the revelation of the "central dynamics of society" itself (p. 231).
acist community is loath to have that aspect of its culture discussed.

A

Nom-

'nally non-racist communities sometimes engage in rather ludicrous startle and
denial behavior when the unpondered and unconfessed racist elements of this
culture are exposed and openly discussed.
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Mowrer has received a good deal of criticism for his views on the thera~eutic

value of "confession."

While much of what he has written and especially

the tone of his writing are not above criticism, it is still interesting to
listen to the "tone" of his critics as they focus in on the "confessional" aspects of his theories.

It is difficult not to see an element of "Thou-does-

protest-too-much" in this spontaneous "this-is-nonsense" style of criticism.
~uch

of this criticism, it seems, stems from unexamined cultural taboos against

self-disclosure.

The critic is speaking out, ritually as it were, the fears of

his society, the "central dynamics" of which have been challenged.

The medical model and cultural permission.

Even a society that is some-

•hat afraid of honesty cannot ban self-disclosure completely.

One person's

communicating himself intimately to another, especially in times of special
stress, is such a basic need that even a relatively closed society must find
ways of channeling such disclosure, must find cultural justification for it.

Freud was a courageous.man.

He took a bold step forward when he declared that

the revealing of intimacies about oneself was a medical act and, as such, was
perfectly justified in any society.

Society could hardly be recused of greeting

Freud's thesis with wholehearted approval.

Still, over the years, it has be-

come quite acceptable to reveal oveself to a doctor or to a psychologist or
counselor.

Intimate self-disclosure became justifiable as a medical act, or at

least as a para-medical act.
also its way of containing it:
Professional.

Society's way of allowing self-revelation was
it should take place between a client and a

Seeking therapy or counselling gives a person the cultural ex-

cuse he needs to establish a relationship in which he is free to tell any': [ting
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about himself.

But "therapy" implies illness and even counseling implies

"problems," so that, to a large extent, self-disclosure is till associated with
;.•eakness, if not illness or emotional disturbance.
The professional has become the traditional one to listen to and deal with
the intimate details of one's life because he is considered capable of understanding "what is behind" disturbing or uncontrolled behavior.
the one who can become the

cataly~t

At least he is

for understanding or insight, and insight

has long been considered the key to the control of behavior:.

The problem is

that we live in a day when both the medical model of emotional disturbance
(Szasz, 1961;

Werry, 1968; Sarbin, 1967) and the primacy of insight (London,

1964; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967) are being challenged more and more.
problems is the work "problem" or at least the work "solution."

One of th

It is true tha

::ien refer to disturbances in interpersonal living as "problems," and when they
come to mental health professionals, they are looking for "solutions."

Behav-

ioral scientists have more or less followed this "problem-solution" paradigm in
their approach to psychopathology.

But, while this paradigm is obviously well

suited to mathematics, it is not clear that it is generally applicable to human
relationships.

Too many people think that they have the "problem" and that the

professional has the "solution."

But impasses in interpersonal relationships

are more properly "transcended" than solved; that is, when two perple change
their attitudes and their ways of acting toward each other, when they communicate more freely with each other, areas of conflict dissipate or are transcende
e problem-solution paradigm is too neat and pat to fit the complexities of

uman interaction, especially the complexities of disturbed conununication.

The

person suffering conml\mication disturbances does not need a professional "solu-
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cion."
ver.

He needs experiments in cominunication, not someone to give him an ansThe professional is a professional, not because he has answers, but be-

cause he is creative, because he- can set up and evaluate these experiments in

communication.
Group therapy widened the scope of the cultural permission to reveal oneself.

One was now allowed to reveal himself to peers, provided that some pro-

fessional presided over the group interaction.

The present popularity of all

kinds of "sensitivity training" is a further breach in the wall.

People do not

want to have to declare themselves ill in order to involve themselves in com-

munication experiences analogous to those in group therapy, so they turn to
sensitivity training as a kind of "therapy for normals."

It is quite true that

the latest National Training Laboratories brochure asks prospective participant
not to look upon the various laboratories as psychotherapy or a substitute for
psychotherapy, and yet, for many, sensitivity training seems to afford a cultural permission to speak freely about themselves not unlike the permission
granted in group psychotherapy.

It seems that there are several different

"b rands II of sensitivity training and the question of "therapy for nonnals' I in a

laboratory setting is not an issue that has been settled even within the Nation
al Training Laboratories (e.g.,
Benne, 1964b; Frank, 1964).

W~~~hler, MasJ;rlk~

:and Tannenbaum, 1962;

The contract gro~p seems to take up a position

somewhere to the right of group psychotherapy and to the left of "traditional"
sensitivity training.
Privacy:

the pros,

~especially

the

~·

Much has been written on the

Value of and the individual's right to privacy (e.g., The Panel on Privacy and

.!

Behavioral Research, 1967).

Much heat has been generated in discussions con-
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:erning the tendency of the behavioral scientist to overstep his bounds in this
1

rea.

But the coin has two sides and Bennett (1967) takes a rather refreshing

:Jok at the obverse side:

Privacy ••• is a graceful amenity, generally to be fostered, but with
discriminating restraint and with due recognition of obligations as
well as privilege. It is the writer's contention that the moral imperative is more often allied with the surrender of privacy than with
its protection ••• Secrecy within the community is incompatible with
cooperation, inimical to the welfare and progress of the ingroup •••
Strictly speaking, of course, sex is not ordinarily a private experience, but a peculiarly delicate and intimate transaction between at
least two people. I submit that even in this sensitive area, more
serious problems stem from mismanaged connnunication about sex--partners who cannot discuss it, children who must not be told, and alienation of the deviate-than from mere breaches of privacy ••• The confessional is also respected as a confidential relationship. It should
be noted that this, too, is a communication; a revelation, in fact, of
the most private secrets to at least one other person ••• The reference,
in many religions, is to public confession. The Protestant sinner
must bear witness "before men 11 to achieve absolution. Indeed, it is
recognized in Catholic circles that the traditional confessional,
intent on making peace with God, leaves unresolved the problem of
making peace with the connnunity ••• The readiness of people to discuss
their personal problems with neighbors, and even strangers, makes one
wonder, in fact, whether confidentiality.is so necessary to the privacy of the patient as the comfort of the therapist. There are therapists who believe that the therapeutic process is facilitated in
the presence of an audience. The popularity of group therapy reflects a similar assumption that patients find help in sharing personal problems--that confession i~ good for the psyche as well as
the soul ••• The contemporary concern over privacy parallels a pervasive need to communicate ••• Our dilennna will not be resolved by
hiding away from each other in separate caves, but through more and
more interpersonal communication, better managed ••• The critical
problem we face is not how to keep secrets from each other but how
to facilitate this readiness to communicate. The overriding question is how to maintain an atmosphere of trust and confidence which
will enable us to talk about personal affairs ••• freely •••• It is the
writer's conviction that the importance of honest communication in
our interdependent relationships outweighs the sanctity of privacy
as a social value ••• Anyone who undertakes to influence the lives of
other people must accept an obligation to let them know where he
stands, to reveal his motives, to share his purposes (pp. 371-376).
This entire article is worth reading.

Undoubtedly, many would take excep-
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might find difficult to respond to with honest self-examination and honest

txamination of the "dynamics" of society.

, I
;~ss

Jourard (1967) has already been mentioned as championing more openness,
secrecy, by means of a more honest experimenter-subject dialogue in behav-

! :ral research.
i

Sidowski (1966, p. 22)

discusses the "mutual distrust" between

hperimenter and subject that characterizes a good deal of behavioral research.

!

~~ener (1954) approaches the problem of secrecy in the context of a different

Lad of

research, but perhaps he, too, has hit on a principle that has wider

I

i
/;plication to the human enterprise than one might first suspect.

Wiener has

i
I aong reservations regarding the secrecy that surrounds research projects,

I

I;iecifically

.II·~ch

government research.

secrecy is uneconomic.

·ffort.

It is his contention that in the long run

Lack of connnunication leads to reduplication of

Thus, if the purpose of secrecy is, let us say, to gain time ·on an

·nemy in an area of research which will eventually yield its secrets anyway,

f

~'.ien

the price of secrecy is usually too high:

r comml.lllication would lead to.

rd Wiener

the loss of progress that great-

It seems that Mowrer, Mainord, Jourard, Bennett

are all saying, though from different points of view, that there is a

:endency in society to look upon secrecy and privacy as values in themselves,
[
,·ven

though in the long run they may be self-defeating.

:he loss imagined to stem from revelation is imaginary.

In many areas of life,
The amount of energy

':-:Pended in keeping the secret and "encoding" it -- the neurotic may be consid-

f

rred to "encode II his secrets in his symptoms -- is too costly and ill spent.
1·

( much more costly than revelation.

Just as secrecy is often considered a

j"'alue in itself, so revelation is considered as an evil

~n

itself.

We have

j:earned to fear self-disclosure as self-destructive, so that few of us are

I
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~eady

to examine the possibility of its having constructive consequences.

,ocietv and Truth
In a study by Kohn (1959) in which middle-class and working-class parents
~ere

asked to select the three characteristics most desirable in a ten- or ele-

1en-year-old child, the top-rated choice was honesty,

This may or may not

point to some fundamental drive for truth and honesty, at least in these seg.:ents of the population, but whether it does or not, there is some question as
o both the availability and the social desirability of truth.
Psychoanalysis £!!. the availability of truth. The widespread impact of psyhoanalysis on society, or at least on some segments of society, is undeniable.
'very educated man has some knowledge, however distorted, of psychoanalytic
~heory.

Psychoanalysis has opened up (at least some would say so) whole new

"1stas in the domains of history (e.g., Erikson's
~iterature.
~ometimes

~arely,

Young~

Luther, 1958) and

Comedians find in it an almost limitless source of humor, their wit

adding to already distorted conceptions, and sometimes, though more

laying bare the very marrow of some Freudian insight.

There is no intention here to mount an attack against psychoanalysis, but

it does not seem out of place to suggest a hypothesis pertinent to the question'
bf self-disclosure.

One of the perhaps not too subtle messages of psychoanalysi ~

-whether this be the "fault" of the theory or those who exercise the right of
Private inte:n>retation in variegated exposures to the theory--is that truth is
not a commodity that is readily available.
lot what they seem to be.

Things, especially human things, are

Much of the "really real," to borrow a phase from

~lato, is a below-the-surface phenomenon; it is a source which is not easily
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:apped, however good the intentions of the searcher might be.

:ands free association rather that or at least in

addit~on

The analyst de-

to the revelation of

the intimate details of the patient's life, for the latter is not as significan
ly revealing as the former (Munroe, 1955, p. 38). Therefore, it would seem that

psychoanalysis is one of the forces contributing to a kind of "tacit understanding"~~in

society that man is relatively incapable of telling the truth about

:iimself, of revealing the deepest sources within himself.
Nor is such a view restricted to psychoanalysis.

Thorne (1955) claims tha

the individual is never able or willing to reveal what is really important abou
!1imself.

"Nothing should be taken at face value in eliciting facts concerning

the life record" (p. 116).

It seems to be something other than strong addic-

tion to empiricism that leads him to say: "Actually, no statement or behavior
pattern should be taken at face value, whether the person is normal or abnormal,
except with confirmatory evidence from external sources" (Thorne, 1950, p. 134) •
. owrer has been heavily criticized for his sharp attacks on psychoanalytic
theory.

However, I would suggest that at least part of Mowrer's intuitive dis-

taste for psychoanalysis arises from the more or less philosophical position of
that theory that man is unable to tell the truth about himself.
nition of man that Mowrer finds intolerable.

It is a defi-

It is a philosophical position

that affects man's appraisal of himself and his communication with others.
The cultivation of the lie.

While it may be assumed that many men in soci

ety have become more or less convinced that the deepest truths about themselves
are tmavailable, many others find a need to distort the truths that are available.

The fact that most men lie now and again is such a truism that, on a

widely used personality inventory, a confession to this effect is part of a

283
-.·alidity scale built in to the test (Hathaway & McKinley, 1942;
~ehl,
~o

1951).

Perhaps a less evaluative way of looking at validity scales is

say that they attempt to measure the defensiveness of the individual taking

the test.

The fact that most men lie now and then, however, is not the point

It is rather that we seem to live in a society that actually cultivates

~1cre.

f

Hathaway &

the lie, and does so in ways \ll\available to the generations that have preceded
Perhaps Alexander the Great and Caesar lied about their campaigns to their

~.

subjects at home.
tle.

But it seems undeniable that a good deal of the \ll\easiness felt in the

~·nited
'JS

This is a question that classicists and historians must set-

States today stems from the suspicion that ''they" are not really telling

the truth in many aras of nati.onal liveing.

Some critics are quite outspo-

'.:en in their condemnation of what they see as a lying generation •
••• This new generation of the Left hated the authority because
the authority lied. It lied through the teeth of corporation
executives and Cabinet officials and police enforcement officers and newspaper editors and advertising agencies, and in its
mass magazines, where the subtlest apologies for the disasters
of authority (and the neatest deformations of the news) were
grafted in the best possible style into the ever-open mind of
. the walking American lobotomy: the corporation office worker
and his high-school son (Mailer, 1968, pp. 83-84).
Lying in diplomatic circles is frequent enough, well documented enough, and
publicized enough to be considered axiomatic.

It could be the cause of a good

deal of hilarity were one not sober enough to interpret it in terms of devastating mistrust among individuals and communities.

Henry's (1963) comments on

the passion for truth in our culture· are certainly apropos:

"Most people are

not obsessive truth-seekers; they do not yearn to get to the bottom of things;
they are willing to let absurd or merely ambiguous statements pass" (p. 49).
One of the principal objects of his attack is the phenomenon of advertising:

.I
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The relaxed attitude toward veracity (or mendacity, depending
on the point of view) and its complement, pecuniary philosophy,
are important to the American economy, for they make possible an
enormous amount of selling that could not take place otherwise (p. 49).

I

One of the discoveries of the 20th century is the enormous variety of ways of compelling language to lie •••• We pay intellectual
talents high price to amplify ambiguities, distort thought, and
bury reality (p. 91).
:How. many men in our society are "outer-directed" (Riesman, 1950), their anten-

I!
I.
!

:1as high in the air in an attempt to pick up cues from society as to what they
~ay

and may not say?

Fromm sees men as considering themselves, their person-

alities, as a commodity to be "marketed" in society, and one wonders how much
deceit, falsification, and facade are indigenous to this marketing process.
The

poin~

of these remarks is not that psychoanalytic theory is wruthout

value (this would be absurd) or that twentieth-century western culture is neeessarily more addicted to both the blatant and the subtle lie than other cultures, past and present.

However, given the assumption that the kind of self-

disclosure required in the contract group has some interpersonal-growth value,
it is essential to face the fact that there are subtle and not-too-subtle forces
within society that militate against this kind of self-disclosure.

A deeper

awareness of these forces, it is hoped, will help facilitate the fulfillment of
the self-disclosure provision of the contract.
Intra-Individual Sources of Resistance
The flight from self-knowledge.

!_e.

Self-Disclosure

The problem-solution model of psychother-

apy which sees self-disclosure as a transmission of necessary information to thE
therapist so that he can work out a solution is so obviously inadequate that it
could be easily ignored, were it not for the fact that a certain percentage of

I

I
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clients, at least initially, subscribe to such a conception.

Stockpiling infor-

:ation about oneself with another s!Lmply does not . necessarily or ·automatically
lead to more effective emotional- adjustment.
~en

Unless the client begins to lis-

to himself in such a way that he begins to get into better contact with his

own experiencing (Gendlin, 1962), then he speaks on in vain.

Self-disclosure

is one of the principal ways, not only of communicating with others, but of

comnnmicating with oneself.

Perhaps the latter is even logically prior.

It is

assumed here that many men flee self-revelation because they fear this closer
contact with themselves.

"The human organism seems capable of enduring any-

thing in the universe except a clear, complete, fully conscious view of one's
self as he actually is" (Sherrill, 1945).

Self-disclosure both crystalizes and!

in a sense reifies aspects of the self that a person would rather live with silently--however painful the living--than face.

At least in this one aspect,

then, a group is only as threatening to a participant as he is to himself.
Inevitable it is the individual participant who is his own severest judge.
Jourard (1964) speaks out very strongly to this very poing •
••• When a man does not acknowledge to himself who, what, and how
he is, he is out of touch with reality, and he will sicken and
die; and no one can help him without access to the facts. And it
seems to be another empirical fact that no man can come to know
himself except as an outcome of disclosing himself to another person. This is the lesson we have learned in the field of psychotherapy. When a person has been able to disclose ·himself utterly to
another person, he learns how to increase his contact with his
real self, and he may then be better able to direct his destiny
on the basis of knowledge of his real self (p. 5).
When I say that self-disclosure is a symptom of personality
health, what I really mean is that a person who displays many of
the other characteristics that betoken healthy personality •••
whill also display the ability to make himself fully known to at
least one other significant human being ••• Neurotic and psychotic
symptoms might be viewed as smoke screens interposed between the
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i

I

patient's real self and the gaze of the onlooker.
the symptoms 'devices to:. avoid_ becoming known. '

f

l

We might call

A self-alienated person--one who does not disclose himself truthfully and fully--can never-love another person nor can he be loved
by the other person (p. 25).

l

~!uch

Ii

is being written about alienation and identity conflicts, with attempts

being made to establish both the social conditions and the interpersonal dynam-

I

ics of these problems.

I

from connnunication with himself.

Man's flight from himself is, in large part, a flight
Self-alienation is frightening, but any kind

of intimate contact with the "problem-self" is seen as even more frightening.
Self-alienation, then, becomes self-reinforcing, its ·"reward" lying in its
being, supposedly, less painful than its alternative.

Even when a person gets

out of contact with himself and with others to the degree that he flees to a
mental hospital, this is still no guarantee that he is ready to face himself.
Time and again in mental hospitals, when a patient is faced with the choice
between the pain of alientation and the pain of therapy, he chooses the former,
unable to find the courage to be.

Since a similar dynamic is seen as operative

in the. "psychopathology of the average," self-disclosure is stressed in the
interpersonal-growth contract.
Fear of intimacy. In dealing with patients in both individual and group
psychotherapy, I discovered another block to self-disclosure.

I
!

f

It is difficult

to reveal oneself on a deep level to another without creating, by the very act
of self-revelation, some degree of intimacy.

In a group situation, for some

reason or another, this intimacy has a special intensity.

The participants in

group psychotherapy and in other kinds of group growth-experiences are aware of
this, and even though they might have the courage to let others

•: the "myste
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Jf iniquity" or even the "mystery of goodness" that they. are, they cannot tolerate the intimacy that this act would create.

.

~

'

i

such.

They flee intimacy.

They do not flee self-revelatio

Meerloo (1956) believes that for many persons

fear of hwnan relations is greater than the fear of death. Berne's (1964) thesi

II

seems more apropos in our present culture.

i

timacy frightens many people.

I

avoid real intimacy.

The all too real possibility of in-

They prefer to skirt real self-revelation and to

They engage in sporadic acts of pseudo-self-revelation

leading to pseudo-intimacy in a "games" approach to human relationships.

=erely eschew self-revelation.
tralize its effect.
to time.

If it takes place by accident, they try to neu-

"Am I frightened?

It's quite normal."

Other

I suppose so.

Most men are from time

The obvious "message" here is "Don't probe."

Failed intimacy is another major dimension of the "psychopathology of the aver-

age."
Flight from responsibility.

In some cases flight from self-disclosure is

flight from responsibility, a flight from the anxiety and work involved in
constructive personal change.

Self-disclosure leads to·;the revelation of "area

of deficit" and "areas of aspiration" in human living.
to avoid both these areas in day-to-day living.
"reified,"

It is relatively easy

However, once these areas are

once a person ddares what he finds 'lmacceptable in himself and

what goals he thinks that he should be pursuing, he connnits himself to change,

and avoidance behavior becomes more painful.
It

Self-disclosure commits one to

conversion," to the process of re-structuring one's life; it demands that a

Person leave the security of his own house and journey into a foreign land, and
most men balk at that,

If one senses that "conversion" is impossible, then

self-disclosure must be avoided.

So it is assumed that some men fear or even

,-------------------------------------------------------2-8_8_________,
~eprecate

self-disclosure because of the behavioral consequences it entails.

lf the self-revelation takes place in a group, then the pressure to change is

even greater than in a one-to-one- situation, for there is the necessity of
facing the pressures and demands of a "commtm.ity."
In the mental hospital it is common enough to run into patients who would

I

like to be better adjusted, if adjustment could be effected through some kind
of magic.

Popular forms of magic are:

just being in the hospital, drugs,

getting other people to change, getting the "answer" from the professionals,
the hope for spontaneous remission, etc.

In this sense, it seems not \lllfair to

say that a certain percentage of mental patients actually choose their illness.

Some will argue that it is the function of the therapist to motivate the

pa~

tient, that if the patient does not want to participate in some therapeutic
program, he should be taught to appreciate the program and its potential benefits.

So much of psychotherapeutic theory and technique is predicated on the

assumption that the patient wants to be cured.
be all theory, method, technique.
tion of 'motivation.

In the academic setting, it can

In the mental hospital, it is often a ques-

If a person "chooses" to be "mentally ill, 11 how much money

and energy should society pour into convincing him that he really wants to be
well and that he should decide to undertake an arduous program of psychotherapy
This problem is not as serious in private practice.
most likely is actively seeking therapy.

First of all, the patient

Secondly, there is the selection fac-

tor: the "best candidates" for therapy are often chosen, and part of the definition of "best" is "well-motivated."
general

Psychotherapy and growth-experiences in

.
can be proffered, in many different ways

and repeatedly.

Part of the

"proffering" may even be a hospital ward behavioral reinforcement program
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e.g., Ayllon & Ayllon, 1959; Ayllon & Haughton, 1962; Ayllon & Azrin, 1964),
~csigned to help the regressed patient· achieve, if possible, a state of inte-

,ration and "contact" sufficient to elicit from the patient some kind of cues
~ndicating

that he "wants" to be cured.

Beyond a certain point, however, the

.. atient must himself opt for health .and the work involved in striving for it.
Mowrer's (1968b) contract intimates that self-disclosure is part of the
sychotherapeutic "work," but that it is not enough.

Self-disclosure is the

relude to behavioral change, especially self-initiated behavioral change s.
~ainord' s

(1968) contract implicitly demands a great deal of behavioral change,

though he admits that the patient is somewhat unsuspecting when he agrees to
:ontractual terms that do not appear to be excessively difficult.
~roup

also demands behavioral change.

~reater

openness.

The contract

The change directly contracted for is

But it is only fair to warn the person who intends to be ope

about himself that this has behvaioral consequences beyond the group.
Anderson (1964) proposes the thesis that at least some of men's emotional
roblems have their toot, not in guilt, but in "grandiosity."
are filled with feelings of "entitlement."
ay to resentment.

Men, she says,

When they are frustrated, they give

This grandiosity also underlies feelings of helplessness.

J

lbe "helpless" person is one who cannot reach a preconceived degree of perfec-

l

tion in some area or who cannot get others to behave as they should.
ride is subtle and insinuates itself into all areas of life.

This

This thesis is

interesting and perhaps pertinent to flight from self-disclosure.

There is in

.. est men a rather deeply embedded desire to change first, if they think that
they must change at all, and then present themselves as changed to others--in
the case at point, to the group.

Anderson would recognize this as false inde-
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;endence.

Perhaps there are some changes that demand a group, a community of

some kind.

There are some things that either cannot be done outside of com-

:unity or are done much more effectively in community.
~ot

just a surrender to dependence, to admit this.

It takes humility, and

Group experience .is not an

abdication bf autonomy, but it is a potent vehicle of change.

However, a man

will reveal himself to the group only to the extent that he wants to change.
The reverse halo-effect. Another source of fear in self-revelation could
~e

termed the "reverse halo-effect."

The halo-effect refers to the fact that

a person, judged to be competent or outstanding in a particular area, will also
likely to be judged to have a similar degree of competence in other areas.

If

A is an expert in psychology, this aura of expertise tends to spread to other
areas and either he or others begin to look upon his pronouncements in theology
or political science with the same awe.
self-disclosure in growth groups.

The reverse process sometimes stifles

The group member fears self-disclosure be-

cause he usually thinks first in terms of disclosing the worst in himself.

If

he tells the other members about incompetence in one area of living, he feels
that they will assume similar incompetence or irresponsibility in related or
even unrelated areas.

If a person admits problems in his private life, he

fears that others will assume incompetence in his professional life.

This is

especially true if the person's profession is closely related to human living,
e.g., psychology.

There are several ways of handling this in the group.

The

participant can ·try to give a balanced view of himself, speaking alternately of
.

strengths and weaknesses.

Or the group can take up the problemof the

halo-effect" and discuss it directly.

II

reverse

The reverse halo-effect brings up the
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?roblem of stereotyping and categorizing. No one likes to be dealt with as
''problem," but there is a tendency in groups to identify the participants with
cheir problems in living, for it-is easier to deal with problems than with per-

sons.
that

I

Self-disclosure in the contract group should be in dialogue-disclosure,
is, the participants should reveal themselves gradually in dialogue with

one another and not allow themselves to fix on one person, even those his problems differ from those of the rest of the group.

'

These, then, are some of the reasons why people tend to avoid self-disclosure.

As Shaffer and Shoben (1956) note:. "One of the hindrances to successful

counseling is that it depends on discussing the very things that the client is
least inclined to discuss ••• " (p. 529).

And yet, willingness to engage in

self-exploration, which certainly involves self-revelation, is central to the
growth process. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) review the evidence for such a statement:
A number of studies have explored what it is that successful
patients do in therapy. There is a great deal of convergence .upon
the patient's intrapersonal or self-exploratory experiences. Using
a variety of indices of constructive behavioral and personality
change, Truax (1961) fotmd significantly more depth of self-exploration ••• in successful than in unsuccessful cases of hospitalized
schizophrenics. Truax and Carkhuff (1963) reviewed results indicating relatively clear-cut findings that the greater the degree
of patient engagement in the deep intrapersonal or self-exploratory
process, the greater the degree of constructive personality changes
in the patient. Further analysis indicated that even during initial stages of psychotherapy (the second interview), the level of
patient self-exploration was significantly predictive of final
outcome ••• Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler (1960) report similar findings in a study of client-centered counseling. Their data indicated that patients with successful outcome tended to explore
themselves more in the course of psychotherapy, whereas patients
who could be classified as therapeutic failures showed little
self-exploration and emotional involvement. In a more specific
study of client-centered counseling, Braaten (1961) found that
measures of self-reference and 'private self' differentiated

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _" " " " '_ _ _ _ _ _ _" ' ' " " '
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successful from unsuccessful counseling cases (pp. 372-373}.
It is hypothesized here that such openness will be of equal benefit to non-

psychiatric populations.
~

and Self-Disclosure

In a study by Talland and Clark (1954}, clients judged the therapeutic
value of fifteen topics discussed during counseling.
~ent

as to the relative value of the topics.

There was general agree-

Ratings showed a high correlation

between the perceived helpfulness of a topic and its "disturbing" qualities.
The topic called "shame and guilt" was experienced as extremely upsetting, but
the discussion of this area of life during counseling sessions was considered
to be very helpful.

A group of psychologists also rated the same fifteen top-

ics for their "intimacy,"
the clients.

that is, the degree of personal significance for

There was a high correlation between what the psychologists

deemed "intimate" and what the clients judged to be helpful.
are household items in human living.

Guilt and shame

It would be impossible to deal adequately

with self-disclosure without treating of them.

They will be treated separately

guilt in this section, shame in the next.
The many faces of guilt.

The psychological literature, especially the

literature dealing with theoretical formulations, is filled with references to
guilt and guilt feelings (e.g., Cameron, 1963; Erikson, 1963; London & Rosenthal, 1968; Lynd, 1958; May, 1958).

Guilt and anxiety are often related.

For

instance, Lowe's (1964) work with a guilt scale compiled from MMPI items indicates that anxiety and guilt are highly related phenomena.

Levitt (1967) sug-

gests taht individuals with high anxiety-proneness are given to stronger guilt

h
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feelings or ot more easily provoked guilt feelings.

He suggests that anxiety

and guilt are really not separate constructs, but that guilt is simply another
form

of anxiety.

Mowrer (1968b) sbggests that poorly handled guilt leads in-

evitably to increased anxiety.
with a number of species.
~hether

The problem is that guilt seems to be a genus

Guilt as a genus implies violation-of-standard,

the standard be real or imagined, and some kind of perception of this

violation on the part of the violator, whether this perception be· "clear~_ana ·
distinct, 11 vague, or even "mi.conscious. 11

The species of guilt differ depending

on the kind of standard violated and/or the kind of perception

involved.

species of guilt that seem relevant to the discussion may be termed:
existential, pseudo- (or conventional).

The

moral,

It is the contention of the writer

that hidden guilt, of any kind, is a potential source of psychological trouble
and that one of the most effective ways of handling guilt is self-disclosure.
Self-disclosure is related, though in different ways, to the "therapy" of all
species of guilt.
(a) Moral guilt.

Moral guilt refers to a willful violation of some moral

or ethical or contractual standard that a person holds,
explicitly.

either implicitly or

If A, realizing that it is a violation of his norms of conduct,

steals money from B, then he becomes the subject of moral guilt.

Ethical value

systems differ from culture to culture, and even from individual to individual;
that is, both individual and cultural subjectivity enter somewhat into the
determination of a particular value system.

AI.most everyone, however, has some

kind of value system or, from the viewpoint of Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966), a
network of contracts with

~elf,

others, and society at large.

If the network

itself is either non-existent or deficient, one is considered "ill" in whatever
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;ense the psychopathic or antisocial personality may be considered ill.

It is

~ot

necessary for a person to reflect explicitly on the contractual nature of

~is

relationships.

By merely existing as a human being, by entering into rela-

tionships with others, and by living in society, one assumes contractual responsibilities.

When a person, more or less knowingly and willfully, violates

one or more of these contracts, he becomes the subject of moral guilt.
It is of course Mowrer's (1964, 1968a, 1968b) thesis that the complexus-contract-violation-behav!or, followed by concealment and failure in restitution
behavior--is pathogenic.

"Confession," especially when coupled with restitu-

tion, seems, at least generally, to deprive, contract violations of their
potentially pathogenic power.

Since value systems usually deal with social

relationships, a violated value usually implies a break in human relationships.
The guilty person is who, by his behavior, has gotten "out-of'cotmnunity."
Recognition and revelation of this behavior is a step toward getting back into
community.

Many people would say that this is good common. sense: at least it

seems to be a very good working hypothesis.

However, attempts should be made

to test this hypothesis in various ways, though it is evident that experimentation in this area would be quite difficult.
this hypothesis.

There are apparent exceptions to

For instance, some people brag about exploits that others

would consider to be contract violations.

In defense of the hypothesis, how-

ever, such behavior might not be the exception that if first seems to be, for

(1) the deviant behavior is "confessed," that is, it is externalized in the
community, and (2) those who engage in such behavior misght not see it as a
Violation of any contract.
levels of society.

Different contractual systems exist at different

It is enough to know this fact without entering into the
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question of the relative merits of each contractual system.

ThereDore, what

seems to be "contractual unawareness" might merely reflect cultural and individual variations, ignorance, or, ·if the deviation· is significant, the "illness"
of the anti-social personality.

Tournier (1962) calls moral guilt "value" guilt,
a decision of the self against the self.
objective, or social" guilt.
~ith-others.

It arises, he says, from

Becker (1966) calls it "realistic,

It is a falling short of the requirements of life

He, too, admits that cultural differences are important in the

determination of such guilt.

Others see the whole question of moral guilt as

an unfortunate mixing of theology with psychology.

Terms like "guilt," "self-

disclosure," "confession," "restitution," "contract," and the like are considered too "moralistic" to be dealt with in a behavioral science.
case, I would have to disagree with them.

If this is the

Secrets concerning past moral failur

ay well be contemporary determinants of behavior if they divert energy
putting up a facade and keeping it in good repair.

into

Undoubtedly,

of Mowrer' s critics are disturbed by the fact that he'·refers to man's moral
at all.

However, one criticism of Mowrer does seem justified.

It is

isturbing that Mowrer, at least in his writings published to date, deals
xclusively with moral guilt.

d.L:";:,;t

At least this is often the tone of his writings.

is position is reductionistic in that he tends to reduce most, if not all,
eurotic guilt to moral guilt, and in the process ignores both existential and
harisaical guilt.

Perhaps it is not that Mowrer says too much, but rather

little.
(b)

Existential guilt.

It is also asstnned here that self-revelation gets

another kind of guilt that is just as pervasive as moral guilt.

Existential
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,r ontological guilt deals with "failed-potentialities."

From the very fact

that we are human, there stand before us any number of "possibilities" in the
Jrganic process that we call human--life and growth.

It is quite obvious that

a man cannot choose and fulfill all the "possibilities" or "potentialities" in
~is

life.

But the fact that he allows too many possibilities to slip by, that

he chooses poorly among the possibilities that are at :·.hand-this is the source

I

I

of existential guilt.

May (1958) follows Medard Boss (1957) in his treatment

of this species of guilt:

If, as Boss puts it, we 'forget being' --by failing to bring
ourselves to our entire being, by failing to be authentic, by
slipping into the conformist anonymity of das Man--then we
have in fact missed our being and are to that extent failures.
'If you lock up potentialities, you are guilty against ••• what
is given you in your origin, in your "core"' (p. 53).
Failed-potnetiality can take a number of forms, both intrapersonal and interpersonal:
••• We can be as guilty by refusing to accept the anal, genital,
or any other corporeal aspects of life as the intellectual or
spiritual aspects.

l

I

t

We have cited only one form of ontological guilt, namely,
that arising from forfeiting on's own potentialities. There
aer other forms as well. Another, for example, is ontological
guilt against one's fellows, arising from the fact that since
each of us is an individual, he necessarily perceives his fellow
man through his ownlimited and biased eyes. This means that he
always to some extent does violence to the true picture of his fel~
low man and always to some extent fails fully to understand
and meet the other's needs. This is not a question of moral
failure or slackness--though it can indeed by greatly increased
by lack of moral sensitivity. It is an inescapable result of
the fact that each of us is a separate individuality and has
no choice but to look at the world through his own eyes. This
guilt, rooted in our existential structure, is one of the most
potent sources of a sound h\llllility and an unsentiment'al attitude
of forgiveness toward one's fellow men (p. 54).
This lack of interpersonal sensitivity can be considered as "forfeiting one 1 s
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:-.m potentialities," for it is a question of failed-potentiality in the area

I

Jf interpersonal living.

Clark (1967) makes a distinction between existential guilt and existential

~

-~I-

i

'

!

t

I

hame, but the notion of failed-potentiality underlies both:

5

Buber has shown (1965, pp. 121-148) that existential guilt is the
guilt of not having affirmed another, of not having answered another's plea for community, of not having entered an I-Thou relationship. Existential guilt, then, is clearly an important determinant in one's coming to value and create relation, for such
guilt can often be expiated only by the establishment·-. of relation
in the here and now.
Existential shame, on the other hand, is the shame of not
experiencing nneself as an actor, as a creator, as--to use Bugentals 's term (1965, pp. 203-208)--an 'I -process.' We experience
existential shame as we are aware of having reated ourselves only
as recipients of power and not also as expressors of it (p. 256).
Dealing with existential shame and guilt seems to be a function of a growthexperience or "therapy for normals."

If this is the case, then Clark sees

sensitivity training as precisely this kind of experience:

"This kind of

experience people in sensitivity training groups have is one which is designed
better than any other I know of to allow for the experiencing of both existential guilt and existential shame, and both are manifestly important for man to
experience" (p. 256).
What are the "standards" violated in existential guilt?

They cannot be

contractural standards, for violation of contract leads to moral guilt.

In

many of the contracts that define a person's life, there is what "must" be done
or not done, if the contract is to remain integral.
the fullness of the contract.

Beyond that, however, lies

Scholastic philosophers make a distinction be-

tween~ (to be), the bare existence of something, and its bene ~(to be

Well or fully), the perfection of its being.

In marriage, for instance, the
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I
I

!

iarties must not commit adultery, the husband. usually must support his wife,

;

?utting them into more intimate contact with each other, with themselves, and
.-ith

others (children, friends, etc.), then it is a question of the bene

Jfmarriage.

~

Living out this potential seems to be related to a kind of quasi0

contract tha t a person has with himself, to what he demands of himself with
respect to the bene

~

of the marriage.

It is no longer a question of ful-

fillment or non-fulfillmertt, it is rather a question of degree.
uilt refers to the bene

I

I

~of

Existential

living.

Men do experience existential guilt.

Everyone carries the burden of failed

otentiality, in the pursuit of a career, in interpersonal relationships, even
nplay and creative enjoyment.

But few men discuss failed-potentialities.

e contract group and growth groups in general afford an excellent opportunity

i

o reveal and discuss areas of failed-potentiality.

However, entering a sen-

itivity group, or especially a contract group, may increase the risk of adding
0

one's store of existential guilt.

Once it becomes clear that the provisions

f the contract, such as self-disclosure and expression of feeling, are "possi-

ilities" for growth, then a refusal to participate in these experiences will
nly add to one's existential guilt.
ailed-potentiality.

The group experience becomes just one more

Such failure can produce a real sense of diminishment.

(c) Pseudo- .£!:. neurotic guilt.

This guilt, which Tournier (1962) calls

'functional", and which Becker (1966) refers to as "fantastic," is usually conidered to be the domain of professionals dealing with emotional disturbances.

-....._-.--------------------------------------------------------------------
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::i1s kind of guilt has a number of subspecies or at least it can be expressed
~:1

;

quite different ways.

Some psychotics think or feel that they have com-

~

:itted the "unforgiveable sin," when they have not done anything very reprei

[ ~ensible.

Some neurotics think they are "rotten," though they do not speak of

{

I

or even know of any particularly egregious. contract-violations in their lives.
I prefer to refer to this kind of guilt as "pseudo-guilt" rather than "neuro-

tic," for (1) its analog is also foi.md in psychotic patients, and (2) "pseudo-"

implies that (a) there has been no real violation of standard, there has been
no relevant instance of contract-violation, although the "guilty" party insists
that there has been or at least "feels" that there has been, or (b) there has
been some kind of contract violation, but the individual's reaction is out of
proportion.

Stern (1954) reco\lllts a case in which a woman, after the death of

her rather brutal husband, talked about having committed the
sin.

11

\lllforgiveable"

It was finally learned that her guilt revolved around the fact that a

friend of her husband's had made a "pass" at her some thirty years previously.
She had not cooperated with the man, so that no real contract-violation had
occurred.

I
i'

Her reaction was simply not proportioned to the incident.

Stern summarizes the differences be~ween moral and neurotic guilt (which,
in Stern's sense, is a narrower concept than pseudo-guilt):

moral guilt has

the quality of proportion, can be assuaged by realistic restitution or atone~ent, does not necessarily depend on emotion, and refers to realized acts only;

pseudo-guilt lacks proportion, cannot be "undone," is so inextricably interwoven with anxiety that that which is experienced subjectively is at times only
the anxiety without conscious feelings of guilt, and refers to repressed drives
rather than realized acts.

I
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Sometimes pseudo-guilt takes the form of an exaggeration of existential
~'Jilt.

A person feels, without "reason," that his whole life has been meaning-

:css, that his life, rather he himself ,--is defined by failed-potentiality •

.;ome draw a distinction between "guilt" and "guilt feelings."
~ion

If it is a ques-

of contract-violations and/or failed-potentialities, then the individual

"feels guilty" (and should).

If, however, a person invents, exaggerates, or

otherwise distorts normal guilt, either moral or existential, then he ''has
.~uilt

feelings."

This terminology is abandoned. here as being too ambiguous.

Another problem, more complex than that of classification and terminology,
is the source of abnormal guilt.

As indicated above, Mowrer (1964, 1968a,

1968b) has tended to think that "neurotic" guilt is the result of concealed

and otherwise mismanaged moral guilt.

There has been little room for "pseudo-

guilt" in his system, though I have ~the feeling that he is movb.g away from
what I consider to be an overly reductionistic position.

Psychoanalytic theor-

ies, on the other hand, tend to see the origin of pseudo-guilt in such processes as repressed libidinal drives.

A drive exists.

The individual learns in

some way that, at least for him here and now, it is prohibited.
repressed.

The drive is

Since this process, in the main, takes place on the level of the

unconscious, it remains "unlabeledu (Dollard & Miller, 1950).

Even though the

individual has never actually violated the· standard in question, he •:feels as if
he did, and because of repression he does ~ot know why he feels quilty.
"d evelopmental guilt"

is explained somewhat differently by others.

stance, the significant adults in a child's life reject

This

For in-

him for one reason or

another (e.g., he was not wanted in the first place, he is not attractive, they
are too busy with other interests, etc.).

The rejection may be open or subtle,
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. 'Jt the point is that the child forms his self-image from the cues he receives.
~- Erikson (1964) puts it:

Hardly has one learned t~ recognize the familiar face (the original harbor of basic trust) when he becomes also frightfully aware
of the unfamiliar, the strange face, the unresponsive, the averted, the darkened and the frowning face. And here begins ••• that
inexplicable tendency on man's part to feel that he has caused the
face to turn away which happened to turn elsewhere (p. 102).

:n the extreme case, the child learns to look upon himself as worthless.
!l!arned in this fashion becomes a mode of being.
·~hich

I have dealt with cases in

the patient who "learned" his worthlessness as a child and youth later

:icted out his worthlessness.

"'They' treated me rottenly, so now I will act

rottenly," is the logic of such behavior.
~ven

Guilt

This renouncement of responsibility,

though it is triggered by adverse developmental circumstance, seems to be

a contract violation situation, however mitigated the person's guilt might be.
These are cases of "mixed" guilt.
The point of this hurried, incomplete, and somewhat over-simplified consideration of the possible etiology of pseudo-guilt is to suggest that it, too,
can be, and is, treated, at least in part, by one form or another of self-disclosure.

The concealed is laid open, the repressed is "labeled."

If therapy

is considered not just a question of insight but a "corrective emotional experience" (Alexander, 1963), this, too, demands self-revelation.
perhaps over-simplified, is something like this:
Therapist:

Patient:

The paradigm,

"I am worthless."

"Tell me about yourself, reveal to me the ~person inside.'"

perhaps slowly and painfully, the p~tient reveals himself.
have to be honest with you.

Therapist:

Then,
"I

I find the person you have revealed worthwhile.

IIf you have really been listening

to yourself, I think that you might have Lite
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'
same reaction.

"

·But enough about pseudo-guilt.

Perhaps the pseudo-guilt

life" can be handled in the contract-group.
~tiology,

of everyday

However, the consideration of the

nature, and treatment of its more serious manifestations belongs in

·•orks on psychopathology and psychotherapy.
tion, ma de up

J:ll

OJ!

The contract group is, by defini-

norma 1s. II

Pharisaical guilt.

(d)

11

Some of the standards of conduct established in

j

society refer to the more superficial, conventional, and ritualistic aspects

i

~f interpersonal relating and living in community.

,

L

not necessary.

It is not that ritual is

On the contrary, ritual is an essential part of human living,

whether the .ritual be religious or secular in character.
human need and finds expression in any number of ways:

Ritual is a deep
in liturgical services,

in guru-style meditation, in the stylized activities of fraternal organizations
in some stereotyped family activities (e.g., Sunday visiting of relatives can
be deeply ritualistic), etc.

Indeed, this area of human behavior would be a

fruitful area of more intensive socioiogical and psychological research.

The

"sick" rituals of the obsessive-compulsive and of the psychotic are dealt with

in detail in works on psychopathology, while normal ritual remains comparatively ignored.

Berne (1964) sees much of ordinary human living as ritualistic

but his viewpoint is somewhat cynical (though often realistic), and he ignores
the deeper rituals that bind men together.

Why do people keep going to movies

and watching television programs that are cast in the same mold, that follow
the same pattern?

Why do people read certain genres of literature such as spy,

detective , and love stories?
Ualistic

.

At least part of this behavior seems to be rit-

a search for same ness.

Ritual, whether it centers on t!1e deepest
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,re of human living or on its more superficial aspects, connotes security,

I

ntrol, rhythm of living, a 'Sense of well-being from knowing what is going to

1?pen, a kind of securely encompassing knowledge.

Ritual excludes the in tru-

. tve and the unexpected.

Convention might be considered as part of the ritualistic dimension of li:ing.

It seems to connote, however, defined aspects of interpersonal living

hat are, at least relatively, more superficial.

:n man than does convention.
::1d

Ritual taps something deeper

The latter refers to the more superficial aspects

even to the more humorous aspects of the "what-is-done" and the ''what-is-

1ot-done" in social intercourse.

For instance, it is said that Mrs. Vanderbilt

'nee asked Fritz Kreisler to play at a dinner party which she was giving for
H~r

exclusive set of friends.

She asked him what he would charge.

lst replied: "Thirteen thousand dollars."
:ou will not mingle with my guests."

She agreed, but added: "Of course,

"In that case, Madame," Kreisler is said

.. o have replied, "my fee is five hundred dollars."
ith conventions.

Day-tp-day living is filled

The conventions of society usually call for a certain degree

f conformity and men readily respond.

emanding.

The violin-

Keniston (1965)

Technological societies are particularly

suggests that, since so many of the positions of-

fered by the corporations and organizations of our society demand on-the-job
training, the primary value of a diploma and a degree is to give witness to the
fact that one has been able to endure sixteen years o~ "education."

This is

the proof that a technocracy requires to be assured that a prospective employee
,dll become an obedient cog in an efficient organizational machine.

Allport (1962) suggests that the concept of "social influence," as

u., twlly

understood, does not explain the phenomenon of "conformity" noted in groups.

t
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:ne group is rather a "theater of operations" -for the satisfaction of indivi1 1
.ua

needs, it is a medium of self-expression • . "Norms" arise from a kind of

:yclic.action within the group.

It is this-rather than a "one-way agency of

the group acting upon the individual."

The group or the "grouping" is consti-

tuted by the give-and-take of behaviors of seeking and recognition.

The rela-

tionship, then, between the conduct prescribed by group norms and the cooperative activities of the group members is close and facilitating.

The forces

that Allport sees as operative in a group or "grouping," then, seem to arise
I

I

out of a kind of benign, security-motivated utilitarianism.
Collins and Guetzkow (1964) see both advantages and disadvantages in the
"conformity" behavior noted in groups.

In general "the social weighting given

to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes the better alternatives to be chosen" (p. 41) .

But there are circumstances under which "social

influence" is more likely to lower the quality of a group product:
(1) An expert may continue to receive the respect of an authority
even though the topic is outside his own area of specialization.
(2) A group member may conform merely for social approval. (3)
Conformity and agreement can set in so soon that all opinions are
not considered. (4) Finally, group members can become so much in
the habit of depending on other persons for knowledge and information that they cannot make contributions on their own.
Useful as social knowledge may be, it must be used intelligentlly. It may be that we place too much emphasis on getting
along with others and not enough on the content of connnunication
in our culture (pp. 41-42).

In general they take a more moderate approach to the question of the "pressure
to conform" in our society than does someone like Whyte (1956) in

~ Organiza-

-·

tion Man

Ritual and convention do have a place in human living and in this sense a

L~tatn

.:::::::::::-

degree of conformity and/or utilitarian "patterning of behaviors 11 is

?art
~d

o~

the social cement that binds men together.

To teject ritual in personal

interpersonal living and to defy .convention as conformism would obviously

:iave a devastating effect on both the individual and society.

To the extent

:hat ritual and convention are necessary for the necessary relationships betwee
the individual and society, they belong to the sphere of contract obligations.
!!owever, ritual can become outmoded and convention can prove stifling.

Phar-

isaical or conventional guilt is the guilt that arises from violation of stan<lards or ritual and convention that have lost their function.

Personal ·growth

:md necessary change within society demand the ability to go beyond ritual and
convention.
~ypassing

Both the individual and society should feel free to experiment wit

certain conventions. The over-ritualized and the over-conventional-

ized balk at this for such pruning and experimentation make them feel guilty.
The flexible person knows when ritual and convention may and should be set
aside.

He feels, not guilty, but free.

The contract group is a place where one might well explore his relation'~ip

to ritual and convention.

Mutually shared self-revelation in this area

has the potentiality to free the rigid and inhibited and to confront the insen1tives.

An example

illustrating~~

species of guilt.

Perhaps an example in

the area of sexuality might draw together some of the principal notions concerning guilt.

(1)

An outright misuse of sex such as adultery is a contract

violation and leads to moral guilt.

(2) If a couple have failed to integrate

sexuality into their married life so that it becomes a means of det:pening tl1eir
love for one another, at once a symbol of their love and an expression of it-this can lead to a sense of failed-potentiality and existential guilt.

(3)

-
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~pressing

one's sexuality, learning to fear this drive as dangerous and/or

~irty, may well lead to pseudo-guilt. (4)

If a married couple were to eschew

•erfectly acceptable forms of experimentation with sexual technique in order to
r

remain within the bounds of what they perceive to be a conventional approach to
sexual expression, they would most likely do so in order to avoid pharisaical

or conventional guilt.

!

summary word £!!. guilt. The topic of guilt is not a popular one.

::iakes too many people wince inside.

It

It is tmpopular enough to make some scoff

when even an attempt is made to deal with it in some kind of scientific context.
living.

But guilt is part of the human condition; it is unavoidable in human
It is a two-edged sword.

If mismanaged or not managed at all, it

tends to become psychological deadweight; if faced and handled, it can become
an important growth factor.

Concealment of guilt from self and others, which

initially appears to be the least painful, if not the only, solution, eventually exacts its price in terms of human growth.

hand, is almost always initially painful.

Self-revelation, on the other

But once guilt "has to be hidden"

from oneself and from others, it is liable to psychological translation or
transformation.

A sense of failure, for instance, becomes fatigue, boredom,

depression, or touchiness in interpersonal relationships.

It is the assumption

iiere that a certain degree of self-revelation in a sensitivity-training group
~an open up new perspectives with respect to the effective handling of guilt,

whether the guilt be moral, existential, pharisaical, or even pseudo- or
neurotic. These diffemt types of guilt are usually not found in the "pure"
state.

They are intermingled and confused in the ordinary man's life, and only

When a man dares let others see his life for what it is, is there hope that the.
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I:omplexities of guilt may not make him less than he really is.
~and

Self-Diselosure
..

~-

Even though Talland and Clark (1964) treated "shame and guilt" as a single
:opic in their study, there are reasons for separating the two here.

Erikson

(1963, 1968) rightly calls shame an "emotion insufficiently studied" (1968,
?·

110).

While it is true that the discussion of failures that have led to

;uilt may evoke shame, the experience of guilt and the experience of shame are
simply not the same thing.
context of guilt.

Shame experiences can arise completely outside the

Just as guilt experiences, if mishandled, can become psychol

ogical deadweight and stand in the way of growth or, if well managed, can have
Jn

opposite effect, so shame, too, can be either a destructive experience or a

stimulus to growth.

It, too, is intimately related to self-disclosure, but in

a way different from guilt.
Erikson on shame. Erikson (1963, 1968) deals with shame briefly in considering the various "stages .of man."
early in the life of the 'child.
~is

The crisis of "autonomy versus shame" comes

The child suddenly wants to have a choice.

tendency must be encouraged, and yet he must be protected from anarchy; he

::iust be trained to "hold on" and "let go" with discretion.

He must be encour-

aged to "starid on his own two feet," and also be protected from meaningless
experiences of shame and doubt. Shame, as Erikson sees it, implies that a person is completely exposed, conscious of being looked at, self-conscious, visible--yet not ready to be visible.

The person who is ashamed would like to a-

vert the eyes of those looking at him, but he cannot, and so he turns his rage
in upon himself.

Erikson, therefore, spells out the dangers inherent in shamin,.
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If a person is shamed too much, this leads to his trying to get away with

things unseen.

If a child or an adult is constantly forced to consider self,

body, and wishes as dirty and evil,- he will either revolt, sometimes even to
,•

the point of defiant shamelessness, or he will succumb to a lasting sense of
shame and doubt.

Erikson believes that many adults, otherwise mature and free

of neurotic symptoms, display this sensitivity, or perhaps over-sensitivity, to
a possible shameful "loss of face."

Shame, then, is a powerful emotion and must be evoked with some caution.
Shame in a group experience is even more powerful.

I have participated in

group experiences in which shame was evoked recklessly, causing a great deal
of pain but very little "healing."

Evoking shame without providing adequate

human support may be as dangerous and destructive of growth in adult life as it
is in childhood.

As Fromm (1956) notes, shame involves a deep awareness of

human separation, and without reunion by love, shame is sterile.
cautions, then, are well taken.

Erikson's

But this does not mean that shame experiences

are merely negative; they can be a powerful force for growth.
Lynd
~1alysis

~ord

.Q!!.

shame.

Helen Merrill Lynd (1958) has written a most remarkable

of shame and its relationship to identity.

is to uncover, to expose, to wound.

The root 'llleaning of the

But shame is not just being pain-

fully exposed to another; it is primarily an exposure of self to oneself.

In

shame experiences particularly sensitive and vulnerable aspects of the self
are exposed, especially to one's own eyes.

It is a sudden experience.

In a

flash one sees his unrecognized inadequacies without being "ready" for this

revelation of self to self; much less is he ready for exposure to the eyes of
others.
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Shame, according to Lynd, in some way pre-exists the specific shaming
~vent:

••• I think that this public exposure of even a very private
part of one's physical or mental character could not in itself
have brought about shame unless one had already felt within oneself, not only dislike, but shame for these traits (p. 29).
The feeling of unexpectedness marks one of the central contrasts
between shame and guilt. This unexpectedness is more than suddenness in time; it is also an astonishment at seeing different parts
of ourselYes, conscious and unconscious, acknowledged and unacknowledged, suddenly coming together, and coming together with
aspects of the world we have not recognized (p. 34).
:he external event, then, that precipitates a shame experience might be quite
A casual remark or a joke might trigger a profound feelil'\g of shame

trivial.

another, while the person who made the remark often remains oblivious to

in

•hat is happening inside the person who was the object of his remark.

But

;hame could not arise, could not be touched off by "insignificant" incidents
:.:.~less,

deep down, one was already ashamed.

~

~ 1-·r

difference between shame and guilt.

Shame and guilt differ. Alexan-

0963) 1'elieves that shame generates feelings of "weakness" or "inadequacy,

: le guilt ghres rise to an "I-am-no-good" or perhaps rather an "I-am-not-

good" feeling.

He contends that inferiority feelings in shame are rooted in a

deeper c~nflict in the personality than the sense of wrongdoing in guilt.
Piers and Singer (1953) believe that guilt accompanies transgression, while
shame follows upon failure.

So guilt is generated whenever a boundary is

transgressed or a standard is violated, while shame occurs when a goal is not
being reached.

Shame thus indicates a real "shortcoming."

that shame lacks the inherent legal reference of guilt.

Lynd (1958) says

It is not a question

of failing to pay a debt or of violating a prescribed code.

Rather shame is
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:-:uch more intimately associated with failed-potentiality and as such related to
~xistenital

rather than moral guilt:

" ••• The Ego-Ideal is in continuous inter-

function with the unconscious and conscious. awareness of the Ego's potentialities ••• Shame ••• occurs whenever goals and images presented by the Ego-Ideal are
:10t

reached" (Piers and Singer, 1953, pp. 14, 16).

Because shame represents a

failure to be, it gets into one's guts in a way that differs from guilt:

"It

is pervasive as anx:ety is pervasive; its focus is not a separate act, but revel
ation of the whole self.

The thing that has been exposed is what I am" (Lynd,

1958, p. 50).

A shame experience might even be defined as an acute emotional awareness
of

a failure to be t-n some way.
•

-

'\

It differs from existential guilt in that it

·1,

is an acute emos~o~l experience and in that it is not just a realization of
-.

~

failed potentiality but a painful awareness of what one is not.

For instance,

one can be ashamed of one's own body (it lacks grace, beauty; it has grown old;
it is crippled, deformed, etc.), but
of

one's physical make-up is hardly a source

existential guilt.
As Lynd well notes, both shame and guilt might arise from the samt!

•

tion:

" ••• Shame and guilt may sometimes

alte~b and

~itua

reinforce each oth-

er ••• a particular situation may be experienced by an individual as shame or
guilt or both according to the nature of the person ••• " (pp. 22-23).

Murder

may be experienced as both a.violation of a standard and as a deep personal
failure.

It is an act that may suddenly reveal to a person his deepest person-

al inadequacies and his most tragic
acts may do the same.

interpersonal

failures.

Less dramatic

A burst of uncontrolled anger may be experienced as some

kind of contract failure, but it might also be a source of deep shame insofar
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, it reveals a person to himself and forces him to gaze at the nakedness of his
'•11

inadequacy.

Both failures to be and over-stepped boundaries are potentially

'.•'Structive to personality integration.

When these tWO strains meet in the same

.u:nan experience, the danger is heightened markedly.

When an acute shame experience strikes, there is no defense.
ne's being.

Bur few recognize the fact that such an experience has potential-

ties for growth.
~e

It rinses

The icy clarity of self-knowledge that is part and parcel of

shame experience is usually too painful.

One has to escape and forget. The

Jund is allowed to heal and any situation that might possibly re-open the
·otmd is quietly avoided.

This not only constricts one's "life-space,"

.:ikes one vulnerable to further shame experiences:

but it

"Not knowing what should be

one with shame, one's first impulse is to conceal it, and this may produce
urther shame, for this involves the demanding process of examining or re-examning one's "assumptive world"

(Frank, 1961):

nitting shame to oneself arises from

"Part of the difficulty in ad-

relue~o

recognize that one has built

n false assumptions about what the world one lives in is and about the way
'thers will respond to oneself'·' (Lynd, 1958, p. 43).
ealment is no answer:

But, as with guilt, con-

"Protection against isolation and the difficulty of com-

nunicating such experiences as shame may take the form of impersonalization and
ehumanization ..•. I will deny the possibility of openness; I will protect myself
gainst it"

(Lynd, 1958, p. 70).

Erikson (1963, 1968) emphasizes the dangers in shame, or perhaps rather in

~shaming" and "being shamed," while Lynd (1958) emphasizes the potential value
f dealing with shame through self-disclosure:

If, however, one can sufficiently risk uncovering oneself and
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sufficiently trust another person, to seek means of coimntm.icating
shame, the risking of exposure can be in itself an experience of
release, expansion, self-revelation, a coming forward of belief in
oneself, and entering into the mind and feeling of another person (p. 249)
..

-

f, as Fromm (1956) says, shame is a feeling separateness without retm.ion by
ove, then self-disclosure can be the beginning of this retm.ion.

And just as a

efusal to deal with the roots of shame can lead tp personality constriction,
.o faced or transcended shame can enhance personal identity:

Shame interrupts any tm.questioning, tm.aware sense of oneself. But
it is possible that experiences of shame if confronted full in the
face may throw an unexpected light on who one is and point the way
toward who one may become. Fully faced, shame may become not primarily something to be covered, but a positive experience of revelation (Lynd, 1958, p. 20).
Experiences of shame are a painful tm.covering of hitherto tm.recognized aspects of one's personality as well as of unrecognized aspects
of one's society and of the world. If it is possible to face the, instead of seeking protection from what they reveal, they may throw
light on who one is, and hence point the way toward who and what
one may become p. 183).
~arne,

then, is a way of discovery.

Shame, revelation of both self and society.

Just above, Lynd refers to

'unrecognized aspects of one's society and of the world."
1

She says that some

f the most acute shame experiences arise when one is ashamed of the "failure

:o be" of those closely related to oneself.

Identification with significant

;thers seems to be the mechanism that mediates suc~e.
is identified with the society that surrotm.ds him,

,~can

If, then, a person
feel deep shame for

I
this society when its "failures to be" are recognized.
once for counseling.

A young man came to me

He had been playing basketball; a game was organized with

!"skins" against "shirts," and he had been asked to remove his T-shirt.

When

he manifested some reluctance to do so, one of the other players remarked that
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·.'was reluctant because he had a scrawny build.
~d

Even though his antagonist

the other players did not realize it, he was flooded with shame.

The inci-

was trivial, but in an instant he did realize with painful clarity that he

~nt

as ashamed of his l>ody.
~nt further than that.

In the counseling session it came out that his shame
He also realized that he lived in a society that ex-

. essively extols physical grace, charm, or beauty, often to the extent that it
ecomes a condition for acceptance.

He realized that he had more or less con-

urred with society in this, so that he was ashamed of himself for having been
o ashamed of his body and he was ashamed of his society for its hierarchy of
alues.
~at

Now he wanted to talk about his feeliµ,gs about his own body and the way

he swallowed whole the values of society.

triction or growth.

He chose to have it lead to growth.

~summary ~.2£.

shame.

otentialities of facing shame.
~ame

His shame could have led to con-

An attempt has been made to indicate the growth

This means not only discussing the sources of

within oneself but also facing the actual shame experience that often

rises both from the disclosure made in the group.

This does not mean that in

ome pollyannish fashion self-disclosure and facing guilt and shame will consti"'e some kind of panacea for the ills of the human

con~.

or instance, does not mean that it will be dissipated:

Sharing shame,

"It is also true that

f one discovered that one was not alone in having these traits, shame would

n one sense be alleviated by being shared; but if one still felt these characeristics as mean and ugly no matter how may people had them, shame would in anther sense be extended" (Lynd, 1958, p. 29).
t1al

This points up the fact that mu-

self-disclosure is not designed just to relieve anxiety.

ut people in more effective contact with the what-is.

It is designed to

It is true that often a
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,crson needs a good deal of support in order to face the what-is, but this is
:ar more conducive to growth than giving support to another in order that he may
·ndure the more or less self-inflicted agonies that arise from not facing the
·hat-is.
Risk and trust.

Most people hesitate to disclose themselves to a group.

:bey balance- ott', the edge of self-disclosure as they would on the edge of a di:ing board.

But just as the shock and pain of entering the water are short-

;ived and inevitably outweighed by the benefits of mutual sharing.

Refusing

o "enter the water" in the group because the shock and pain of self-revelation
;re seen as protracted in a defensive maneuver, a kind of psychological meton·::iy.

Still the pain of self-disclosure and the possibility of rejection lurk

iround the comer, so group members bide their time.
Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the
fear of contempt which ••• spells fear of abandonment ••• the deeper
rooted shame anxiety is based on the fear of the parent who walks
away .!in disgust,' and ••• this anxiety in tum draws its terror
from the earlier established and probably ubiquital separation
anxiety (Piers & Singer, 1953, pp. 11, 16).
isk is an essential feature of growth groups.
e asks himself searching questions:

But before one take~s
this risk

"Can one have faith that wit

c rtain

ther persons greater openness can increase understanding, respect, lo

? 'nlat

ith them increasing intimacy can be, not a corroding, but a deepening and eniching process?"

(Lynd, 1958, pp. 238-239).

Perhaps the "nothing ventured,

othing gained" truism has a special applicability to communication in growth
roups:
Confronting, instead of quickly covering, an experience of shame as
revelation of oneself and of society -- facing 'actual life' -- requires an ability to risk, if necessary to endure, disappointment,
frustration, and ridicule •••• Engagement with life and with history-self-discovery and further discovery of the world--has always involved
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such risks (Lynd, p. 232).
till, even initial risk demands some kind of climate or trust.

But to demand

rust from others, one must first show that he himself is trustworthy.

And one

f his "integrity" groups contract to absolute self-disclosure before even meet-

ng the other members of the group.

Very often this works.

It is true that

he initial interviewer usually "models" for the prospective group member and
·hows that at least he is trustworthy.

But, since there is no such initial

ommitment in the contract group, the problem of mutual trust must be worked out
'erhaps the notion of "kairos," the "right moment," has some value in the conract group.

The.participants all contract to self-disclosure, but each puts

omself "on the line" at the moment that is "right" for himself.

Obviously

uch a concept could be used to rationalize away complete failure to fulfill the
elf-disclosure provision of the contract, but this need not detract from its
ossible utility.

The problem of trust will be taken up more thoroughly in the

hapter on support.
Shame and fantasy.

Daydreaming is a little discussed activity.

Full-

ength studies on daydreaming are few and literally far between (Green, 1923;
inger, 1966; Varendonck, 1921).

Daydreaming or directed fantasy (rather than

'ust mind-wandering) is considered an adolescent activity that is outgrown with
1..he responsibilities of adulthood.
•

s

II

creative,"

In adulthood, fantasy is encouraged i f it

if it is a source of growth rather than a substitute f or i t.

ot encouraged, it is at least countenanced when it is used sparingly-- with
respect to both quantity and quality -- to take the edge off a depressing day

If

--
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or a dreary life-situation.

In this sense, Singer (1966) calls daydreaming

or directed fantasy " a neutral skill available for adaptive enrichment of the

life of otherwise ordinary persons" (p. 187).

But this is not the place to

review theoretical considerations and empirical findings concerning daydreaming.

Singer's work is both adequate and interesting.
The point here is that many men engage in some kind of fantasy in varying

degrees.

Only to the degree that this fantasy distorts the what-is and the

~hat-should-be

(contract standards) of life in a non-creative way does it be-

come problematic.

The revelation of such fantasy can be the source of intense

shame, but it can also get at some of the deepest roots of unfaced failure in
a person's life.

For instance, if a man, when he is having sexual relations

with his wife, imagines that he is with someome else, either real or imaginary,
then it seems that he has failed to integrate sexual experience with love.

If

he reveals his fantasy, he might feel deeply ashamed, but the revelation seems
essential to his getting to the source of his interpersonal failure.

Examin-

ation of fantasy, then, while often painful and productive of shame, can, at
least for some, be an important factor in a growth experience •
.Qfher Approaches 12_ Self-Disclosure

.!!!..

the Training Group

Areas of guilt and shame, as important as they might be, are by no means
the only topics for self-disclosure.

Perhaps they may even be more accurately

considered as dimensions which are sometimes involved in the process of selfdisclosure.

If a person talks about the what-is of his life, he will inevita-

bly talk about areas of living which are touched or even suffused with gui 1 t

and/or shame.

The discussion above indicates the importance of not avoiding
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,:i

area of living because of the guilt or shame associated with it.

But some

ther approaches to self-disclosure might be indicated here:
(a)

Values. In talking about themselves, people often shy away from two

ost important areas, the "best-in-me" and the "worst-in-me."

The "worst-in-me"

s the area of shame and guilt and has already been discussed.

But people also

void talking about the good they do, the values they hold, the aspirations
hey have.
n
::id

In face, when given a choice, that is when asked simply to engage

some form of self-disclosure, most people immediately think of areas of shame
guilt.

Perhaps one of the principle reasons why. the area of values and as-

irations is overlooked is the fact that the good meru do is often not unadulterited good.

We have goals, but we fall short of theml we have certain values,

ut there are times when we ignore these values; we do good, but even the good

·e do is not pure, unmixed, stainless, without blemish.

This is, it is very

1

ifficult to talk about the "best-in-me" without also talking about the "worst-

n-me."

It is also dangerous to talk about values in a group, because one soon disovers that it is impossible, even intolerable, to do so without arousing oneelf from one's value-lethargy and doing something about it.

Uncommunicated

·alues remain uncertain, ambiguous, inoperative in life; communicated values
lace demands on the communicator.

Just as self-disclosure concerning the

'Uilt-shame dimensions of life dem,ands "conversion," so self-disclosure in
irea of values demands action.
1

igh.

Some find the price of such self-disci

thi:>

t,.,

Finally, a person is···sometimes loath to communicate his values bL·cause

ie lacks the co.trage of his

convictions; he is afraid that his values will ap-

ear too naive or outmoded to others.

He is afraid to say "I believe" to a
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·orld that has lost faith even with itself.
eem

inconsonant with a materialistic world.

He is afraid to admit values that
On the other hand, there may be

hildish elements in the values he does hold.
.he

Then subjecting one's values to

scrutiny of a community will entail a process of purification and refine-

.ent.

This, too, can be demanding and painful.
(b) Contract system.

Talking about contract-failures (moral guilt) pre-

upposes a contract system.

A group experience can be an excellent opportunity

for its participants to examine the expressed and implied contracts that prorlde the guidelines for interpersonal living.

For instance, a college student

living at home and commuting to school might examine some of the contractual
relationships that exist between himself and his parent.
1

Is there, for example,

contract of mutual non-interference or mutual non-involvement?

tract a utilitarian one:
'ducation, even though
cent"?

~

Is the con-

"I' 11 obey your rules since you are paying for my
see these rules as your way of keeping me an adoles-

Contracts, of course, can be much more positive and open-ended.

An

2xarnple of such a positive, though in this case unilateral, contract might be:
"I contract myself. to show concern for my parents, to be open with them, even

though they do not reciprocate."

(c)

~l·stand .!!l~grouR•

The kind of self-disclosure that is absol-

utely essential to the life of the group is the revelation of what is happening
inside each member with respect to the process of the group.

If a participant

is afraid to disclose himself, he should at least disclose that.

If he is

bored because what is happening in the group is actually flight from real group
Process, he should say so.

Very often, when a member who has been silent for a

long time is confronted concerning his silence, he will say:

"I've been quiet
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'ecause nothing has been going on.

What you have been doing is very boring."

.\ctually, he has been violating the contract, for the contract demands that he
~ake

the initiative and present his-views about what is happening when it is

· appening.

If group process is boring, then his silence is part of that bore-

Jom and not, as he might view it, a legitimate commentary on it.
The modality of self-disclosure, properly used, is one of the most effective ways of handling the "hidden" variables in the group.

A person that is

honest about himself and his feelings in the group does much to minimize the
effect of the "underground" group culture-- that complexus of "tacit understnadings" that often leads to group s.tagnation--which was discussed in the
chapter on leadership.
~ent

High "visibility" is an essential part of this experi-

in interpersonal growth.

Self-disclosure with respect to the here-and-now

adds a dimension of "control" to eht experiment which is often lacking in other
kinds of growth experiences.
In day-to-day living we seldom take the time to clear up communication
problems that disrupt our interpersonal living.

For instance, research has

shown that there is a powerful tendency to assume that one's positive or negative feelings toward another are reciprocated (Newcomb, 1956, 1958, 1960;
Tagiuri, 1958; Tagiuri, Blake.,.& Bruner, 1953;

Tagiuri, Bruner, & Blake, 1958)

and people tend to act on such assumptions, whether they are true or not.
the contract group is an experimental situation, the participants have

Sine

"cul-

tural permission" to find out where they stand in relationship to one another.
If the group culture supports a healthy feedback system, communication channels

remain open and the participants can related to one another realistically.
In a human relations laboratory which I attended, the trainer of the group
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to which a friend of mine belonged called an extra session.

He told the par-

ticipants that a good deal was happening between different members of the group
;oth in and outside group sessions that was not being discussed and that this
failure in openneess was suffocating group process.

For several hours they

discussed hitherto undisclosed love relationships, animosities and the way
that the members had been "pairing" either with members of this group or other
groups and working out binds and hang-ups outside the group.
demand for intra-group honesty seemed to work.

and the group was reborn.

The trainer's

The siphoning process stopped

In the contract group, the members should demand

this kind of intra-group honesty of themselves; this is the responsibility
of the group and not just of the leader-member.
"Processing" ~.!!.way of keeping the group honest.
a group should stop and "process" what it is doing.

Every once in a while

For. instance, after the

group has been discussing for a while, the leader-member (this is one of his
legitimate functions especially in the beginning sessions of the group) might
interrupt the discussion and ask:

"All right, what have we been doing here?

"hat's going on; what's been ·happening?"

The response is usually refreshing.

The group stands outside itself, as it were, as its own critic.

A new-found

freedom of speech, a freedom that belongs to the legitimate critic, often
springs up in the group during these "processing" sessions and stands in vivid
contrast to "hedging" and "fencing" that was going on before.
The "fish-bowl" technique may also be used as a processing device.

In

this case, the group splits in two -- either in a random fashion or perhaps
into the quiet members and the talkative members -- and half engage in discussion in an inner circle while the other half listen in an outer circle.
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After a predetermined length of time, the discussion is halted and, while the
-.embers of the inner circle remain silent, the members of the outer circle
''process" the discussion.

This "p.rocessing" usually focuses, not so much on

the content of the discussion, but on "process" variables: was -the group
Jpen and honest"
discussion?

were there any "tacit understandings " that subverted the

did the members engage in contract behavior?

gage in the contract and how?

who failed to en-

what N-interactions obstructed contract behavior

These and similar questions deal with process behavior.
The Mode .£!. Quality of Self-Disclosure:

"Story" Versus "History"

The way in which a person reveals himself in the group is very important.
In a sense it is even more important than

the content of the revelation, for

content, no matter how intimate in itself, can lose its intimacy and its meaning in the telliQ.g.

I propose two styles or modes of self-disclosure: "story,"

the mode of involvement, and "history," the mode of non-involvement.
History.

A recent televeision documentary showed excerpts from a "mara-

thon" group experience conducted at Daytop Village, a rehabilitation center
for addicts.

During the early hours of the marathon a young addict began talk

ing about himself and his past life.
"history."

His self-revelation was almost totally

I was disturbed to think that what he was doing was considered

acceptable group process, that is, I was disturbed until one of the group
leaders finally spoke up and confronted the speaker.

In effect he said:

"You

have been engaging in 'history' rather than 'story,' and mere 'history' in
this group experience is meaningless."
"History" is pseudo-self-disclosure.

It is actuarial and analytic, and
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.:sually has a strong "there-and-then" flavor.

It clicks off the facts of ex-

~erience and even interpretations of· this experience but leaves the "person"

Jf the revealer relatively untouched; he is accounted for and analyzed, but
unrevealed.

The person retails many facts about himself, but the "person with-

in" still remains unknown.

"History" is often a long accotmt.

jften steady because it fears interruption.

It is long and

Interruption might mean involve-

:::ent, and a person engages in "history" to avoid rather than invite involve~nt.

"History" has a way of saying "Be quiet" or "Don't interrupt," but these

are dodges to keep others at bay.

The steady clicking off of facts keeps the

group focused on the irevealer, but does not allow the members to deal witi.-i him.
In

"histo~

the manner of self-revelation is usually somewhat detached.

There is little ego-involvement and thus little risk.
himself as object rather than as subject.

Intimate life details might be re-

vealed, but their intimacy has no particular meaning.
facts.

The speaker deals with

They are just more

On the other hand, "history" might be ·a concatenation of generalities,

generalities poorly disguised by the first personal pronoun. But whether it is
a question of intimate details or generalities, the message is always the
same:

"Keep

your distance."

It is as if the revealer were trying to inti-

matie to others that he is rather invulnerable:
me;

I don't see why it should affect you."

"This is not really affecting

Sometime~

sheer quantity of in-

timate informtion about self is divulged because the "historian" implicitlv
realizes that if he retails enough, quickly enoult the others will not be
able to react effectively to any particular part of it.
self-centered.

"History" is also

The leader in the Daytop Village marathon took the young ad-

dict to task for his ego-centricity.

He told him that he had been talking a
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:ong time and had not even mentioned that he had a wife who had feelings.

"Historical" information does not llllite speaker andlisteners.

:he information sits there as an obstacle between them.
..

:han

a bridge.

aura about it.
~oring.

-

Rather

It is a barrier rather

It sometimes even has an "I-dare-you-to-do-anything-about-this"
Even when the information disclosed is intimate, it is usually

The' "historian" exudes and "I-don't-really-care" attitude that is

readily picked up by the other members of the group.
~ecause

it ia divorced from the person.

about it.

The information is boring

It is flat, there is no human drama

To use Matson and Mantagu's (1967) paradigm, "history" is "compu-

torial," and, as such, calls for "feedback" rather than human response.

Or

in McLuhan's (1964) terms, "history" is a "hot" modality, high in definition

and low in involvement.

Its high definition refers not just to sheer quanti-

ty, but to its "there-it-is-and-there-is-really-nothing-to-be-done-about-it"

quality.
"Story."

"Story" lies at the other end of the continuum.

It is authen-

tic self-disclosure, for it is an attempt to reveal the "person within," and
more than that: it is an attempt to get him involved with his listeners.
"Story" is an invitation for others to "come in;" it is an opening of the
door.

In group growth experiences, as in the rest of life, others often

stand around waiting to "come in."

"Story" is a signal for others to move into

one's presence.
"Story" is not actuarial; it is rather selective in detail, for the
revealer intuits the fact that it is not the transmission of fact that is imPortant but the transmission of self.

It does not avoid detail, but the

choice of detail is secondary to the act of communication.

"Story" usually
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avoids interpretation, too; it allows experience to remain unintellectualized
md thus speak for itself.
!

I
I
'

The "story-teller," even if he leaves out detail,

is still graphic and specific; he does ··not hide behind generalities disguised
~y

the first personal pronoun.

Facts are selected for their impact-value, for

their ability to reveal the person as what-he-is-now-through-what-he-has-experI

>

i

'

: :

lenced.
The "story-teller" is taking as risk and he knows it.
is always an implicit request for human support.

Therefore, "story"

The revealer has come to

trust the group to a certain degree, but he still feels his vulnerability; his
ct of self-revelation is askin to Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" which is alays a leap of trust.

But he takes this leap because he wants to relate to

he other members of the group and relate more fully to himself.

He realizes

hat "story" is the way of involvement and the way of discovery, and he wants
oth,

And so he comes to the point,

He does not wander around in. the there-

d-then, but manages to make the past and the "there" and even the future de"ine him as he is in the here-and-now.

"Story," then, is not analytical and

t

iscrete.

f

Otality that is the person himself, who takes shape out of the complexity of

I

is •Xperience.

A

~j

It is synthetic; it attempts to present a totality, the complex

The one who tells his "story," in that "story" is not computorial and there
ore not a request for "feedback," in a dehunanized sense, is looking for human
esponse,
ause "

'he

"Story" of its very nature is dialogue and merits such response.

L<

story" is not computorial and monologic, it is inevitably engaging, even

n someone who is usually a bore adopts it.

Some people are constantly talk-

and most men find this terribly boring.

Such people are
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,ring because they are usually engaging in "history" rather than "story."
·irst of all, they are really. saying nothing about themselves, and secondly,
.~ey

care little for the objects of their monologue and would find real re.~~-

)Onse such as self-disclosure and confrontation frightening.
n

generalities po<i>rly disguised under the pronoun

Bores do speak

"I." But "story," on the

ther hand is always engaging, for it means that the speaker has to "blow his
·over" and drop his defenses and stand somewhat naked in his own eyes and in
he eyes of tohers.

Men are seldom, if ever, bored with a sincere confession,

: ecause they intuitively realize its importance for the one revealing himself
,nd respect him for what he is doing.

The person who engages in "story" is one

·ho stops complaining about how much he hurts and begins admitting who he is.
nis is most refreshing in human affairs.

I think perhaps that it might be

mpossible to dislike someone who engages in "story," for it is an act of humilty, a manifestation of a need to move "into community," and a surrender of egoentricity (or at least a beginning of surrender).
In l1cLuhan's terminology, "story" is a "cool" modality, low in definition
nd high in involvement.

It is low in definition not just because it is sel-

ctive of detail and thus allows others to "fill in the gaps" in an information
ense, but the information transmitted is seen as a medium, a bridge instead of
barrier.

"Story" has high impact-value; it tends to change both speaker and

istener; it draws the listener out of himself and towards the speaker.

It

hanges the speaker in that it calls forth emotions that are more authentic and
herefore perhaps less familiar to the revealer.

"Story," then is not maudlin,

ut it is shot through with emotion; it is not sensational, but it has drama
n the same way that a life fully lived has drama.
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The kind of self-disclosure wanted in the contract-group is that in which
)person gives testimony to himself, gives witness to his own mysteriousness,
·oth the mystery of goodness and the mystery of evil that he is, When a per..
on gives testimony, he asks others to trust him and he binds himself to tellin

-

:he truth.
·:olves love.

Testimony, then, engages not only the mind, but the will: it inTestimony is "involving":

it involves the witness because he

,inds himself to his listeners, and it involves the listeners because it demand
1at they believe.

:1

Men have access to a person's innermost being otlly through

:estmony, and persons give testimony to themselves only under the influence
Jf love (see Latourelle, 1962),

"History" and "story" in the contract-group.

It may be useful to imagine

"hisoty" and "story" as anchoring opposite ends of a continuum.

The members

of the interpersonal-growth group contract to "story," that is, "story" is a

goal toward which the participants are working,

In the same way, the elimina-

tion of the modality "history" is also a goal.

"History" is thus an object of

confrontation in the group,

Levels of Self-Disclosure.

Different kinds of face-to-face groups could be placed in a more or less
rough order according to the degree or level of self-disclosure that de facto
takes place in the context of the group meeting.

From least to most, the

order might read something like this:

1.

"Business" meetings, e.g., mangerial meetings, faculty and
teachers' meetings, community council meetings, etc,

2,

Discussion groups, e.g., formal or informal academic or
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seminar-type groups, discussion clubs, etc.
3. Groups investigating the phenomenon of "group dynamics," e.g.,
academic groups that learn about group dynamics by being a group,
unstructured groups that come together to see what human value
there might be in coming together, etc.
4. "Sensitivity training" groups, e.g., human relations laboratories, personal growth laboratories, etc.
5. Psychotherapy groups.
6. "Integrity training" groups (Mowrer, 1968b).
fnis does nht mean that no self-disclosure takes place during a ''business"
Jeeting.

For instance, if the members of a managerial training have gone

through a sensitivity training laboratory, they may work out their feelings
toward one another before tackling an important managerial decision.
the above order is not rigid.

Also,

For instance, a great deal of intimate self-dis-

closure might take place during a laboratory course in "group dynamics," depending on the kind of group culture that develops.

A particular sensitivity

training group, too, might engage in a degree of self-disclosure usually found
in psychotherapy or integrity groups.

The position of the contract group in

thelist will vary according to the nature of the contract.

The contract being

explicitated here would probably place the contract group between sensitivitytraining and psychotherapy groups.

We have been speaking pf groups in general.

However, within groups a good deal of individual differences with re~pect to
self-disclosure will be manifested by the participants.
The contract group differs from the other groups (and is like the; integrity l
group) in that self.:..disclosure is explicitly established as a group value.
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::owever, unlike the integrity group the '~level" of self-disclosure is not de:ermined by contract.

In the integrity group the prospective participant must

Jgree to disclose all his past contract failures and do so sometime during the
early part of the group experience.

He also contracts to remain "confession-

llly current" throughout the rest of the experience.
~roup

Therefore, the integrity

establishes a certain "level" of self-disclosure at least in one area,

the area of contract failure.
"Level" is a term difficult to define operationally.

It seems to be an

operational term in the integrity group, for there :It means all those actions
:.'hich the "trainee" believes to have been contract failures in his life.

Since

the scope of self-discliosure is wider in the contract group, "level" is not as
easy to define.

Still, group members.have a kind of instinctive awareness of

different "levels" of self-disclosure.

To move to a "deeper" level of self-

disclosure means to reveal that which is more painful to reveal, that which one
is more reluctant to reveal.

The "deeper" one goes, the closer one gets to his

"core," to the "person within," to the person he really is.
closure gets at a person's identity.
nized, the ignared, the unseen, the

"Deep" self-dis- ·

It gets at the repressed, the unrecogunam~; 1..i.;;..,<::u

"best" in a person and the "worst" in him.

1u

,,

p•

1 .•

in; it gets at the

The deeper the self-disclosure, the

more does it reveal the "mystery" of one's person.

"Level," then, is not a

certain set of statements about a certain area of living.

What member A dis-

cusses freely might be a most painful area for member B; the same area of discussion represents different "levels" for them.

"I am bored with this group"

is often an honest statement that reveals something about the person
speaks his mind.

But, "My mother is an alcoholic and I

t

wtH)

so

ind 1 t difficult to be

L
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!th her" would usually be a more painful kind of revelation, tapping areas of
:iilt and shame, and therefore getting cioser to the"core" of the revealer.

·r get deep satisfaction from being a Christian" or "I have deep religious
Jnvicitons, but I have always been afraid to share them with anyone because
don't always live up to them" are statements about values that might tap even
'ceper levels in some persons.
This .more or less metaphorical approach to the concept of "level" is quite
'.Jbviously not entirely satisfactory, but perhaps it is sufficient for the pur1ose intended here.

A more clinical and empirical approach to the concept "lev-

1" is discussed by Truax and Carkhuff (1967) in terms of a self-exploration

.cale ranging from no self-exploration to a very high· degree of self-exploration
n the first stage no personally releveant material is communicated by the clien
.or does he respond to attempts on the part of the therapist to reveal himself.
n stage two, the therapist must coax material from the client, while in stage
hree

the client may actually make brief conunents on material introduced by the

herapis t.

Ins tage four, the client discusses personally relevant mate rial, but

n a mechanical fashion:

he does· not "own" what he is talking about.

Spontan-

ous discussions and reactions on the part of the client begin with stage five.
n stage six the client reacts spontaneously and with feeling, while in stage
even he,:makes tentative gestures toward discovering new material.

Active in-

erpersonal exploration is characteristic of stage eight, and stage nine is a
ighly developed phase of stage eight.

The contract more or less demands that

he participant begin at lesat with stage five, though many participants "re,ress" at one time or another to a lower stage.

In a certain sense, the scale

efines the manner of self-exploration but does not define cnntcnt ar0ns.

J.

330

The members of the contract group contract to self-disclosure, but not to
J~Y

particular level of self-disclosure.

The group has to work through the

?roblem of the level of self-disclosure. and in this respect the variability
.i:iong groups can be great.
"number of factors:

The level of disclosure in the group will depend on

the courage of individual members, the atmosphere of sup-

port and trust developed by the group, the ability of individual members to see
che value of self-disclosure for themselves, and the spirit of cooperation in
che group.

It is assumed that the level of disclosure in .the group will grad-

ually deepen.

The process will not be an even one:

members will retreat dur-

ing crises of trust; there will be plateaus of apparent stagnation and indifference when members are ''feeling their way;"

there will be sudden surges of

honesty and intimacy which most members wi-11 find deeply rewarding.

The con-

tract serves as a means of keeping the group under a certain degree of pressure
with respect to self-revelation.

If it is true that the level of self-disclo-

sure in the group will usually not go beyond the limits set by the atmosphere
of trust and support that exists in the group, then the contract should exert
pressure on the group to create the kind of atmosphere in which disclosure is
Possible and profitable.

~lf-Disclosure at the Service of Behavior Control: "Labeling"
Dollard and Miller (1950) emphasize the greater behavioral effectiveness
of articulated over non-articulated thoughts.

As the child grows up, he under-

&oes a great variety of emotional experiences, but he does not have the ability
to Verbalize these experiences.

~avioral

Anxiety=ridden emotional experiences retain

consequences which are more or less outside rational control becaus<'
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:~ey

have not been subjected to "higher mental processes."

The lack of verbal

.. spouses to drives such as fear, sex, and aggression increases the likelihood
f maladaptive behavior or symptoms...

Learned verbal cues can prevent the gen-

ralization of anxiety from the past to the present.

When previously repressed

·.Jterial is verbalized, the result is not uninhibited behavior but rather be.avior that is under better social control.
Dollard and Miller deal with labeling in the context of psychotherapy in
,;hich the labeling process refers principally to past experience.

But such

abeling or a process similar to. labeling, with an orientation toward the future
m be used as

it

form of behavior-control.

For instance, the group members may

'iscuss the seeds of irresponsibility or the seeds of failed potentiality withn themselves, that is, they "label" unporductive forms of behavior to which
~.ey

feel drawn.

Usually when .a person :lis tempted to do something that he

.·:.inks that he should not or to fail to do something that he thinks that he
~ould, he tries not to think about it.

He puts it out of mind, refuses to sub-

.it it to "higher mental processes," allows the behavior to run off princir 't Ly
'n the level of emotion.
~goes

The man who knows vaguely (or not so vaguely) that if

to this tavern he will get drunk and irresponsibly involved with some

,f the women there will often put such considerations out of mind.

On the sup-

Position that he does not want to engage in such behavior, he might try to reverse the process.

That is, he forces himself to think about what he is tempted

to do; he forces himself to "label" the entire sequence of undesirable behavior
Prior to initiating the sequence.
0 ehavior,

The assumption here is that if he labels this

submitting it to "higher mental processes," he will be in better con-

trol of this behavior.

And if he does initiate the undesirable behavior se-
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:·Jenee, he will do so with increased responsibility (and culpability).

'The contention here is that such a process is most effective when carried
~t

"in-community," whether the connm.mify is a natural one (e.g., marriage

:Jrtner, family) or some conventional group (e.g., the contract group).
:3

It

kes a certain degree of courage to discuss one's "temptations" to violate

'!'!e's contracts or one's tendencies to "fail-to-be" in various ways, but if one
~oes

so, he enlists the resources of the connnunity in his program of behavior

:ontrol.

"Labeling," to be effective, should be specific.

"I feel that I won't liv

up to my expectations during the next semester" is too general and sound more

like a cry of despair than an attempt to control behavior.

"If I go home with

this chip on my shoulder, I'll have a fight with my wife, go out and get drunk,
and end up in a mess" is a much more appropriate example of effective labeling.

Since the over-riding goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth, labeling of specific "temptations" to maladaptive interpersonal relating belongs
in the group.

Effective labeling is a way of transporting the there-and-then

of the future into ~he here-and-now of group process in that it reveals seeds
of action or inaction that are gro~ing and maturing right here and right now.
Labeling need not be restricted to avoiding unwanted behavior, but it can
also be used to stimulate desired behavior.

The individual rehearses something

that he ·:.wants to do, noting what he will do when certain difficulties arise,
but also noting the rewards associated with the desired behavior.

The hypo-

thesis is that the more concrete thelabeling process is, dealing with specific
behaviors in specific situations, the more effective will it be.
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ssible Dangers Associated with Self-Disclosure
Self-disclosure is a powerful behavioral instrument and must be used with
~iscretion.

Under certain conditons, then, self-revelation will be either

;angerous or useless.
(a)

1f it is exhibitionism.

Self-disclosure may be nothing more than

·:erbal exhibitionism, a verbal exposure of self in a exhibitionism-voyeurism
context (see Glatzer, 1967).

Exhibitionism is a manifestation of lack of con-

trol and a symptom therefore of pathology.
~is

The exhibitionist is merely using

listeners to satisfy his own distorted needs.

He is neither attempting

·to involve himself responsibly with others nor is he asking them to respond by
involving themselves responsibly with himself.

The "drama" of the disclosure

.1ssumes a disproportionate significance in exhibitionism;
often its most important feature.

its "shock" value is

Jourard (1964) believes that either too much

or too little self-disclosure is a sign of disturbance.

I wound tend to think

that the context in which it is done and the way in which it is done is more
important than its quantity.
(b)

l l the person receives

~

support for his openness.

phere of relative trust, self-disclosure entails risk.

Even in an atmos

If a person puts himsel

on the line and then fails to receive support, self-disclousre can be quite
tra'lllllatic.

Self-revelation is a way of involving oneself with others.

If they

fail to respond, this is usually experienced as rejection no matter what the
real or objective state of affairs might be.

Sometimes, after engaging in

self-disclosure, a person will feel diminished--perhaps the next day or during
the week between meetings.

This seems to happen when the participant discloses
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'1imself in the wrong way (e.g., with a strain of exhibitionism) or when: he fail
~o

receive proper support.

~othing

~roups

to fill the vacuum.

It is as if he had emptied himself and now there is
Support
is so essential a variable in growth
,.--

that it will be treated separately (chapter VIII).

(c)

If l!_ person contracts to engage in

self~disclosure

This isusually a case of failed-potentiality.

and then reneges.

It is one of those existential

failures that can confirm a person in a negativistic self-image.
(d)

If l!_person engages in "history" rather than "story."

In this case,

self-disclosure is useless, for "history" puts something between the "historian" and his listeners and cuts off interpersonal involvement, the supposed
;mrpose of the group.
(e)

If self-disclosure is incomplete in l!_

rlete openness.

situation that calls for .££.!!-

If a participant in Mowrer's integrity group tells only a

part of his story of contract-failure or refuses to stay "confessionally current,"

then he is more or less living a lie, pursuing a course of action in

the very group that is designed to eliminate such behavior.

It is difficult to

see how this would not take its toll in terms of guilt and anxiety.
Self-disclosure is not as dangerous as some make it out to be.
a medical act; it is first of all a human act.

It is not

Nor need it be a sign of imma-

turity, of "adolescent" behavior. , If done responsibly, it is a continuation of
Valuable human behavior that often does

~egin,

however imperfectly, during

adolescence.
IE._ilo,..&.
~

Johari Window. Luft and Ingham (1955) and Luft (1963) have presented
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1

:t

model of awareness in inter:;>e~rsonal relationships called "The Johari Window."
is depicted below:

Known to
others

Known to
Self

Not Known to
Self

!.

II.

Area of free activity

IV.

III.

Not lalown to
others

Avoided or hidden area

Figure 1:

Blind area

Area of
unknown activity

Til.e Johari Window

I have used this model as a basis for an exercise in a course in abnormal psychology.

The figure is put on the.board and the quadrants are explained.

class members are then given blank three-by-five cards.

The

Til.ey are asked to Move

some bit of information about themselves from Quadrant III to Quadrant I by
writing it on the card.

Til.e cards are collected and a few minutes are spent

eliciting their reactions tothe exercise.

Meanwhile, the person conducting
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:~1e

exercise shuffles the cards so that the exercise can be carried out with

:omplete anonymity.
.1nother.

Next he reads all the cards, without comment, one after

Finally, he elicits the·reactions of members of the class to what

:hey have heard.

There is usually a wide variety of responses, from "I have a hole in my
sock" to
dde."

"I am a practicing homosexual" of "I have felt like committing sui-

The modal response usually deals with alientation, difficulty in human

relations, operating under a facade, and identity problems.
::embers of the class is often quite striking.

The effect on the

Some, for the first time, realiz

that there are others, many others, who have problems similar to theirs.
student once said:

One

"Things just couldn't be the same in that class anymore."

rhe problem is that things can be just the same.

There is a moment of openness

:nl its possibilities are seen, often in a dramatic way; then people return to

their "normal" patterns of living.

People really dislike being shut off from

others, but few want to pay the price of venturing out of themselves.
The value of self-disclosure:
~ith

~~kind

of communication. Mowrer deals

self-disclosure principally as a way of handling the deleterious effects

of mismanaged guilt.

However important this might be, it is not the focus of

the contract group.

Self-disclosure in the contract group is seen as leading

to a new kind of communication or at least to a new freedom of communication.
Dealing with one another is something like showing one another the "houses" we
live in, houses in which one or more rooms must remain locked because of what
is behind the doors.

In the contract group the participants learn the skill of

opening some of these doors and the air that sweeps through the house is refreshing. To use another metaphor, communication which is characterized by a
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:car of self-disclosure is like trying to talk to someone across a room filled
·.-ith pillars.

In the contract group the participants learn how to remove some

Jf these pillars and to their amazement

the house remains standing.

The

contract is a training group in which the participants learn the value of selfJisclosure.

If they learn well, then they return to the "significant others"

in their lives with the potentiality for a new kind of communication.
Self-disclosure is not the only value in life, but it is a dimension of
the interpersonally fruitful life.

Only the individual can determine what

?art it is to play in his own interpersonal life.
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Chapter VIII
Supportive Behavior in Sensitivity Groups
If a sensitivity-group

co~~ract

calls for such variables as self-

disclosure in a rather demanding sense ("story" rather than ''history") and
total human expression in terms of pathos, logos, and poiesis, then the
contract must also provide an atmosphere which will not only sustain but also
actively encourage such variables.
climate of support.

In a word, the contract must provide

~

However, the problem is that attempts to give solid,

/

non-cliche support--whether these attempts are made in the context of group
therapy, sensitivity training, or real life--are often clumsy and ineffective.
When faced with the more dramatic dimensions of others such as their pain,
their anxieties, their peak and nadir experiences, their strong emotions,
whether positive or negative, their successes and their failures, we fumble
around, babble inanities, or take refuge in silence.

The contract-group,

then, is a laboratory in human living in which the participants learn how to
react to the more dramatic dimensions of others.

In the give-and-take of

the group meetings, they learn to remedy their deficiencies in both giving
and receiving support.
The need for a supportive climate in sensitivity-training laboratories
is generally recognized:
The second element necessary for assuring effective feedback is
what Schein and Bennis (1965) referred to as a climate of
'psychological safety' and Bradford et al. (1964) called 'permissiveness.' That is, no matter what an individual does in a
group or what he reveals about himself, the group must act in a
supportive and nonevaluative way. Each individual must feel that
it is safe to expose his feelings, drop his defenses, and try
out new ways of interacting. Such an atmosphere has its obvious
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counterpart in any constructive clinical or therapeutic
relationship (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76).

::ot only must a climate of psychological safety exist, but it must be commllllicated to the participants if it is
with

to

have any kind of

11

\lllfreezing" affect

respect to their behavior:
People must certainly differ greatly in their ability to
accept the guarantee of psychological safety. To the extent
that the feeling of safety cannot be achieved--and quickly-the prime basic ingredient for this form of learning is absent.
Its importance cannot be overemphasized, nor can the difficulty
of its being accomplished (Campbell & Dunnettee, 1968, p. 78).

It is not difficult to find support for such suggestions in the literature
dealing with interactions in small, face-to-face groups.

For instance a

series of studies (Gibb, 1960; Lott, Schopler, & Gibb, 1954, 1955) indicated
that feeling-oriented, positive feedback resulted in the greatest efficiency,
least defensiveness, and greatest spread in participation in such groups.
Supportive behavior, then, is a value in all kinds of sensitivity-training
laboratories.

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest that support is not only

essential but that it must be felt as quickly as possible.

The hypothesis

here is that the contract will facilitate the speedy establishment of a
climate of support.
This chapter has three sections:

one on listening, one on giving

support, and a short section on receiving support.

First of all the

Participants must learn how to listen to one another; this is an absolute
Prerequisite for supportive behavior.

But listening is much more demanding

than is ordinarily supposed, since it involves much more than just hearing
and registering words, sentences, and ideas.
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LISTENING:

THE SINE:QUA-NON OF SUPPORTIVE BEHAVIOR

~Listening

For our purposes listening means becoming aware of all the cues that the
other emits, and this implies an openness t? the totality of the communication of the other.

In the sensitivity group, this requires being aware not

only of individuals but also of the mood of the group as a whole.

Perhaps

listening to the group is even more difficult than listening to individuals
because it demands an awareness of subtle interactional patterns.

Ideally

the leader-member is already sensitive to these patterns and one of his
functions is to point them out to the other members.

Listening, then, demands

work, and the work involved is difficult enough so that the effort involved
will not be readily expended unless the listener has a deep respect for
the total communication process. · ·
One does not listen with just his ears:

he listens with his eyes and

with his sense of touch, he listens by becoming aware of the feelings and
emotions that arise within himself because of his contact with others (that
is, his own emotional resonance is another "ear") , he listens with his mind,
his heart, and his imagination.

He listens to the words of others, but he

also listends to the "messages" that are buried in the words or encoded in
all the cues that surround the words.

As Berne (1961) suggests, he listens

to the voice, the demeanor, the vocabulary, and the gestures of the other,
or, as Haley (1959) would have it, to the context, the verbal messages, the
linguistic patterns, and the bodily movements of the other.
the sounds and to the silence.

He listens to

He listens not only to the message but to

the context also, or, in Gestalt terms, he listens to both the figure and
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the

ground and to the way these two interact.

Re is aware of what Murphy

(1964) calls the "world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and

averting the eyes"; like Smith (1966)
he is aware that "people interact not
.. ·only through words but also through spatial relations ••• through temporal
relations ••• and ••• through gestures and touch and many other media" (p. 3).
The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants are to
learn to become more fully aware of every possible channel of communication,
both verbal and non-verbal.

Weick (1968) thinks that non-verbal aspects of

communication are generally overlooked, much to the detriment of the
communication process:
Observers who are accumstomed to analyzing speech behavior in
naturalistic settings may regard nonverbal actions as a redundant
source of infonnation. This point of view neglects the fact
that humans spend a very small portion of their interactional
time vocalizing •••• (p. 381).
Although nonverbal behavior holds promise for observational
research because of its visibility, naturalness, and discriminability, it can also be too subtle to record unless the obset"Ver:
has been trained to be sensitive to it. That persons are often
unaware of the rich nonverbal language is not surprising, since
much of it occurs unconsciously (Scheflen, 1965, p. 34). Jecker
et al. (1964) found that teachers who were untrained in the
analysis of nonverbal behavior could not predict, from filmed
facial cues, whether a student had comprehended a lesson in
algebra (p. 382).

We are perhaps too ideationally oriented and have a set to bypass non-ideational cues.
of affect":

Tomkins (1962) has suggested that the face is the "primary site
"The centrality of the face in affective experience may also

be seen in the relationship between the hand and the face.
if the face is the site of feeling" (p. 210).

The hand acts as

The relationship of hand to

face, then, is an important source of information concerning the feeling
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states of the other:

"It is our argument that human beings slap, hide,

stimulate, support, caress, inhibit, or reassure their faces with their
hands because they correctly localize the face as the primary site of their
...

concern" (p. 212).

-

Others have studied the face as a rich source of

communication (e.g. Ekman, 1965; Haggard & Isaacs, 1966; Leventhal & Sharp,
1965; Levitt, 1964).

Exline and various associates (Exline, 1963; Exline,

Gray, & Schuette, 1965; Exline & Winters, 1965) have examined the phenomenon
of eye contact and exchanged glances, finding them important channels for
conmnmicating such affective information as liking and various forms of
interpersonal discomfort.

The connnunication potential of both posture

(Scheflen, 1964) and body movements (e.g. Katz, 1964; Mahl, Danet, &
Norton, 1959; Spiegel & Machotka, 1965; Werner & Wapner, 1953) is also an
area of serious study.

In the laboratory setting of the training group it

is feasible to focus more attention on nonverbal aspects of connnunication
than one would ordinarily do outside a laboratory setting for the purpose of
enhancing one's total interpersonal listening skills.
The non-selective character of total listening.
a sense, non-selective:

Total listening is, in

it encompasses all the cues emitted by the other,

even those that the other would rather conceal and those the listener would
rather not "hear."

For instance, the weight of an obviously over-weight

person is a cue to be reckoned with, for through it the other is "saying"
something to those with whom he interacts.

The message may be "I am

frustrated" or "I don't care about others" or merely "I have poor selfcontrol," but it is a message that should not be overlooked.

In a group

therapy session in which I was an observer the therapist asked the wife of
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one of the in-patients (the patient himself refused to attend the sessions)
what she thought she was trying to tell others by her obvious overweight.
The therapist "listened to" a cue_, confronted the woman in a firm, kindly,
responsible way, and successed in instituting a dialogue that proved quite
useful.

Therefore, good listening demands both "subjectivity," that is,

engagement with the other, and "objectivity," that is, disengagement from
the other, in order to pick up both positively and negatively valenced cues.
The good listener is sensitive to the what-is and not just to the whatshould-be or to the how-I-would-like-things-to-be.
Active listening.

It becomes quite apparent that the good listener is

an active listener, one truly engaged in the communication process, one who

goes out of himself, as it were, in search of significant cues emitted by
others.

Listening, then, is facilitated if the listener is actively

interested in others.

Newcomb's (1953) "strain toward synnnetry" principle

leads to the prediction:

the more intense one person's concern for another,

the greater is the likelihood that he will be sensitive toward the other's
orientations toward objects in the environment.
liking another increases sensitivity toward him.

Certain studies do show that
Eisman and Levy (1960)

showed that lip-reading was more accurate the more the reader liked the
corrnnunicator.

Suchman (1956) discovered that people who were more favorable

toward others were more accurate in estimating the feelings of these others.

In a study by Fiedler (1950), it was discovered that all therapists
described the good therapeutic relationship as one in which the therapist
Participates completely in the patient's communication, and, ns Rogers (1961)
has noted, this is impossible unless a mutual respect and liking arise in
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the therapeutic encounter.
The person who is an active listener is much less likely to stereotype
others and becomes guilty of "univocal" listening.
..

make this a bit clearer.

-

Perhaps an analogy would

Everytime Brahm's Second Symphony is played, the

untrained ear hears only the Second Symphony; it is quite a univocal
experience.

The individuality of different orchestras and different conductor

and the nuances of different tempos and accents are all missed.

Thus, while

there is only one Second Symphony, it can be played with quite different--and
distinguishable--nuances.

Similarly, John Doe is only John Doe, but John

Doe, too, has different nuances of orchestration at different times, and
these nuances will be missed by the untrained, "passive" listener who finds
it more comfortable to deal with him as a stereotype in univocal terms.

The

active, searching listener, who is open to all the nuances of John Doe, will
more likely pick up many of these cues.

This openness to nuance, however,

does not imply that the good listener is skilled in "analyzing" the other,
for analysis often means reducing the other to a whole series of stereotypes,
and sometimes this mistake is worst than the first.
All of Rogers' works (e.g. 1942, 1951, 1961, 1967) form a magnificent
treatise on total listening:
I also find the relationship is significant to the extent that
I feel a continuing desire to understand--a sensitive empathy
with each of the client's feelings and communications as they
seem to him at that moment. Acceptance does not mean much until
it involves understanding. It is only as I understand the
feelings and thoughts which seem so horrible to you, or so weak,
or so sentimental, or so bizarre--it is only as I see them as
you see them, and accept them and you, that you feel really free
to explore all the hidden nooks and frightening crannies of
your inner and often buried experience (1961, p. 34).
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Perhaps Rogers' emphasis on total listening explains in part the impact that
he has had on the field of psychotherapy.
listening is in itself therapeutic.

He has seemed to prove that total

Up to the time of Rogers' studies total

listening had been a too little explored aspect of the therapeutic encounter.
Social intelligence and listening.

Tilere is no doubt that this ability

to become totally aware of others demands intelligence:

" ••• [S] ensitivity

to the subtle aspects of the wordless communications in psychotherapy is a
most important dimension of therapeutic skill.

Tilis skill is not too readily

learned but rather reflects native or early acquired aptitudes that are
highly correlated with general intelligence" (Schofield, 1964, p. 105).
However, the intelligence required. seems to be more closely related to what
uay be termed "social" intelligence, a "feel" for people and an ability to
involve oneself creatively and responsibly with them, rather than academic
intellectual interest.

The socially intelligent person is capable of

becoming aware of the wide range of cues emitted by others, of evaluating
them, and of responding to them.
Obstacles to Effective Listening
Alienation from communication.

Against the background of what it means

to be a good listener, it will be helpful to review some of the obstacles
that arise to prevent effective listening in the group.

Goffman (1957)

discusses three kinds of preoccupation that disturb the communication process.
The kinds of alienation he describes actually interfere with a person's
ability to listen to others in the fullest sense of that term, althoush what
he says must be modified somewhat in order to apply it to a sensitivitytraining group.

(a)

External preoccupation is the first kind of alienation:
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the individual neglects the prescribed focus of attention, giving his main
concern to something unconnected with the other group members in their
capacity as fellow-participants.

He is "listening" to something that is

"outside" the group in some way.

According to Goffman, the topic of

conversation is the prescribed focus of attention, but in a sensitivitytraining group the focus of attention is wider than just the topic being
discussed.

For instance, in the contract group the topic actually being

discussed might well be irrelevant to contractual goals and should be
challenged rather than attended to.

The daydreamer is alienated in any

group, but in the contract group the person who is actively listening to the
total interaction might become more preoccupied with the atmosphere
surrounding the discussion rather than the topic itself, perhaps because
the atmosphere is "speaking louder" than what the participants are saying
about a specific topic.

The atmosphere is not external to the topic of

conversation, for it is having an effect on the entire conversation.

In

the case described, the good listener will interrupt the conversation,
bringing up the problem of the non-facilitative atmosphere of the group.
(b)

Self-consciousness is a second cause of alienation.

Self-consciousness

results from one's preoccupation with himself as an interactant and this
prevents him from giving himself entirely to the topic of conversation.
Whitman (1964) discusses this phenomenon in terms of perceptual defense:
The extreme type of perceptual defense is autistic perception.
Here there is really no perception at all. Very often you see
somebody in the group who has a dreamy look in his eyes or
perhaps even listens interestedly, but a few minutes later
will say, 'Well, I've been thinking what was said to me (ten
minutes ago!) and I have thought of this point •••• ' This is the
person who most often is responsible for contributing a thud
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or dud to the group discussion, because his remark is connected
to his own ruminations but not to the thread of group discussion
(p. 321).
In the sensitivity group, however, a certain degree of self-consciousness is
.---

expected of the participants, for they are evaluating themselves precisely
as interactants.

There seem to be two kinds of self-consciousness:

one

which draws the participant away from the interaction into himself and one
which makes the participant more acutely aware of his part in the interactional process and therefore
during group

meetings.~_

more acutely aware of all the cues generated

(c) The third kind of alienation, according to

Goffman, is interaction-consciousness.

The participant is so worried about

how the interaction itself is progressing that he constricts his ability to
follow the topic of conversation.

Again, in the sensitivity-group there is

a constructive form of interaction-consciousness just as there is a
destructive form.

Perhaps the difference is between being interaction-con-

scious (Goffman also calls it being "other-conscious") and being interaction
or other-involved.

In human relationships "the medium is the message" to a

large extent, that is, the manner in which the interactional process is
conducted also connnunicates.

Therefore, members of sensitivity-training

groups are asked to become aware of interactional styles.

The victim of

interaction-consciousness is really so deeply involved with his personal
concerns that his awareness of what others are saying and of what is
happening in the group is constricted, while the interaction-involved
participant is "hearing" more than just the conversation, for he is picking
up communication cues from a variety of sources.
Listening, then, in sensitivity groups is different from listening in
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ordinary conversation groups, for in sensitivity groups
is a focus of study.

listening itself

But even in ordinary conversation groups there is more

to communication than just the_ topic of conversation.

An awareness of all

the factors involved in communicating increases one's ability to follow
and evaluate a topic of conversation.

"Message anxiety"

~ ~

obstacle to listening.

Research indicates

that the comprehensibility of a message is unfavorably influenced when the
content itself is anxiety-arousing.
anxiety."

Nunnally (1961) calls this "message

Gynther (1957) found that "message anxiety" lowered the

"communicative efficiency" of the speaker.

Kasl and Mahl (1965) discovered

that it led to speaker anxiety and flustered speech, while Geer (1966)
found that it produced speaker anxiety, slowed speech, and silences.
"Message anxiety," then, is an obstacle to effective listening in two ways:
(1) it makes the speaker himself less comprehensible so that the listener

has to fill in the "gaps," and (2) it is hypothesized that the speaker
conununicates his own anxiety plus the anxiety of the message to the listener
and the resultant "listener anxiety" further distorts the message.

Since

in sensitivity groups there is likely to be a good deal of "message anxiety,"
the participants should be prepared to handle the communication difficulties
that arise from it.

This means that both the speaker and the listener must

be aware of possible communication distortions and make efforts at minimizing
them.

High visibility would be very helpful here, that is, if the speaker

were to admit that he finds the content of the message quite disturbing,
this would be a cue for the listener to listen more intently and become
aware of the anxieties that are possibly being generated within himself.

m<'t-e
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Campbell:

human error in the communication process.

Campbell (1958),

in studying the communication process, discovered certain sources of
systematic error, an understanding of which is extremely useful to anyone
.. ~-

interested in human interaction.
Campbell's

findi~gs,

Both speaker and listener can profit from

for these findings can be cast in terms of principles

. for improving the process of speaking (output) and the process of listening
(input) •
(a)

Length of the speaker's remarks.

If the only "recorder" present

to take down a speaker's remarks is the listener himself, then both the
speaker and the listener should realize that a coinmunications "leakage"
takes place between output and input.

There is a good chance,. according to

Campbell, that the average listener will tend to shorten, simplify, and
eliminate detail from the actual output of the speaker.
speaker's remarks, the greater the leakage.

The longer the

Thus, if the speaker really

wants to get his remarks across, he will take into account the natural
leakage of the listening process and not be unnecessarily long.
important lesson here for sensitivity groups.

There is an

In such groups there is

usually little reason for anyone to speak at considerable length.

Extended

speeches are out of place both because they cut down on interaction and
involvement and because they entail too much leakage.
for example, has less impact than compact "story."

Extended "history,"

An active, concerned

listener will interrupt longer discourses precisely because he does want to
listen, assimilate, and interact.

On the relatively rare occasions on which

a participant does speak at some length in the group, he must realize that
his listeners are not assimilating all the facts that he is retailing but
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are rather receiving a total impact from his remarks.

If he speaks at

length, it must be because "total impact" is more important than individual
facts.
(b)

,---

The middle of the message.

be least well retained" (p. 343).

" ••• [T]he middle of the message will

The concerned listener must take greater

efforts to retain what is said as remarks lengthen, but the concerned speaker
realizing this, will try to "eliminate" the middle, that is, by keeping his
remarks short enough so that they have, as it were, only a beginning and an
end.
(c)

"Rounding off" the message.

The listener tends to "round off"

what he hears, "dividing the content into clear-cut 'entities,' reducing
gradations both by exaggerating some differences and losing others" (p. 344).
This seems to be a function, at least in part, of a kind of egocentricity
with which every listener is afflicted:
needs.

he tailors messages to fit his own

The good listener, then, has to take pains not to ignore subtle

differences in what is said, even though these differences go contrary to
opinions that he himself holds.

Also the good speaker will speak frankly,

honestly, and plainly, making shadings of meanings as clear as possible.
When a speaker becomes too subtle, when shadings of meaning begin to
proliferate, this may mean that the speaker is unsure of himself or afraid
of those to whom he is speaking.. If either is the case, he should be
honest enough to say so and let his message be interpreted in the light of
his own misgivings.
(d)

The past haunting imperfectly transmitted messa.ges.

"An imperfect-

ly transmitted message will be distorted in the direction of important past
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messages, both rewarding and punishing past messages" (p. 350) •

Perhaps

another way of putting this is that a listener is influenced in his listening
by the way he has been reinforced by communications in the past.

If a parti-

cipant in a sensitivity group hears a confused, abstruse, or poorly delivered
message, there will be a natural tendency for him to interpret it in the light
of past messages that have had either positive or negative (rather than merely
factual) meaning for him, that is, messages that he himself has found important.

Obviously, the good listener, being active, will try to minimize this

source of error by having the speaker clarify the message.

But it is

surprising how many participants, for one reason or another, allow imperfectly
transmitted messages to go without challenge.

Secondly, a good listener will

try to be aware of what the speaker is actually saying in light of previous
emotional experiences with the speaker.

If the participant is honest enough

to keep his relationship with the other members out in the open, there should
be less tendency for him to distort messages because of emotional reasons.
(e)

The reductive nature of listening.

The "most pervasive of the

systematic biases" (p. 346) is the tendency for the listener to modify a
new message so that it becomes more like previous messages.

Obviously, if

the spaakers were never to say anything new, the listener would not be burdened with

a~have

to cope with anything new.

Therefore, the speaker who

rarely says something new is contributing to this bias.

But the good

listener is one who can consistently break away from this bias.

To do so,

however, he must be in affective contact with the speaker and he must allow
the speaker the freedom to change.

Time and again in sensitivity groups

member A, after listening to member Z, will say something 1 ike:

''We've
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really heard that story before:

in fact, we have heard it over and over

again," only to have member B, who possibly has been listening more creatively
say:

"That's not ture.

There is something new here.
...

though in a confused way:
hearing."

-

'I do want to change.'

He is now saying, even

Anyway, that's what I'm

Unfortunately poor listeners are a most formidable obstacle to

change in group members.
(f)

Hearing what

~

expects to hear.

In general, according to

Campbell's findings, listeners will modify messages so that they conform to
the meaning expected by them.

The poor listener, then, either does not

listen or stops listening half way through a message, and he does so because
he "knows" what the speaker is going to say.
at its worst.

This is "creative listening"

Again, it is a question of casting the speaker into a univocal

mold, thus stripping him of his freedom.
listening or "computer" listening.

Too much listening is "Kantian"

The listener has present categories and

whatever is heard must fit into these molds or handled by these "banks."
Whatever cannot be received into his computer banks must be shunted off and
excluded.

And yet, Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature

on group decision-making processes, find that "the most important part of
conference communication may occur when another member says something that we
do not expect and thus offers us a perspective or possible solution which
should not have occurred to us while working alone {p. 184).

Poor listening

is poor business practice besides being poor human relations.

The intelli-

gent speaker, realizing this human tendency to stereotype,

truncate, and

not to allow for the possibility of change, will emphasize the fact that
what he is saying is different from what he had said before, that he has
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~!1anged

~n

or moved away from a previously held position (if this is the case) ,

order to break through his listeners' natural stereotyping process.

:·inally, I would hypothesize thaE those who are uncomfortable with their own
freedom or with the freedom of others tend to constrict the messages of others
(g)

''You agree with me."

The listener tends to modify messages so that

they are in better agreement with his own opinions and attitudes.

Although

such a tendency is nothing more than a concrete specification of the ancient
scholastic principle "whatever is received is received according to the
state, condition, or bias of the receiver" and as such is in no way new,
empirical data are being amassed which manifest just how pervasive such a
principle is in man's practical life.
we want to hear.

Thus, to a large extent we hear what

The sensitive listener, however, addicted as he is to the

what-is, constantly fights this natural tendency in order to hear what is
actually being said.

This means that to be a good listener one must drop or

at least relax his defenses a bit in order to be willing to explore the new.
(h)

Black-or-white listening.

"There is a tendency to distort coding

assignments in the direction of an affective or evaluative coding.

The most

natural coding .of any input by the human operator seems to be the general
nature of 'like' versus 'dislike,' 'approach' versus 'avoid,' 'gooJ' ver:.,u:,
'bad,' 'beautiful' versus 'ugly,' etc.

The general finding of psychologists

is that whatever assignment is given tends to be distorted in this direction
of this evaluative assignment.

This is shown repeatedly as a 'halo' effect,

•

or general factor in rating assignments' (p. 357).
the either-black-or-what tendency in man.

This is a reflection of

Not only is everything a subject

of evaluation, but things tend to end up in just two categories, "good" or
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"had."
1

It seems almost natural for man to listen to messages in evaluative

'terms and it is much simpler to hear a communication as "bad" or "good" in
its entirety rather than to expend the effort that differential evaluation of
..

a message would demand.

·-

This basic tendency to listen to conununications in

evaluative terms prevents the listener from assimilating other aspects of
the message; creative aspects of the message are lost in its "badness" or
deficiencies are swallowed up in its "goodness."

If the speaker realizes

that his message might strike others as immediately "good" or "bad," then a
caution against this should be built into the message itself urging listeners
to suspend, if possible, this evaluative propensity.
(i)

The pressures of the group and "filtered" listening.

"When a

group of persons are exposed to a message stimulus and asked to state its
meaning (size, degree of movement, amount of prejudice, etc.), they will
distort their individual interpretations in the direction of their fellows"
(p. 361).

The average listener tends to listen, at least to some extent,

"through" the group, that is, he filters what is said through the more or les
complex interactional and attitudinal patterns that comprise one aspect of
the culture of the group.

Although such a process can be advantageous at

times--for instance, in group decision-making situations:

"The social

weighting given to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes
the better alternatives to be chosen" (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964, p. 55)-this is not the case in sensitivity groups.

The good listener listens, or

makes every effort to listen, directly to the other without sifting what is
said through the attitudinal filters of the group.

It would seem that there

is greater possibility for success in this area in the contract-group
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:ecause of the high-visibility nature of the group culture and because of the
~uilt-in

cautions against "tacit understandings" and "covert decisions" in

the group.

But even under such contract conditions nature will out to a
..

·-

certain degree and members will tend to modify what they hear so that it
~ight

fit more neatly into the group culture.

For instance, if there is a

tacit understanding in the group not to discuss sexuality, when a member does
bring the subject up, others will tend to ignore what he has to say or "hear"
it as a digression.

This pres en ts another challenge to the good listener,

for he must see the individual as primary and the group as serving the needs
of the individuals who constitute the group.

It is hardly necessary for sensitivity-training participants to memorize
the communications obstacles described by Campbell.

It is sufficient to

realize that it has been demonstrated that just in the ordinary course of
events it is difficult to be an unbiased listener.

The pitfalls that he

describes cannot be avoided entirely; they can only be minimized.
The Impact of the Speaker

~Listening

Whenever a member speaks and really says nothing or, in the contractgroup, whenever he engages in various forms of flight behavior, he must
realize that the quality of listening will go down in the group.
general rule, the speaker gets the kind of attention he deserves.

As a
Some

participants speak vaguely and evasively because they do not want to be "read'
by

their listeners; they thrive on the haphazard listening they receive.

Such tendencies should become the object of confrontation in the group.
~

"Compleat" Listener
It has been suggested that the good listener is tho active listener,
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one who readies himself to be as receptive as possible to all cues generated
in the group and one who is aware of and tries to combat the variety of
obstacles, stemming from within himself and from the matrix of the group,
standing in the way of effective listerilng.

The "compleat" listener,

however, goes further than this, for he realizes that the proof of the
pudding always lies in the eating.

Therefore, once he has listened in the

sense described here, he must in some way manifest to the speaker that he
has listened fully, intelligently, and sympathetically (that is, he has not
prejudged the speaker's remarks.)
support in the group:
and intelligently.

In fact, this is the basic source of

the knowledge that one has been listened to actively

Secondly (and this is the ultimate proof on one's

listening skills), he translates what he has heard into effective contractual
interaction.

That is, the good listener is hardly just one who amasses

information, however conscientiously, and communicates to the speaker that
he has been an effective tool of enregistration; rather, the variety of ways
in which the individuals and the group itself have spoken have served as
stimuli, and because he has listened well, there is a mu.h better chance that
his responses will be proportioned to the stimulus.

In the contract group hi

response will generally take the form of one or more of the contractual
modalities, namely, direct supportive behavior, self-disclosure, expression
of feeling and emotion, or some form of confrontation.

All of these modal-

ities, if carried out responsibly, are supportive.
~tening as Diagnostic

The quality of one's listening is "diagnostic" with respect to the
quality of one's human relations.

Rotter (1962) claims that it is not lack
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of insight into self that characterizes the person in emotional trouble but

rather a lack of insight into others.

He is so poorly aware of others that

his interactions with them are awkward and self-defeating.

The contract-

group, then, is a laboratory in which the participants are to experiment with
active listening.

Part of the process of being an active listener, one who

searches out communications cues, will include challenging participants who
speak vaguely or evasively.

The participant who finds out that he does not

listen carefully or that he is unable or unwilling to venture out into the
group insearch of clarity of communication will profit diagnostically.

On

the other hand, the participant who succeeds will find himself much better
prepared
SUPPORT:

~o

provide active support in the group.

CREATING A CLIMATE FOR GROWTH

The universal need for interpersonal warmth.

There is almost universal

recognition of the fact that a degree of warmth in interpersonal relationships is absolutely essential for psychosocial growth.

This need begins at

birth and, although it might undergo certain transformations throughout the
maturational process, it would seem that it is a still strongly felt need
during old age.

Watson (1959), in reviewing the literature on the deleterious

effects of maternal deprivation, found the evidence confirmatory despite the
fact that there were experimental inadequacies in many of the studies (for
the specific kinds of design inadequacy varied from study to study).
Lehrman (1960), in his clinical work, found that this need for warmth does
not stop with childhood:
The incisive work of Ackerman (1958) and others on intra-family
interactions, ••. Ferenczi's (1926) demonstration that the analyst's
warmth is a necessary condition for cure, and Fromm-Reichmann's
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(1950) brilliant sensitivity with schizophrenics all encourage
the hope that precise knowledge of the effects of inter-personal
warmth at the breast, in the home and role-appropriate warmth
in the office can help us fulfill our task of preventing and
curing mental illness (p. 1102).
The work of Rogers (1961, 1967) and others (e.g. Schofield, 1964; Truax, 1961

1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1964) not only supports this conclusion but leads
one to believe that warmth is not necessary just for psychotherapeutic

situations, but that it is universally needed for personal and interpersonal
growth.
Frank (1961) claims that "the greatest potential drawback of therapy
groups is the tendency not to supply sufficient support, especially in
early meetings, to enable members to cope with the stresses they generate"
(p. 190).

Whether this is the greatest potential drawback of sensitivity

groups or not (some would certainly think so) is still to be determined,
but the fear of non-support is certainly one of the greatest fears of those
who are considering the possibility of engaging in sensitivity training and
of sensitivity-group members who are considering taking certain risks in the
group (e.g. disclosing themselves, dealing openly with emotional issues,
etc.).

Prospective participants realize in one way or another that they

are to engage in some kind of self-disclosure, that they are going to be
confronted or challenged by the leader or other participants, and that such
interaction is more than likely going to arouse strong emotion.

They see

the possibility of some kind of shame experience and they rightfully fear it,
for, as Erikson (1959) says, "Shame supposes that one is completely exposed
and conscious of being looked at •••• One is visible and ready to be visible
.•.• Shame is early expressed in an impulse to bury one's face, or to sink,
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right then and there, into the ground.

But this, I think, is essentially

rage turned against the self" (pp. 142-143).

Prospective participants

foresee quite easily the potential pain of the sensitivity experience, but
what they do not or cannot foresee is a climate of support that will render
what is foreseen as painful interaction not only tolerable but even
stimulating and deeply satisfying.
Psychological safety, then, is a legitimate concern of any kind of
growth group, any kind of group in which intrapsychic and interpersonal
concerns constitute the principal focus of attention, and it is a seeming
lack of concern for such safety in some quarters that disturbs many
professionals.

However, support has always been a concern for those seriosly

committed to laboratory training, e.g. the personnel of the National
Training Laboratories (NTL):
A first purpose of the T Group is to help individuals to
learn from their continuing experience in the areas of
self-awareness, sensitivity to phenomena of interpersonal
behavior, and understanding of the consequences of behavior-one's own and others'. Learning in these areas requires
willingness to explore openly one's motivations and one's
feelings; to utilize the reactions of others as feedback
about the consequences of one's behavior; and to experiment
with new ways of behaving. Since each of these steps
requires emotional support, the T Group faces the dual task
of creating a supportive climate and of developing situations
in which members can learn through examining their own
experience (Bradford, 1964, p. 191).
Yet, while most practitioners agree that a supportive climate in human
relations laboratories is absolutely essential (and actually see to it that
such a climate does develop in the group or in the community of which the
group is a part), still few have taken the pains to discuss either the nature
of support or the ways in which a supportive climate is created in a group.
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::eedless to say, there is little if any published research in this area.
Antecedent and Consequent Support
In the contract group support can be discussed in terms of the kinds of
interaction specified by the contract.
of support:

There are basically, then, two kinds

antecedent and consequent.

Encouragement of any kind, whether

direct or indirect, given to participants to engage in contractual behavior
is antecedent support, that is, it comes before contractual behavior and
is directed toward eliciting it.

For example, if the leader-member models

some form of contractual behavior, let us say that he engages in self-disclosure of some kind, and if he does so skillfully and sincerely, his behavior
is a form of antecedent support, for it is designed to encourage members to
engage in the same kind of behavior.

On the other hand, reinforcement give

to participants for actually engaging in contractual interaction is
consequent support.

Reinforcement, of course, can take place in many

different ways, but it always "says" to the participant who has engaged in
contractual behavior:

"You have done a good thing in the group."

During the

early sessions, the trainer primarily (but also as many of the other participants as possible) should engage in forms of antecedent support, for it is
amazing how many "normal" people have fears and feelings of inferiority
floating immediately below the surface or lurking behind carefree facades.
These feelings inhibit group process and people need encouragement to
overcome them.

In the contract group, the contract itself provides one of

the main sources of antecedent support in that it takes into consideration
the natural fears of the participants and serves as a stimulus to
participation.

The contract establishes a rather large "cultural island"

hn
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around which the participant may wander freely and with relative safety.

If

the participant chooses to remain on one small part of that island and remain
a spectator of instead of a participant in the life of the island, this is
not the fault of the island culture but rather of his exaggerated fears.
~ ~

of Antecedent Support

"l accept you because you ARE": Acceptance
regard as antecedent support.

~unconditional

positive

The contract-group recognizes the fact that

the basic attitudes its participants have toward one another merely or
simply as fellow human beings are crucial to the climate of interpersonal
growth.

Therefore, insofar as possible (though obviously one cannot change

deep-seated attitudes and habitual behavioral patterns by contract or edict) ,
the contract calls first of all for the basic kind of acceptance which
Rogers (1961, 1967), following Standal (1954), calls "unconditional positive
regard"; this attitude, considered essential for the therapeutic process,
is described by Rogers and Truax (1967):
A second condition which is hypothesized as essential for
therapeutic movement and change is the experiencing by the
therapist of an unconditional positive regard for the client.
This means that the therapist communicates to his client a
deep and genuine caring for him as a person with human
potentialities, a caring uncontaminated by evaluations of
his thoughts, feelings, or behaviors. The therapist
experiences a warm acceptance of the client's experience
as being a part of the client as a person, and places no
conditions on his acceptance and warmth. He prizes the
client in a total rather than a conditional way. He does not
accept certain feelings in the client and disapprove others.
He feels an unconditional positive regard or warmth for this
person. This is an outgoing, positive feeling without
reservations and without evaluations. It means not making
judgments. It involves as much feeling of acceptance for the
client's expression of painful, hostile, defensive, or
abnormal feelings as for his expression of good, positive,
mature feelings. For us as therapists it may even be that it
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is easier to accept painful and negative feelings than the
positive and self-confident feelings which sometimes come
through. These latter we almost automatically regard as
defensive. But unconditional positive regard involves
a willingness to share equally the patient's confidence and
joy, or his depression and failure. It is a non-possessive
caring for the client as a separate person. The client is thus
freely allowed to have his own feelings and his own experiencing.
One client describes the therapist as 'fostering my possession
of my own experience and that I am actually having it; thinking
what I think, feeling what I feel, wanting what I want, fearing
what I fear; no "ifs," "buts," or "not reallys,"' This is the
type of acceptance which is expected to lead to a relationship
which facilitates the engagement of the patient in the process
of therapy and leads to constructive personality change.
Thus, when the therapist prizes his client, and is searching
for the meaning or value of his client's thoughts or behaviors
within the client, he does not tend to feel a response of approval
or dissapproval. He feels an acceptance of what is.
Unconditional positive regard, when communicated by the therapist,
functions to provide the non-threatening context in which it is
possible for the client to explore and experience the most
deeply shrouded elements of his inner self. The therapist is not
paternalistic, or sentimental, or superficially social and agreeable. But his deep caring is a necessary ingredient in providing
a 'safe' context in which the client can come to explore himself
and share deeply with another human being (pp. 102-104).
To a great extent what Rogers and Truax describe here is the kind of
acceptance ideally owed to another simply because he is a

human being.

It

is a willingness to let the other be who he is and what he is, but it is an
active, concerned letting-the-other-to-be rather than a detached "not-givinga-dam" what the other is like or what he does.

It means allowing the other

to have the psychosocial lifespace that he needs in order to be himself as
fully as possible.

Negatively it means a refusal to exercise various sorts

of control over the other, demanding that his life-style conform generally
or in specific aspects to one's own, e.g. with respect to style or modes of
interpersonal interaction and to value-system.

Acceptance implies an activt
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allowing the other to be different from oneself, "active" here meaning that
A's interaction with B should actually foster B's otherness, his differences,
his unique way of being.

In a sensitivity group it is as if each member of

the group were to say to every other member:

"You have a value that neither

I nor we collectively either determine or can abrogate.

We recognize you

as being this value."
At the very minimum acceptance demands that one allow the other to
express the ways in which he is different, different from the other members
of the group and perhaps different from the images of man that are currently
"acceptable" in our society.

But if such acceptance is to be active, the

members must be willing to say to one another:

"Your actions cannot be so

different or bizarre as to open an unbridgeable gap between you and me."
Insofar as acceptance is active, it appproaches what Fromm (1956) calls
"brotherly love," the most fundamental kind of love.

This love means such

things as care, respect, and the desire to further the life of the other.
Such acceptance or love tends to disregard status, for it is a love between
equals.
Schofield (1964) says that "this quality of 'acceptance'
~this

in~

culture

time is peculiarly stricted to the psychotherapeutic contract, but

it is common to all such contracts.

In this sense, psychotherapy provides

a very special, perhaps ideal, form of friendship" (p. 109).

There is no

absolute reason, however, why such attitudes of acceptance cannot become
more pervasive in

~

culture at this time.

Perhaps one of the reasons for

the proliferation of sensitivity-training laboratories in our culture at

---

this time is
--

--

to disseminate among the general population "growth-variables"
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that up to now have been common only in therapeutic enterprises.
laboratories--and certainly

contract~group

Sensitivity

laboratories--are designed to

stimulate the cultivation of such attutides of acceptance among people not
engaged in any strictly therapeutic situation.

These laboratories encourage

participants to become aware of their basic attitudes of acceptance and
rejection of others and to grow in their active concern for others to be who
and what they are.
creates

a

This is essential to the kind of support-in-depth that

climate in which participants can engage freely in the modalities

called for by the contract:

self-disclosure, expression of feeling and

emotion, and mututal confrontation.

As Latourelle (1962) says, for

communication and dialogue to become a reciprocal opening up, that is, a
mutual revelation, both the speaker and the hearer must respect each other
in the mysteriousness of their personalities:
and availability.

there must be mutual trust

One of the principal tasks of the laboratory is to find

ways--direct and indirect--of communicating this basic attitude of acceptance
of one another to one another.
regard.

The laboratory is also diagnostic in this

If a person finds himself lacking in this basic acceptance of

others, then he should explore the interactional consequences of his lack.
If he decides that he should do something about it, then, for him, the laboratory will be principally remedial.

If he decides that he is unwilling to

change, then he mus.t learn to live with the behavioral consequences of his
decision.
Stern (1966), in discussing psychotherapy, makes a distinction that
might well bridge the gap between Rogers and Truax's views of unconditional
positive regard and the following section on acceptance versus approval.
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According to Stern, there are two approaches to experience:

(1) the

instrumental which aims at mastery, and (2) the sacramental which aims at
appreciation.

The therapist using the instrumental approach will see the
,.·-

patient's past as something to be overcome (either by emotional insight,
behavioral modification, learning ways of adjusting to reality, or a
combination of all these methods).

On the other hand, the therapist

following the sacramental approach looks upon the patient's past with respect,
even though (in the eyes of the therapist or of ·society in general or of the
patient himself) it may need to be trascended 9 and he looks upon the patient'
present as an experience which can be transformed, at least in part, through
concerned and appreciative confrontation.

In the sacramental approach the

patient's task becomes that of learning how to recognize himself as a unique
and total being, while the therapist must enter into the relationship
as an interacting-with-another self instead of a mirror in whose clear
surface the patient can come to appreciate his deepest feelings and how he
is distorting reality.

I sincerely believe that the core of what Rogers call

unconditional positive regard is compatible with the kind of respectful confrontation suggested by Stern.
Acceptance versus approval.

Acceptance, whether it is described in

terms of Rogers and Truax's unconditional positive regard or in terms of
giving the other respect, concern, understanding, the freedom to be, and the
opportunity to make and be responsible for his own decisions, is not
synonymous with approval (Rogers and Truax explictly place it outside the
pale o.f either approval or disapproval).

But acceptance in the fint·s t sense

does not, it is contended here, exclude the kind of confrontation to be
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described in the next chapter.

I do not believe that A, if he is sincerely

interested in growth, wants or expects .B to accept him in the sense that B
must accept, overlook, discount or even approve of modes of acting with which

A himself is dissatisfied and which remain for him a source of concern if not
of some kind of contract or existential guilt.

A does not (or should not)

expect B to consider his own (B's) value system so cavalierly and narrowly
as not to be concerned about these values among men in general and even with
respect to A.

Therefore, B can really accept A in a way that is consonant

with such concepts as unconditional positive regard and non-posessive warmth
(and certainly this kind of acceptance does have some kind of priority in
human relationships) and still (at least eventually, if not inunediately)
suggest to A the hypothesis that some aspects of A's behavior might be
proving deleterious to A himself, if not also to others.

B can do this

without in any way refusing to "respect" the experience of A, no matter how
different from his own such experience might be.

Once a person has declared

effectively--perhaps by word but especially by his actions--that he is antecedently "for" another, that he is open to him and his experience--his
miseries, his joys, his triumphs, his failures, his problems--then,and
perhaps only then, does he had the freedom to make careful confrontational
interventions in the life of the other.
Rogers and Truax (1967) and Schofield (1964), in discussing acceptance
as a therapist variable, do not discuss the relationship between acceptance
and confrontation nor do they discuss approval at any length.

But if, as

Patterson (1966) suggests, one person manifests certain ideal qualities in
his relationship to another--empathy, genuine concern, a desire to help, a
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belief in the ability of the other to change, an expectation or a hope that
the other will change in directions indicating growth, self-congruence, and
sincerity--then it would seem to follow that approval simply could not be
tied to the coattails of acceptance, for this would demand a certain
dishonesty on the part of one desiring to give himself to the other and thus
vitiate the concept of acceptance itself.

In a word, at least at a certain

stage of a relationship between two people, confrontation can be a
manifestation of positive regard, a regard that still remains unconditional
in that the confronter does not make his friendship depend on a change of
life in the confrontee.

His positive regard is also still unconditional

in that he is not trying to rob the person he is confronting of his
freedom (indeed, he wants him, if possible, to be even freer than he is now).
On the other hand, wholesale approval of another implies .either radical
non-involvement with him or non-concern or it implies unlimited rather than
unconditioned love.

If A really does not care for B, then he can be lavish

with his approval, because it costs him nothing.

Or if A's unlimited "love"

for B is really an unlimited need for B and B's affection and approval, then

A might well be ready to do whatever is necessary to maintain this relationship.

But there is no evidence that such unlimited approval or "love'' is

therapeutic or otherwise growthful.

On the contrary, developmental studies

have demonstrated that setting limits for a child as he is growing up, if
done responsibly with the child's growth rather than just the adult's
comfort in mind, is an obvious act of care and concern.

On the other hand,

there is evidence that unlimited approval is deleterious to growth.
Strickland and Crowne (1963) found that patients with high need for approval
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terminated therapy significantly earlier than patients with low need for
approval.

It is true that these patients might have terminated the relation-

ship for a number of reasons (poor therapist, "spontaneous remission,"
failure to receive unconditional positive regard, misunderstanding of the
nature of therapy, financial concerns, etc.), but it also is possible that th
early-terminators were, on the whole, immature people who expected to
receive unlimited approval or love from the therapist.

Truax and Carkhuff

(1967) suggest that the need for approval (as opposed to a need for respect,
concern) is an indication of disturbance rather than a remedy for it.

In

somewhat the same vein, Frank (1961) maintains that in group therapy support
need not be expressed in terms of increased "liking" (one of the forms of
approval) but in terms of respect for the "new" self that emerges from the
therapeutic process.

I am· in no way suggesting that Rogers and Truax's

concept of unconditional positive regard suffers from the inadequacies
outlined here; rather it is a question of trying to demonstrate that there
is no conflict between the concept of non-possessive warmth and responsible
confrontation, even though the latter has not been a part of the armamentarium of non-directive or client-centered approaches to therapy and other

growth experiences.
Antecedent acceptance
condition.

~

an expressed sense of solidarity in the human

An acute awareness of the fact that man, for all his splendid

accomplishments, often not only chooses unwisely but doggedly adheres to
self-destructive choices--this awareness expressed by sensitivity-group
members in such a way as to make it evident that no one is exempt from
human folly is a form of antecedent acceptance.

The sooner a member gives
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sufficient cues to indicate that he is open to both the heights and the depths
of the human condition, the sooner will he find himself "in-connnunity" in a
spirit of mutual trust.

It is the person who in one way or another can say:

"We are a micro-community of men participating in both the wisdom and folly
of man--it is this person who expresses a kind of solidarity with others in
the human condition that is both a statement of acceptance of others and a
plea to be accepted by others.
Fromm-Reichmann (1950) says that the respect that the therapist has for
his patient is valid only if the therapist realizes that his client's
difficulties in living are not too different from his own.

She also

maintain~

that such a statement is not just a humanitarian or charitable hypothesis
but that it is a scientific conviction.

Another way of putting this is that

in order to create a climate of trust, acceptance, and support, the participants in a sensitivity group must in some way denude themselves of statusroles and appear in the group simply as human beings, subject to both the
sublimities and follies of the human condition.

Stern (1966) suggests that

this should also take place in therapeutic encounters.

The therapist, he

says, should let his clients see some of his own problems in living, for
therapy is someplace where two or more people go together.
If this is to be accomplished, then the participants must lay aside
not only formal status roles (e.g. psychiatrist, psychologist, clergyman,
manager, teacher, etc.) but also any role that would interfere with free
contact among group participants.

For instance, if someone assumes a quasi-

role based on the supposition that "problems put people in categories,
problems divide," and if he translates this role into interaction in the
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group, saying implicitly or explicitly:

"I've listened, but my hang-ups are

not yours nor are yours mine; we're playing this game in different ballparks,'
he is assuming a role that demands that he reject others and that others
,

reject him.

..

-

This kind of psychological or interactional distancing, no matteI

how subtle or covert, inhibits mutual acceptance and therefore limits or
interferes with the kind of trust that is absolutely essential in the group
if all the participants are to "contact" one another freely.

works in two directions.
problems are not yours:

This distancing

The one who says, at least by implication:

"My

they make me less than you, they set me apart from

you" sets himself apart from others, making it very difficult for them to
provide him with any kind of support.

Though he does this in order to make

himself less vulnerable to rejection, he defeats his purpose because he
creates an atmosphere in which support is not viable.

If he also adds a

poor-me element, he complicates matters further, for he both refuses support
and at the same time tries to extort it.

This makes the rest of the

participants ambivalent toward him, if not angry.
participant takes the attitude toward another:

On the other hand, if a

"Your problems are not mine:

your problems set you apart from me," then his "support," if .he gives it at
all, will smell of condescension, and the one being "supported" will resent
being patroni2ed.
Support is most effectively given by one who has a feeling of involvement, of being with others, whatever the human experiences of these others
might be.

He has a strong feeling for the what-is of human living instead

of the what-should-be.

He so gives himself to others that the ways he is

like others and the ways in which he differs from them do not determine his
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involvement.

The one who isolates himself from the experiences of others

in the group is less human for doing so, no matter how he rationalizes his
isolation.

----

Availability~

antecedent support.

Friendship, and this includes the

beginnings of friendship in sensitivity or contract-groups, may be defined in
terms of availability.

Friends are mutually available and the degree of

availability defines the strength or the depth of the relationship.

Some

distinction, however, must be made between physical and psychological availability.

Physical availability refers to the spatio-temporal dimensions of

the relationship.

lbere is a high degree of physical availability if one

person spends a good deal of time with another, if he remains georgraphically
close, if physical presence of some sort (e.g. even contact by telephone) can
be easily achieved, or if more intimate kinds of actual physical contact are
a dimension of the encounter.

But, as important as physical availability

is for friendship, psychological availability is even more important.
Physical and psychological availability are separable, and the latter is the
more difficult to define.

First of all, any kind of availability, whether

physical or psychological, can be either active or passive.

For example, A

might invite B to spend some time with him or, on the other hand, he might
merely allow B to be with him.
availability.

These would be examples of active and passive

A person is actively available in a psychological way if he

takes the initiative in sharing hirnself--his deeper thoughts, concerns,
feelings, and aspirations--with another.

If he merely allows the other to

share such things with him, that is, if he is a more or less willing listener
to the confidences of another, then he is also psychologically available, but
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passively so.
It is evident that there are all sorts of combinations and degrees of
availability, both active and passive, physical and psychological.

For

instance, a prostitute might be actively available on a physical level, but
not psychologically available at all.

Perhaps the ideal marriage, in terms

of availability, is one in which the partners are utterly psychologically
available to each other and in which mutual physical availability is worked
out according to the individual needs and responsibilities.

Marriage

partners come together with a frequency and an intimacy of contact which are
not available to others, and their physical intimacy symbolizes, promotes,
and enriches their mutual psychological availability.

Both their physical

and psychological intimacy reveal how deeply they are "for" each other, how
deeply each wants to support the very being of the other.

In like manner,

failures in marriage, and in friendship in general, can be conceptualized
in terms of failures in physical and psychological availability, both active
and passive.
Since I had always been an at least "implicit "believer" in the dictum
that one could have very few close friends, I was taken aback once by a
trainer in a sensitivity group in which I was participating when he said
that he neither believed in that dictum nor lived by it.
had many deep friends.

It is true that he did

He claimed that he

not see many of them very

often (physical availability was relatively low in many cases), but when he
did see them, he did not need time to "work his way" back into the relationship.

Rather he and his friends started communicating immediately at a deep

level (psychological availability was very high).

It may be that our sub-

--------------------------------------------------------------------~.......J.
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scribing to the few-friends dictum (don't spread yourself too thin, 11

11

don't

become a psychological glutton," etc .• ) is a way of rationalizing our fears
of getting too close to others.
In the contract group, then, members are supportive to the degree that
they become available to one another.

At first glance, it would seem that

they are always, as long as the group is in session, physically available to
one another, but even in the group itself there are degrees of physical
availability.

For instance, there are certain physical cues--e.g., looking

at the other, modulations of voice, etc.--that indicate psychological
availability or the beginnings of it, and these cues may or may not be
present.
"contact"

One of the main purposes, in my opinion, for using nonverbal,
exercises in the group is to allow the participants an opportunity

to use physical contact both to stimulate and symbolize their psychological
availability to one another.

Such exercises, however antecedently anxiety-

arousing or "silly" they may seem to be (see Kaplan, 1968), are actually
serious and fear-reductive, for they usually reveal others as more psychologically available than one had realized.

The sooner the participants

become available to one another and the more deft they become in finding ways
in which to reveal or give evidence of this availability, the sooner will
they create a climate of trust that will support more than superficial
manifestations of the modalities of self-disclosure, expression of feeling,
and confrontation.
Participant "congruence" as antecedent

s~1pport.

Rogers (1961) , Rogd ':

and Truax (1967), and others (e.g. Truax & Carkhuff, 1967) have studied the
value of therapist autheticity or "congruence" in the therapeutic relation-
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ship, and they have come to the conclusion that it, together with unconditional positive regard and accurate empathy, is one of the most important
therapist variables:
We readily sense this quality of congruence in everyday life.
Each of us could name persons who always seem to be operating
from behind a front, who are playing a role, who tend to say
things that they do not feel. ·They are exhibiting incongruence.
We tend not to reveal ourselves too deeply to such people. On
the other hand, each of us knows individuals whom we somehow
trust because we sense that they are being what they are in an
open and transparent way and that we are dealing with the person
himself, not with a polite or professional facade. This is the
quality of congruence.
In relation to therapy it means that the therapist is what he
is, during the encounter with the client. He is without front
or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at the
moment are flowing in him. It involves the element of self-awareness, meaning that the feelings the therapist is experiencing are
available to him, available to his awareness, and also that he is
able to live these feelings, to be them in the relationship, and
able to conununicate them if appropriate. It means that he comes
into a direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him
on a person-to-person basis. It means that he is being himself,
not denying himself.
It is not a simple thing to achieve such reality. Being real
involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the
flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked
especially by complexity and continuous change ••••
It is not an easy thing for the client, or for any human being,
to trust his most deeply shrouded feelings to another person.
It is even more difficult for a disturbed person to share his
deepest and most troubling feelings with a therapist. The
genuineness, or congruence, of the therapist is one of the
elements in the relationship which makes this risk of sharing
easier and less fraught with dangers .
•••• At a very low level of congruence the therapist may be
clearly defensive in the interaction, as evidenced by the
contradiction between the content of the message and his voice
qualities or the nonverbal cues which he presents. Or the
therapist may respond appropriately but in so professional a
manner that he gives the impression that his responses are formulated to sound good rather than being what he really feels and
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means. Thus incongruence may involve a contrived or rehearsed
quality or a professional front.
At the upper ranges of therapist genuineness, his openness to
all types of feelings and experiences, both pleasant and hurtful,
without trace of defensiveness or retreat into professionalism,
is usually most evident from the quality of his voice and the
manner of his expression (Rogers & Truax, 1967, pp. 100-102).
It is hypothesized here that this quality of congruence is essential not only
for a therapist in a therapeutic relationship but for anyone who wants to
live a fully human life.

Again, it is a question of a variable that is

perhaps too closey identified with the therapeutic relationship.
therapeutic because it is deeply human.

It is

Therefore, participants in a

contract group are to examine or rather experience their ability or inability
to be congruent in the interaction of the group and attempt modes of behavior
designed to develop congruence.

It is evident that a group of congruent

participants will be supportive provided that they effectively handle the
confrontation that arises naturally from their being congruent.

This

problem will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Trust formation as antecedent support.
antecedent support is as trust formation.

One way of conceptualizing
Erikson (1959, 1963, 1968) sees

trust-versus-mistrust in existence itself as the first crisis faced by the
child:

What we here call trust coincides with what Therese Benedek has
called confidence. If I prefer the word 'trust,' it is because
there is more naivete~ and more mutuality in it: an infant can be
said to be trusting where it would go too far to say that he has
confidence. The general state of trust, furthermore, implies not
only that one has learned to rely on the sameness and continuity
of outer providers, but also that one may trust oneself and the
capacity of one's own organs to cope with urges: and that<ne is
able to consider oneself trustworthy enough so that he providers
will not need to be on guard lest they be nipped.
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•••• But let it be said here that the amount of trust derived
from earliest infantile experience does not seem to depend on
absolute quantities of food or demonstrations of love, but
rather on the quality of the maternal relationship. Mothers
create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of administration which in its quality combines sensitive care of the
baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthiness within the trusted framework of their culture's life style.
This forms the basis in the child for a sense of identity which
will later combine a sense of being 'all right,' of being oneself, and of becoming what other people trust one will become
(1963, pp. 247-249).
Thus trust-mistrust crisis is, of course, resolved differentially so that
even the "normal" participants in a sensitivity laboratory will differ in
their ability to trust themselves and others.

It is important for the

participants to realize this as they attempt to create a climate of trust in
the group.
Gibb (1964) claims that trust is absolutely essential for growth; he
links defensiveness to the trust-mistrust crisis:
A person learns to grow through his increasing acceptance of
himself and others. Serving as the primary block to such
acceptance are the defensive feelings of fear and distrust that
arise from the prevailing defensive climates in most cultures.
In order to participate consciously in his own growth a person
must learn to create for himself, in his dyadic and group
relationships, defense-reductive climates that will continue
to reduce his own fears and distrusts (p. 279).
Gibb sees the participants' unresolved feelings of fear and distrust, even
though these may be buried and denied, as formidable obstacles to growth
through group interaction.

Acceptance must precede what he calls "data-flow,

that is, the free interaction of group members:
within the limits of trust formation.

"Data-flow is possible only

A free flow of data is possible only

with antecedent or concurrent reduction of distrusts and fears" (p. 283).
It is evident that this is an area in which careful research is needed, but
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there is some evidence to back up Gibb's clinical observations.

Mellinger

(1956), for instance, found that scientists in a research organization tended
to conceal their attitudes about a particular issue when communicating with
persons in whom they lacked trust.

Read (1962) found that among executives

the less trust they hold for their immediate superiors the greater the
tendency toward "inaccurate communication" (p. 10) with these superiors.
Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note:

As

"Communication behavior is a function of

... the nature of the milieu" (p. 167).

If distrust colors the environment,

we can expect distortions in communication.
Some of the symptoms of distrust in the group are:
••• persistent defense of one's public image, attempts to
change attitudes and beliefs of others, attempts to make
decisions for others, avoidance of feeling, avoidance of
conflict, advice giving, flattery, cynicism about the powers
of the group, derogation of the group's abilities, lack of
confidence in the product of the group, and denial of
membership (Gibb, 1964, p. 284).

Gibb (1968) suggests other symptoms of lack of trust in groups:

"strategy"

behavior, differences between what is said inside and outside the group,
and impersonal talk:
[E]arly in groups, people are pretty closed and they operate with
a certain kind of strategy. They program their communications,
they plan what to say. They plan what to say on the basis of the
effect it will have •.•. The more I fear someone, the more I ration
my communications, the more I restrain my behavior, the more
controlled I am ••••
[An] operational test we use in research is: Do people say the
same things about each other in the group that they do in clusters
going home? To their wives after they get there ••• ? If they say
the same things about each other outside as they do to each inside,
that is a good feedback system. It is very rare in my experience.

[P]eople tend, when they are fearful to be impersonal. They tend
to escalate the cognitive level, to say: "Isn't it interesting that
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people are this way--people need people," rather than to say "I
need you," "I hurt," "I ove you," "Sit by me" •••• (pp. 3-4).
Therefore, since little happens in a group until the participants learn to
trust one another, one of the most important tasks of early group sessions
is the formation of a climate of trust.

It is far better to try to forestall

the mistrust behavior described by Gibb than to try to remedy it.

In the

contract group, the process of building a climate of trust is aided by the
contract itself.

If one knows that all the other participants have

subscribed to the same contract, then it is easier to trust them, for one
can, at le:st to some degree, predict their behavior and reactions. However,
if the contract is imposed on the group instead of being freely chosen
(imposition-of-contract instead of entry-by-contract),

t~en

it is necessary

to determine to what degree the participants are actually "buying" the
contract before one could use the contract as a source of trust.

The

leader-member should be familiar with the signs of distrust within the group
and bring the entire trust issue out into the open.

If he does not do

this, the participants themselves will do it eventually (and sometimes
repeatedly), therefore his early confrontation of the trust issue might be
more "economic" in the long run.
The way the preposition "behind" is used in the English language casts
some light on the question of support and trust.

If someone is "behind"

someone else, this is usually either a heartening or a threatening situation.
"We are behind you all the way," is a positive and supportive situation, but
if a person is merely "behind" another in the sense that he is in the

shadows, as it were, undeclared and unknown, then his presence is experienced
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as threatening.· If a person does not in some way declare himself "for" me-especially if my contract with him is fairly extensive--then it is not
paranoid for me to wonder whether he is "against" me in some way or not.
..

-

He

need not declare himself "for" me directly; it is sufficient if he indicates
that he is the kind of person who is "for" others generally.

Another way

of saying this is that the "he who is not for me is against me" dictum has
some general applicability to human relationships.

Most men would prefer

to have those who are not "behind" them in a positive sense to stand out in
the open, "in front of" them, in honest opposition, if necessary, rather
than remain in the shadows unknown.

This kind of honesty in the sensitivity

group goes far in establishing a facilitative climate of trust.
Misplaced trust can, as Lynd (1959) points out, lead to deep, even
incapacitating, experiences of shame:
Even more than the uncovering of weakness or ineptness, exposures
of misplaced confidence can be shameful--happiness, love, anticipation of a response that is not there, something personally
momentous received as inconsequential. The greater the expectation, the more acute the shame; the greater the discrepancy between one's image of oneself and the image others have of one,
the more one has to put on a 'brave face' (pp. 43-44).
Creating 'a climate of trust, then, involves having others "declare" themselve

in the group, that is, declare their attitudes (or lack of them) toward
others.

Still one cannot wait to share oneself until he is absolutely sure

that he will be accepted by others.

There is always the chance that one's

gift of oneself will be spurned or go unnoticed, at least to a degree.
However, the risk of laboratory training reflects the risk of life; too
many of us fail to grow because we prefer a climate of absolute or excessive
safety.

The laboratory, because it is life in miniature (though it is also
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life under a magnifying glass), has supportive resources more ready at hand

for those who take risks and fail or are failed than do macro-life situations.
Someone once called belief "prophetic of reality," that is, if a person
believes deeply enough in something, his faith will enable him to muster the
forces needed to create that in which he believes.

Trust, in the sense of

entrusting oneself to others, can also be prophetic of reality:

the person

who dares to entrust himself to others goes far in creating a climate of
trust in the group.
Consequent Support in Terms of Reinforcement
Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature on communicatio
and interaction, come to the conclusion that "communication behavior is a
' function of •.• the kinds of reward particularly valued by the individual (his
motives and needs).

A communicator initiates communication when he expects

a reward on the basis of his own past experience with this or similar task
environments and fellow group members" (p. 167).

Therefore, if the various

forms of antecedent support are instrumental in getting effective group
interaction started and in contributing to the formation of a viable "inter-·
actional climate," it is conseq9ent support in terms of reinforcement that
keeps the interaction going and brings it to term.
Recognition and appropriate response as reinforcement.

In the contrac.t-

group, reinforcement means, in general, that once a member has part i:·ipated
in some form of contractual behavior (e.g. self-disclosure, expression of
feeling), the other members should both (1) recognize (actively, behavior
the fact that he has acted contractually, that he has done "something good"
in the group, and (2) respond appropriately to his contractual behavior.
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Ideally, recognition and response emerge into a single act.

For instance, if

a person engages in meaningful self-disclosure ("story"),· it is not enough fo
the group simply to recognize verbally the fact that he has acted contractually:

"You have engaged in 'story' and this is a 'good thing' in this

group"--but they should react or respond to what he has said (if it is "story'
the assumption is that it is meaningful), that is, they should react personally to the disclosure.

"Appropriate" response means response proportioned t

the modality in which the other is speaking.

For example, if A, perhaps only

after screwing up his courage to take a responsible risk in the group,
confronts B, then B's best response to A would be to examine himself on the
issues suggested by A.

Such a response would both recognize and reinforce

A's contractual behavior.

Again, if A reveals himself significantly to the

group, then B might respond by revealing himself along similar or relevant
di mens ions •

B's act would indicate to A not only that he has listened

carefully to him but also that he has felt a certain solidarity with him.
Such an act would provide A with a good deal of reinforcement.
hand, if B were to reply to A's

self-discl~E\fe

On the other

irresponsibly--for instance,

by trying to "upstage" A with his own disclosure--then, obviously, his

"response" would have the opposite effect.
The trouble with simple direct recognition of contractual behavior-"We recognize the fact that you have engaged in 'story "'--as opposed to full
contractual response which includes recognition is that recognition that
,.

stands by itself can carry overtones of "separateness" from the other.

If A

merely recognizes the fact that B has acted contractually, he "stands off"
from B to a certain extent, at least by not really involving himself with B.
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Mere recognition of the plight of another is closer to pity than empathy,
and a person who pities another separates himself or stands off from the
other.

Sometimes, however--and this is especially true of earlier sessions

in the life of the group--the only response a person is honestly capable of
is to recognize the fact that another member has acted contractually.

For

instance, if someone reveals himself to a degree that was unexpected in the
group, he might catch the other members off guard, as it were.

Perhaps

all they can say at the moment (if they say anything) is something like this:
"This is the deepest level of self-disclosure that we have experienced in
this group.

But, although we appreciate the fact that someone has moved us

forward by his contractual behavior, we are still at a loss for appropriate
modes of response."

I have participated in groups in which "premature" and

ill-prepared-for self-revelation has, unfortunately, merely angered the
group.

In one group, the participants kept referring to such a disclosure as

"the bomb," and the group finally ended without their really being able to
handle this disclosure.

Such a situation could have been avoided if the

group had first discussed its goals and worked out some sort of contract to
deal realistically with possible group interactions.
Jourard (1967) discusses some research that seems to support the general
position taken here, that is, that more than mere recognition of contractual
behavior is necessary for adequate reinforcement:
Another student, W.J. Powell, Jr. (1964), did a doctoral
dissertation which was more carefully controlled than Rivenbark's
exploratory study. He conducted interviews with college students,
asking them to make themselves as fully known to him, the interviewer, as they cared to. He carefully controlled all extraneous
variables and compared the increase in self-disclosure (using an
op'eran t-condi tioning design) that occurred when, on the one hand,
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he responded with authentic disclosures of his own (in contrast
to 'reflecting' the feeling or content of their disclosures)
and when, on the other hand, he responded with expressions of
approval and support. He found that 'approving, supporting'
responses did not increase the students' disclosures at all.
Reflection and restatement of their disclosures resulted in an
increase in disclosures of negative self-statments, but did not
affect positive, self-enhancing expressions. Self-disclosure
from the researcher was associated with significant increases
in the subjects' disclosures of both positive and negative selfreferences (p. 114).
This research tends to confirm what has been said here about approval and the
value of responding by self-involvement.

The implications not only for

sensitivity training but for therapy in general are evident, even though
it means a departure from more comfortable therapeutic approaches to which
we have become accustomed.
The necessity of "immediacy" of rein.forcement.

Collins and Guetzkow

(1964), in extending the experimental data on the timing of rewards (see
Hilgard & Bower, 1966), suggest that temporal immediacy has its place in
social reward situations also:
The experimental data on the timing of rewards suggest that
they are most effective when they follow behavior within a few
seconds. Although the ability of humans to verbalize and plan
for the future increases the effectiveness of an environmental
reward, many social systems would be impossible if events in the
task environment were the sole source of reward. It may take
a goodly time for the group to realize its goals, but social
rewards may be applied immediately by verbal and gestural
behaviors in the face-to-face group (p. 77).
For instance, what is suggested here may well refer to the situation in
which a sensitivity-training participant puts himself "on the line" in some
way or other, and, once he is finished, there follows a comparatively long
silence.

We should find out whether such temporal "gaps" are deleterious to

the social reinforcement system operative in the group, and the hypothesis
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here is that they well might be.

I remember one group in which a young

man "put himself on the line" and, after he had finished, called for some
feedback from the others.

Luckily enough, this particular segment of the

group experience was recorded on videotape.
immediate response from the others.

He received practically no

In fact, when he called for response,

most of the participants tried to "leave the scene" by bowing their heads or
by looking off in a different direction.

When I replayed the tape, I told

them to watch what they did with their heads when they were asked to give
some feedback.

Then I asked the one who had put himself "on the line" how

he felt at that moment.

He said that he had felt alone, very much alone.

I would hypothesize that the more "immediacy" there is in reinforcement
behavior in the sensitivity group the greater the effect.
1

This refers to

temporal immediacy, certainly, for temporal immediacy of reinforcement means
at least that the listener has picked up the cue "I-am-finished" or the cue
"I-would-like-some-response."

But it also refers to "qualitative immediacy,"

that is, the degree to which the respondent really puts himself "into" the
response.

Indeed, such qualitative immediacy seems to be more important

than mere temporal immediacy.

One way of conceptualizing this qualitative

immediacy of response is in terms of a therapist variable currently receiving
a good deal of attention--accurate empathy (Rogers, 1961, 1967; Truax, 1961,

1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1967).
Immediacy of supportive reinforcement in terms of accurate empathy.
Rogers and Truax (1967} describe accurate empathic understanding:
The ability of the therapist accurately and seii::d t tvely to understand experiences and feelings and their meaning ~ the clie1~~
during the moment-to-moment encounter of psychotherapy consti-
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tutes what perhaps can be described as the 'work' of the therapist
after he has first provided the contextual basis for the relationship by his congruence ••• and his unconditional positive regard.
Accurate empathic understanding means that the therapist is
completely at home :lhthe unhr-erse of patient. It is a momentto-moment sensitivity that is in the 'here and now,' the
immediate present •.•• [I]t is of limited use to the individual
if the therapist only arrives at this insightful and empathic
understanding ••• as he drives home at night. Such a delayed
empathy or insight may be of value if the therapist has a later
chance to respond to the same theme, but its value would lie in
formulating his empathic response to the patient's immediate
living of the relationship.
The ability and sensitivity required to communicate these inner
meanings back to the client in a way that allows these experiences
to be 'his' is the major part of empathic understanding •
.•• To communicate this perception in a language attuned to
the patient that allows him more clearly to sense and formulate
his confusion, his fear, his rage or anger is the essence of
the communicative aspect of accurate empathy •
••• The communication is not only by the use of words that the
patient might well have used, but also by the sensitive play of
voice qualities which reflect the seriousness, the intentness,
and the depth of feeling .
••• This empathic understanding when it is accurately and
sensitively communicated seems crucially important in making it
possible for a person to get close to himself, to experience
his most inward feelings, to maintain contact with his inner
self-experiences, thus ailowing for the recognition and resolution of incongruencies. It is this self-exploration and consequent
recognition and resolution of incongruities that we believe allows
the client to change and to develop his potentialities.
The common element in a low level of empathy involves the
therapist's doing something other than 'listening' or 'understanding'; he may be evaluating the client, giving advice,
offering intellectual interpretations, or reflecting upon his
own feelings of experiences. Indeed, a therapist may be accurately
describing psychodynamics to the patient, but in a language not
that of the client, or at a time when these dynamics are far removed
from the current feelings of the client, so that there is a
flavor of teacher-pupil interactions (pp. 104-106).
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) note that "accurate empathy which stressed dLi,'"''
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tic accuracy or sensitivity to feeling or experience from a slightly analytic
point of view proved much more highly related to the criterion indices than
did the better known variable which grew out of the client-centered tradition"
(p. 365).

However this S·tatement may be reconciled with what Rogers and

Truax have said above, it is hypothesized here that the accurate empathy
that is effective in sensitivity groups (and indeed in human relationships
generally) includes both the ability to get "within" the other and the
willingness and ability to convey this to the other in terms that are
intelligible to him.

Perhaps this would make a therapist more active than

a Rogerian therapist is generally thought to be, but ff this is a development
in client-centered theory, it seems to be in the right direction.
Reinforcement of the individual rather than the group.

Research

indicates that individuals involved in some group task, rather than the
group as a whole, should receive reinforcement.

Rosenberg (1960) demonstrated

that an individual will not learn new modes of behavior if the group as a
whole is rewarded in such a way that the task-environmental rewards and
punishments are not specifically coordinated to his behavior.

Zajonc (1962)

has reported that the performance of seven-man teams was inhibited when
individuals received knowledge only of group success and failure and did nut
receive feedback on individual performances.
lesson for sensitivity groups.

This contains an important

Group members frequently tend to address the

group as a whole instead of one another when more individualized responses
would be more appropriate.

While this might be safer (because it is less

involving), it is also self-defeating, because the participants as individuals
are not rewarded for taking risks in communication.

Furtherr:,,. r·e, communica-
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tions addressed to the group as a whole tend to become general and
less immediate, less personal.

abstractiv~

Certainly some communications must be

addressed to the group as a whole, and all communications are directed toward
the group in some way.

If A reveals himself, he usually reveals himself to

the group as a whole directly (unless his self-revelation is in response
to a communication from another member, in which case it is made directly to
the other member and indirectly to the entire group).

But if B responds to

what A has said by addressing the group in general, even in rewarding terms-"Now we are getting somewhere!"--his response is less effective than if he
had addressed A directly.

In this case the group is best reinforced by A's

being reinforced.
Failures in Support
Group members can fail to support one another in a variety of ways.
Some of them are listed here.
Clichl' £!. ritualistic support.

Our language is filled with socially

,;

appropriate cliches expressive of support--"! know how you feel," "Is there
anything I cun do," "You must feel awful," "I just didn't know," etc.--an.d
they usually abound in sensitivity groups.

I

One of the more disturbing cliche

is the "I know just how you feel" followed immediately by "because

!· .. "

It is disturbing because the implication is that the authenticity of
another's feelings in some way depends upon whether it can be verified in
the experience of the one listening to him.
represented by the person who merely

This situation at its worst is
I

uses the cliche "I know how you feel"

in order to divert attention to his own experience.

The problem with such

ritualistic or "socialized" support is that it simply is not supportive.
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We find non-cliche support difficult because it involves emotion--the other's
and our own--and we simply are not comfortable with emotion.

,,

We find non-

cliche support difficult because it involves going out of ourselves to the
other.

It demands that we lay aside our egocentricity and many of us are not

ready to do that.

Frequently when we try to express positive emotions in

support of one another, we sound phony because we do not trade in these
emotions from day to day and we are simply gauche with the unfamiliar.

In

a sensitivity group it may be more supportive (because it is more honest)
if a member were to admit that he is faced by one of the lessons of the
Book of Job, that is, that it is fruitless and even inhuman to try to engage
in logical and highly "socialized" dialogue with someone who is suffering.
If a participant frankly admits his inability to go beyond the cliche for
the moment, even this can be refreshingly supportive.

In fact, this honest

"clearing of the decks" might make attempts at more authentic kinds of
support somewhat easier.
Cheap empathy.

Some sensitivity-training participants never miss an

opportunity to give support, especially to the sufferer.
professional wake-goers, their motto seeming to be:
side (in times of disaster)."

They resemble

"I am always at your

Such support is ritualistic, triggered by any

sign of pain in the other, and seems to be directed toward fulfilling the
needs of the one "giving support" rather than the one in need.

Actually the

one supported is seen as a stereotype, "one-in-pain," "une-·needing-rnysupport," and to the degree that this is true support is not authentic inter-

II

action with this person.

L

On the other hand, over-support might be a per:-'. --: , s

way of manifesting his own need for support or mothering.

Support should

n~t

!
'

I
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be "mush," even though it may be tender; it should not be sentimental, even
though it involves feelings and emotions.

It should arise out of the strength

of the one who gives support and_not out of his weakness.

The one who gives

authentic support will give support in both adversity and joy, success and
failure because support does not mean "propping the other. up," it means being
"with" him especially when the other reveals or is trying to come to grips
with some of the more dramatic dimensions of his life, positive or negative.
Lynd (1959) suggests that we overemphasize support-in-adversity:

"Scheler

points out that the term 'sympathy' is often wrongly confined to pity or
compassion.

Sympathy with suffering (Mitleid) and sympathy with joy (Mit-

freude) are two different things, often confused, and the second is frequent!
neglected in the study of the first" (p. 236).

It takes both strength and

skill to support the other because he is the other and not because he is
either victim or hero.

Only those who are not afraid of universal contact

with the other can provide a wide range of support.
The St. Sebastian Syndrome.

St. Sebastian was a Christian martyr who

was killed, it is reported, by being shot full of arrows.
happens in an analogous way in sensitivity groups.

Tilis frequently

A person tells his "story'

and, although it is vaguely sensed by others that support would be an
appropriate response, no one knows how to go about such a task.

Being

unskilled in the .art of support, they tend to substitute a caricature:

they

begin to ask questions to show their "interest," "How do you feel?--When did
it happen?--How are things now?--How long has it been going on?"--etc., etc.
This keeps the victim in the center of attention of course and does away
with the need for real involvement or response.

At first (at least this is

r.:y experience) the victim does not recognize the game:

he thinks thcit

tht~

others are actually asking serious questions and he tries to answer them.
Then he begins to feel that what is taking place is either out

o~

place,

missing the point, or downright ludicrous, but being polite, he still
answers the questions for a while (though with less and less enthusiasm).
His interlocutors keeping pumping him with arrows (by this time even they are
tiring of the game) until he and the interaction die.

This caricature of

support can also be called the "Is-it-bigger-than-a-breadbox" syndrome both
because of the Twenty Questions nature of the game and because such a question frequently seems as "meaningful" as the others being asked.

This does

not mean that an occasional question cannot be both extremely insightful and
deeply supportive, but it must be appropriate, non-ritualistic, sincere,
pithy, forceful, and a prelude to a deeper involvement with the other.

A

question in this vein which is actually quite confronting can be more

"

supportive than all the cliches and vapid questions put together.
Support versus "red-crossing."
I

"Red crossing" is a term that originated

believe, at Synanon and means "rushing to the aid of a group member like a

Red Cross worker."

Its connotations are obviously pejorative.

Some people

cannot stand seeing another in any kind of pain, physical or psychological,
even in cases in which the pain is beneficial.

For instance, if someone is

being confronted in the group in a responsible way and therefore necessarily
undergoing the pain associated with the process of confrontation, it is the
"red-crosser" who comes. to the aid of the confron tee in an effort to "get
him off the hook."

He does so in a number of different ways:

he gives

approval to the confrontee's behavior (whether the confrontee approves of his
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own behavior or not), he tries to rationalize away the other's guilt or
responsibility,

giv~s

speeches the burden of which is that "all of us are

likewise sinners," and in gene!al tries to show that the person being
confronted is an innocent victim needlessly suffering.

The "red-crosser"

is not at all like the person who intervenes when he believes that the
confrontational process has become irresponsible, negative, and profitless
in a particular case.

This kind of intervention is often needed in

sensitivity-groups (less often, I believe, in contract-groups).

Needless to

say, in the contract-group the "red-crosser" fulfills no useful function.
Silence

~

failure in support.

to misuse a line from Milton.

"They also fail who only sit and wait"--

A ·group member once talked about the "hurt"

that she felt from the silent members.

She did not sense that they were

hostile, but she found it difficult to engage in self-disclosure in front
of people who willed to remain strangers.

Even silence that is perceived as

sympathetic is harmful if it is protracted.

In the contract-group there

should be no silent members; in fact, there cannot be if the contract is
being fulfilled.

,TI!! PROBLEMS IN RECEIVING SUPPORT
Even when support is given responsibly and sincerely, there is no
guarantee that it is going to be received as it is given.

The people who

attend sensitivi.ty laboratories come with a wide range of normal problems
of living a number of which militate against their being open to even very
really human supportive behavior.

Some arrive with dependency problems

against which they have been struggling.

They see themselves as tending to

be overly dependent and the resent any kind of behavior in others which c.'.ln
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be interpreted as pla¥ing to thei.r dependency needs.

Evidently such

counterdependent behavior interfers wi.th their effecti.ve involvement with
others.

Therefore, if it becomes clear during the interaction of the group

that a participant has been fending off attempts on the part of others to
support him, his behavior should become the object of confrontation.

If he

is struggling with dependency, then, i f possible, he is to share this problem
with the group, he is to 'bring it "into community" where it can be handled.
On the other hand, there are those who thrive on attention and uncreative
forms of "support."

They are constantly looking for subtle forms of approval

Ideally, support, at least in the contract-group, should elicit further
contractual behavior from the one who s.eeks support or to whom support is
actually given.

If it does not, if supportive behavior constantly goes "sour'

in the case of any particular participant, the group should take this as
diagnostic and try to get the problem out into the open.

Furthermore, if

the members of a group are giving one another support and still find that
little or no progress is being made in effecting a viable climate of trust
(even though there is a generally "pleasant" atmosphere in the group), then
it is time to investigate whether support putatively given is also "support
received."

Unfortunately, groups can run a long time on social "pleasantnes~.''.

and other counterfeits of support.
they really are by their effects:

Support-counterfeits are seen for what
(1) the tend to make the group comfortable

and the participants tend to lose that edge of anxiety that frequently stirs
up meaningful interaction; (2) contractual behavior diminishes, becomes
emasculated, or disappears entirely.
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CONCLUSION
No one and no contract can program the development of a climate of trust
and support in a sensitivity-training group.

As Gibb (1968) notes, the

group, no matter how long it remains in existence, continually discovers new
levels of trust and support.
one of hopelessness:

The initial reaction of many participants is

"I could never really entrust myself to you."

However,

as the group moves forward, even the most timid, encouraged by the risks
the other members take, begin to move out into the group.

If the contract

helps the participants, including the most fearful, to move "into community"
more quickly and with a greater degree of psychological safety, that it
serves its purpose we.11.
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Chapter IX
Confrontation ;i.n Laboratory Training
Introduction
Confrontation is an important "growth" variable both in the laboratory
and in life, but it is one that merits careful explanation for a number of
reasons.

First of all, confrontation-in-caricature is popularly taken as

the symbol of laboratory training in general and sensitivity training in
particular:

"I don't have to attend a laboratory to tell people off and to

give them their chance at me."

It is true that some laboratory experiences

are characterized by irresponsible confrontation, but this is certainly not
generally true nor is there any reason why it has to be the case in any
given laboratory experience.

Laboratories are designed to be growth-exper-

iences, not places where the psyche is laid open to possible destruction.
And yet time and again people approach me asking me whether a particular
individual should take part in a laboratory experience or whether a laborator
should be allowed to operate at all lest an individual or a group be exposed
to psychic harm.

Well-run laboratory experiences are no more "dangerous"

than group therapy experiences, and I assume that the latter are run for the
benefit of the participants.

Laboratories have been designed in which all

the participants are drawn from a psychiatric population (Morton, 1965) and
with apparently excellent results (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle,

& Moyer, 1965).

Other laboratories prefer to exclude those with more severe

problems in living (the NTL literature specifically states that its laboratories are not designed as therapy sessions).

If confrontation is

responsible, that is, proportioned to both the laboratory design and popula-
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tion, then it will be a powerful force for growth.
Secondly, confrontation as a therapy-variable or as a modality of mature
human interaction has received practically no theoretical attention in the
literature (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967), and controlled
research in this area has just begun (e.g., Berenson & Mitchell, 1968;
Berenson, Mitchell, & Laley, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968;
Boyd & Sisney, 1968; Truax, Fine, Moravec, & Millis, 1968).

Confrontation

is another one of those "therapy-variables" that is therapeutic because it is
a fully human and growthful kind of interaction; it receives no mystic
baptism because it is associated with therapy.

Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, &

Pierce (1967) suggest that life itself ''without confrontation is
passive, and

impot~nt"

(p. 172).

directionles~

One of the reasons why confrontation

seems necessary for full human living is what might be called the ''bias"
nature of man:

man, when unchallenged, tends to drift towards extremes, he

becomes either too much "for" himself (Anderson, 1964) or too much "against"
himself (Reik, 1949}.

Or he merely drifts into the "psychopathology of the

average," which, given his potentialities, is also an extreme.

The mature

man is one who has learned to challenge himself and his own behavior; is
always looking for more productive ways to be and interact with others.

But,

since he is really mature, when he fails to challenge himself, he is grateful
when his friends (and perhaps even his enemies) are concerned enough to
confront him.
Confrontation, then, has its place first of all in all mature human
interaction, and, because it is a modality of mature living, it also belongs
both in interactions which attempt to explore human potentialities and deal
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with the "psychopathology of the average" (training laboratories) and in
interactions designed to come to grips with more serious problems in living
(psychotherapy).

It is not strange to find confrontation in therapy and

other interpersonal-growth experiences, rather it is strange that "normal"
men make such limited and ineffectual use of such a powerful growth variable.
Confrontation, psychoanalysis, and client-centered counseling.

Douds,

Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce (1967) note the general failure of the
"psychotherapies" to deal with the issue of confrontation:
as life, continues independently of all therapeutic models.

"Confrontation,
With the possible

exception of the existentialists, none of the major systems leaves room for
the concept of confrontation:

the existentialists alone approach confronta-

tion by their concept of 'encounter"' (p. 170).

Many of the therapies in

existence today have been directly or indirectly, but still deeply, influenced
by both the psychoanalytic tradition and, at least in the United States, the
non-directive approach.

Non-directive approaches, by definition, eliminate

direct confrontation and the therapies that have been influenced by the
psychoanalytic tradition have stressed insight rather than action (see London,
1964).

Douds and his associates (1967) believe that the absence of confronta-

tion in therapy has produced a rather exsanguinated therapeutic culture; they
refer to the "middle-class" therapy "which hopes to seduce the illness aw< "
(p. 171).

With regard to the non-directive tradition, however, perhaps we

have come full circle in a spiral of growth.

In Hegelian terms, the

thesi~

would be therapy as advice-giving, therapy in which the therapist took over
the direction of the other's life, therapy that was too heavy-handed, robbj,the client of his freedom to grow.

In the main the non-directive appro3ch
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became the antithesis to such a tradition and stressed total acceptance and
empathy, the ability to get into the ''world" of the client.

The synthesis,

the beginnings of which are being felt today, finds a place in therapy for
responsible confrontation, but in an atmosphere of unconditional positive
regard and empathy.
Confrontation and other therapies.

Although theoretically few writings

deal directly and separately with confrontation as a therapy variable, this
does not mean that therapies in which confrontation plays a key if not centra
role do not exist.

Synanon and Daytop Village (Casriel, 1962; Maslow, 1967;

Patton, 1967; Shelly & Bassin, 1965; Yablonsky, 1965) have been using
confrontational "encounters" as an important part of their total institutiona·
program; and it is with some frequency that those participating in the progr
are called to task because they are ''talking the talk but not walking the
walk," that is, their behavior is lagging behind Daytop & Synancin expecta:ncies.

Alcoholics Anonymous groups have long been confronting what they call

the "stinkin' thinkin" of members who try to rationalize and excuse their
behavior. Mainord (1968a, 1968b) and Mowrer (Mowrer, 1967; Drakeford, 1967)
have for years now been using contractual approaches to therapy in which
contract-oriented confrontation plays a major role.

For instance, Mainord

suggests the following dialogue to indicate how his patients are held to
the contract:
Patient
Patient
Patient
Patient

A:
B:
A:
B:

Therapist:

How did you get along sexually?
Not very well.
What do you mean?
I'd rather not talk about that--it gives me this
terrible feeling just to think about it.
Your agreement was to be completely honest, and that
witholding information was to be considered dishonest.
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You didn't agree to be honest only when it felt
good, if you'll remember (1968b, p. 1).
Ellis (1962) uses logic, reasoning, suggestions, persuasion, and prescription
of activities in his rational-emotive psychotherapy, all of which contain a
large element of confrontation:
TH: Let's get back to changing John. Would it be so terrible if
you got refused, even by a girl you didn't know that there was a
good chance beforehand she was going to refuse you, and you didn't
know at all what was going to be? Or would it be so terrible if
you gradiosely didn't get exactly what you wanted without any
effect and without their selecting you?
PT: No, it, uh, it wouldn't be bad. This I, you know, I, this
I can logically believe this.
TH: At times.
PT: Yeah, at times.
TH: But most of the time, more strongly, you still believe the other
things ••• (Patterson, 1966, pp. 128-129).
Bach (1966) conducts "Marathon" groups according to rules which demand a kind
of total confrontation or what he calls "constructive aggression" (p. 998).
The ordinary rules of tact are suspended for the duration of the Marathon.
Stoller (1968b) also outlines a kind of marathon therapy in which confrontation plays an important part.

Beier (1966) has written on the use of the

"asocial" response as a means use9. by the therapist to free himself from the
"games" of his client and to confront the client with what he is really
saying or impl.ying.

Corsini' s (1968) "immediate therapy" is a form of

group therapy in which both self-confrontation in conununity and confrur:tation
by others play a central role.

The existentialists (e.g., Frankel, 1962;

May, 1958, 1961; May & van Kaam, 1963; van Kaam, 1962) place such emphasis
on the client's "possibilities" and on his freedom and responsibility that
confrontational encounters between patient and therapist are inevitable.
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The list of those who use confrontation as one of their therapeutic
tools could, I am sure, be lengthened considerably, but the point here is
that confrontation is not new to therapy just as it is not new to life
(Plato long ago said that the unexamined life is not worth living, and the
unchallenged life tends to be the unexamined life).

Moreover, there is a

good deal of informal experimentation with confrontation taking place both
in therapy and in laboratory-training situations.

As a powerful element of

human interaction, it can both stimulate personal and interpersonal growth
and it can cause extensive harm.
user's own deficits and pathology.

In inept hands it becomes the tool of the
On the other hand, when used responsibly,

it becomes another avenue of involvement with and concern for the other.

What follows is an attempt to describe confrontation and its caricatures and
to indicate some of its uses in a variety of growth-group experiences.
Toward

~

Description of Confrontation.

Berne (1966) defines confronta-

tion in terms of his transactional system:
In confrontation the therapist uses information previously
elicited and specified, in order to disconcert the patient's
Parent, Child, or contaminated Adult by pointing out an
inconsistency. The patient is stirred up and his psyche is
thrown out of balance, and this tends to cause a redistribution of cathexis .••
To the patient's Child, a confrontation may represent a Parental
move in a game that stimulates defensive operations learned
early in life .••. To his Adult it may represent an intellectual
challenge for which he is grateful ("I never noticed that
before"). To his Parent it may represent an incursion on
Parental authority •.•. (p. 235).
Confrontation, therefore, has the purpose of ending a "game" type of interaction, but if it is not reacted to properly, it becomes a stimulus for
further game-involvement.

Douds and his associates (1967) describe confron-
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tation in a way that is more adaptable to the needs of a sensitivity-group:
Direct confrontation is an act, not a reaction. It is initiated
by the therapist, based on his core understanding of the client.
It brings the client into more direct contact with himself, his
strengths and resources, as well as his self-destructive behavior.
The purpose of confrontation is to reduce the ambiguity and
incongruities in the client's experiencing and communication. In
effect, it is a challenge to the client to become integrated; that
is, one with his own experience. It is directed at discrepancies
within the client (his ideal versus real self); between what the
client says and does (insight and action); and between illusion and
reality (the therapist's experience of the client versus the
client's expression of his experience of himself and the therapist).
The therapeutic goal is nondestructive and emerging unity within
the client. It implies a constructive attack upon an unhealthy
confederation of miscellaneous illusions, fantasies, and life
avoidance techniques in order to create a reintegration at a higher
level of health (p. 171).
This is the kind of confrontation that people engage in who are concerned abou
one another.
The measurement of confrontation in research.

Berenson and his

associates (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, &
Moravec, 1968) have distinguished five "major" types of confrontation for the
purpose of research:
Five major types of confrontation were employed: Experiential,
Didactic, Strength, Weakness and Encouragement to Action ••••
Experiential confrontation was defined as the therapist's
specific response to any discrepancy between patient and therapist's experiencing of the patient, or to any discrepancy
between patient statement about himself and patient's inner
experience of himself, or to say discrepancy between patient
and therapist's, experience of the therapist. A didactic confron·tation was defined as the therapist's direct clarification of
the patient's misinformation or lack of information. This type
of confrontation may include the therapist's efforts to offer the
patient information based on test data, behavior, or data about
some aspect of the world as well as details about the therapist
or the structure and function of the therapy process. Confrontation of Strength referred to an experiential confrontation which
focused on the patient's resources. Weakness referred to an
experiential confrontation which focused on the patient's
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liabilities or pathology. Finally, Encouragment to Action
involved the therapist pressing the patient to act on his world
in some constructive manner and discouraging a passive stance
toward life. Frequency and type of confrontation were accepted
only when the two independent judges agreed upon both presence
and type of confrontation (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968,
pp. 111-112).
In a sense, then, there are only three types, for Strength and Weakness are
both subdivisions of Experiential confrontation.

Results seem to indicate

that "high-level" therapists use "experiential" confrontation more frequently,
while "low-level" therapists tend to confront the client's weaknesses (howeve ,
confrontation of weakness is defined in the article as a kind of "experiential" confrontation).

Whether these are the categories which will eventually

prove most helpful in research remains to be seen, but certainly a much
clearer theoretical discussion of the bases for classification is needed at
the present time.
Truax and his associates (Truax, Fine, Moravec, and Millis, 1968) have
studied the effects of therapist persuasive potency in individual psychotherapy.

A therapist is high in persuasive potency if during an interview he

"is the kind of person that communicates a socially influential or potent
person" (p. 360--again, a clearer operational definition of "persuasive
potency" would have made this article more meaningful).

The results suggeste

"that therapist persuasiveness operates to effect patient improvement
somewhat independently of other personal qualities of the therapist (specifically his level of accurate empathy and nonpossessive warmth for the patient)'
(p. 362).

I would hypothesize that there is some positive relationship be-

tween therapist "persuasive potency" and his ability to L':1gage in growthful
confrontation.

Indeed the relationship between persuasion (see Frank, 1961)
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and confrontation in therapy and other growth experiences is an intriguing
one, but little can be said until more effective operational definitions for
and measurement of both persuasion and confrontation have been devised and
research has been carried out.

I would now like to dissect the act of

confrontation and suggest ways in which it can become an effective variable
in interpersonal growth experiences.

THE ANATOMY OF CONFRONTATION
Generally confrontation takes place (1) when one person (the confronter)
either deliberately or inadvertantly places some act (2) which causes or
directs another person (the confrontee) to advert to, reflect upon, examine,
question, or change some particular aspect of his behavior.

In other words,

some act on the part of the confronter--whether he is aware of it or not-acts as a stimulus to the confrontee and this stimulus-act has a specific
effect on the confrontee:

it challenges him, "pulls him up short," directs

him to reflect upon or change some aspect of his behavior (behavior, that is,
in wide sense:

overt acts, inaction, attitudes, moods, etc.).

that confrontation must be described or defined as

ge~erally

I believe

as this if it

is to include all behavior that is referred to in the literature as confrontational.

Moreover, if it is defined this generally, it becomes q11lte easy

to see that there are many different forms (both growthful and destructive)
and many different degrees of confrontation.

It is extremely importcmt f,"r

sensitivity-training participants to understand the natur.e of confronL1l i,'n
and to become acquainted with the different forms it can take, for it can '
one of the most potent forms of interpersonal behavior and i
be respected.

~s

powe ;· should
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At first glance confrontation is a simple process, but it can

become

extremely complicated because of the variables involved:
(1) the nature of the stimulus act;
(2)

the natural "bias" of the confronter;

(3)

the relationship between the confronter and the confrontee;

(4)

the motivation of the confronter;

(5)

the manner in which the confrontation takes place;

(6)

the effect which the stimulus act has on the confrontee;

(7)

the manner in which the confrontee responds to the confrontation.

Each of these elements of the confrontational process merits separate
consideration.
(1)

The nature of the stimulus act:

the forms of confrontation.

A wide variety of act, both verbal and nonverbal, may have a confrontational effect upon any particular person.

If the confronter realizes or

suspects that some act that he places will have a confrontational effect on
someone else, then he is deliberately engaging in the modality of confrontation.

However, if he merely places an act which de facto has some confron-

tational effect which he neither foresaw or intended, then the confrontation
is not deliberate.

I.t is evident that group members should become as aware

as possible of the effects of the acts they place, for :hdeliberate (and
uncontrolled) confrontation can be destructive.

t 1'• 1 s

A review of some of

of stimulus-acts that can have confrontational effects is a starting
for making confrontation a more rational process.
Confrontation can take place through a variety of stimulus acts.

The.

following are the confrontational stimuli dealt with in this chapter:
I

--------------------------------------------------------------J
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(a)

giving the confrontee information he does not possess or is
considered to possess in an adequate way;

(b)

interpretation of the confrontee's behavior;

(c)

directly challenging the other's behavior;

(d)

self-involvement of confronter with confrontee as a mode of
confrontation;

(e)

group situational variables which are considered confrontational,
e.g., group exercises, the contract itself in a contract group,
being with strangers, etc.;

(f)

"processing," that is, group self-criticism;

(g)

withdrawal of reinforcement;

(h)

the use of videotape.

Each of these will be taken up in order.
(a)

Confrontation through information.

One of the basic forms of

confrontation is to transmit to another sume infonnation concerning his
person.

Again such information transmission may or may not be deliberate

and it may not be foreseen that it will have a confrontational effect.

One

way of illustrating this process is by means of the "Johari Window"
(Luft & Ingham, 1955), which we have already seen in Chapter VII. (See
Figure 1).

Each quadrant of the "window" is defined by its coordinates.

Therefore, Quadrant II (blind area) involves those things which a person
does not know (at least in some sense of "know") about himself but which are
known by at least some others.

In confrontation through information the

confronter moves some kind of information that has some relationship to tht::
confrontee from Quadrant II into Quadrant I.

By the very fact that one man
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Figure 1
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i
Figure IX:l.

The Johari Window.
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"outside" another he has a view of the other of which the other is metaphysically incapable.

In this sense, those that surround us are, at least

potentially, valuable sources of information about our own persons, for they
have sources of evidence that are not directly available to us.
If confrontation were merely a question of the transmission of correct
and meaningful information by a concerned observer to a willing listener in
order that the latter might engage in and grow

t~rough

self-examination and

subsequent behavioral-change, then everything would be simple indeed.
reality, however, such simplicity has to be learned:
than a starting point.

In

it is a goal rather

In confrontation-through-information, there are a

number of important variables:

the nature of the information transmitted

(its veridical status and/or hypothetical character), the person (confronter,
confrontee, or other) to whom it principally refers, the fact as to whether
or not the seriousness of the information, and the differential meaning the
information has for confronter, confrontee, and the other members of the
group.

Since these factors influence the quality of the confrontation, they

must be taken into consideration.
A third set of statements deals with the interpretations of behavioral
cues emitted by the confrontee.

These will be dealt with below under

"interpretations."
Does the confrontee already possess this information or not?

If the

confrontee suspects or knows that what he has to say is already known by
the confrontee, then he should weigh the consequences of telling someone
what he already knows.

For instance, if he says to another participant:

"You have not said a word here this C:Jening," undoubtedly the other already
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realizes this.

If the information is already known, then the confronter

should manifest his intent in repeating it; for instance, he should explain
how he feels about the other's silence and why he has interrupted it.
Usually the confronter assumes that what he has to say is "unknown"
to the other in some sense of the word "unknown."

For instance, the

confronter may think that the information, though known, bears repeating,
that it should be brought "into community," that repeating it here and now
would have a specific effect, that it needs to be dramatized, etc.

In this

case he assumes that the confrontee does not ''know" the information well
enough to act upon it, that is, the information is "unknown" in the sense
that it has either made little impression on the confrontee or has not had
any behavioral consequences.

On the other hand, if the confronter realizes

that it is most likely that the confrontee simply does not possess the
information that he is about to transmit, then he should first weigh the
consequences of his act, its surprise or "shock" value, the impact it will
have on the group, etc.

In other words, the confronter should have a healthy

respect for the power of knowledge and use it reasonably.
The importance of the information and its differential meaning
confronter and confrontee.

~

''Your tie is crooked" is a relatively unimportant

piece of information, while ''You have bad breath" or "I notice that John
never sits close to you" might be relatively more important.

The seriousness

or the objective importance of a piece of information will usually determine
its impact on the group as a whole, including the confrontee, but still at
times the subjective meaning of any particular

bi~

.

i

irt;"ormation might di ff e1

greatly with respect to confronter, confrontee, or any other member of the
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group.

For instance, if the confronter says, "Your tie is crooked," this might

be accepted by the confrontee and the group as a whole with a certain amount

of indifference, but the point is that a crooked tie on this particular person
might bother the confronter quite a bit.

On the other hand, the confrontee

might be particularly sensitive to information that is relatively meaningless
to confronter and the group as a whole.

The intelligent and considerate

confronter is one who can judge not only the absolute importance of any piece
of information but its relative importance to the confrontee and to the
others.

If there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective impor-

tance of what the confronter has to say and its subjective meaning to him,
it might be best if he were to lay the entire problem before the group:
"You know, your tie is crooked and that has been bothering me.

I tend to be

compulsive, I know, but I really think it bothers me because it is your tie
that is crooked.

I think that I have something to work out with you."

keeps the real issue before the group.

This

Furthermore, if the confronter suspec:ts

that there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective importance of
the information and the subjective meaning it has for the confrontee, he will
have to decide what constructive use may be made of the information.
(b)

Interpretation

~~stimulus-act.

Interpretation of the behavior

of another as a mode of confrontation is a two-edged sword:

:it

can either be

a powerful stimulus to fruitful self-examination or it can lead to irrelevant
and meaningless speculation and be utilized as a means of flight by an
individual and by an entire group.

If interpretations are nothing more than

detached intellectualized exercises on the part of the confronter, then he
is playing "psychiatrist" in a game of "psychiatry," the purpose of the game
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being to avoid intir:iacy.

Interpretation as a game is at best an exercise in

logic; at worst it is a destructive form of manipulation of the other.

On

the other hand, interpretation, if carried out with skill, integrity, and
empathy, can be a powerful stimulus to growth.
Theoretically interpretation leads to insight and insight is supposed
to be some kind of key to better psychological living.

This point of view,

however, is currently being strongly challenged:
As for goals of therapy, the actionists allege that Insight
therapists delude themselves and at their worst, defraud
society, by claiming to sell self-knowledge, for this is what
practically nobody comes to them to buy. Even knowing that
their clients seek relief, not information, they stock their
bazaars with certificates their license dispensation of a
balm they do not have. Face to face with customers, they then
produce a diagram of illness and a blueprint for repair, both
always the same--they say he suffers from illusions that must
dissipate when once he knows himself. Chief among them, and
most illusory of all--he thinks that what he thinks is his
trouble really is his trouble. Almost by sleight of mind,
the sufferer's surface troubles are made secondary, and the
rationalization with which the therapist diverted his attention
from them to begin with, launches him on his introspective
voyage, and perhaps keeps him there forever--for when does a
man really know himself? (London, 1964, pp. 75-76).
London goes on to maintain that the Action therapists, too, have their
problems and suggests a combination of the best of both action and insight
might be the road that therapy must travel.

Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, and

Pierce (1967) also have problems with insight as a vehicle of growth and
suggest that too often it leads to psychological paralysis:
In his helplessness and confusion [the client] seeks therapy.
More of ten than not, he receives insight in the form of a
conceptual integration of himself. He may choose insight as a
way of life, a culturally higher, secondary goal. Insight may,
seemingly, reduce confusion by subsuming the conceptualizations
he has about himself in a neater package, allowing him the
illusory belief of being "on the top of his problems,"--he can
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now explain his anxiousness on high level terms. Victimized
by a wishful need for a magic solution, he accumulates
insights based on his reactions to different people and
situations, hoping for THE ULTIMATE INSIGHT which will be an
answer to everything. Still paralyzed to act, he remains
dependent and passive, noticeably lacking action and
directionality in his existence (pp. 172-173).
Insight gives the client an "out," a way to not-deal with his behavior.
Insight in the sense in whi,ch it is under attack here deals principally with
cognitive systems and the relationships between cognitive systems.

The

problem is that in the client cognitive systems and behavior are in
separate compartments.

The critics of insight might well paraphrase

Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel and say to the client:

"Your insights are

beautiful castles; too bad you do not live in them."
However, this does not mean that insight and the interpretations which
"produce" insight are useless in and of themselves.

Interpretations as

therapeutic variables are certainly prone to certain defects:

they are too

often presented as facts instead of hypotheses and they frequently come as
packaged answers to questions instead of stimuli designed to goad the
confrontee into finding his own answers.

Moreover the focus of interpretation

has been the dynamics underlying behavior, the hypothetical sources of
behavior, rather than behavior itself.

But, in the final analysis, both inter

pretation and insight are valuable to the degree that they lead to constructiv
behavioral modification:
A comprehensive psychotherapy of the kind implied by this
argument would be one that uses both insight and action to
attack complex psychological problems. But insight, within
this system, would no longer focus so much on motives as on
those behaviors, present and historical, that produced
disorder by violating one's relationship with the functional
context that lends meaning to onets life. And its primary
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purpose, once achieved, would be to steer the development
of a new action system, one which channels the individual's
behavior in ways intended to restore his functioning within
that context. And the context, the referent that makes the
action system meaningful, would oe neither the painful
symptom, nor the wounded selfhood that may lie beneath it,
but something external to the individual. For most such
therapies, a social system, real or hypothesized, must
provide that context (London, 1964, p. 133).

I
l

r

!

Effective interpersonal living is the ultimate goal of therapy or any other

j

kind of growth experience and the value of any therapy variable must be
judged according to this criterion.

Interpretations, then, are valuable to th

degree that they are points of departure for growthful action, whether "insigh "
intervenes or not.

An interpretation is "valid" and an "insight" is "meaning-

ful" if the action which follows from it on the part of the confrontee is
"growthful," that is, if it leads him to more effective interpersonal relating.
What then can we say about interpretation as the stimulus in an act of
confrontation?
proffered?

What antecedent "validity" must it have before it is

Slater (1966) suggests that we need not worry much about the

"validity" of an interpretation, because, in a sense, all interpretations are
valid:
••• [I]n psychotherapy, an interpretation can never be incorrect,
unless it is stated comparatively or quantitatively, since
human beings are so complex and ambivalent that any statement
will be accurate at some level. (This follows from the psychological law that every motive has an equal and opposite
contramotive,) From a theoretical viewpoint, the issue is
whether it is salient or not; from the practical one it is
whether or not it is well timed (p. 162, fn 57).
I cannot agree with his epistemological views concerning interpretati<m (and
I will say why presently), but I am in complete accord that the saliencv
(which 1 consider a practical issue) of the interpretation and other variables
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associated with the conditions under which it is presented to the confrontee
are extremely important.

The "goodnessn of an interpretation is measured by

its positive or growthful

impact-val~e:

it must cause the confrontee to

examine his concrete behavior, some aspect of his life style, in such a way
that he is moved to modify this behavior in ways which improve his ability
to involve himself with others.

It is only the empathic confronter that can

come up with salient interpretations, for he alone is both outside and
"inside" the confrontee enough to put his finger on issues that are central
to the confrontee's behavior and life-style.

Timing, too, is important:

the

good confronter knows when the confrontee has opened at least enough to
receive the full impact of an interpretation.

Furthermore, confrontation must

be related to the ongoing process of the group and not just appear from
nowhere; it should flow from the group experience and be integrated into it.
:inally, it should be pithy, the starting point for interaction between the
confronter and the confrontee (and the rest of the group) and not a longwinded statement with an air of finality.

In general, long-winded speeches

2-n groups, no matter what their "pith and moment" tend to "lose the name of
action."
The epistemologx of interpretation.

Interpretations transmit

"information" that is hypothetical, conjectural, inferential:
I

"You know, Bill,

think that you have real sexual hang-ups with women and that maybe you are

even latently homosexual."

Such a statement is a hypothesis and as such is

the conclusion of an inferential process.
premises:

Since it is a conclusion, it has

certain behavioral "cues" emitted by the confrontee and a subjectiv

element, the feelings or "clinical" judgment or insight of the confronter.
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for instance, the premises of the hypothesis stated above might have been:
"When you talk nth the males in the group you are usually animated and
interested, but your conversations witJl the females are guarded, short, and
sometimes clip" and other such behavioral observations together with the feelings and "insights" that lead to the confronter's interpretation of the
behavioral cues.

That is, such hypotheses are inferences based on both fact

(the behavior of the confrontee) and feeling (the feelings of the confronter
which arise from the impact the confrontee has on him).
Since hypothetical statements arise from the process of clinical
inference, it should be remembered that such judgments suffer from all the
problems with which the inferential process is plagued.

O'Neill (1968) points

out the bases of clinical inference and the problems to which each kind of
inference is subject:

no matter whether one reasons from definitions and

categories ("She is obviously schizophrenic"), uses empirical tools of
varylng accuracy nnd sophistication ("Sho lrns nn olovntl'<l Pd

is a poverty of M ro1:1po111,u.rn"), Otl81l!J;tHl ln lntorprtit11l ll'"

t11'

1-ll'.llrt'.

"Tlit't°l'

"

11

uymh11\ri ( ::11.., uh11'~'

a preference for asparagus"), deals in "causal" explanations of behavior
("He probably has some minimum brain damage," "It is a question of an
excessively strong superego"), or uses his own emotional reactions, whatever
their integrity or sensitivity, as the basis of his inferences ("I can tell
You are ripped up inside," "I feel a tremendous warmth when you talk to me")-whatever the bases of one's inferences, when it is a question of confrontation
it is essential to communicate to the confrontee that one is dealing in
inferences and not in self-evident facts.

Moreover, the confronter should

convey to the confrontee some indication of the degree of certitude he believe.
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to underlie his hypothesis.

The certitude underlying a statement like

"You are anxious" will probahly differ from the certitude underlying
are dishonest."
in some way.

"You

Every hypothesis, by definition, falls short of certitude

The "high visibility" of the contract group demands that the

confronter give some indication of just how hypothetical his statement is.
The point is this:

in the group, facts should be presented as facts,

feelings as feelings, and hypotheses as hypotheses.

The problem is that too

often in sensitivity groups the confronter presents his feelings and his
hypotheses abruptly and apodictically as facts concerning the person of the
confrontee.
group •

As a rule this simply should not take place in the contract

The contract calls for "high visibility."

In this case this means

that the confronter should share with the confrontee the bases of his
feelings and the premises of his inferences and not wait until they erupt
abruptly as "facts" (£or they they are really accusations).

If the more

apodictic "You are arrogant" is preceded by the less apodictic "I. feel that
you are more or less patronizing me" and "Your tone then was pretty harsh" and
"At times you don't seem to give the rest of us much credit," it is likely
that there will be more mutual honesty and involvement and less need for
destructive sledgehanuner-confrontation.

If I bring my feelings and my

premises "into connnunity" as quickly as possible, then the other person can
share in the inferential process and is more likely to accept a reasonable
hypothesis concerning his behavior, especially if it contains a realistic
suggestion for growth.

If the participants are willing to be this open, then

' at least facts will sould like facts, feelings will sound like feelings, and
hypotheses will sould like hypotheses, and failed epistemology will not muddy
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the waters of the group experience.
(c) The direct challenge.

Although there is an element of challenge in

any kind of deliberate confrontation, still the explicit verbal challenge can

stand as a specific kind of stimulus-act.

In its simplest form the challenge

is a suggestion, request, or demand that the con£rontee change his behavior
in some way:

"I don't deny that it might be painful, but maybe it would be

more growthful if you were to try to involve yourself with us more," "Do you
think that you could honestly answer a few direct questions about our
relationship, yours and mine?," "Stop monopolizing the conversation."
Evidently these are examples of bald challenges, whereas most challenges are
situated in a much wider context of information, explanation, etc.
The direct challenge as such is neutral, that is, its growth value for
the confrontee (and for the group) depends on a number of confronter, confrontee, and situation variables.
number of reasons:

For instance, the confronter may act for a

annoyance, concern for the confrontee, concern for the

group or others influenced by the behavior of the confrontee, a feeling that
he "should" say something, etc.; he may challenge the confrontee to do
something that is growthful or nongrowthful, relevant to the confrontee's
needs or irrelevant, possible or impossible; the confrontee may or may not
be

prepared for the challenge:

he may be hurt and not ready to listen, he

may be very anxious, etc.; there may or may not be a climate of trust and
support strong enough to sustain the kind of challenge made. -If the confronter fails to take these variables into consideration, he may end up blowing
in the wind, much to his own frustration.
It is usually a mistake if the confronter deals in dem.:tnds rather than
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suggestions and requests when he challenges the behavior of others.

Even if

he does not intend to play God or omnipotent father, he may give the impress-

ion that he is doing so, and this tends to destroy any value that the confrontation might otherwise have.

Since no one can predict with absolute certainty

whether a change in andher's behavior will benefit the other or not, there is
always an element of hypothesis in every challenge.

Therefore, as in

confrontation-through-information, the degree of certitude associated with
the hypothesis should dictate the manner in which the challenge is made.

If

the confrontee's behavior is obviously self-destructive or destructive of those
around him, then the challenge can be put quite directly and forcefully.

If,

on the other hand, the confronter only suspects that a change in behavior
will benefit the confrontee or others, the force or the "demand-element" in
the challenge must be proportioned to the certitude of the hypothesis
underlying the challenge.
confrontee:

For instance, whenever a confronter says to a

"You talk too much here," there are certain hypotheses and

attitudes underlying such a challenge, e.g., that the confrontee talks but
says nothing, that he monopolizes the time of the group, that he is exhibitionistic, that he prevents other members who want to interact from interacting,
etc.

Perhaps it would be more realistic to say that no matter how forcefully

the confronter challenges the behavior of the confrontee, honesty demands
that he deal openly with whatever is implicit in his challenge.

If the

confronter is willing to do this, he will soon learn whether he tends to
challenge others

because of his concern for them or because of his own needs.

Calling the other's game.

A special and quite effective form of direct

challenge consists in "calling the other's game."

According to Beier (1966--
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a book well worth reading in its entirety), many patients in therapy attempt
to "engage" the therapist either by their verbalizations or other communications, that is, they try to get the therapist to play their "game."

The

patient tries to hide his game under the guise of certain conventions, his
real intent lying in subtle cues rather than in the overt message:
Subtle cues are actually the means by which a sender constricts
the response outcome. He uses these subtle cues to influence
and control another person's responses to his own ends with only
a minimal risk of being exposed for his attempts .•••
In addition to constructing the respondent's possible recognition of his intentions, an individual can, as stated earlier,
also hide the meaning of his manipulation from his own awareness. With his subtle hidden cues he can influence the respondent and bid for and provoke certain responses, yet maintain that
he is quite innocent, that he really had no share in triggering
these response activities ••••
The mechanism described here allows the sender to 'engage' the
respondent and at the same time reduce the possibility of
exposing his own intentions. The concept of engagement leads
to new observations helpful in the analysis of the communicative
process, particularly with reference to understanding certain
practices in the psychotherapeutic process (pp. 280-281).
The purpose of "engagement" is to keep the environment as safe as possible:
Vulnerability, then, gives rise to certain preferred behaviors
in interaction, which are ways of engaging and involving another
person. When carefully analyzed, these messages seem to yield
the ideas that made the individual vulnerable in the first place.
An individual's preferred modes of interaction are not merely
defenses; they are also behaviors that seek out ce".~~ain responses
in the environment. They trigger responses that are safe (as
the sender has created an emotional climate in the respondent
by which the resp0nse activity has been constricted) and
apparently are also rewarding. They give the patic~nt the
experience that he is still dealing, still 'alive' in the .area
of his vulnerability (p. 281).
The effective therapist "disengages" himself from the patient's game,
affording the latter an opportunity to grow:

J
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The therapist is most effective when he provides disengaged
responses that do not reinforce the patient's present behavior.
The therapist's responses not only interrupt the patient's
expectancies (and in this manner extinguish association) but,
being disengaged, are actually designed to give the patient
the experience of 'beneficial uncertainty.' This experience
provides a challenge to explore new choices- in a nonthreatening situation. The patient should experience with the therapist,
message by message, that he can tolerate the uncertainty and
even utilize if for the discovery of territory previously
prohibited to him. He will experience that in this 'sanctuary'
he can forgo the dangers and pleasures of being misunderstood,
and so his messages will become less discordant.
Through the disengaged response, the therapist trains the patient
to give more freedom to the people he encounters (p. 283).
This is one example where withdrawal of reinforcement is an effective mode of
confrontation.
The general instrument of "disengagement" is what Beier calls the
"asocial" response, a response which indicates a refusal on the part of the
therapist to give "conventional" replies to the conventions the patient uses
to restrict the therapist's interaction.
reinforce the patient's expectations.

It is a response that fails to

A few samples of such responses will

illustrate what is meant:
Patient: I hate you.
Therapist: Go on (p. 51).

I don't think I should come to
see you again.
Therapist: To seek help from an ignorant man like myself, this is
crazy (p. 53) .

Patient:

You are sure a quack.

A patient who claims she has been raped says:

I like you very much,

even dream of you.
Therapist: You want to lie with me on the couch?

I

(p. 61).

Member 1: Nice weather today.
Member 2: Oh, yes, I love a blue sky.
Therapist: And the clouds are just beautiful. And the wind is
blowing so sweetly. And the sun is sparking, bright and
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Member 1:

handsome.
Let's get going (p. 149).

Patient: You only see me for the money.
Therapist: Why would anyone want to see a fellow like you for
anything but money1 (p. 60).
The "asocial" response "disengages" the patient, thus placing him in a state
of "beneficial uncertainty," but it is a type of growthful uncertainty

especially in view of the fact that it takes place in an atmosphere of
acceptance and support.
Others suggest a variety of approaches to "catch" patients in their
attempts to keep growth at a distance and to ward off constructive interpersonal contacts.

Dreikurs (1967) suggests that patients in psychotherapy

use their symptoms to cover up their real intentions and he considers one of
the goals of the therapeutic process the revelation of the "game":

"As

Adler pointed out, one of the most effective therapeutic means is 'spitting
in the patient's soup.'

He can continue what he is doing, but it no longer

'tastes as good"' (p. 230).

Ellis (1962) challenges the "illogicalities" to

which the patient is addicted and which he (the patient) perpetuates by his
·1erbalizations.

Beier claims that although what he proposes may sound like

Ellis' rational-emotive therapy, it is really different:

"Ellis argues the

patient into behaving rationally, while we propose to provide the patient
with responses that give him the experience of beneficial uncertainty about
his previous expectations.

We propose that with the proper, disengaged

response by a therapist, the patient is placed in a position. where he can

make more adequate choices" (p. 55).

That is, Beier jolts the client into

experiencing his own freedom, while Ellis is much more interested (or more
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exclusively interested) in the client's behavioral changes.

, I

I

What Beier proposes pertains, I would suggest, not just to therapy but
to sensitivity training, other growth experiences, and life itself.

We

would be better off if others were to respond to us "asocially" more
often, catch us in our games, pull us up short.

Beier (1966, in discussing

family group therapy, offers three guidelines for effective confrontation:
he suggests that the therapist should intervene (1) when a member says or
implies that someone else must change to solve his (the speaker's) problem
("If John would only stop drinking .•• "), (2) when any member makes a

' statement which is designed to maintain the past ("Well, this is the way my
father was and his before him," "My wife wants me to be more aggressive, but
I am what I am, and I can't help it"), and (3) when a member constricts

communication by asking "loaded" questions or by giving connotations of which

I
I

he may not be aware ("We always talk things over, don't we, dear?," "Isn't
that the way you have always treated me?").

These kinds of communications

i

always crop up in sensitivity-training groups and they should be challenged,
but not just by the leader; in the contract-group all the members agree to
challenge such response-restricting communications.
(d)

Involvement of

self~!!.

stimulus-act.

Not every kind of confron-

tation is an explicit and direct form of con r: un td t L,;n.

If a person tries

to live up to the implicit contract of any sensitivity-training group or tr•·
explicit one of the contract-group, he will take an active role in "contactinc;
others in various ways, especially through the modalities of the contract,
e.g. self-disclosure, expression of feeling, and support.

In short, he will

reach out to others in attempts to establish varying degrees of intimacy.

I

I
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Such contact is confronting because intimacy itself is confronting.

The

person being contacted, the "confrontee," feels himself being reached out
to, he feels himself as the object of unconditional positive regard and
..

--

empathy, he fee.S the impact of the other's congruence, he experiences the
other as a locus of deep feelings and emotions.

But in many ways he is

probably not used to such behavior, especially such focused behavior, and it
"pulls him up short," it makes him take stock of himself, it makes him reach
for responses that are not usually at hand.

Intimacy in our culture is

almost bound to have a confrontational effect, especially when it is set in
sharp focus through the experiences of the laboratory.

Since these indirect

forms of confrontation can be as strong or even stronger than more direct
forms such as challenges of the other's behavior, the participants should be
as aware as possible of the impact their behavior is having on the other.
Some of the conflicts which arise in the laboratory stem from the fact that
a participant's whole mode of behavior has been confrontational without his
realizing it.

For instance, the way a participant interacts with another may

place the other under extreme emotional pressure.

If this is the case and it

is not sensed by the confronter, then the confrontee or someone else should
advert to what is happening:

"John, you are making tremendous emotional

demands on me right now, and I do not think that I can reply to them at this
time or under these conditions."

Indirect forms of confrontation have the

same effects, generally speaking, as more direct forms and should be pursued
in the same way.
(e)

Group situation variables as confrontational.

Certain aspects

of the laboratory experience itself are designed to have a confrontational
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effect on the participant.

In the contract group the contract itself is an

instrument of confrontation:

it outlines a rather demanding set of inter-

?ersonal behaviors and usually sends the prospective participant searching
into himself to see if he has the resources necessary to engage in such
behaviors.

The fact that a certain degree of intimacy is demanded in any

sensitivity-training group is confronting enough, but this is compounded by
the fact that the participant finds himself in a "stranger-group":
not choose his bedfellows.

he does

As he looks around the group, it is as if each of

the other participants were saying:

"Here I am; you have to deal with me."

It is not that any of the participants verbalizes or even conceptualizes such
a challenge, rather each is the challenge by his very being.

1

The verbal and

exercises used to stimulate communication in the group constitute

~onverbal

lanother source of confrontation.

The participant finds himself touching others

or Jroking at others without using words, and such focusing in on relatively
molecular aspects of the interactional process is foreign to him and as such
places its own set of demands on him.

One commonly used exercise,called

prescription, is directly confrontational.

If this exercise is used, then some

where towards the middle of the "life" of the group each member takes his
turn leaving the group while the others work out a "prescription" for him,
that is a set of suggestions for improving the quality of his interpersonal
'living.

When he returns to the group, the prescription is presented to him

rand he can use it' i f he wants' as a basis for further experimentation in

I:the group.

These are just a few of the group variables that can have a

l
!confrontational effect; whether they do not depend on how they are perceived

lby

the individual participant.
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(f)

Processing

~

a group mode of self-confrontation.

is a very useful form of group interaction.

"Processing"

After the participants have been

interacting for a while, the interaction is stopped and the members "process"
what has been taking place, that is, they try to examine the nature of the
interaction and answer such questions as:

''What have we been doing here?

!low have we been interacting with one another?

whom?

What have been our communication blocks?

has been silent?
been bored?

Who has been interacting with
Who has been active?

Which participants have assumed leadership roles?

Who
Who has

Processing gives the group an opportunity to be its own critic.

The members receive a kind of "cultural permission," as it were, to stand
outside themselves and act as critics of their own behavior.

Remarks made

during this period are not taken as "critical" in a negative sense, because
responsible criticism is

~he

very meaning of this processing interlude.

Very

of ten because of this cultural permission participants will find themselves
saying things that they simply had not been able to say during the group
interaction itself:

"We have really been beating the air," "John, I think

you wanted to get us going, but you really monopolized the situation,"
"Bill, I am not so sure now that I was really honest with you," "I think we
showed how really afraid of self-disclos.re we are," "I was just too anxious
to say anything."

In the early stages of the group life, processing is

something that stands "outside" the regular interaction of the group.

This

gives the members an opportunity to realize that self-criticism can be quite
constructive.

I

Gradually, however, the members lenrn to incorporate processing

into the regular group interaction itself.

! periods

Until this is possible, processing

provide excellent opportunities for groups to confront themselves,

424
to admit and frankly examine the modes of flight which individuals and the
group as a whole have been utilizing, and to do so without arousing
intolerable anxiety.
(g)

Withdrawal of reinforcement as confrontational.

As seen above,
,',

Beier' s "asocial" response is one that fails to reinforce certain behaviors
that are seen as nongrowthful.

(
,,,,1,

Other such withdrawals of reinforcement in

sensitivity groups can also serve as stimuli with confrontational effects.
For instance, the person who uses humor to flee intimacy or interrupt interj

actions which are uncomfortable for him is reinforced in such behavior when

I' others laugh.

Tension dissipates and uncomfortable issues are sidetracked.

!
I A refusal to reinforce such behavior, that is, a refusal to laugh and/or

I

aJandon an uncomfortable issue, is confrontational.
non-involving monologue:

Another example is the

if group participants tend to deliver monologues

which prevent mutual interaction, then passive attentiveness will be an
effective reinforcer.

Confrontation in this case means interrupting and

:;:igaging the speaker.

Part of the "processing" of group interactior. should

consist in pointing out the .ways in which unproductive forms of behavior in

i'
I

the group are reinforced and in determining effective ways of withdrawing
such reinforcement.

If the participants fail to support a- or anti-contractua

behavior, the group will become less diffuse and more productive.
(h)

Videotape as a vehicle of confrontation.

Since about 1960 an

increasing amount of research has taken place in which attenpts have Li,.
made to alter the behavior of psychiatric patients by confronting them with
photographs, movies, or videotape recordings of their appearance and behavior
(e.g. Boyd & Sisney, 1967; Cornelison & Arsenian, 1960; Kagan, Krathwohl, &

,,
I
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:liller, 1963; Miller, 1962; Moore & West, 1965; Pascal, Cottrell, & Baugh, 1967
Rogers, 1968; Stoller, 1968; Ward

&

Bendak, 1964).

This technique has also

been used with cardiac patients (Verwoerdt, Nowlin, & Agnello, 1965) and in
the training of counselors and psychotherapists (Schiff & Reivich, 1964; Walz
&

Johnston, 1963).

Boyd arid Sisney (1967), using videotape playbacks, found

that "interpersonal concepts of the self, the ideal self, and the public self
became less pathological and less discrepant with one another following the
self-image confrontation" (p. 291).

One of the primary advantages of feedback

by videotape is its objectivity, its "cleanness."

The confrontee is confronte

by himself, and, since he cannot charge bias, rationalizations are relatively
useless.

Furthermore, the confrontee sees his behavior in context, he gets

a view of the molar realities of his interaction which ordinarily escape him.
Re can more readily see thos,e aspects of his behavior which elicit what Stolle
(1968) calls "discrepant" feedback, that is, response to his behavior other
than what he believed he would receive.

I find that immediate playback of

the tape tends to have the greatest impact value, for, as Rogers

(1968) notes

"the closeness in time to the behavior that has just happened makes it
difficult to disown what has occurred" (p. 38).

In time, videotape feedback

should become one of the most potent sources of confrontation in both
individual and group therapy and in laboratory-training experiences.
(2)

The natural "bias" of the confronter.
A second factor to be noted in the confrontation process is the possible

"bias" of the confronter.

If the confronter merely by the fact that he is not

the other, by the fact that he stands "outside" the other, is in a metaphysical position to know the others in ways that are not available to the
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I/latter,

it is also true that his "separateness" is a source of bias.

The

information which he feeds to the other is processed through the subjective
filtering systems (e.g. the philosophical, value, and natural psychological
systems) of the confronter and takes on the latter's "color."

Though this

bias can be minimized (and this depends in large part on how close the confronter is to his own experiencing), it cannot be avoided altogether.
!fnerefore, both confronter and confrontee should be aware of this phenomenon,
for it is another source of possible error in the confrontational process.
Even when the stimulus-act does not consist of information, interpretations,
or direct challenges on the part of the confronter but rather in the emotional
impact which he has on the confrontee, the confrontation may still be quite
biased.

The confronter's emotions are real, but they are not necessarily

realistic.

He may "confront" by expressing anger toward someone who really

did nothing to provoke it (that is, he may be projecting the anger he feels
toward himself).

In such cases his emotions are "biased" (in some sense of

the word) and thus the confrontee cannot be expected to respond as if he had
actively provoked these emotions.

In general, confronter bias should be

controlled by group members other than the confrontee, for the latter should
be as open as possible to constructive confrontation.

But this very openness

makes him less sensitive to sources of confrontational "error."

The others,

therefore, are in a better position to pick up elements of bias and de.:il \,•i th
them openly.
(3)

The relationship between the confronter and the confrontee.
Both the long-range and the ad hoc aspects of this relationship affect

the quality of the confrontational process.

Confronter and confrontee might
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llwe,

hate, or be indifferent or neutral toward each other, or the relationship

might be a confused or muddied one, marked by an admixture of feelings,
conscious and semi-conscious, strong and weak, positive and negative.
1over, such feelings may be mutual or one-sided.

More-

But even though the confronte

loves the confrontee, at the moment of confrontation he might be acting from
some lesser motive such as pique, jealousy, momentary irritation, etc.

On the

other han-d, a confronter who generally dislikes another might rise· above his
feelings and engage in an act of concerned, growthful confrontation.

In the

contract group the participants are asked to be as aware as possible of their
\relationship to those they confront including the quality of the relationship

I
j

at the moment of confrontation.

If the confronter has really done nothing

l

Ito establish a relationship between himself and

the confrontee or if he has

Ieven rejected overtures of friendship on the part of the confrontee, this is

I

e·1idently going to affect the dynamics of confrontation.

There is some

research evidence that corroborates what seems to be a "common sense" observation:

the behavior of liked persons is seen in a more favorable light than

:::e behavior of disliked persons even when this perception is not accurate

I
I

(Berkowitz, 1956, 1957; Horowitz, Lyons, & Perlmutter, 1951; Sherif, White,
&

Harvey, 1955).

The responsible participn.nt will first of all be aware of th,

quality of his relationships and then try to rectify whatever bias might e;;.L
in his perceptions.

t i

An ideal atmosphere for confrontation is one in which the

quality of the relationships is "highly visible."

This means a group culture

in which members know where they stand in relationship to one another because
these relationships have been dealt with "in community."
that confrontations that take place

It is evident, then,

early in the group will oft.::n center

l

'
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around clarifying relationships ("We have really never spoken to each other,
so I'm not sure where I stand").

The more "real" relationships within the

,
I

group are, that is the more frank,_open, and motivated by concern they are,

the greater the chance of eliminating some of the natural "bias" factors

mentioned above.

(4)

The motivation of the conf rontee.
An analysis of the motivation underlying confrontation has two distinct

dimensions:

(a} the purpose or function of an act of confrontation in itself

and (b) the motivation of the confronter.

Ideally a high degree of correlatio

I

will exist between these two dimensions, that is, the confronter will choose
to confront because of the growth-functions he sees inherent in an act of
responsible confrontati_on.

These two dimensions, however, are separable,

and the confronter can choose to confront out of motives that are less than
ideal.
(a)

The purpose of

~act

of confrontation.

In general, confrontation

is just one more modality of interpersonal contact and as such stems, ideally,
from a desire on the. par,t of the confronter to involve himself more deeply
with the confrontee.

The term confrontation when used in the context of

international politics connotes a stand-off, a refusal to yield, an impasse,
an irreducible separateness on the part of the nations involved.

However,

confrontation, as used in the context of growth experiences, has the opposite
connotation:

an act of constructive confrontation is an attempt on the part

of one person to involve himself with another, it is a way of expressing his
concern, a way of showing the confrontee that he is "for" him.
is a way of

11

Confrontation

being with" rather than "being againstn the other, even though
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the

confronter might disagree strongly with the confrontee.

In the contract

;roup, then, the rule is simple:

do not confront if you do not intend to

involve yourself with the other.

The person who confronts in such a way that

he

either does not want or fails to exhibit concern or a willingne$ to become

1involved

~erely

with the confrontee is actually an intruder.

Since the intruder

wants to get "inside" the other for some reason or another without

fostering any kind of mutuality, it is hypothesized here that such intrusive
presence is inimical to interpersonal growth and is to be avoided in sensitivit
groups.
The direct purpose of an .act of confrontation is not to change the
.behavior of the other but to create a situation in which it becomes possible

Ifor

him to change his behavior.

to engage in self-examination.

Confrontation is an invitation to the other
The confronter, then, invites the confrontee

"into community" to reflect on his behavior--whether the "community" be a dyad
or a larger group.
but to free him.

The purpose of confrontation is not to restrict the other
The confrontee, then, is given an opportunity--in an

atmosphere of trust and security--to step back from his behavior in order to
see it in a different light and from a different viewpoint, that is, as it
strikes others.

It is possible, then, that he will be_ challenged to consider

perhaps more fruitful or at least less destructive modes of .behavior or to
take a longer look at the human "possibilities" that are in and around him,
lbut he will grow only if he chooses from these possibilities.

I

Another way of

I

sayi,ng this is that one of the purposes of confrontation is to bring the

Iconfrontee into more direct

contact with his own expc; . ·ncing.

Gendlin (1962)

!suggests that a person need not be forced to live with the "introjected" valc.:es

I.

: II
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of alienated man.

Rather, through therapy or some other growth experience,

he can become psychologically "open,'·' that is, he can learn to trust his own
!experience and use it as a direct referent and source of wisdom.

Rogers (1964)

develops the same theme:
Most importantly [in therapy], he can begin with much difficulty
at first, to sense and to feel what is going on within him, what
he is feeling, what he is experiencing, how he is reacting. He
uses his experiencing as a direct referent to which he can turn
in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his
behavior ••.• As his experiencing becomes more and more open to
him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his
feelings, then significant changes begin to occur in his approach
to values (p. 20).
Confrontation,

the~,

becomes a way of inviting the other to become himself

more fully.
Another way of looking at confrontation is to see it as an instrument
whiCh might help the other reduce the amount of "cognitive dissonance"

I (Festinger,

1957) in his life.

One way of reducing such dissonance is to

I

i

tailor reality to one's own inner needs, and there is an extensive (though
hardly unchallenged) literature suggesting that such "tailoring" is quite

1 cormnon

among men.

Confrontation offers the possibility of realistic resolutio

l, ~, 0 dissonant cognitions.

For instance, as Newcomb (1 q5·3) points out, there

is a very strong tendency to assume that one's highest ranked associates on
1a

II

scale of preference return the compliment, however unwarranted such an

assumption might be.

Furthermore, the ability to judge the attraction of

j others toward oneself does not become more accurate with increasing acq uo.ir: ' tance.

Now, if I think that another has more interest in me than he really

i

!I has, I may try to ignore whatever cues he emits which would indicate disinter-

I est.

On the other hand, 1 could try to make sure where I re:illy stand with
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him, realizing that positive regard is not always reciprocated.

Concerned

mutual confrontation, then, though it sometimes risks being painful, is a
powerful tool for the reduction_of dissonance.

In the contract group the

participants are asked to share this kind of openness with one another,
establishing a group culture that is as dissonance-free as possible. Responsible confrontation goes far in making reality the measure of one's thinking
instead of one's thinking the measure of reality.
(b)

The motives of the confronter.

Ideally the confronter engages in

confrontation for the reasons listed above:

he involves himself witn the

confrontee so that they might grow together.

However, he may engage in

confrontation for more idiosyncratic and less growthful reasons:

to relieve

his boredom, to ward off confrontation from himself ("the best defense is a
good offense"), to punish the confrontee or the entire group, to take flight
by engaging the group in "game" behavior, to relieve his own frustration and
anxiety, to fulfill a need to dominate, etc.

Moreover, his motivation might

be mixed, that is, he might confront for a variety of reasons, both good and
bad.

Although it would be an exercise in futility if the confronter himself

or the group as a whole were to try to unravel the confronter's entire
Motivational skein, still it is useful for the particpants to realize that
confrontational behavior, like roost human behavior, is multi-determined,
multi-motivated.

However, if, as far as th0 confronter is able to determine,

his personal motives are in general agreement with the purpose of confrontatio
in the group, then he need not worry about ancillary motives.
or the group suspects that

an~~llary

However, if he

motives are quite important or even

predominate, then "high visibility" dc.mtmds that he qualify his conf:_ontat~_;"n

II .
\II

j

,!1
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("I may well be biased in my remarks because John and I have never gotten

along") or, if he fails to do so, that his remarks be challenged by the other
participants.
--·-

(5)

The manner of confrontation.
Confrontation implies some kind of separateness, some kind of "gap"

between confronter and confrontee which the former, for one reason or another,
desires or feels impelled to close.
can either

enhanc~

His reasons for doing so, as we have seen,

or vitiate the act of confrontation.

However, good

motivation is not enough, for even the well-motivated confronter may do so
in such a way as to thwart the desirable effects of confrontation.
Punishment as a dimension of confrontation.

This question is a thorny

responsible, seems to have a punitive dimension; some people confront in order
·to punish and succeed in doing so, but, on the other hand, an act of confrontation not intended to be punitive might have quite punitive effects.

This

is problematic because research has not yet given us clear-cut answers with
respect to the growth-value of punishment in human interactional situations.
Research s.o far has shown that punishment, depending on the conditions under
which it is administered, can have both positive and negative effects
1

(see Bandura, 1962; Church, 1963; Hilgard & Bower, 1966:

1133-139; 488-490; Solomon, 1964).

I

pp. 83-85; 113-114;

Studies indicate that punishment might

be ineffective if it is delayed too long (thus losing its association with

i the

"punishable'' act), that it can serve as a cue for sclecU.11.g an .::ipproprL1te

I

I response (provided that the subject is awnre of alternative responses). that

t~--~-------------------------------------------------------------
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mild punishment might merely suppress a response temporarily rather than
eliminating it (though during the time of suppression the subject has an
opportunity to learn alternative responses), that punishment that produces
only emotional excitement tends to fixate the punished response, and that it
is important that punishment be given in the presence of the discriminative
cues for the response.

If the evidence on punishment is not all in, and if

what we have leads to different conclusions, it is quite difficult to map out
an intelligent plan for the use of punishment in psychotherapy and other growth
experiences.

To my knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to do so.

Most of the research on punishment so far has been carried out on
animals or on molecular aspects of human behavior, so that the problem of
application to more molar aspects of human behavior is necessarily an
unresolved one:

"This series of experiments by Estes, with their interpre-

tations, show how, within the experimental and theoretical framework of
Skinner's system, it is possible to experiment upon problems genuinely
relevant to the practical control of learning situations.

The challenging

difficulty is finding appropriate ways to test the implications in

Icontext"

(Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 139, emphasis added).

~

soc Lt lo

Perhaps sensitiv-

ity-training groups and other forms of laboratory experience will provide a
realistic "social context" for such research, but the fact is that this has
not yet happened.

French and Raven (1960) touch on the question of punish-

Iment in social behavior:
I

I

At times, there is some difficulty in distinguishing between
reward power and coercive power. Is the withholding of a reward
really equivalent to a punishment? Is the withdrawal of punishment equivalent to a reward? The answer must be a psychological
one--it depends upon the situation as it exists for P [a person].
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But ordinarily we would answer these questions in the affirmative;
for P, receiving a reward is a positive valence as is the relief
of suffering. There is some evidence (Dittes & Kelley, 1956)
that conformity to group norms in order to gain acceptance (reward
power) should be distinguiS:ed from conformity as a means of
forestalling rejection (coerciv~ power).
The distinction between these two types of power is important
because the dynamics are different. The concept of sanctions
sometimes lumps the two together despite their opposite effects.
While reward power may eventually result in independent systems,
the effects of coercive power will continue to be dependent.
Reward power will tend to increase the attraction of P to 0
[some social agent]; coercive power will decrease this attraction
(Raven & French, 1958) . The valence of the region of behavior
will become more negative, acquiring some negative valence from
the threatened punishment. The negative valence of punishment
would also spread to other regions of the life space. Lewin
(1935) has pointed out this distinction between the effects of
rewards and punishments. In the case of threatened punishment,
there will be a resultant force on P to leave the field entirely.
Thus, to achieve conformity, 0 must notonly place a strong
negative valence in certain regions through threat of P'-mishment,
but 0 must also introduce restraining forces, or other strong
valences, so as to prevent P from withdrawing completely from O's
range of coercive power. Otherwise, the probability of receiving
the punishment, if P does not conform, will be too low to be
effective (pp. 614-615).
:foile much of what is said here is thought-provoking and in some way applicabl
; ~ot only to sensitivity-groups in general but specifically to the act of
confrontation in the context of such groups, still it is quite theoretical
and in need of confirmation by research.
In vew of the shaky research foundation upon which the social value of
Punishment rests, one might imagine that it would be excluded from such
interactions as confrontations in growth groups.

Not only has this not been

the case, but there is a rather interesting body of evidence which would
indicate that punitive--and sometimes extremely punitive-confrontation has
quite a salubrious effect on the confrontee.

Grinker anJ his asSL'clates (1957
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attempted to evoke anxiety in hospitalized patients by means of a stressful
interview, but, to their chagrin, the patients tended to look upon the
interview as helpful no matter how threatening the interpretations made to
him (Hawthorne effects?).

Heller, Davis, and Myers (1966) studied the

activity-passivity and the friendliness-hostility dimensions of interviewing
patients.

The most noteworthy point of the experiment was that the only clear

advantage of interviewer friendliness was that this condition was overwhelm-

I ingly
I no

preferred by the subjects.

Despite this preference, however, there was

indication that verbal behavior during the interview changed in any way

as a result of friendliness.

In fact, there was some evidence that the

subjects may have felt more pressure to discuss some possibly threatening
topics. (e.g. sex) with hostile interviewers.

Kushner and Sanalu (1966)

found that punishment therapy may be best used when there are other factors,
such as social pressure, WO'X'king on the patient to reduce undesirable
behavior.

They suggest that in aversion therapy the level of punishment

should be clearly noxious, but not so intense so as to immobilize the organism
These considerations, it would seem, could well apply to confrontation.
More striking than these considerations, however, is the apparent
success of groups in which rather punitive confrontation forms the central
core of the therapeutic or growth process.

Bach (1966) works in the context

of the group Marathon in which group-pressure "is a major vehicle which can
move people effectively and quickly from impression making and manipulative
behavior toward honest, responsible, spontaneous levelling with one another"
(p. 995).

The Marathon situation may be called totally confrontational:

"It takes devotion mixed with CONSTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION to get people to t.:ike
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off image-masks and put on honest faces.
break down resistances against change

It takes patience and energy to

wh~ch

all well-entrenched behavioral

patterns ••• will put up as part of a person's phoney 'self-esteem. ' •••• Tired
people tend to be truthful!
(p. 998).

.--

They do not have the energy

to play 'games"

Bach admits that, at times, .the confrontation can be quite brutal:

"In the 'feedback' reactions to the expression, no holds are barred!

Candid

'levelling' is expected from everyone, which means participants explicitly
share and do
one another'

~hide

or mask their here-and-now, on the spot reactions to

Tact is 'out' and brutal £.'rankness is 'in'"(p. 1001).

An even

more brutal approach is taken at Daytop=Village; Drakeford (1967) describes
;•.

an "encounter" at Daytop:

~.

Three nights a week the whole population of Daytop musters for a
ninety-minute session of encounte~. Thia unique even, de.scribed
as 'the principal formal medium fqr effecting value and behavioral
changes,' commences with a aatherf.ag in the asseml;>ly room. The
leader stands to read the namea of the participants in each group
and designates their meeting plac~s. It ia the prerogative of any
member of the community to fill out a slip indicating his desire
to be in a group with a certain o~p.er individual. There may have
been some difficulty of relationsh~p and he wants to tell this
other person what is 'on his chest.• '
I tried to look nonchalant and unconcerned as I sat in the dining
room with my assigned group. A
led off with a blast of
.

man

abuse ••• hia superior who had offe~de4 hJa by hia attitude in a
work relationship. T• aay that the ltateiaenta of the offended one
were candid would be a gross 1.nlderstatemant. In a couple of
minutes the protester was pouring:out a torrent of abuse ••• (p. 72).
Maslow (1967) was pulled up short by

wh~t

he witnessed at Daytop Village.

found himself re-evaluating his position on the value of confrontation and
asking himself questions he bad not asked before:
I have a lot of impressions and thoughts rushing in on me •••
Let me say it this way: Do you think that this straight honesty,
this bluntness that even sounds cruel at times, provides a basis

He
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for safety, affection, and respect? It hurts, it must hurt, •••
It seems possible that this brutal honesty·, rather than being an
insult, implies a kind of respect. You can take it as you find
it, as it really is. And this can be a basis for respect and
friendship (p. 30).
A similar type of therapeutic process called the Synanon Game is played at
Synanon three times a week.

Patton (1967) describes the game:

The Synanon game has been described as 'intense group interaction '--which it is. It has also been called 'attack therapy,'
which tells no.thing at all about the actual game experience.
One sociologist describe the game as 'verbal street fighting,' a
threatening analogy, though not an entirely inaccurate one, in
spite of the limited backgrounds of most Synanon residents in
streetfighting, verbal or other. For Synanon people the game is
a group situation where one can spill out his fears and hostility,
· where he can expect to hear the kinds of truths he cannot see in
himself, where he can tell others what he really thinks of them
without retribution, where he can solve the confusions and conflicts
of his working day and his inter-personal relationships, where he
can be as spontaneous, creative, rigid, angry, loud or passive
as he chooses with no authority or rules save one, the proscription
against physical violence or the threat of it •••• Its weapons are
the language of truth and accuracy, which always hit a moving
target; both have no place in the Synanon game--itself ever
chang:l.µg and becoming (p. 5) •
No attempt is made here to imply that the populations of such centers as
Daytop Village and Synanon are comparable to those which engage in sensitivitytraining laboratories nor is it suggested that "brutality therapy" become a
way of life in such labor4tories.

Rather the point is this:

severely

punishing, even brutal, confrontation in each of the contexts described above
apparently ''works," and somehow this fact must be integrated into a theory of
confrontation.

The point is this:

behavior is a very complex question.

the use of punishment in the control of
One simply cannot say: · "I am going to

'

punish John by this act of confrontation, but it is· for his own good," unless
one has some basic understanding of both the effects of punishment in general
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and of the "how" of the inflicting of punishment in particular:

As Solomon

(1964) notes:

[T]he effects of punishment are partly determined by those events
that directly precede it and .. those that directly follow it. A
punishment is not just a punishment. It is an event in a temporal
and spatial flow of stimulation and behavior, and its effects will
be produced by its temporal and spatial point of insertion in that
flow (p. 242) •
Thus, to predict in even the grossest way the action of punishment
on a response, one hs to know how that particular response was originally inserted in the subject'Tfi"response repertoire (p. 243).
Campbell and Dunnette (1968) apply some of Solomon's theorizing to laboratory
trai~ing:

Based on his and others' research, Solomon theorized that learning
as a consequence of punishment occurs in a two-stage process:
First, a conditioned emotional reaction must be established to
temporarily suppress the unwanted behavior. Second, and most
important, responses incompatible with the punished response must
then be reinforced and established; only in this way can one guard
against the rapid extinction of the conditioned emotional reaction
and the correspond·ing reappearance of the unwanted behavior. In
the context of the T group, this means that'punishment' in the form
of anxiety arousal must be accompanied by the reinforcement and
shaping of responses incompatible with those responsible for
originally inducing the anxiety. In a sense this is what the T
group tries to do; however, it seems r~asonable to ask whether or
not the usual T group is sufficiently structured to assure the
sophistic,ated control of stimuli and reinforcement configurations
necessary in the two-stage process suggested by Solomon. Given the
variablity of contingencies that this lack of structure probably
produces, some possible alternative outcomes aiaht be either that
simply no learning occurs or that some of the negative side effects
are incurred (p. 78).
It is hypothesized :here that a contract, especially one which deals specifi-

cally with confrontation as a possibly punitive stimulus, might help to
control some of the contingencies of which Campbell and Dunnette speak.
Finally, all of this is said not to discourage the use of confrontation
even though it almost inevitably.has punitive aide effects but to make the
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confronter realize that he can expect at times quite negative responses to
what he might consider most "benevolent" acts of necessarily punitive
confrontation.
Confrontation and domination.

If confrontation can be used to punish,

it can also be used to control and dominate.

If A confronts B because A thinks

that he is right and B is wrong, he should be careful of his motivation.
Gibb (1968} notes, when people are fearful, they tend to control.

AB

If there

is an atmosphere of trust in the group, tendencies to confront in order to

control should diminish.

However, if such confrontation continues to be a

part of any participant's interactional style, this should become a matter for
group reflection.
Confrontation in

~

context

beginning to show that therapists

~

wh:o

acceptance and empathy.

Research is

supply ample amounts of empathy,

positive regard, and genuineness are more likely to •occasion deeper levels
of self-exploration in their clients than therapists lacking in these
qualities (Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; Holder, Carkhuff, & Berenson,
1967; Piaget, Berenson, & Carkhuff',

& Carkhuff, 1965).

1~67;
<~

Rogers, 1967; Truax, 1966; Truax

Therefore, if one ,·of the most important functions of

confrontation is to invite the other to responsible self-examination "incommunity," then it seems that confrontation would be most effective if
carried out under the conditions mentioned above, that is, under conditions
of empathy and positive regard.

Good therapists confront more than poor

therapists (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968), but they also provide the
conditions that sustain confrontation.

The results of this research are in

keeping with the theory underlying Stern's (1966)

"sacramental·~

approach to
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i psycho therapy:· he sees a person's present as an experience which was to be

i

I transformed and if necessary transcended through concerned and appreciative

l

I

confrontation.

A study by Torrance (1966) suggests that confrontation will

be more effective if it is post;ive and constructive rather than negative
or merely evaluative.

Somehow, these facts, too, must contribute to a total

theory of confrontation.
The manner of confrontation:

reconciling diverse elements.

My

own

experience with confrontation in different kinds of growth groups has been
mixed.

I have seen confrontations which fulfilled the caricature of

sensitivity-training ("a place where people tell one another off") do a good
deal of harm (e.g. apparently push someone into a short-lived psychotic
episode--though some claillled that it was a beneficial episode) and yet I have
also seen bitter confrontations produce not only realistic self-exploration
and growthf ul behavioral changes but even increased intimacy between confronter
and confrotttee.

On the other hand, I have witnessed non-punitive, ''high

regard" confrontations both succeed and fail.

It seems that we must say that

confrontation is a growth-experience 'variable with great potential although
it is not entirely clear under what conditions

~his

Proportion as.!. key to 1rowthful encounter.

potential is released.

The question here is:

how

can one strip confrontation of its tendencies to attack and destroy without
stripping it of its impact?

At attempt will be made here to formulate certain

hypotheses about the manner in which confrontation must take place if it is to
be a growthful rather than a neutral or even destructive epxerience.

These

remarks take on the nature of hypotheses because they are based on evidence
that is principally observational and have not been confirmed by experimenta-
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tion.

The evidence so far suggests that the "proportional" nature of confron-

tation is most important, that is,

c~frontation,

if it is to be effective,

must be proportioned to a number of confronter, confrontee, and situational
variables.

Another way of saying this is that the interaction of confronta-

tion variables is as important as the variables themselves.

It is assumed

here that it is the socially intelligent person who can perceive the importanc
of these interactions and act upon them.

In fact, this is one definition of

social intelligence.
The strength. of any confrontation arises principally from two variables:
the sensitivity or closeness-to-core of the subject matter of the confrontation (e.g., under ordinary circumstances the area of sex would be a more
sensitive one, closer to the core of the confrontee, than, say, personal
neatness) and the vehemence with which the confrontation is delivered (e.g.
the Daytop Village approach would score very high on a scale of vehemence).
These variables are additive, so that vehement confrontation in a highly
sensitive area would represent the strongest kind of confrontation.

If

confrontation is to be responsible,:its strength must be proportioned to a
number of variables among which are (a) the quality of the relationship
between confronter and

~onfrontee,

(b) the current psychological state of

the confrontee, (c) the possible disorganization which the confrontee will
undergo as a result of the confrontation, (d) the limits of the confrontee's
capabilities, (e) certain group conditions, and (f) the contract, either
implicit or expressed, which governs the group experience.
(a)

The quality of the relationship between confronter and confrontee.

The confronter must ask himself:

"What can the relationship between the
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other and me bear?"

To use metaphorical language, the more "solid," the

"healthier," the more "substantial" the relationship is, the more powerful
the confrontation may be.(other conditions being equal).

If the confronter

.~--

has done little to build a solid relationship between himself and the
confrontee, then he cannot expect to engage in strong confrontational encounte ,
for it has nothing on which to stand.

However, if a participant has tried to

build a relationshi.p and has received no response, then he would be justified
in engaging in comparatively strong confrontation, especially with respect
to the lack of communication on the part of the confrontee, for mutual
involvement is one of the expressed goals of the group.

In general, then,

the confronter must realistically assess the quality of the relationship
between himself and the other--his degree of acceptance and concern for the
other, the

d~gree

of support of which he is capable and which he is willing

to provide th.e other, etc.--and then proportion his confrontation to these
variables.
(b)

.!h!, current psychological state of the confrontee.

The strength

of the confrontati.on must be proportioned to the current ability of the
confrontee to support and act upon the confrontation.
things.

If, for instance,

t~

This means a number of

confrontee is already laboring under a good

deal of anxiety, h.:Ls iDJmediate need lilight be for encouragement and support,
and the confronter should ask himself whether it would be fruitful to confront
him at this time (timing is always an important concern) or in this area of
sensitivity or with this degree of vehemence.

No participant is expected to

he free of anxiety, but the level of anxiety should stimulate rather than
paralyze.

Confrontation should also be proportioned to the other's ability
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to change, and, to some extent, his desire to change.

One of the purposes

of confrontation is to try to show the other than he does have the personal
and/or community resources necessary to change an unproductive or destructive
style of life.

But if the confrontee is relatively eager to change, then he

can ordinarily tolerate much stronger confrontation than a person who is not
convinced that he can or should change.

If the confronter is interested in

the other, he will not mount a strong frontal attack when he knows that it
has little or no chance of being effective.

The confronter who, knowing

that the confrontee has little or no interest in change, still hits him with
an extremely strong confronta.tion, is dealing in a form of "shock" therapy
("kick the TV and see what happens").

I have seen such tactics "work," but

it seems to be a last resort and effective only in the hands of the extremely
socially intelligent.
Some people, without being masochistic, are looking for "strong
medicine" in terms of confrontation and are quite ready to respond favorably
to it.

I would hypothesize that this is especially true for those who

voluntarily attend sensitivity-training laboratories (especially if they have
a basic idea of what such a laboratory entails).

It should be true to an

even greater extent of those who join a conttact group.

Others, again

without being masochistic, welcoueeven the punitive aspect of confrontational
process, for, i f I may use an analogy from religious experience, they see in
it an element of cleansing or expiation.

They "pay the price, 11 as it were,

of re-integrating themselves DlOre fully "into community."

On the other hand,

it is possible that a person might seek confrontation precisely to prove
to hi.maelf hia o-wn lack of self worth.

But such a situation in sensitivity

!'
I
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groups is relatively rare and usually easy to discover, for then, for that
person, confrontation becomes an end in itself and is divorced from subsequent
behavioral change.
(c)

.--

The risk of disorganization.

Effective confrontation will usually

induce some degree of "disorganization in the other:
The therapeutic risk will ••• depend upon the amount of disorganization both the therapist and the client can handle ••••
The closer the decision affects the inner core of a person,
the greater the fear of the life and death choice. A constructive therapeutic confrontat·ion frequently does result in
death of a sort:
the death of illusion, hence, an illusory
death •••• After an initial experience of death to the illusory
self, the void which is temporarily created has a chance to fill
up With the person's real being •••• The therapist, by active
confrontation, precipitates an awareness of crisis; he did not
precipitate the crisis (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce,
1967, pp. 171, 173, 195).
Confrontation is usually in some way directed toward the defense mechanisms
of the confrontee.

This questioning of defenses, although ultimately

growthful, does entail disorganization.
Almost every individual has an established self-image protected by
a number of defense mechanisms. Such mechanisms. have become resistant to change because of their repeated association with the reinforcing properties of anxiety reduction; that is, they protect the
self-image from threat. Thus, in the T group when an individual's
usual mode of interacting is thwarted and his defense mechanisms
are made a direct topi.c of conversation, considerable anxiety
results. Such anxiety then conatitues a force for new learning
because, if the group experience is a sudc,essful one, new methods
of anxiety reduction will be learned. If the T group is successful,
these methods will be more in line with the goals of the training
and will have more utility for the individual in coping with his
environment than his old methods which may indeed have been
dysfunctional. Thus, anxiety serves the purpose of shaking up or
jarring loose the participant from his preconceived notions and
habitual forms of interacting so that feedback may have its
maximum effect. Without such "unfreezing,' feedback may be
ineffectual ••• (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76).
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The strength of the confrontation must-be proportioned to the degree of
disorganization foreseen and the ability of the confrontee in the context of
the group to handle this disorganization.

Confrontation means in some.way

challenging the unrealities of the "world" of the other, which, though unreal,
feels "solid" to him.

Maslow (196 7), however, after his experience at Day top

Village, suggested or hypothesized that in therapy in general we have looked
1

upon the client as too delicate, too fragile, too incapable of handling

, strong confrontation and its disorganizing effects, and so we have been
afraid to use this tool.

Douds and his associates (1967) suggest that we

fail to confront because we are afraid of the consequences for ourselves, for
he who confronts opens himself to confrontation:

"Much of the time it is the

fear of exposure that is at the base of the therapist's avoidance" (p. 176) •
The "disorganization" that Douds and his associates speak of sounds a good
deal like Beier's (1966} ''beneficial uncertainty" which is a step toward
growth rather than toward dissolution.
(d}

The limits of the confrontee's capabilities.

'!be contract group

should be "diagnostic" in the best sense of the word,that is, the participants
should get a "feel" for one another's areas of potentiality and of deficit.
While the participants should allow one another a wide latitude for growth,
they should also come to a realistic understanding of one another's limits.
Confrontation should be proportioned to these limits.

Certainly the object

of confrontation is to help the confrontee to move beyond his present limits,
but even concerned confrontation cannot create'potentiality where it does
not exist.

lt may well be that the confrontee is not capable of interpersonal

styles that are the preferred styles of the confronter, and it is a mistake
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to use confrontation in a an attempt to get the confrontee to· assume a style
of relating that is not consonant with his capabilities.

I have seen indivi-

duals and even groups spend unreasonable amounts of time trying to get the
confrontee to assume an interpersonal style more similar to their own.

This

is a waste of time and also a way of avoiding 9ne's own problems.
(e)

Group conditions.

Confrontation must be proportioned to certain

group variables, that is, the group must create a climate in which confrontstion is viable.

For instance, if the participants have achieved a certain

degree of mutual trust and support, then

relat~vely

strong confrontation can

be handled even if the confronter himself fails to provide proportional
support, for the other members will supply for his deficiency.

Confrontation

is also much more possible in a group which has developed an "open" culture,
that is, a group that has refused to tolerate the."tacit understandings" which
tend to constrict or eliminate effective communication.

In a group in which

the participants show that they are willing both to confront and to be
::nfronted, confrontation soon becomes a constructive dimension of the
group culture.

In a word, confrontation must be proportioned to the culture

of the group •
(f)

Contract, implicit .2!. expressed.

It was suggested earlier that

every group operates on some contract, whether exJressed or implied.

The

trouble with implicit contracts in sensitivity-training situations is that
they may or may not effectively provide for confrontation, and, even if they
do, the conditions that regulate its use always remain vague.

It seems only

reasonable to assume that making confrontation one of the specific provisions
of an overt group contract goes far in preparing the group for this variable.
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One way of conceptualizing this is to say that through the contract (and
other variables) receive a high degree of "legitimacy."

French and Raven

(1960), in discussing coercive power (and there is an element of "coercion"
in confrontation), suggest that "the more legitimate the coercion the less it
will produce resistance and decreased attraction" (p. 622).

The hypothesis

is that contractual "legitimation" of confrontation will increase its frequencyit
responsibility, acceptability, and effectiveness.
stronger degrees of confrontation to be used.

It will also allow

The group, then, becomes a

laboratory in which the participants, through their successes and failures,
learn how to make responsible confrontation part of their interpersonal styles
of life.

The success of such therapeutic communities as Daytop Village and
Synanon and of Bach's Marathon groups rests, in part, on the fact that the
participants contract more or less explicitly to confrontation.

They know

what they are getting into but their desire for change outweighs the pain
they foresee.

At one time I was tempted to call such experiences "supportless"

groups, but this, I believe, is inaccurate.

They ban from the beginning

more "effete" or unsubstantial kinds of support and even, to a large extent,
the approaches to support outlined in the previous chapter.

Support arises

rather from the fact that severe confrontation takes place in a total institutional setting (even Bach's groups are "in residence" for the entire time of
the Marathon), that there are no observers but just participants (leaders and
clients together), that everyone realizes that there is work to be done and
gets down to doing it "in community," that everyone present is striving for
interpersonal growth.

Motivation, too, is quite high in such groups.

Bach,
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for instance, chooses only those who can demonstrate a sincere willingness to
change.

It cannot be assumed that the rank and file of those who participate

in sensitivity-training laboratories or even contract-group programs possess
.--the same degree of motivation as Synanists or Marathon participants.
(6)

The effect confrontation has on the confrontee.
There is no absolute way to predict the precise effect that any

particular act of confrontation will have on the confrontee.

His immediate

emotional response might be one of elation, depression, or indifference
regardless of whether the confrontation is responsible or irresponsible.

The

"high visibility" of the contract group would suggest that the confrontee
reveal to the confronter and the group in general what impact, positive or
negative, that th.e confrontation has had upon him ("I guess for the moment I
really do not know what to say, because frankly you really took me by surprise,
"My immediate reaction ·is elation over the fact that you are concerned enough

about me to confront me," ''You've made me so angry that I have to get my wits
about me before I could possibly make a rational response").

If someone says

to John, "John, your contributions here have been both marginal and minimal
and I really feel your absence in our interaction," John may be relieved,
appreciative, anxious, shocked, or angry, but if he reveals his emotional
response, he will go far in preventing unproductive ambiguity, confusion,
wicertainty, or "stickiness" from arising in the group.

Once the confrontee

has gotten his emotional reaction "into community" so that it can be dealt with
productively there, then he will be much freer to channel his energies into
the open and constructive reaction to confrontation called for by the contract.
Precisely how a person "should" react or rather respond to confrontation is a
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subject that concerns us next.

GROWTHFUL RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATION.
Up to now we have been dealing with what the confronter should do in
order to make confrontation a responsible interactional process.

We now turn

to the confrontee and what he should do in response to objectively growthful
confrontation.

Most of us naturally tend to react to confrontation, automa-

tically, as it were, and emotionally, but few of us develop the art of
responding to confrontation.
art is to be learned.

The contract group is a laboratory in which this

The most common reactions to confrontation are various

forms of defensiveness ("My family has always been this way," "But I'm like
this only in this group'') and counterattack ("You haven't put out much in
the group yourself").

Pilisuk (1962) showed that subjects tended to retain

favorable estimates of their own performance in the face of adverse criticism,
and it made little difference whether the criticism came from a friend or a
stranger.

However, if the subject thought that the criticism came from a

friend, he used different forms of rationalization to explain away the
friend's behavior.

Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (1957) found that criticisms

were distorted by confrontees when they were thought to come from friends;
confrontees also tended to devalue friends who engaged in such criticism.
a word, it is not easy to respond nondefensively to confrontation.

In

However,

it is assumed here that awareness of just this fact is a step toward taking
on a more positive attitude toward confrontation.

Kirtner (1955) found that

the client who sees his problems as .involving his relationships with others
and who feels that he has contributed to these problems and wants to change
is likely to be successful in a therapeutic encounter, while the client who
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externalizes his problems, feeling little self-responsibility, is much more
likely to be a failure.
process.

Motivation, then, is crucial to the confrontational

If the participant wants to change, he will want to be confronted

and be willing to endure its unpleasant dimensions.

The ideal is that the

confrontee enter actively into the confrontational process, that he become
an agent in a dialogic process rather than just a "patient" suffering through

something that is "for his own good."

Now to a clarification of such

confrontee "agency. 11
Accepting the invitation to self-examination.

If growth-provoking

confrontation is, in one sense, an invitation to self-examination as a prelude
to possible behavioral change, then actual self-examination on the issues in
question is the "proper" response to confrontation.

Research in psychotherapy

is beginning to show that that successful outcome is related to the client's
ability or willingness to explore his behavior.

Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler

(1960) found that successful patients tended to explore themselves more, while
those who failed engaged in little self-exploration and in general manifested
little emotional involvement.

Braaten (1961) found that therapeutic success

was related to exploration of the "private self."

Truax (1961) found

significantly more depth of expe'ltencing in therapeutic successes than in
therapeutic failures from a schizophrenic population.

Similar results have

been reported by Truax and Carkhuff (1963), Holder, Carkhuff, and Berenson
(1967), Piaget, Berenson, and Carkhuff (1967), and Tomlinson and Hart (1962)
among others.

Pratt (1966) calls this striving on the part of individuals

or groups to understand themselves and their conditions and to take part in
changing themselves and their contractual surroundings their "reflexivity
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quotient."

As Pratt implies, the kind of self-exploration desired is one

geared to the examination of behavior and focused on behavioral change.

Too

many people equate self-examination with a kind of amateur psychoanalytic
self-exploration.

The person who sees himself only through a maze (or haze)

of "interpretations" can too easily become convinced that responsiblity for
himself lies either outside himself or in hidden layers of his personality
which are relatively impossible to fathom.
Getting

~

"feel" for how

~

is experienced El_ others.

The participant

cannot respond to confrontation unless he is willing to venture outside
himself.

One of the most effective ways for him to learn is to drop his

defensiveness, at least partially and temporarily, and try to understand the
way in which he is experienced by the others in the group.

Ideally, the

conf rontee-admittedly under somewhat adverse conditions--tries to become as
"accurately empathetic" as he can during the confrontational encounter, that
is, he tries to get inside the "world" bf the confronter and actually "feel"
how he is being experienced by the other.
Self-confrontation.

The contract calls for self-exploration-in-communit

as the response to confrontation, but such self-exploration may be either self
initiated or undertaken in response to a challenge by another.
is looked at a bit abstractedly, a certain gradation appears:

If the questio
it is "good"

for a participant to respond appropriately to unsollicited confrontation, but
it may even be "better" if he actively seeks it out, that is, if he manifests
to the other members that he is open to meaningful hypotheses about himself
and his behavior.

It might even be "best" if the participant were to confront

himself ("It strikes me that l have been coming across rather punitively in
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our interactions here; I'm dissatisfied with my behavior and would like to
deal with it"), for such self-confrontation-in-community indicates a very
high degree of responsibility or "agency" on his part.

The self-confronter

I~--

takes the initiative, but he realizes that he needs the "community" both
for support and for a corrective "outside" view of himself.

The person who

does nothing more than respond appropriately to confrontation seems to imply
that motivation for change must come principally from others; it is they who
make him want what is essential to his own growth.
oneself, then, is one of the goals of the group.
counter-feits of self-confrontation:

Learning how to confront
There are, however,

some participants "get" themselves first

so that the other members will not "get" them in areas more sensitive and more
in need of attention.

They want to avoid certain issues, so they take the

initiative in less sensitive areas.

Since many groups fall for this ploy, it

would seem that a healthy confrontation culture would call for a combination
of self-initiated and other initiated confrontations.
Differential response to different modes of confrontation.

There is

absolutely no reason why group participants .•.should respond univocally to
different kinds of confrontation.

It may well be that any given participant

will respond quite differentially to the various forms of confrontation that
arise in the group.

For instance, a person's ability to respond to highly

intellectualized or rational. verbal confrontation might differ drastically fro
his ability to the confrontation implicit in the others' emotional approaches
to him.

Such a person might be quite frightened by manifestations of affectio •

The contract asks such a person to try to respond to such a confrontation as

he would to more intellectualized or strictly verbal forms of confrontation:

~--

~-

---

------------------
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.1 feel your concern and your warmth and frankly they frighten me, they make
1

~want

to turn you off and run away, but. that's precisely why I think I

,,:;:)uld take

a good look at what's going on inside me and between you and me."
..
5ince it is usually much more difficult to deal with a "feeling" rather than
~-

a "rational" confrontation, the confrontee has to take gre~ter pains to be

honest with himself and others, the group partic:t:>ants have to provide the
support necessary to sustain such confrontation.

Very often it is only the

confron tee who knows what kind of stimulus-acts "pull him up short," and the
responsibility is his to reveal this to the group so that he may reap the
benefits of confrontation.
An openness

~

temporary disorganization.

The confrontee should be

ready to accept (in some sense of the term) the disorganization induced by
effective confrontation.

Confrontation almost always demands some kind of

reorganization of perceptions, attitudes, and feelings, and such reorganization
is impossible without some kind of uprooting.

However, if the participant is

prepared for this disorganization, then his chances of responding rather than
merely reacting to

confron~ation

are greatly increased.

If, in addition to

this, the group culture itself and the participants individually provide
support proportioned to the degree of organization. the possibility of
successful confrontational interaction is further enhanced.

Confrontation

Without support is disastrous; support without confrontation is anemic.
Over-response.
a sponge.

A person is not supposed to soak up confrontation like

This might be as bad or even worse than being closed to confronta-

tion, for it implies a lack of agency and of contact with one's own experiencing which are essential to change:

"Other people can give us feedback,
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and we can sense when their reporting is accurate, if their view resonates
with an organismic sensing within us of.what we have been doing, and
consequently we can change our course of action"(A.11. Rogers, 1968, p. 37).
,,

..

-

llliile it is true that those who are relatively socially adjusted do not
count on continual social reinforcement in order to operate effectively on
an interpersonal

~vel,

it is also true that passive absorption or any and

every confrontation cannot be termed responstJ>le openness to confrontation.
If this takes place in a group, a getting at the roots of such masochism
~sychoanalytically

defined or not) would not be out of place.

In a word,

over-response to confrontation•should be challenged and if possible unmasked.
Confrontation and conflict.

Even though the "correct" response to

confrontation is self-examination in view of possible behavioral change, this
does not eliminate conflict and differences of opinion.

Once the confrontee

has assimilated the point of view of the confronter and has examined himself
on the issues proposed, then together they might examine both areas of
agreement and areas of conflict.
hostility, and aggression,
than argumentative.

Conflict differs from defensiveness, attack,

It may be intense, but it is constructive rather

it is a challenge for those who participate in it to

accept one another's "otherneaa. 11

Hoffman, Harburg, and Maier (1962) offer

some evidence suggesting that conflict can increase the number of alternatives
which group members generate.
of interpersonal contacts.

It is quite likely that the same can be said

When conflict is merely a front for a defensive

refusal to examine oneself or just a disguise for counter-attack, it is usuall
unproductive.

The group participants themselves--and this is especially true

during confrontational interactions--should monitor the conflicts that arise

456

in order to keep them honest.
Responding to irresponsible confrontation.

There ar~ those who take

advantage of the relative non-defensive climate of the group in order to ride

.--

roughshod over the other participants.

If the confrontation is irresponsible-

if it is nothing more than attack, if its primary aim is punishment rather
than involvement--then the leader and ·the group as a whole should intervene
and confront the confronter.

Little is gained if the confrontee merely

becomes angry and fights it out with his aggressor.

However, if the confronte

can ignore the irresponsibilties of the other, he can often sift out elements
of truth that otherwise might never have come up:

"I really thought that

John's primary purpose was to attack and punish me and that he exaggerated
quite a bit, but as I look at myself I am beginning to realize that his basic
point is true:

I am fundamentally a very selfish person and I do try to

disguise this at times_by 'do-good' tactics."

Honesty, whenever and wherever

it can be found, is a valuable commodity.

AREAS OF CONFRONTATION
Behavior rather than motivation.

The direct object of confrontation

should be a person's overt behavior rather than its conjectural foundations,

that is, what-is should be the primary objact of confrontation rather than
what-may-be.

The closer confrontation comes to motivation the more

hypothetical it becomes and thus the more abstract.

For instance, one way

of conceptualizing neurosis is in terms of a set of

"central strategies":

A conceptualization of the problem of neurosis in terms of
information storage and retrieval is based on the fundamental
idea that what is learned in a neurosis is a set of central
strategies .(or a program) which guide the individual's
adaptation to his environment. Neuroses are not symptoms
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(responses) but are strategies of a particular kind which lead
to certain observable (tics, compulsive acts, etc.) and certain
less observable, phenomena (fears, feelings of depression, etc.).
The whole problem of symptom substitution is thus seen as an
instance of response substitution or response equipotentiality,
concepts which are supported-by abundant laboratory evidence
(Breger & McGaugh, 1965, p. 355).
A person might emit all sorts of behavioral cues which reveal his "program,"
but the fact still remains that his behavior is quite real while the "program"
is a construct.

If the construct is the object of confrontation, it should

be confronted as construct and primarily through the

behavio~al

cues through

which it is revealed.
Strength

~well

.!!. weakness.

Since the purpose of the contract group .

is not unmasking but rather interpersonal growth, it would be meaningless if
the participants were to confront one another only in areas of interpersonal
deficit without touching on one another's constructive resources.

To do so

would be to fall into the error of the'iow-functioning" therapists studied
by Berenson, Mitchell, and Laney (1968) and by Berenson, Mitchell, and
~oravec

(1968):

than resources.

"low-functioning" therapist tend to confront weaknesses rathe
"You say little in the group" differs quite a bit from ''You

don't say much, but when you do speak you always contact someone and without
I
cliches." It is still a question of confrontation, but now it is directed
toward unused or little-used potential.

If a participant always deals with

deficits rather than the resources of others, this is "diagnostic" in itself
and should become a subject of discussion in the group.
Self-underestimation.

Self-underestimation is possibly a form of

flight and as such should be confronted.

Some informal research which

Dr. Barbara Powell and I did with sensitivity groups while we were at
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Galesburg State Research Hospital indicated that there is a rather high
correlation between self-estimate measures on group process variables
(administered before regular group sessions began) and actual performance in

.--

the group.

In other words, participants seem to place a limit on their own

own desire or ability to participate and their performance becomes a self-

fulfilling prophecy.

Therefore, if participants are to move beyond their

own self-estimated limi.ts, they must be confronted with the fact that they

tend to underestimate their ability to participate in the give-and-take of
group interaction.

This is a specific form of "confrontation of strength."

Behavior in the group:

confrontation and contract.

It is relatively

easy to delineate what kind of behavior should be confronted in the contractgroup:

(l) any behavior that violates any of the provisions of the contract

and (2) the different forms of flight from contract-fulfillment (these will
be considered separately in the next chapter).

In groups in which there is

only an implicit contract, areas of confrontation cannot be as clearly
delineated.

Also the "high visibility" demanded in the contract group points

:.') certain areas .of confrontation, that is, the "bidden" aspects of the
group culture:

"taci.t understandings," hidden agenda, hidden goals, etc.

Differential intragroup relatiottships.

The contract does not demand

that the participants involve themselves with one another in any univocal
way.

Each participant becomes in different ways and to different degrees

with his fellows.

However, much can be learned by confronting the participant

with these differences in involvement.
deeply
and C.

wit~

For instance, if A involves himself

B but only superficially with C, this says something about A, B,
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Behavior outside the group.

Behavior outside the group is relevant

only to the degree that it can be made a here-and-now concern for the ·
participants in general.
not.

As a rule "story" is relevant, while "history" is
.~-

Once a person reveals extra-group behavior, it, too, can become an

object of confrontation.

However, the group should not deal exclusively

: with the "out-there" behavior of the participants.

This leads to loss of

immediacy, loss of interest, and· eventually to the stagnation or the death
of the group.

The way a person behaves "out there," however, affects his

"in-here" relationships, but the "out there" and the "in here" should be
dealt with concomitantly.

SUMMARY:

SUGGESTED "RULES" FOR CONFRONTATION.

In sunnnary, the following rules may help to make confrontation in the
group a constructive process:
(1)

Confront in order to manifest your concern for the other.

(2)

Make confrontation a way of becoming involved with the other.

(3)

Before confronting, become aware of your bias either for or against the

conf rontee.

Do not refrain from confrontation because you are for him or

.

use confrontation as a means of punishment, revenge, or domination because you
are against him.
(4)

Before confronting the other, try to understand the relationship that

exists between you and him and try to proportion your confrontation to what
the relationship will bear.
(5)

Before confronting, try to take into consideration the possible punitive

side effects of your confrontation.
(6)

The strength or vehemence of your confrontation and the areas of
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sensitivity you deal with should be proportioned to the needs, sensitivities,
and capabilities of the confrontee.
(7)

Confront behavior primarily; be slow to confront motivation.

(8)

Confront clearly:

hypothesis.

indicate what is fact, what is feeling, and what is

Do not state interpretations as facts.

Do not engage in constant

and/or long-winded interpretations of the behavior of the others.
(_9)

Remember that much of your behavior in the group can have confrontational

effects (e.g •. , not talking to others, your emotional attitudes, etc.).
(10)

Be willing to confront yourself honestly in the group.
No set of rules will provide assurance that the confrontation will

always be a growthful process in the sensitivity-training group.
can learn much from both the use and abuse of confrontation.

But groups
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Chapter X
A Stance

~gainst

Flight

Introduction
....-

It is not easy to engage in the kinds of interaction outlined in the
previous chapters.

Thus, human nature being what it is, there is a natural

tendency for group participants to find ways either to resist or to flee the
work at hand.

Even though participants engage in sensitivity-training

experiences because they want to, it can still be expected that they will
resist the process, because it is anxiety-arousing and demanding.
are the common defense mechanisms such

a~

Not only

projection, rationalization, reaction

formation, insulation, etc. used, but they are used in ways which are peculiar
to the group situation.

.

The group situation threatens the participants with

both self-knowledge and intimacy, and the defenses of the participants rise
to the challenge.
Flight tendenciaa seem to appear whenever the human organism is
threatened by the often painful processes associated with intrapsychic and
:.nterpersonal growth.

It is not surprising, then, to find flight a constant

problem in both psychotherapy and other kinds of growth situations.

Gibb

(1964), for instance, note• that "a person may ••• engage in frenetic offtarget work in an effort to find himself or to keep from finding himself
(p. 282).

Whitman (1964} suggests that group participants defend themselves

against involvement by overintellectualization, overaffective behavior, and
selected inattention.

In Grinker's transactional therapy, the patient is not

permitted to become anonymous, to intellectualize, or to talk persistently
about others.

Mowrer (1950), Dollard and Miller (1950), and Rotter (1954) all
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see the maladjusted person as one who fails to learn adjustive or growthful
behavior automatically because he

per~istently

engages in avoidance behavior

which keeps him from situations in which he could learn more adaptive and
growthful behavior.

Although such avoidance behavior is not really satisfying

(flight never really is) and is punished in the long run, it is immediately
satisfying and, therefore, persists.

Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) define

failure in therapy in terms of various forms of flight:

"Failure to benefit

from therapy occurs (1) when a patient succeeds consistently in maintaining a
habitual maladaptive solution in the group, thus remaining uncomfortable but
affectively untouched by the situation; (2) when a patient resorts to physical
or psychological flight, thus insulating himself from the affective forces of
the group; or (3) when a patient reacts to threat with the breakdown of
previously established solutions and the substitution of disorganized,
inadequate behavior" (p. 180).

Whatever the immediate rewards of flight

)ehavior, it is ultimately self-destructive.
Flight can be conceptualized in various

ways~for

covert and mild-severe dimensions.
A

B
I

II

IV

Ill

c

D

Covert
Figure 10.1.

Flight behavior.

instance, along overt-
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At point A (inild-overt) in quadrant I we might find some such remark as ''We
i

don't have to overdo it here," or "It's better to let this thing develop
gradually," at point B (severe-overt) in quadrant II actual physical flight,
.~·-

at point C (mild-covert) in quadrant III a passing joke that breaks the
tension of the interaction, and at point D (severe-covert) in quadrant IV
disruptive aggressive and punitive behavior on the part of some group member.
Flight from growth is easily conceptualized in the contract group:

it

refers to failures to engage in the contractual behaviors outlined and in
substituting

a~

or anti-contractual behavior.

Therefore, we have already

dealt with a number of different kinds of flight--for instance, engaging in
"history" rather than "story" in the modality of self-disclosure.

It is our

purpose here, not to repeat What has been said above, but briefly to classify
and clarify the major modes of flight used in groups in the hope that such

exposure of flight modalities will reduce flight behavior in actual group
interaction.

Nor are all possible flight modalities detailed here, for, given

the ingeniousness of the human spirit in both devising modes of flight and
disgusing them, this would be an endless task.
This chapter, then, is an attempt to "spit in the soup" of the group
member in flight.

The members of the contract group are asked to become aware

of the principal kinds of flight behavior and to take a stance against flight
by confronting themselves and one another when it arises.

This refusal to

withdraw from the enterprise is extremely important, for flight in the group
only mirrors the flight behavior in the participant's day-to-day life.
Since not only individuals but also entire groups may engage in flight,
the following is divided into two sections:

the individual in flight and
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, the group in flight.
The Individual in Flight
Cynicism, initial and otherwise.

'!be participant who comes to the group

.~·-

experience with a closed mind and whose principal defense is a cynical attitude
toward what is happening 'in 't:he group will find it extremely difficult, i f not
impossible, to engage in the group interaction.

Watson and his associates

(1961) found that those who come to a laboratory experience ready to give
themselves to it showed positive and results afterwards, while those who
expected the laboratory to be irrelevant found it irrelevant.

Perhaps the

most incapacitating failure of the cynic is that he refuses to initiate anything in the group.

To initiate is to show interest and he cannot be caught

showing interest in an enterprise that is in some way below him.

He waits

until someone else initiates something and then he sits in judgment on what is
happening.

In fact, his usual posture is one of silent judgment on the pro-

ceedings of the group.

This makes him all but unvulnerable, for he can

naintain the same posture even when he becomes the object of confrontation.

At

times he may bearrapt along by the action of the group, and when the group
situation calls for sincerity, he is sincere.

But he returns almost immediatel

to his former posture and hangs albatross-like around the neck of the group.
Silence.

It seems logical to begin with

silence~

Some have tried to

rationalize silence by claiming that there is no evidence that the silent
person is not benefiting from the group experience; others say that the silent
member is a "point of rest" in the group or that he is "dynamic" in the sense
that the group must deal with him.

There are a number of errors here.

The

silent person may well be learning something in the group, but he certainly is
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not growing if growth means interpersonal growth, for it is ludicrous to
assume that interpersonal growth takes place without interpersonal exchange •

•
Growth means, in part, that the person become an "agent" instead of a

11 patient"
.--If the silent member is considere "dynamic"

in his interpersonal contacts.

in that he contributes to the dynamics of the

group~his

silence is a felt

"force" or he mobilizes the energies of the group, for they must deal with
hiro--then his silence is implicitly or explicitly manipulative and deleterious
to interpersonal growth.

The silent member frequently arouses the concern of

the group ("Why is he silent?", "What is happening inside?"), creates feelings
of guilt ("We have been neglecting him"), or provokes anger (''Why does he
choose to remain an outsider?", "~y does he sit there in judgment of the rest
of us?").

That is, silence does manipulate, whether this is the intention of

the silent member or not.

Furthermore, in the contract group, silence and

contract-fulfillment are simply antithetical.

By definition the silent member

is not growing in the contract-group insofar aa contract fulfillment can bo
considered a sign of growth.

It has already been mentioned how one sensitivit -

group member felt "hurt" by the silent members:

she did not know where they

stood in the group and this constricted her ability to interact with them.
Smith (1957) found that group productivity was negatively affected by the
presence of two silent members in five-person groups, for the silent members
were perceived as unpredictable.
Slavson (1966) sees silence in group psychotherapy as a form of conununication even though it is also a form of resistance.

The reasons for silence,

he says, are either characterological (e.g., the person never says much, he
has developed habits of silence) or neurotic (e.g., the result of anxiety
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and/or guilt).

An individual may also be "selectively" silent, that is, he

might be silent because he is not interested in the topic of discussion in
t~at

it has no relevance to his current needs or preoccupations or the topic
··'-

might constitute an area of threat for him.

In the contract group, however,

such selective silences violate certain provisions of the contract, for the
participants are asked to deal openly with their boredom and, at least in a
general way, with their areas of threat.

Slavson calls an attempt on the part

of a member to impose silence on the group because the interaction threatens
him "endogenic" silence; if, on the other hand, the members of a group "turn
off" an overassertive member, this is "imposed" silence.

In the contract-

group, however, anxiety arising from threat should be handled as openly as
possible, and the overassertive member should be confronted and not merely
silenced.

In a word, imposing silence on another or others usually indicates

some sort of flight.

Finally, Slavson talks about "iatrogenic" silence, that

is, silence that ensues in the group when the leader is abrupt or becomes
angry.

In the contract group, the leader is a leader-member and his behavior,

too, is open to confrontation.

The group that responds to leader-behavior

by falling silent is in flight.
Sometimes the entire group becomes silent, but naturally so.

The

of such silence varies, but by no means is it always a sign of flight.

meanin~

If

such silences occur with any frequency or if they occur at dramatic moments
in the life of the group, their practical meaning for the group should be
investigated.
Silence-as-flight, although it admits of degrees, tends to limit growth.
What Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) say of the silent patient also refers to
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the

I
I

participant in any kind of interpersonal growth experience:
Therapeutic benfit is limited for the consistently silent patient.
He can experience affect associated with crucial personal conflicts
in the group, can observe the conseq~ences of others' yielding
maladaptive solutions similar to1lis own, and can achieve insight
through being exposed to relevant group information. Direct interpretations and feedback are less available to him and less likely
to be accurate and usable. He cannot directly experience the
actual testing of the reality of his fears or the necessity for
maintaining habitual maladaptive solutions (p. 180}.

' Although quality of participation is, absolutely speaking, more important than

I quantity,

there comes a point where lack of quantity is deleterious to the

overall quality of an individual's participation.

This marriage of

quanti~y

and quality of participation is something that must be learned in the actual
give-and-take of group interaction.
Interpretation and the pursuit of insight.

Interpretation and insight

go together, for supposedly the former leads to the latter.

The value of both

interpretation and insight in therapeutic practice is currently being
challenged form a number of quarters.

Whatever the outcome of the struggle

between "insight" and "action" therapists (London, 1964), the point is that in
all growth experiences, including sensitivity-training situations, the use
of interpretation and the pursuit of insight too often constitute flight
behavior.

Our culture tends to make us think that the only kind of real

knowing is "scientific" knowing.

In growth-groups, then, the participants

think that they are doing the "scientific" thing when they attempt to tease
out the conjectural foundations of their own behavior and that of their fellows
The person in the group who makes interpretation one of the principal components of his style of interaction is either misled or in flight.

It is not

just that the "understanding" of behavior becomes an end in itself, but
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there even comes a point where interpretation and insight no longer refer to
actual behavior and become merely inte.rnally consistent logical systems with
their own axioms and postulates •

--

.

Rogers and Truax (1967) maintain that accurate empathy is a far cry from
the interpretation-insight dyad under attack here:
An accurate empathic grasp of the patient's conflicts and problems

is perhaps most sharply contrasted with the more usual diagnostic
formulation of the patient's experiences. This diagnostic understanding which is so different but so common involves the "I
understand what is wrong with you" or "I understand the dynamics
which make you act that way" approach. These evaluative understandings are external and even impersonal. While they may at times
be very useful in developing external understanding, they are in
sharp contrast to an accurate and sensitive grasp of events and
experiences and their personal meaning to the client. The external
and evaluative understanding tends to focus the client's being on
externals or upon intellectualizations which remove him from an
ongoing contact with the deeper elements of his self (p. 105).
Insight cultures are often flight cultures because they keep the group from
coming to grips with the affective behavioral dimensions of interpersonal
living.

Frank (1961) reflects on the problems inherent in an overintellectual

ized approach to therapy.

At least in American psychotherapy

[t]he scientific ideal reinforces the democratic one by valuing
lack of dogmatism. It also values objectivity and intellectual
comprehension and these features may not be entirely advantageous
for psychotherapy. They tend to result in an overevaluation of its
cognitive aspects. From the patient's standpoint, 'insight' in the
sense of the ability to verbalize self-understanding may be mistaken
for genuine attitude change. From the therapist's standpoint, the
scientific attitude may lead to undue stress on the niceties of
interpretation and avoidance of frankly emotion-arousing techniques
such as group rituals and dramatic activities, even though there is
universal agreement that in order to succeed psychotherapy must
involve the patient's emotions (pp. 219-220).
It is not that insight is considered meaningless.

Rather it may be that

insight-through-action might be more interesting and ultimately more productiv
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than a more intellectualized and abstractive form of insight.

As Goroff (1967)

notes, "the development of 'insight' ·comes not from interpretations, but from
experiencing ••• changes in ••. beha!1-or" (p. 432).
contract group are asked to do just that:

The participants in the

change their behavior, attempt to
/

be with one another in different, non-cliche ways.

The sharing of resulting

emotional reactions and insights is a far cry from the sterile insightsearching that goes on too frequently both in and out of therapy.

Douds and

associates (1967), too, severely criticize the insight-game:
At best, insight inundates affect with ideas and drowns it in a
whirlpool of words. At worst, the person is left with the feeling
of being splintered into a thousand pieces, in contact with the
fact that he has no identity of his own, only fitting in relation
to specific people and situations. Feeling alone, without action,
leads to no change. Thus, the alienated person who seeks only
insight slowly decays while having the illusion of making progress
(p. 177).

Our fear of feelings and emdtions moves us to try to substitute logic
for them.

It is a poor substitute. .There are two ways in which the interpre-

tation-insight game may be played.
interpreter:

First, a participant may play the role of

he feels free to discuss the dynamics underlying his own

behavior and that of others.

Another way of playing the game, however, is

to demand that the other come up with "proper" interpretations of and insights
into his own behavior.
the question "why."
1

'why. 11

The favorite ploy of the person who plays the game is

His immediate response to disclosure is not support but

If the respondent plays his game, he usually has to venture into

intellectualized conjecture which is usually quite boring and does not lead
either to fruitful insight or behavioral change.

However, it does prevent

group members from interacting affectively with one another, and this might
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just well be the whole purpose of the game.
Although the pursuit of interpretation and insight might be the problem
of only a member or two, it can become a group problem, that is, a "culture"
of interpretation and insight can develop within the group.

If intellectual-

ized interpretation and insight go unchallenged early in the life of the
group, the participants tend to enter into a "tacit understanding" to
encourage or at least to tolerate such activities.
been made, it is difficult to unmake.

Once the "decision" has

The leader-member should challenge

such "tacit understandings" from the beginning.
This is not to say that every interpretation and that all pursuit of
insight constitute flight behavior.

Interpretation is valuable to the degree

that it has some impact on the person whose behavior is being analyzed.
Interpretation must produce some kind of "focus" that leads to behavioral
change.

Wiener (1967) suggests that "it is not the quantity of information

that is important for action, but the quantity of information which can
penetrate into a connnunication and storage apparatus sufficiently to serve
as a trigger for action" (p. 127).

The pithy, conjectural, "impact"

interpretation usually produces intensive interaction in the group, while the
extended interpretation almost inevitably ends in monologue and lecture.

As

May (1958) notes, the more detailed we become in our analysis of forces and
drives, the more abstract we become and the more removed from living human
beings.

An "interpretation culture" contributes vastly to the entropy of

group process.

Such a·culture is overly intellectual and analytic, living

together in dialogue, on the other hand, is emotional and synthetic.
Humor.

Humor is a two-edged sword.

For instance, it can be used to
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ease the punitive side effects of confrontation and thus facilitate interaction, but it can also be used as a weapon to destroy attempts to deepen
the level of the interaction or to broach sensitive topics.
.....

-

When humor is

used to dissipate tension, it does just that, but it does so without getting
at the issues underlying the tension.

Whenever either an individual or a

group adopts humor as a consistent component of interactional style (e.g. the
group spends five or ten minutes in banter at the beginning of a session, or
a member becomes humorous whenever a particularly sensitive issue is brought
up), such behavior should be challenged.
The questioner.

It is amazing how many participants seem to handle

emotional interactions by means of questions.

For instance, participant A

reveals himself at a fairly deep level and expresses a good deal of emotion
in doing so.

Participant B, unable to handle either the revelation or the

emotion, begins to ask A questions instead of supporting him or engaging in
counter self-sharing.

Questions can be effective if they get at the guts

of the interaction and also reveal something about the questioner in the
process (e.g. that he is concerned, anxious, etc.).
interrogation primarily to help document points

decisive ("Did you really steal tlte money?").

Berne (1966) uses

tha~

promise to be clinically

Questions put to the patient's

Adult, Berne says, are thought provoking and in this respect resemble confrontations.

But, on the negative side, questions can be an attempt to

intellectualize emotions expressed in the group or even an expression of
hostility, a way of "picking at" the other.

Some people ask questions because

they think that they should say something or interact in some way, and
questions constitute the safest way of doing this.

Whenever questions,
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especially "why" questions, become the instruments of an ineffective interpretation-insight culture, they indicate flight and the question-culture
should be challenged.
Rationalizations.
every defense mechanism.

.-Rationalization

is part of the warp and woof of

In sensitivity groups an almost infinite variety

of rationalizations are available to the participant who finds that he is

As the proverb goes, he who

not giving himself to the group experience.
cannot dance says that the yard is stony.

It is possible to mention here

only a few of the more commonly used rationalizations.
fields" syndrome:

One is the "distant

the participant says t.o himself if not to others that he

would be doing well if he were only in "that other" £roup.

It is the peculiar

combination of personalities in this group that prevents him from getting on
with the work.

Once that he has convinced himself that the obstacle is his

environment (including the trainer) rather than himself, he proportions is
participation to his "discovery."

Sometimes it takes the form:

"Even I

cannot cope with this group."
Others project their own inadequacies on the laboratory experience
itself:

"This is a contrived situation, quite unreal; it does not facilitate

real interpersonal contact."

The fact is that no one claimed that the group

situation was not contrived; the laboratory is both real and unreal, but the
person who becomes preoccupied with its unrealities is in flight.

It is too

easy to blame these· unrealities-for one's own failures, just as it is so easy
for the person who is either afraid of .failure or who feels he has failed to
become cynical about the powers of the group.
A rather silent member of a group once suggested a rather interesting

475

he should not punish but apologize, for he has violated his contractual
obligations in a number of ways.

In the contract group, the participant who

does nothing about his boredom deserves it •
...

Over-involvement.

-

Some people flee centrifugally, away from the inter-

action, while others (probably fewer in number) flee centripetally, into the
action.

The latter over-involve themselves with the group and cannot tolerate

what seems to be under-involvement on the·part of others.
becomes their identity (perhaps because

t~ey

Being-in-the-group

have little sense of identity

outside the group) and what they experience inside the group is more real
for them than what they experience outside the group.
means of enhancing one's. interpersonal living:

But the group is a

not a substitute for it.

Perhaps the over-involvement of some can be explained by the construct of
reaction-formation:

those who feel most uncomfortable and alienated from the

group (or from others i.11 general) must seem to be its most ardent supporters.
Those who make a cult

ot growth..-group experiences both inside and outside

the group do lllUCh to alienate both fellow participants and the general
population.

Over-involvement, however, i.s not the usual participant problem,

and those who tend to flee centrifugally should be slow to accuse their
fellow participants of too much involvement.
Dealing in generalities.

One of the most common failings of

pants is a "generality" approach to the interaction.

partici~

·

When speaking, they use

"you" and "one" and "people" instead of.· "I," they state and restate general
principals without applying them to themselves, or to others and they address
themselves to the group at large

instea~

of contacting individual participants

But being specific does make a difference in the sense of immediacy in the
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group.

There is a world of difference between the statement:

"You get

scared to bring up what is really bothering you," and "I am really afraid to
talk about the things that bother me here."

It. does make a difference when

participants talk. ahout specific incidents and people inside the group instead
of speaking generally about the group culture.

It does make a difference when

a participant directs a high percentage of his remarks to individuals in the
group instead of speaking generally to the whole group.

When a participant

addresses the whole group through the innnediacy of his contact with another
individual, the entire interaction becomes less abstractive and more engaging.
In experimenting with. groups, I have arbitrarily banned the use of "people"
and of "you" and "one," refused to let others make general statements, and
demanded th.at the participantsaddress themselves to particular individuals
instead of the entire group.

The resulting culture, while somewhat artificial,

at least initially, dramatizes the lack of inunediacy that preceded it.

Rid

the group of the generaliti.es that plagt.ie it and you rid it of one of the most
connnon sources of boredom.
Low tolerance for conflict and emotion.

Inevitably there are some

participants who have a low tolerance for conflict and/or strong emotion.
When conflict and emotion run high, these participants react in one of two
ways (or both ways at different times):

they either withdraw from the

interaction or they try to stop what is taking place.

In conflict or

confrontational situations they may become mediators, saviors, or "redcrossers."

They defend the confrontee, chide the confronter, and in general

pour oil on the

water~

they find intolerable.

of conflict.

Nor is it just negative emotion which

Often strong positive emotions are just as threatening

--~
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and these, too, must be tempered by hwnor, changing the subject, and other
ploys.

This does not mean that no one should ever intervene in conflict

situations; some conflict situations
are unprofitable and forms of flight
,.·in themselves and deserve to be challenged.

It does mean, however, that one

should try to be aware of and perhaps declare his motivation when he does
intervene in conflictual or other emotional situations ("intervene" is used
here in distinction from "participate").

The participant who can declare his

discomfort during even responsible conflict without trying to sabotage
the interaction has taken the first step toward handling his low tolerance
for emotion.
No space

12. ~· One of the functions of growth experiences is to

reveal to the participant the possiblities for growthful change.
resist this revelation in a variety of ways.

He can

He may deny that any change or

at least the changes proposed would be beneficial or even possible.
he may present himself as having no "room" in which to "move."
himself as hemmed in by his heredity, environment, and history.
response to confrontation is:
I am."

That is,

He sees
Too often his

"I can't do anything about it; that's the way

The problem here is not that the participant refuses to move in the

directions suggested by others but that he refuses even to entertain the
possibility.

He

might refuse to do so in the name of personal freedom and

integrity or out of a sense of being the victim of forces outside his control,
but responsible confrontation is not an attack upon a person's integrity nor
a call to do the impossible.

The person comes to the group not to be re-made

but to entertain possibilities for change.
A

If he resists this, he is

resisting the very raison d'entre of the group.

If a participant finds that
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his interactional style is heavily loaded with statments

of defense and/or

attack, he might well entertain the hypothesis that he is unwilling to examine
even the possiblity of change.

.--

The Group in Flight
Obviously some of the resistances and flight modalities outlined above
could apply not only to individuals but to the group as a whole.

This is

especially true if the group establishes a "culture" in which one or another
flight modality, e.g., intellectualized interpretation, is either tolerated
or even encouraged.

Certain other behaviors, however, pertain more to the

resistance or the flight of the group as such, though here again any particula
behavior might characterize an individual rather than the group.

Some of

these behaviors are outlined below.
Extended contract talk.

In contract-group experiences it is essential

that participants have a solid understanding of the principal provisions of
the contract.

In other kinds of growth-group experiences, especially

experiences characterized by goallessness or "planned ambiguity," it is
necessary for the participants to work out some kind of contract among themselves.

In both groups, then, early meetings are characterized by "contract

talk" which includes a discussion of goals and the group structures necessary
to achieve these goals.

However, when the group persists in "contract talk,"

when it keeps formulating and reformulating its goals, when it keeps restructuring the contract, then it is quite likely that the group is allowing talk
about the contract to take the place of fulfilling the contract.

It is much

easier to discuss a contract (expressed or implied) than to engage in it.
This does not mean that a group should not discuss the contract or reformulate
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its goals from time to time.

This reformulation, however, should be quite

concrete, that is, goals should not be discussed in themselves but in terms
of the individuals, interactions, and incidents of the group itself.
..

--

If this

is done, occasional "contract talk" will become just another modality through
which the participants contact one another.
Analysis of past interactions.

Detailed analysis of past interactions

in the group is both a caricature of "processing" and a seemingly popular
form of flight.

For instance, the group in an afternoon meeting discusses

in detail the dynamics of the morning meeting.

This takes place under the

guise of "working things out" and "getting things straight," but the hidden
purpose is frequently to gain a respite from intimate interaction.

The

group analyzes not to put things in perspective but to put the interaction at
a distance.

Sometimes these "historical" analyses take place during the

same meeting, that is, the participants interact for a while and then the
interchange degenerates into a "This happened and then that happened: or

a

"No, B got angry and then A got angry" situation in which the here-and-now is
abandoned for a safer there-and-then.

In worthwhile "processing," the

participants become critics of the group culture and of their own interactions
with a view to improving both.

"Historical" analyses, on the other hand,

usually become ends in themselves; the group treads water, as it were, in
order to avoid involvement.

It is interacting to see what happens after the

group concludes an "historical" analysis of its interaction:

frequently it

merely drops silent for a while, which is some indication of the relevance
of the analysis.
Serious a-contractual conversations.

Sometimes groups flee the expresse
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or implied contract by engaging in ''worthwhile discussions" which really have
/ no relation to the goals of the group.

I sat in on a sensitivity group

once

and listened for a while to a rather high-level discussion of some of the

II

most important social issues of the. day.

Had a total stranger come into the

group without knowing its general purpose, I am sure that he would have
thought that it was a social-action group that was taking itself seriously.
Such conversation would have been most appropriate at another time in another
place, but in the training group it was merely an expression of discomfort
and anxiety and a flight from the real purpose of the group.

Usually, such

serious discussions take place early in the life the the group, for most
people assume that when they are talking intellectually about serious issues,
they are in close contact wi.th their fellow discussants.

Such conversations

are difficult to challenge, too, for it seems ignoble to interrupt something
that is so worthwhile in i.taelf.

I tend to interrupt the conversation and

have the group "process" what i.t is doing.

Soon the participants realize

that they are avoidhg the real issues at hand.

The point is that such

conversations should be interrupted immediately so that "serious intellectual
discussions" do not

become part of the group culture.

Turn-taking~

dependence

~exercises.

Some of the exercises which

are commonly introduced into human relations laboratori.es involve "turntaking" or "going around."

For instance, early in the life the the group,

each member might be asked to give his first impressions of every other
member.

Turn-taking provides a structure which both forces each member to

participate and provides a certain amount of "institutionalized" safety.

As

the group moves forward, however, there should be less and less reliance on
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is the case, then these

m~mbers

are in flight.

No structure which signifi-

cantly reduces the involvement of a number of members (or serves as an excuse
for their non-involvement) should be tolerated; if "dealing with one" has this
...

-

effect, then it is not being handled properly.

It is possible to "deal with

one" in a way which does not cut down on the involvement of the participants.
First of all, no participant should be allowed to excuse himself from the
interaction simply because another participant is to a greater or lesser
extent the focal point of the discussion.

Secondly, "dealing with one" does

not exclude interactions between participants other than the focal participant.
Too often it is assumed that if the group is "dealing with one," the only
permissible interactions are those between the focal participant and someone
else.

This is artificial and stultifying.

Thirdly, the focal participant,

himself realizing that there is a tendency on the part of some to withdraw
from the interaction in a "dealing with one" situat:bn, should take the
initiative in bringing silent members back into the discussion.

The problem

is that most focal participants become somewhat passive and merely allow
themselves to be dealt with.

Another danger inherent in a "dealing with one"

situation is the tendency to focus on there-and-then incidents and concerns
rather than the here-and-now.

This of itself serves the cause of alienation.

The responsibility for maintaining a here-and-now culture in a "dealing with
one" situation falls to a great degree on the shoulders of the focal participant.

He cannot escape talking about there-and-then concerns, but it is his

responsibility to make these concerns relevant to the here-and-now.

For

instance, it may be that the there-and-then limits his ability to involve
himself with the other participants, that is, his past history affects his
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sharing yourself with me, it gives me the courage to share myself with you."
It is.also unwarranted to assume that the group can work completely through
any participant's self-revelation at any one time.

Such gradiosity covers a

multitude of uncertainties and anxieties in groups.

The group should feel

...

-

free to return again and again to anything that has been said in the group
and to look at new facets of self-disclosure in the light of subsequent
group interaction.
Interruptions and moods.

If the group culture is too "polite," it will

not allow one participant to interrupt another nor will it allow anyone to
interrupt a group procedure such as "dealing with one."

Perhaps a distinction

should be made between relevant and irrelevant interruptions or interventions.
To

inte~rupt

in order to change the topic is one thing, to intervene because

one has something important and relevant to say is another.

On the one hand,

the group culture should not encourage boorishness, but, on the other, it
should promote a freer atmosphere than that found in polite conversations.
With good purpose one should be able to break into a conversation without
being made feel that he is an intruder or a bull in a china shop.

Although

it has been thought that the number of interruptions that would occur when
members of families of schizophrenics

interacted would be significantly

higher than the number of interruptions during the conversations carried on
by the families of normals.
opposite was true.

Mishler and Waxler (1966) found that the

The data suggest that the families of acute schizophrenic

patients have the fewest interruptions and families of normal children have
the most.

Such data may indicate that "interruptions" are even an essential

part of good conversational interaction.

If the interaction is so fragile tha
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any interruption can destroy it, then perhaps the participants should work at
making it more robust rather than pouring energies into protecting it.

Some-

,,
!

I

times participants claim that through interruptions the "magic of the
moment" is lost:
mean:

"We never got back to it."

This statement, however, may

"We did not want to get back-to it"--relief being disguised as altruist

annoyance.

The group does not have its moods and mood can be a facilitating

factor, but the group should not be too dependent on mood in order to get
its work done.

It is not that there are not "right times" for dealing with

certain issues, but it is up to the group to create these "right times"
rather than waiting for them to happen.
Problem-solution cultures.

No matter how applicable a problem-solution

model might to be such sciences as mathematics and physics, it leaves much to
be desired when applied to intrapsychic and interpersonal.living.

As soon

as a group participant mentions that he has certain "problems," this evokes
certain predictable reactions in the other participants:

they want to "solve"

his problems, have him "solve" them himself, or help him'"solve'them.

In

fact, the group usually welcomes talk of problems, because it is much easier
to deal with problems than to involve oneself with persons.

If certain of

his behaviors can be separated from him and labeled as problematic, then
one's approach to him can be relatively simple and "clean."
This seems to be more than just a question of semantics. "Problems"
and implied "solutions" simply are not persons but ways of setting persons
at a di.stance.

In fact, people are beginning to substitute other tenns for

the word "problem."

For instance, they talk about their "hang-ups."

It

I.
may be that the term "hang-up" is just a current substitution for the cliche
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"problem," but the former term implies that the person who is "hung up" is in
some way responsible for this behavior and that behavioral change in within
his power.

At least "hang-ups" do not seem to have "solutions."
..

--

Life is not the compartmentalized or atomistic entity that the problemsolution paradigm envisions.

Life is principally interpersonal living, but

to cast interpersonal living in terms of "problems" and "solutions" tends to
make objects out of people.

Even though most interpersonal-growth groups,

at least in the beginning, identify depth of involvement in the group process
with the revelation of "problems," depth of involvement entails their sharing
themselves rather than their problems.

If the participants insist upon

sharing problems, this might be because they cannot share themselves.

When

two people find it difficult to involve themselves with each other, they
seldom sit down and "solve" this "problem" they have with each other.

Rather,

through dialogue they begin to transcend attitudes and behaviors that keep
them apart.

Once they become more available to each other, a new synthesis

(rather than a "solution") takes place in their relationship.

They grow

in relationship to each other, and growth does not fit in well with a problemsolution paradigm.
If a person always talks about himself in terms of his problems, he
tends to maintain the false hope that if he solves his problems, then things
will be all right:

Utopia is the land of solved problems.

Perhaps the use

of $UCh terms as "problem" and "solution" appears unhealthy or inappropriate
because such language is symptomatic of overly "mechanistic"

attitudes

toward oneself and one·'s relationship with others.
Tacit decisions.

The tendency of the group to make "tacit decisions"
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or come to "tacit understandings" has been mentioned above, but it bears
repeating here in that it is one of the principal ways in which groups as
such take flight.

As Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) note, unchallenged modes

of behavior tend to pass into the group culture as "laws," and once these
"laws" are made, they become very difficult to change or abrogate.
understandings" can affect almost any aspect of group life:

"Tacit

the content of

discussions ("We do not talk about sex here"), procedure ("When one person
is talking, no one should interrupt him and he should be given all the time
he wants"), depth of interaction ("We really don't want to wash our dirty
linen here" or "Thre are some things that we should just keep to ourselves"),
rules ("Coming late or absenting oneself from this group is not an offense"),
style ("Humor is allowed almost anytime during the interaction"), goals
("Our purpose is to decrease the discomfort that we feel in being together
with one another" or "Cooperation with one another is not a group value in
this situation").

Since flight-by-tacit-decision can take place very early

in the life of the group, it is up to the leader-member to explain both the
process involved and the consequences of such "understandings" and to
challenge them as soon as he sses them being formulated in the group.
"Tacit decisions" can begin with clearly expressed statements which go
unchallenged in the group.

For instance, in a group which was slated to

meet once a week for twelve weeks in three-and-a-half hour sessions, one of
the participants said during the first meeting:

"This set-up really doesn't

allow us much time to get involved with one another; the time is short and
we don '·t see one another between sessions."

One hypothesis might be that

he was afraid of getting involved with the others and that he really feared
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that there was too much time.

His statement, however, went unchallenged in

the group and kept coming up like a refrain in subsequent meetings.

The

participants tacitly accepted his analysis of the limitation of the
...

-

possibilities of the group and spent the following weeks trying to live
with the frustration that this entailed.

There are always tendencies to

blame the group structure (time, length of meeting, lack of specific things
to say and do, etc.) for group inaction, but to allow these tendencies to
become concretized in the group culture can mean the suffocation of the
group.
Ritual behavior.

Alexander (1963) warns against what he calls "standard

izing the treatment" in psychotherapy, that is, allowing it to degenerate
into an interaction ritual between therapist and client.

The interpersonal-

growth group, too, can easily take on a ritualistic atmosphere devoid of
eruptions of any kind in which sameness soothes.

Although the participants

become quite comfortable in such a ritual, there is still the illusion that
something serious and worthwhile is really taking place.

In a ritualistic

group culture, not only do the same issues come up over and over again, but
they are handled in the same way.

For instance, participant X's silence and

general lack of involvement is dealt with from time to time, but little is
done between ritualistic confrontations to bring X into the interaction.
It is almost as if the participants were to say to themselves from time to
time:

"Since nothing in particular is taking place right now, we might as

well make a group assault on X again."

One way to dramatize the ritualiza-

tion of the group is to replay a videotape of, let us say, session three
together with a tape of session eight.

If the same issues are being dealt

....
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with in the same way, that is, if it would be impossible for a stranger to
determine which was the earlier and which the later session, then it may
well be that the group has ritualized itself as a form of resistance or
_.-flight. A ritualized group culture is a sterile thing of which boredom and
resistance to attending (reluctance to come, coming late, actual absences)
are the inevitable signs.
Exceeding contractual limits and.the question of "loyalty."
following situation comes up again and again in groups.
scheduled to last from seven until 10 o'clock.

The

The meeting is

Little happens until about

nine-thirty so that by ten o'clock the group is "in the middle of things."
Most members take it as a sign of involvement in and loyalty to the group
to extend the group session until ten-thirty. or eleven o'clock.

Not only

that, but they implicitly or explicitly accuse anyone who wants to leave at
the contracted time of "disloyalty."

Frequently this mode of proceeding is

established early in the life of the group by means of a "tacit understanding'
and becomes an important factor in the group culture.

The group attempts

to take flight by substituting sheer quantl.ty of participation (time spent
together) for quality.
and. stop in time.

In my opinion, meetings should, in general, start

"Loyalty" should be demonstrated not by a willingness

to give oneself to endless discussions (quite often such discussions entail
"dealing with one" in a way which precludes the involvement of the majority
of the members) but by a willingess to get down to work from the start.

The

person who "opens up" five minutes before the scheduled end of the meeting
should continue in the following meeting.

If in the following meeting he

finds that t:1e "golden moment" has passed, it is 100re than likely that he was
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only teasing the group in the first place.

Or if mood is so important for

him, then the interactions that take place when the mood is upon him might wel
have little learning value.

His moods are perhaps analogous to drugged states

in which real learning either does not take place or does nto transfer to
non-drugged conditions.
Concluding Remarks
Flight

~

non-growthful avoidance learning.

Avoidance learning has been

used with varying degrees in treating such problems as alcoholism and
sexually deviant behavior (Kalish, 1965).

The client ·must learn to stay

away from a certain situation, avoid a certain stimulus, or place a certain
act in order to prevent some unwanted consequences.

for instance, an alcohol

ic treated with Antabuse might learn that nausea and violent retching are too
high a price to pay for drinking, so he avoids the stimulus that results in
such a noxious response.

In groups the participants soon learn that, at

least initially, a certain degree of pain and discomfort is associated with
involving themselves affectively with one another.

They also learn that

there are certain behaviors (see flight behaviors outlined above) which put
off, circumvent, or in other ways avoid painful self-actualizing interaction.
Each time a participant engages in some sort of flight and not only avoids
painful interacton but even receives some kind of positive response from his
fellow participants, the flight behavior in question is reinforced and the
group is on i.ts way toward a flight culture.
Participation versus involvement.

Some members participate quite a

bit in the group interaction but involve themselves minimally.

In reviewing

videotape of a group session recently, I began scoring the interactions,

491

using (X) to indicate a contractual interaction, (0) a non-contractual
interaction, and (N) a kind of neutral interaction designed to "keep things
moving" though not constituting a real contribution in itself.
"styles" began to emerge.
string of (N's).

Participation

For instance, one participant ended up with a long

He had participated quite a bit in the interaction but had

contributed little of himself.

He had really assumed the role of "facilita-

tor" without even realizing what he was doing (for he was quite surprised
later when his fellow participants told him that he was playing the role of
leader).

The participants who have long strings of (O's) and (N's) are

certainly participating, but they are not involving themselves. rt·would
be better if these members were to cut down on their participation and
increase their involvement.
Fight versus maintaining adequate defenses.

Sensitivity-training

experiences, if carried out responsibly, give the participants a relatively
safe opportunity to lower some of their defenses in the name of growth.
growth experience, however, should demand that the participant divest
self of hi.a defenses entirely.

No

him~

But maintaining adequate defenses (even in

the process of lowering them) and resistance-flight are two different
processes.

The more connnon danger is that the participant will not drop his

defenses enough to allow the experience to have its impact on him.

The

person with crumbling defenses either refuses to participate in such
experiences because he senses the danger or he reveals his tenuous defensesys tem behaviorally early in the life of the group.

Selection procedures

should screen out those with crumbling defenses so that the group culture
can bring to bear fairly strong pressures on those with more than adequate
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defenses.
Flight as entropic.

Group interaction tends to entropy unless it is

fed "information" from "outside" the system, that is, outside the systems
of defense and convention that enclose the participants.
entropic, a cause and, a sign of the decline of the system.

Cliches are
Long-winded,

intellectualized interpretation-insight systems are entropic.

"Story," on

the other hand, has high "message" or "information" value, for it keeps
the system "open," reverses the entropic process, and leads to an enclave
of anti-entropic "organization" (see Wiener, 1967, and Rosenblith, 1967).
Flight is always identifiable by its entropic effect.

No matter how en-

gaging or entertaining it might be at the moment, it has no sustaining effect
and the "system" that is constituted by the interrelationships between
members "runs down."

If nothing is done, it dies.

Again, no contract,

implicit or explicit, can ban the various forms of flight that take place
during sensitivity-training laboratories, but if the participants are willing
to examine the modes of flight in which they do engage, they can learn much
about themselves.
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Chapter XI
Epilog
The Problem of Agency
An assumption throughout this book has been that it is the relatively

active participant who will benefit most from the training experience.
group has no miraculous powers:

The

it cannot serve the personal and inter-

personal growth of the participant who actively resists the experience or
who remains a passive spectator of the group interaction.

However, as Bion

(1961) notes, it is impossible to do nothing in a group, not even by doing
nothing.

A refusal to accept the challenge of agency in a group is a

refusal to face one's potential.

The assumption here is that such refusals

are deleterious to personal and interpersonal growth.

Erikson (1964).speaks

generally about the agency-passivity dimension of psychic life:
Patiens, then, would denote a state of being exposed from within
or from without to superior forces which cannot be overcome
without prolonged patience or energetic redeeming help; while
agens connotes an inner state of being unbroken in initiative
and in acting in the service of a cause which sanctions this
initiative. You will see immediately that the state of agens
is what all clients, or patients, in groups or alone, are
groping for and need our help to achieve (p. 87).
Indeed, one of the common marks of emotional disturbance is the surrender of
agency, especially the refusal to be an agent in interpersonal situations.
Perhaps one of the most important goals of laboratory training in interpersonal relations is experimenting with one's power-of-agency in interpersonal living.

In order to do this, the individual participant must take

responsibility for what is happening in the group:

"The group (including the

trainers) is responsible for itself, each of us must exercise his personal
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and joint responsibility if any degree of 'self-actualization' is to be
achieved" (Bugental & Tannenbaum, 1965, p. 110).

The group will be as good

as I make it--this seems to be the cold, hard logic of sensitivity-training
groups.
Agency, like independence, cannot be conferred; it must be seized:
In the last analysis independence cannot be conferred; it can
only be seized .... [W]e can only say that it has become manifest
in an individual or group when it no longer occurs to that group
or individual to seek the solution of its problems by an agent
outside itself. To 'demand one's independence' ••• is of course a
contradiction in terms (Slater, 1966, p. 150).
"Initiative," therefore, is an important concept in training groups.
contract group this is made abundantly clear:

In the

the member, for all practical

purposes, contracts to be an initiator, to move out of himself and "contact"
the group and its individual participants.

It is unlikely that the group wilJ

transform a passive person into a high-initiator, but an increased sense of
agency is an important goal for every participant.

If a person participates

only by responding when he is contacted in some way, then his participation,
rated in terms of seconds spent talking, might well be high, but if his
participation is rated in terms of number of acts initiated (see Mann, 1959,
p. 244), then his participation will be low.

The contract cnlls for partici-

pation by initiation--at least this is an ideal to be pursued.
It is not suggested here that universal active participation is
characteristic of face-to-face groups.

The evidence indicates that

ordinaril~

"interaction is unevenly distributed among group members" (Collins & Guetzkow,
1964, p. 170).

There is a characteristic tendency for a few people to

dominate group interaction and this tendency increases with the size of the
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group.

In training groups, however, tendencies to domination and passivity

are to be resisted.
cohesiveness.

This is essential if the participants are to work toward

The group dynamics literature indicates that cohesiveness,

defined in terms of inter-member attraction or liking, increases with increase<
interaction (for a sunnnary see Lott & Lott, 1965).

Collins and Guetzkow

(1964) also cite evidence indicating that the "more interactions initiated
by a group member, the more interactions will be directed to him bo other

group members" (p. 170).

In other words, group cohesiveness depends on

intermember activity and intermember activity depends, at least in part, on
the willingness of the individual participant to assume a.certain degree of
agency in the interpersonal life of the group.

Mann (1959) indicates that

initiators in groups are usually more intelligent, better adjusted, and more
extroverted than non-initiators.

Since group members usually possess

different amounts of intelligence, adjustment, and "extroversion," this means
that the group as a whole will have to strive to keep the interaction
distributed in such a way as to benefit all members.

This is not to say

that all members must participate equally (nor is mere quantity rather than
quality of participation being urged), but it does mean that care should be
taken to give all members an opportunity to become initiators and that the
relatively passive should be encouraged to initiate inter.action.

It is

hypothesized here that a certain quantity of participation (and initiation)
is essential to overall quality of participation.

Every group sessions starts

with an emptiness which can be filled only by the initiative of the participants.

Filling this emptiness must be a cooperative effort.

Bunker (1965), in studying the effects of laboratory training in the
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participants' day-to-day lives subsequent to the training sessions found no
differences between participants and controls in effective initiation of
action, assertiveness, and self-confidence--all factors in the "agency"
dimension of living.

However, what we do not know is how much initiative,

assertiveness, and self-confidence are displayed by the experimental group
in the laboratory itself.

Nor do we know whether increasing initiative,

assertiveness, and self-confidence were explicit goals of the laboratory
experience or not.

A laboratory will not magically increase these qualities

unless it is desinged to do so and unless the participants experiment with
and exercise their power-of-agency within the group.
the exercise-of-agency is an explicit goal.

In the contract group

I would like to see Bunker's

experiment replicated with an experimental group which hae been explicitly
encouraged to responsible agency by the laboratory experience itself.
Research:

Issues and Applications

A number of reviews have covered the research literature on laboratory
learning from a variety of points of view (Buchanan, 1965; Campbell &
Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967; Stock, 1964).

While most of the research has

had a direct or indirect managerial or organizational orientation, still it
raises issues and suggests application to laboratory experiences the goals
of which are self-actualization and interpersonal growth.

Unfortunately,

despite the phenomental growth and spread of these latter experiences, there
is little research which deals directly with them.

In fact, the research

that seems most relevant to such groups is that pertainly to psychotherapy
and to a number of areas of social psychology.

However, no one has yet

synthesized the pertinent aspects of this literature and used it as a
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starting point for research into interpersonal-growth oriented sensitivitytraining groups.

Yet it is only fitting to comment on some of the research

findings in the general area of laboratory training and discuss their
relevance to the kind of experience outlined in the past ten chapters.

Since

these comments will not be exhaustive, the reader interested in a more
comprehensive

review of research problems and findings is referred to the

reviews listed above.
The lack of !!_unitary phenomenon.

The consensus of those who have

reviewed the literature is that the evidence concerning the value of
laboratory-training experiences is contradictory, confusing, and inconclusive.

Since most of the research deals with the use of laboratory

train~ng

for the purpose of increasing managerial skills and organizational
effectiveness, the above statement may be put as follows:

"Examination of

the research literature leads to the conclusion that while T-group training
seems to produce observable changes in behavior, the utility of these changes
for the performance of individuals in their organizational roles remains
to be demonstrated" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 73).

As such, this

conclusion does not deal with the use of laboratory techniques as means of
increasing self-actualization processees and interpersonal growth.

One of

the principal causes of the confusing and contradictory evidence obtained
so far is undoubtedly the fact that "sensitivity-training," the "T-group,"
and "laboratory-training" are very often broad terms which do not indicate
any kind of unitary phenomenon.

Laboratories use a variety of techniques,

e.g., lectures or lecturettes, exercises, both verbal and nonverbal, and
face-to-face conversation of various kinds; trainers use a variety of
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styles, some being quite passive while others are quite active; laboratories
take place in a variety of settings with different kinds of populations, e.g.
volunteers who attend a residential laboratory, students in courses, nonvolunteers who represent a cross-section of a particular organization,
volunteers in weekly local groups conducted by non-professionals,etc.
Perhaps it is the phenomenon itself which is confusing and not the evidence.
As

Campbell and Dunnette (1968) put it:
Research concerning the relative contributions of specific
technological features of the T group is also sparse. For
example, there are no systematic studies examining the influence
of differences in trainer personality and/or style on the outcome
achieved by participants. Case reports and anecdotal evidence
are all that exist (p. 97).

It is practically impossible at times to replicate studies, for the
descriptions of what took place in the training situations are either nonexistent or too sparse to be meaningful.

The variables of the laboratory

situation must be described carefully if replication is to become possible.
In that the contract-group approach delineates goals, leadership style,
and the kinds of interaction expected of the members, it offers a kind of
unitary phenomenon for study.

If, in addition, a log is kept indicating

the sequence of such events as exercises, greater control is possible in
replication studies.

This does not mean that research with laboratories

characterized by goallessness and "planned ambiguity" is impossible (though
it is probably more difficult).

However, the essential communalities of

such experiences should be carefully described so that research efforts

I
l

center around the same phenomena.

A contract approach to self-actualization

through the small group experience may standardize the experience in a way
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then so is impossible, then so is research and all that an interested party
can do is listen to the "witness," both positive and negative, given by
those who engage in laboratory training.
Methodological problems and the question of outcome.

It is a truism

to say that enormous methodological problems face the researcher interested
in macro-aspects of human behavior.

Furthermore, once one has read to

extent research literature dealing with laboratory training, it is easy to
criticize the efforts which have been made to measure this phenomenon.

For

instance, one glaring defect in these studies (among many in the design
of research) has been the failure to use control groups (Gassner, Gold,

& Snadowsky, 1964).

One of the serious problems facing the researcher is

how to measure outcome.

In this respect, a kind of dilemma exists:

on the

one hand, traditional psychological tests are not sensitive to the changes
which take place in training groups, and yet, on the other, ad hoc scales
and tests are unvalidated.

For instance, Dunnette (1962) reports a study

in which the California Psychological Inventory was used to assess change
in 70 business students who has engaged in 48 hours of laboratory training·.
Although the results were termed negative, perhaps it would have been
more exact to say that they were irrelevant, for there is no reason why
the GPI should measure the outcome of laboratory training.

Haiman (1963)

found significant shifts in attitude as measured by a composite open-mineJnes
scale, and indeed, as Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest, the whole area
of attitude change as one of the principal outcomes of laboratory experiences
is one which has been little studied even though it is an area of grL.,.
promise.

Some of the tests which have l:een used to me:.rnure outcome l;av(· [,een

500

used to measure outcome have been of limted use because of ceiling effects:
laboratory participants score high on the pretest and thus have little
"room to move."

Better tests in the area of the self-actualization of the

relatively normal person are needed.

After a laboratory experience, a

participant might feel better and be more satisfied with the quality of his
interpersonal interaction, but many are wary of such subjective measures.
In sunnnary it seems relatively well established that the way in
which an individual sees himself may indeed change during the
courses of a T group. However, there is no firm evidence
indicating that such changes are produced by theT-group training
as compared with other types of training, merely by the passage
of time, or even by the simple expedient of retaking a selfdescriptive inventory after a period of thinking about one's
previous responses to the same inventory (Campbell & Dunnette,
1968, p. 91).
Furthermore, while it is possible to ask the associates of a person who has
participated in a laboratory whether he has changed for the better or not
(Bunker, 1965), such measurement is awkward and of unknown accuracy.

More-

over even the positive changes might be unrelated to both the kinds of
interactions and the goals which characterize the laboratory experience.
It might even be that the participant merely used the laboratory experience
as an occasion to engage in some kind of "conversion" experience which is
relatively unrelated to the goals, operations, interactions, and exercises
of the laboratory.

But if this is the case, are we to say that the labora-

tory has been successful or not?

i
j
I

Most outcome studies deal with group scores.

The problem wiL:i sroup

scores, however, is that individual differences are lost and ceiling
effectives are frequently operative.

During the same laboratory experience,

some participants improve their interpersonGl skills while others seem to
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regress.
S far research focused on the 'average' effects of T-group or
laboratory training has been considered. That is, the crucial
question has been wehter or not training makes a difference for
the group as a whole. S~ch a generalized interpretation might
cover up important interactions between individual differences
and training methods. Given a particular kind of outcome,
certain kinds of people might benefit from T-group training while
others may actually be harmed. The same reasoning may be
applied to the interaction of differences in situational and
organizational variables with the training experince. However,
very few studies have investigated interactive effects (Campbell
& Dunnette, 1968, p. 96).
What is it that causes some to succeed and some to fail?
successful person do that the unsuccessful

What does the

person does not?

Finally, the question of "baseline" measurements seem to be important
in outcome studies.

In a study by Zand, Steele, and Zalkind (1967) it was

found that individuals rated as most "involved" in the laboratory experience
also tended to be rated as the most involved in follow-up activities.

At

first glance, this evidence would seem to bear on the question of "agency"
discussed above.

But since no baseline with respect to involvement has been

determined, i.t is not clear whether it was or increased agency or merely of
consistency of behavi.or.

There was no baseline against which to

measu.tt.~

improvement in "involvement" or "agency."

Perhaps it is time to review the criteria we use to judge the success
or failure of sensitivity-training experience.

If measuremert is to have

any meaning at all, it is necessary clearly to delineate the specific
goals of any given laboratory experience, to determine what means are
associated with achieving these goals, and to devise measures to ._:c· ·
whether these goals have been reached or not.

P\!rh.1ps the criteria \viilch

we have used to measure success or failure have been too gross or have not
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reflected the real goals of the experience.

For instance, managerial-

training laboratories aside, can success be indiat:ed by the very fact that
the participant believes that he as benefited by the training experience and
somehow feels enriched for having involved himself rather intimately with
this set of people at this time?

Does the criterion of success always have

to be (or at lest exclusively be) what constructive changes take place in the
home situation subsequent to the laboratory experience?

Perhaps at this

stage of laboratory-training development we should be more modest in looking
for results.

But we can be neither modest nor exact unless we get a clearer

picture of what takes place within the laboratory and of the component
parts of the goals set for training experiences.
Research and the goals of laboratory learning.

To say that "inter-

personal sensitivity" is the goal of laboratory learning is to say almost
nothing.

Campbell and Dunnettee (1968) discuss the vagueness of such a

goal:
The major purpose here is simply to emphasize that irrerpersonal
sensitivity is not only an elusive, but also a high complex
phenomenon. Persons involved in a T-group training program
may indeed become more "sensitive," but the nature and underlying
strategies of the sensitivities developed may differ widely from
person to person and from program to program. Unless the various
components and strategies involved in interpersonal sensitivity
are taken into account during the design of measuring instruments
and during the design and implementation of research investigatiow,,
little new knowledge concerning T-group training effects or the
likelihood of transferring skills back to the work setting will
accrue. So far •.. most investigations have not atte:''pted to cope
with the serious measu:rement and design problems in this area
(p. 80).

Later in the same article the authors run up against the very compleixity the\
speak of.

They suppose that one of the goals of laboratory learning should
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ability of an individual to predict the values and attitudes of others.
Then they conclude on this negative note:

"In sum, the studies incorporating

a measure of how well an individual can predict the attitudes and values of
others before and after T-group training have yielded largely negative
results'.' (p. 91).

Yet it is doubtful that such predictive ability is the

goal of interpersonal-growth oriented laboratory training.

Accurate

empathy refers to the ability to get some kind of feeling for what is going
on inside another here and now and is not necessarily related to conceptual
accuracy or predictive ability.

Sensitiv~ty

training should produce more

openness to the attributes, attitudes, opinions, feelings, and reactions of
others.

Accuracy, ·however, is something that depends upon both the one who

emits the communication and the one who receives it.

A person perceives

another more accurately both if he gets rid of his own barriers to perceiving
and if the other emits communications more directly and accurately.

Accuracy

depends both on the abili.ty to perceive and the clarity of cues emitted.
The central point is this:

it is difficult to measure attainment of goals

unless there is agreement on the part of the participant, trainer, and
researcher that the particular laboratory experience is designed to achieve

a certain goal and that the participants see it as a goal worth achieving.
Perhaps it would be better to set more modest goals for laboratory
experiences.

Perhaps the laboratory is a success for any participant who

experiments with his behavior sufficiently to get some ldnd of feel for
his interpersonal potentialities and deficiencies.

The laboratory, then,

would be an instrument of exploration rather than a vehicle of inunediate
change.

It would be much easier to determine whether a participant experi-

'
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ments with.certain kinds of behavior than to determine whether his life style
has changed.

It might well be that it is participant who explores his

possibilities who ultimately changes.
"

-

If this is the case, then it is not

surprising that Harrison (1966) and Schultz and Allen (1966) have found
that some of the principal effects of laboratory training in terms of behavioral change did not take place until months after the training experience.
Perhaps there is a period of fermentation or incubation characterized by
subtle behavioral changes (e.g. changes in interpersonal attitudes).
The psychotherapy research paradigm.

Research in laboratory learning

could well take some cues from some of the more effective research taking
place in psychotherapy.

First of all, the goals of any particular kind of

laboratory training should be quite clear and operationalized in terms of
specific behaviors.

In the contract group, engaging in self-disclosure,

expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a
response to confrontation are the specific interactional behaviors that
define the group goal of interpersonal growth.

The immediate goal of the

contract group is experimentation with these behaviors on the part of the
participants.

The laboratory is a "success" in one sense if the partici-

pants actually do (increasingly) engage in such behaviors, for it is hypothesized that through these behaviors they come in more effective contact
with themselves and with

other.

The laboratory becomes "diagnostic" in a

good sense of that term:

the participants come face to face with their

interpersonal deficits and potentialities.

It is hypothesized that if the

participants do experiment constructively with such behavior in the context
of the group, then possiblities for growthful behavior change arise in re .
.:--------------------------------~--------"'""'-
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life situations.
The laboratory must provide a climate in which the kind of experimentation described above becomes possible.

Certain participant, trainer,

relationship, and situation variables facilitate such a climate.

It is the

function of research to determine precisely what these variables are.
(a)

Participant behaviors.

Friedman (1963) found that a patient who

enters a therapeutic relationship expecting to be helped in that relationship
usually does find help in the form of symptom reduction, that is, patientexpectancy is related to symptom reduction.

Similarly, it seems that the

person who enters a laboratory experience expecting to benefit from it will
tend to profit from the experience.

The person who enters a laboratory close

minded and cynical is likely to leave the experience the same way (and then
perhaps blame the experience itself for being ineffective).

Truax and

Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that concreteness or specificity of expression
is a highly desirable patient variable, that is, they find some evidence
that it is related to successful outcome.

Concreteness also seems to be a

participant variable which adds to the effectiveness of training sessions.
The question is:

what participant variables

are related to positive and

negative outcomes?
(b)

Trainer variables.

Rogers and his associates (1967) discuss the

differences between "high-functioning" and "low-functioning" therapists,
outlining the qualities that make for high-functioning, e.g. acceptance and
warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy, etc.

Others (e.g., Berenson &

Mitchell, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, &
Moravec, 1968; Doude, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967) have added
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confrontation to the repertory of high-functioning therapists.

Patients in

therapy with high-functioning therapists tend to make progress, while those
in therapy with low-functioning therapists tend to stay the same or deteriorate.

Now, given the wide variety of trainer styles in laboratory experiences

there are probably certain kinds of behavior that help create a climate of
growth for participants and other kinds of behavior which inhibit such growth.
It is the function of research to determine precisely what trainers should
and should not do in order to facilitate growth in the laboratory.

In the

contract group the function of the trainer is spelled out with a good deal
of clarity:

he is to manifest the growth-facilitating behaviors suggested

by Rogers (1967), he clarifies the contract, he suggests problems that
might arise because of his role as leader or leader-member, and he models
the kind of interactional behavior called for by the contract.

It is

hypothesized that if he does these things well, he will help provide a
climate in which interpersonal growth (defined by the participants' fulfillin
the contract by experimenting with the kinds of behavior it calls for) is
facilitated.
Situation and relationship variables, too, should be studied in laboratory settings, especially with respect to the impact they have on outcome.
Outcomes:

success, indifference, disappointment, and dpmage.

Though

Bunker (1965), Boyd and Elliss (1962), and Valiquet (1964) in more or less
objective studies have showed that laboratory experiences caused increased
sensitivity, more open communication, and increased flexiblity in role
behavior, still most of the evidence that exists concerning the outcome
of laboratory training exists in the form of personal testimonials.

't- 11;
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volunteers believe that they have been helped in some way (although at times
they have difficulty in specifying in just what ways), though it is also
true that while the participant

~ight

believe that he has changed greatly,

his associates do not perceive the changes.

This may mean that the labora-

tory participant is inept in externalizing the change, that his associates
are inept in recognizing change, or that change simply has not taken place.
On the other hand, a certain percentage of participants leave the laboratory
experience feeling indifferent, disappointed, or even disturbed.

Klaw (1965)

for instance, found one in ten liking themselves less after a training period
and not knowing what to do about it.

It is not uncommon that people change

after laboratory experiences, but the changes are not always in the expected
or "right" direction.

A study by the Foundation for Research on Human

Behavior (1960) showed that participants believed that they had changed in
seven or eight.areas, but it also showed that they thought that half of
these changes were negative.

Boyd and Elliss (1962) studied three groups:

one laboratory-trained, the second conventionally trained, and the third
not trained at all.

Of 22 reported changes judged to be unfavorable (e.g.,

increase in irritability or loss of tolerance) 20 were attributed to members
of laboratory-trained groups.

Underwood (1965) showed that laboratory

training produced more observable changes in participants than in controls
with respect to job behavior, but it also produced a higher percentage
unfavorable changes.

I

I

of

Even if the participant changes "for the good" during

the laboratory experience, this does not mean that his life will proceed
more smoothly than before, for his friends and the organizations to which
he belongs might not be ready for these changes.

For example, Schein and
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and Bennis (1965) report three incidents of participants who suffered more
tension after they returned to the job.

It may well be that these

participants changed "for the better" but the laboratory did not help them
handle the problem of re-entry into a society that had not changed.

In

fact, some of the unfavorable changes reported above might merely reflect
resistance to growth on the part of the back-home associates who rated the
trainees' behavior

subseq~ent

to the training experience.

In sum, the whole

problem of the transfer of training effects to real-life situations is an
unsolved one.
As to the question of whether laboratory experiences are actually
psychologically harmful or not, House (1967) in a review of the literature
states:

"Instances of reported collapse as a result of participation in T-

Group training are rare and completely undocumented ••• " (p. 29).

(1968) corroborates this:

Seashore

"The incident of serious stress and mental

disturbance during training is difficult to measure, but it is estimated
to be less than on per ·cent ofparticipants and in almost all cases occurs
in persons with a history of prior disturbances" (p. 2).

Such assurances

are important because it seems that in the whole mythology of sensitivity

training almos.t everyone knows a "person who" has suffered tragic emotional
upset because of some laboratory experience.

This does not mean that

laboratory experiences do not have risks, but then again it is somewhat
dangerous to fly, to drive, get married, and to set one's goals high, that
is, there is a certain danger associated with living, especially with living
a full human life, but men usually do not become preoccupied with these
dangers.

Safeguards should certainly be built into laboratory experiences,

----------------------------------------·····"
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but people should not become obsessed by potential dangers.
The power of the laboratory experience.

The evidence we have indicates

that the laboratory is a powerful force for behavioral change, but it also
indicates that we have an imperfect understanding of the sources if its
power and of ways to channel it into constructive change.

An enlightened

and integrated process-outcome research program is essential if laboratory
programs are to become growthful vehicles of personal and cultural change.
The Ending of the Group
While most sensitivity-training laboratories are relatively short (a
two-week residental laboratory, a semester course, a week-end marathon, etc.)
this is not always the case.

Some people are beginning to integrate a group

experience into the pattern of their lives.

Even in the short-lived

laboratory, many of the participants get to know one another quite irtlmately
and, in a sense, do not want to see the group experience come to an end.
There is often a certain nostalgia associated with the last meeting, but
usually there is no choice:

because of real-life needs, the group must end.

Perhaps Mills (1964) describes the feeling tone of the last meeting most
poignantly:
(p. 79).

"Yearning for a benediction from some source, the group ci ies"

Those who belong to groups that do not die probably do so for a

number of reasons, e.g., security, companionship, stimulation, intimacy,
interpersonal growth, etc.

Little can be said about these variables,

however, since little or no published research refers to such ongoing g:uups.
Some, I imagine, would feel uneasy about such groups, seeing them as foste;:
dependency needs, substituting

for real interpersonal living, or as a means

of fleeing the larger social issues of life and the action which these issues

510
demand.

Certainly encounter groups could be misused in these and other ways,

but there is nothing in the structure of these groups which would necessitate
such misuses.

If I were to risk a prediction, I would say that the ongoing-

group phenomenon will increase and that at its best it will both contribute
significantly to interpersonal growth and stimulate its members to become
more effective agents 0£ constructive social change within the communities
and organizations to which they belong.
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